Perfidy and Reality.

The only thing surprising about this [1st article) failure of Putin
and Russia to keep their promises is that France has noticed!

The FT leading article is a balanced view of the situation, I feel

xxxxxxxxxxxx cs
===========================
TELEGRAPH 23.8.08
Georgia: West condemns Russia's failure to withdraw
Britain, France and the United States have accused Russia of failing
to fulfil its promise in withdrawing from the main body of Georgian
territory by last night.

Russia's defence minister insisted the pullback had been completed on
time, but despite the long columns of tanks rolling back into the
separatist enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, some Russian
troops remained.
They were seen by journalists yesterday digging trenches around the
port of Poti on the Black Sea and erecting checkpoints in a "security
zone" in Georgia.

Russia's deputy chief of staff, General Anatoly Nogovitsyn, said his
forces were allowed to maintain a presence in a buffer zone outside
the enclaves and retain influence over large swathes of Georgian
territory.

The Foreign Secretary David Miliband said he was "deeply concerned
that Russian forces have not withdrawn to the position as agreed."

A White House spokesman said: "They have not completely withdrawn
from areas considered undisputed territory and they need to do that."

A senior Russian general also insisted Russia could retain control
over a buffer zone of Georgian territory and keep a force of 2,000
soldiers stationed in the enclaves.

He showed reporters a map marked with "zones of responsibility" that
included long stretches of Georgia's main east-west road linking the
capital Tbilisi to the Black Sea.

Georgia says this presence amounts to a continued Russian occupation,
but Moscow insists the deployment is permitted under old peacekeeping
agreements that date back to the civil war of 1991.

FINANCIAL TIMES 23.8.08
A harsh world for Russia’s neighbours

The Georgian crisis has shown President Dmitry Medvedev’s Russia for
what it is – an aggressive authoritarian power. The slim hope that he
might soften the tough line set by his ex-KGB predecessor, Vladimir
Putin, is gone. Prime minister Putin is the master and President
Medvedev does his bidding.

The main foreign policy aim is to restore Russia’s lost superpower
status: by recovering its dominance in the ex-Soviet Union,
exploiting its role as an energy supplier and boosting its say in
world affairs.

The Georgian adventure has been a great success. Moscow has punished
pro-west Tbilisi for trying to join Nato and humiliatingly exposed
the limits of the west’s support for allies in the post-Soviet
region. It has developed a tool – support for embattled ethnic
minorities – which can be used elsewhere. The next target could be
pro-west Ukraine’s Crimea, with its ethnic Russian majority and a
Russian outpost in the leased naval port of Sevastopol. Even Belarus,
the most pro-Moscow ex-Soviet state, is worried. So are Nato’s east
European members like Poland, which has quickly signed a US missile
defence deal.

The post-1989 opening of the ex-Communist world to western values and
interests has suffered a big defeat. But all is not lost. First, the
gains made in reducing Russian dominance are huge, with a swathe of
new European Union and Nato members. Next, while oil-rich Russia is
wealthy, it has deep-seated problems, not least a declining
population. Finally, despite Georgia, the world is not yet in a new
cold war. There is scope for co-operating with Russia, as well as
containing its aggressive intentions.

The long list of issues for collaboration ranges from energy to
nuclear non-proliferation. But the desire to work with Moscow must be
matched by a clear response to Russian aggression. Nato’s mutual
defence pledges should be backed by actions, such as building new
forward bases in frontline countries, notably the Baltic states, and
doing more to promote energy security.

But the alliance must take greater care over any further eastward
expansion. Until now, the west has forced Russia to accept
enlargement, betting (correctly) that Moscow was too weak to respond.
Russia has shown that is no longer the case. The west should accept
future new members, including Georgia and Ukraine, only if they are
really ready to join and if Nato can really defend them. It cannot
absorb states with violent internal conflicts (Georgia) or with deep
splits over Nato (Ukraine).

This must not give Russia a veto over neighbours’ sovereign rights.
Nor must it divide the region into spheres of influence. But
countries that want to ally with the west will have to work harder to
resist Russian pressure. And they can expect less western support
than before. That is the painful reality, post Georgia.