Pipeline politics caused the war in Georgia.

TELEGRAPH 20.8.08 - Leader
1. Nato must not shrink from its biggest challenge

The response of Nato's foreign ministers to Russia's illegal
incursion into Georgia may have been rhetorically colourful but in
practical terms it amounted to little.

While David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, said that Russia had
"violated international law as well as the rules of the international
game", the alliance stopped short of taking any serious punitive
action against Moscow.
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Despite the urging of the United States, Nato decided not even to
suspend its biannual ministerial meetings with Russia on the grounds
that it would be counterproductive to sever channels of communication
with Moscow. Such a tepid response to Russia's bullying hardly augurs
well for the ambitions of both Georgia and Ukraine to join the
alliance.
=================AND --->
2. Pipeline politics caused the war in Georgia
By Rafael Kandiyoti

There are increasing reports from Georgia that Russian troops are
systematically destroying oil transportation links. If confirmed, the
tales of destruction may provide the best evidence that they do
indeed intend to withdraw. From the beginning, oil and gas
transmission has been at the centre of this conflict.

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the interests of the
newly emerging states of the Caucasus and countries such as Ukraine
and Belarus have repeatedly and fiercely clashed with those of
Russia. In particular, they have competed with each other over energy
resources and the transmission corridors of the former Soviet Union.

Russian interruptions of gas supplies to Ukraine, Belarus and the
rest of Eastern Europe are legion - and so are the restrictions they
have imposed on the transmission of Kazakh oil to the international
market across their territory. If Russia controls the flow of energy,
it also has dangerous sway over the economies of Western Europe.

The EU had been trying to wean itself off energy dependence on Moscow
by developing a network of energy routes through Georgia. It's no
wonder that the Russians turned their attention in that direction.

No one quite believed in the mid-1990s that Western oil companies
could pump Caspian crude across two war-torn republics, Azerbaijan
and Georgia, to a quiet bay on the Mediterranean, and that they would
do it without so much as a by-your-leave to the two regional
superpowers, Iran and Russia.

But before a bomb (probably not Russian) put out part of the Baku-
Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline some two weeks ago, it was carrying 40-45
million tons per year to the international market. Another line is
feeding Caspian gas across Georgia to Turkish consumers. And Russia
can do nothing.

Only last month it looked like Russian resistance to improving
pipeline capacity across its territory would force Kazakhstan to
increase its trans-Caspian tanker-born oil transport. Meanwhile, the
transport of Azeri (and possibly Kazakh) oil through Georgia and
Turkey ran counter to all Russian aims.

This is because Russia can exercise no political control and get no
share of the profits. Add to these frustrations, the eastward
parallel advance of NATO and the EU during the past decade - Russia
is feeling beleaguered.

Since 2004, when oil prices began an inexorable rise, the Kremlin has
repeatedly stated that it no longer expects the West to consider
seriously Russia's very real concerns in the area. It seemed that the
new cold war was very much "on".

Russia has consistently sought policy changes by Georgia and possible
"regime change" to realign Georgian policy with their aims. Against
such a backdrop, it is difficult to be diplomatic about Saakashvili's
adventure in South Ossetia, at once politically inept and militarily
disastrous.

And now that they are in, it is difficult to see the Russians
allowing Georgia much latitude to continue exercising her independence.
To the south of the Caspian, more carefully calibrated American
policies could have made a profound difference on the regional
chessboard via engagement with Iran. Natural gas from Turkmenistan
and Iran could have flowed to Europe through Turkey.

Azeri, Kazakh (and Turkmen) oil could have flowed to the Gulf,
providing the global market with a large consignment of crude.
It is clear that the West cannot independently deal with their
friends and allies in the Caucasus and trans-Caspian without
establishing a reasonable line of communication with either Russia or
Iran. And the latter is the other potential oil and gas route out of
the western heart of Asia.

But with Washington having failed to find any sort of accommodation
with Iran, the region has been deprived of alternative outlets.
Russia has been allowed a second wind.

It will use this to reassert wider influence in Central Asia and the
Caucasus, along the axes of their aging oil and gas pipelines, and
through somewhat outdated perspectives of political dominance. There
are, therefore, worrying days ahead.
--------------------------------------
Rafael Kandiyoti is the author of 'Pipelines: Oil Flows and Crude
Politics' (IB Tauris).
=================
THE TIMES 20.8.08 - Leader
Georgia: the Reckoning
As Nato confronts defiance in the Caucasus and casualties in
Afghanistan, it must find the confidence to match its words with
actions [That’s the end of positive thinking in The Times! cs]

“Force cannot be the basis for the demarcation of new lines around
Russia.” The German Foreign Minister offered this precise summary of
the challenge facing Nato in Georgia as he arrived for yesterday's
emergency summit in Brussels. Almost simultaneously, seven [!]
Russian armoured vehicles drove west out of Gori.

A withdrawal of sorts had begun. It offered some consolation on a
bleak day for Nato commanders, informed yesterday morning of the
deaths of ten French troops in a clash with Taleban forces in
Afghanistan. President Sarkozy promptly vowed to fly there, and
affirmed that “the cause is just”
.
The same can be said of Nato's task of containing Russia in the
Caucasus. For all the alliance's hesitancy in recent days, this task
is also achievable: the crisis there may have left relations between
Russia and the West chillier than at any point since the Cold War,
but, as yesterday's troop movements showed, Western diplomacy and
Russian manoeuvring have seldom been so tightly linked.

The lesson for Nato is clear: Moscow, for all its bluster, is paying
close attention to steadily mounting condemnation of its Georgian
adventure. Nato force is still a last resort. Its use is all but
inconceivable in Georgia. But Nato unanimity counts for a great
deal. [!]

Yesterday's pullback from Gori was better than intransigence, but it
was limited. As the small contingent of armoured vehicles headed for
South Ossetia, more Russian troops looked on from the roadside, going
nowhere. Their commander said that a full withdrawal would have to
wait until his forces had set up what he called “peacekeeping posts”.
Despite a prisoner exchange aimed at calming tensions near Tbilisi,
Russian units remained within easy striking distance of the capital.
Farther west, there was no sign of a withdrawal from the strategic
port of Poti, nor from Abkhazia, where 1,000 Russian troops have
arrived in the past two weeks.

Such is the reality on the ground. It mocks the ceasefire agreed with
President Sarkozy two days into the crisis. It may yet make
Condoleezza Rice, the US Secretary of State who brokered a second
deal last Friday, look equally naive. But it has hardened Nato unity.

As David Miliband, the Foreign Secretary, wrote yesterday in The
Times, “Russian mind games on withdrawal do them no credit”. The US,
long since the most enthusiastic champion of Georgian membership of
Nato, now proposes the establishment of a permanent Nato-Georgia
Commission. Germany had resisted further Nato expansion for fear of
antagonising Moscow, but now explicitly supports Georgian membership.

Much of the rhetoric emanating from Moscow is for domestic
consumption. Some of it, including the weekend's absurd threat of a
nuclear strike on Poland if it proceeds with a missile defence pact
with the US, may be symptomatic of power struggles between President
Medvedev's Kremlin clique and an increasingly vocal military over
which he exercises only nominal control.

This is not the time for similar bellicosity from the West. There is
little to gain and much to lose by issuing further ultimatums as long
as Russia continues to withdraw. [!] But Nato warships should
remain in the Black Sea [Aparft from Turkey’s are there any there? -
cs] until the pull-back is complete. The Organisation for Security
and Co-operation in Europe must insist on replacing Russian
peacekeepers in the region with its own. And the EU as well as Nato
must agree and publish detailed mechanisms for isolating Russia
should it persist in dragging its feet. [They should have done so
already-cs]

Mr Miliband has advocated “hard-headed engagement”. [!] But actions
must have consequences. For now, Nato needs to be more hard-headed
with Russia and less engaged.
=================
THE GUARDIAN 20.8.08
1. Attacking Iran via South Ossetia
Could the conflict between Russia and Georgia be the excuse the Bush
administration has been looking for to bomb Iran?
Stephen Kinzer
[A few choice quotes - - - cs]

This year, I've developed a comparable pathology. I am terrified that
the Bush administration is going to attack Iran sometime before it
leaves office on January 20. Whenever there is a new tremor in
Washington or the wider world, I ask myself: Does this make an
American strike against Iran more or less likely?
- - - - - - -
Russia's day is once again dawning. That is not necessarily bad. A
multi-polar world shaped by balances and equilibrium is, in the end,
safer and more secure for everyone
- - - - - - - - -
I'm reading their minds, and this is what I fear they are thinking:
"We're on our way out of office. The way things look now, the last
confrontation between us and the bad guys will have been one that
they won. We can't let our term end that way. This can't be the last
word. We have to go out in a blaze of glory. Where should we set off
that blaze? Iran, of course. No country has taunted us more
relentlessly. By bombing Iran, we will send the world a defiant
farewell message: Forget Russia - We Still Rule!"

He said “pathology” not me! -cs
=================AND --->
2. In Europe, as in Asia, Nato leaves a trail of catastrophe
This outdated military alliance is playing with fire in Russia. In
Pakistan and Afghanistan it is playing with dynamite
All comments (51)
Simon Jenkins

Nato is useless. It has failed to bring stability to Afghanistan, as
it failed to bring it to Serbia. It just breaks crockery. Nato has
proved a rotten fighting force, which in Kabul is on the brink of
being sidelined by exasperated Americans. Nor is it any better at
diplomacy: witness its hamfisted handling of east Europe. As the
custodian of the west's postwar resistance to the Soviet Union's
nuclear threat it served a purpose. Now it has become a diplomats'
Olympics, irrelevant but with bursts of extravagant self-importance.

Yesterday's Nato ministerial meeting in Brussels was a fig leaf over
the latest fiasco, the failure to counter the predictable Russian
intervention in Georgia. Ostensibly to save Russian nationals in
South Ossetia, the intervention was, in truth, to tell Georgia and
Ukraine that they must not play games with the west along Russia's
frontier. Nato, which Russia would (and should) have joined after the
collapse of the Soviet Union, is now a running provocation along the
eastern rim of Europe.

There was no strategic need for Nato to proselytise for members, [It
didn’t proselytise. They all begged to come in to give themselves
some protection from Russia. How right they have been proved. They
valued NATO more highly than the EU -cs] and consequent security
guarantees, among the Baltic republics and border states to the
south. Nor is there any strategic need for the US to place missile
sites in Poland or the Czech Republic. This was mere Nato self-
aggrandisement reinforcing the lobbying of the Pentagon hawks. [Oh
no, it wasn’t It was to protect Europe from Iranian missiles and
Russia was offered a share in it -cs]

These moves were bound to infuriate the hypersensitive Russians, and
did. There is no point in western pundits saying that the thrust of
Nato close to the Russian border is quite different from the cold war
location of Soviet missiles in Cuba. It seems the same to Russian
nationalists.

Nor is it any good pundits remarking that Russia's defence of Russian
minorities in Georgia [that’s a n ew excuse for an invasion set up
months before! -cs] is quite different from Nato's intervention to
defend the Kurdish minority in Iraq [Eh? First I’ve heard of that
reason -cs] or the Albanian minority in Serbia. Again, that is just
how it seems to Russia.

George Bush said earlier this month that "the age of spheres of
influence is over". In that case why push [‘pull’ not ‘push’ -cs]
that most potent sphere of influence, Nato, to the Russian border?
And what of the sphere-of-influence theory that underpinned Bush's
neoconservative plan to conquer the Muslim world for democracy?
[There’s a bunch of unsupported prejudices neatly wrapped up in one
phrase -cs]

The US's two greatest bugbears at present, Russia and Iran, both have
grounds for feeling encircled by hostile forces. However badly they
behave, they too are vulnerable to the politics of irrational fear.
Both countries display the rudiments of democratic activity, with
paranoia playing on pluralism.

The glib response of Nato's leaders has been hawkish, that the only
thing "these people" understand is tough talk and big sticks. But
that just apes Russia's attitude towards Georgia and Ukraine, which
at least Russia has the power to enforce.

The west is not threatened by Russia. [Oh yes, it is. Russia is
getting a stranglehold on massive oil supplies to blackmail us all.
It threatens all its neighbours which, sooner or later, will turn
into a real shooting war -cs] Turning its border into a zone of bluff
and counter-bluff, so Nato can boast 10 extra flags outside its
headquarters, has proved destabilising and provocative. Intelligence,
like morality, is supposedly the tribute power should pay to reason.
Russia is boorish and belligerent enough already. Why encourage it?
[No just lie down and let Russia do what it wants, eh? -cs]

[Here follows a long dissertation on Afghanistan/Pakistan. Since he
mainly describes facts he is not so much seething with inaccurately
based opinions. I omit it here only for brevity -cs]