A shameful day for Britain. Secret deal kept British Army out of battle for Basra.

This is shameful. British honour was besmirched and we stood aside
while the Iraqis and the Americans sorted out a nest of vipers. From
the Times report it would seem that the Secretary of State for
Defence himself was involved. Maybe that day he was too busy being
Secretary of State for Scotland.

Liam Fox goes up in my estimation by the day .

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POLITICAL HOME Blog 5.8.08
DR. LIAM FOX, MP. (WoodsPring)
HOUSE OF COMMONS
LONDON SWlA OAA


Rt Hon Des Browne MP
Secretary of State for Defence
Ministry of Defence
Floor 5,Zone B, Main Building
Whitehall, London
SWlA 2HB

5 August 2008

Dear Des,
I am writing to seek information regarding the claim in today's Times
(5 August 2008, "Secret deal kept British Army out of battle for
Basra", p. 1) that British Forces operating in Basra made an
agreement with an lranian backed Shia militia which delayed and
limited the involvement of British Forces participating in Operation
Charge of the Knights. lf there was no agreement made could you
please explain why it took several days before British Forces were
allowed to enter the city?

We learned last spring that British Forces were only given less than
48 hours
notice to prepare and coordinate for the lraqi offensive. You told
the House in
your Oral Statement on lraq that British Forces "deployed elements of
one of
our three battlegroups, using tanks, armoured vehicles and artillery
to provide
in extremis support to lraqi units in combat on the ground" (1 April
2008,
Official Documenf, Column 630w). Yet, 48 hours seems to be hardly
enough
time for British Forces to coordinate a supporting mission of this
scale for the
lraqi Security Forces (lSF).

According to a MoD spokesman in today's Times, we learn that in the
first few
days of the operation the only military support provided by British
Forces to
the ISF was Tornado ground -attack aircraft. ls this true, and if so,
what were
the reasons?

Finally, I was wondering if you could clarify one more point. The
article in the
Times suggested that British Forces were not allowed to enter Basra
without
first receiving your approval. ls this claim true? lf it is true
could you please
explain to me what the advantages are to having such a restrictive
hold over
tactical decisions on the ground that would generally be reserved
for-at
least- general officers in theatre? Did this decision have an impact on
Britain's ability to respond in a timely manner?

It would be outrageous if the Government made a deal with an lranian
supported militia which prevented British Forces from carrying out
their
responsibilities to the lraqi people. lt would be equally
unacceptable if we
were unwilling to risk British casualties for purely political
purposes. I hope
you agree

I look forward to your response.

(Signed)
Dr Liam Fox MP
Shadow Secretary of State for Defence

====================


5.8.08
Secret deal kept British Army out of battle for Basra

Deborah Haynes in Baquba and Michael Evans, Defence Editor

A secret deal between Britain and the notorious al-Mahdi militia
prevented British Forces from coming to the aid of their US and Iraqi
allies for nearly a week during the battle for Basra this year, The
Times has learnt.

Four thousand British troops – including elements of the SAS and an
entire mechanised brigade – watched from the sidelines for six days
because of an “accommodation” with the Iranian-backed group,
according to American and Iraqi officers who took part in the assault.

US Marines and soldiers had to be rushed in to fill the void,
fighting bitter street battles and facing mortar fire, rockets and
roadside bombs with their Iraqi counterparts.

Hundreds of militiamen were killed or arrested in the fighting. About
60 Iraqis were killed or injured. One US Marine died and sevenwere
wounded.

US advisers who accompanied the Iraqi forces into the fight were
shocked to learn of the accommodation made last summer by British
Intelligence and elements of al-Mahdi Army, the militia loyal to
Moqtada al-Sadr, the radical Shia Muslim cleric.

The deal, which aimed to encourage the Shia movement back into the
political process and marginalise extremist factions, has dealt a
huge blow to Britain’s reputation in Iraq.

Under its terms, no British soldier could enter Basra without the
permission of Des Browne, the Defence Secretary. By the time he gave
his approval, most of the fighting was over and the damage to
Britain’s reputation had already been done.

Senior British defence sources told The Times that Nouri al-Maliki,
the Iraqi Prime Minister, who ordered the assault, and high-ranking
US military officers had become disillusioned with the British as a
result of their failure to act. Another confirmed that the deal,
negotiated by British Intelligence, had been a costly mistake.

The Ministry of Defence has never confirmed that there was a deal
with al-Mahdi Army, but one official denied that the delay in sending
in troops was because of the arrangement agreed with the Shia militia.

A spokesman for the MoD said that the reason why troops were not sent
immediately into Basra was because there was “no structure in place”
in the city for units to go back in to start mentoring the Iraqi
troops.

Colonel Imad, who heads the 2nd Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi
Army Division, the most experienced division, commanded one of the
quick-reaction battalions summoned to assist British-trained local
forces, who faltered from the outset because of inexperience and lack
of support.
He said: “Without the support of the Americans we would not have
accomplished the mission because the British Forces had done nothing
there.

“I do not trust the British Forces. They did not want to lose any
soldiers for the mission.”

Lieutenant-Colonel Chuck Western, a senior US Marine advising the
Iraqi Army, told The Times: “I was not happy. Everybody just assumed
that because this deal was cut nobody was going in. Cutting a deal
with the bad guys is generally not a good idea.”

He emphasised, however, that he was not being critical of the British
military, which he described as first-rate.

Captain Eric Whyne, another US Marine officer who took part in the
battle, said that he was astounded that “a coalition force would make
a pact with essentially their enemy and promise not to go into their
area so as not to get attacked”. He alleged that “some horrific
atrocities” were committed by the militia in Basra during the British
watch.

A senior British defence source agreed that the battle for Basra had
been damaging to Britain’s reputation in Iraq. “Maliki, and the
Americans, felt the British were morally impugned by the deal they
had reached with the militia. The British were accused of trying to
find the line of least resistance in dealing with the Shia militia,”
said the source.

“You can accuse the Americans of many things, such as hamfistedness,
but you can’t accuse them of not addressing a situation when it
arises. While we had a strategy of evasion, the Americans just went
in and addressed the problem.”

Another British official said that the deal was intended as an IRA-
style reconciliation. “That is what we were trying to do but it did
not work.” The official added that “accommodation” had become a dirty
word.

US officials knew of the discussions, which continued until March
this year. They facilitated the peaceful exit of British troops from
a palace compound in Basra last September in return for the release
of a number of prisoners. The arrangement fell apart on March 25 when
Mr al-Maliki ordered his surprise assault on Basra, catching both the
Americans and British off-guard.

The Americans responded by flying in reinforcements, providing air
cover and offering the logistical and other support needed for the
Iraqis to win.
The British were partly handicapped because their commander, Major-
General Barney White-Spunner, was away on a skiing holiday when the
attack began. When Brigadier Julian Free, his deputy, arrived to
discuss the situation with Mr al-Maliki at the presidential palace in
Basra, he was made to wait outside.

The first British troops only entered the city on March 31.

The MoD spokesman said that the operation was launched at such short
notice that the only support that could be given in the first few
days was air power – in the form of Tornado ground attack aircraft –
and logistics.

He said that after British troops were withdrawn from Basra last year
it was realised that the Iraqi forces still needed help, which was
why the current British force contained more instructors and trainers.