Monday 20 October 2008

SELF-DEFEAT 101
by Stephen Kruger
Copyright 2008 Stephen Kruger
 
The 1967 war was the third major, post-independence military attack of Israel by Arabs. In baseball, the rule is, three strikes, you're out. This practical should have been applied in 1967.
 
Instead, Israel continued its touchy-feely policy toward Arabs, put in place by left-wing Jews in Palestine at the end of World War I. The self-defeatism inherent in that policy caused Israel to lose the peace in 1948, to lose the peace again in 1956, and to cement its loss of the peace in 1967 by abandoning Judea, Samaria and Gaza.
The denial of Israeli sovereignty over Judea, Samaria and Gaza created the condition precedent for some other sovereignty there. To bring into ex-nihilo existence a populace for some other sovereignty, Israel connived with Jordanians who lived in Judea and Samaria, and connived with Egyptians who lived in Gaza, to view themselves as "Palestinians," a term which theretofore never connoted a national identity. With further Israeli connivance, "Palestinians" created the potential sovereignty of "Palestine." Moreover, during the intifadas, Israel took quarter-measures. Israel did not attack Arabs in response to Arab murders of Jews. No rockets were fired into Gaza in response to rockets fired from Gaza into Israel.
 
Instead of using crushing military force in Judea, Samaria and Gaza, Israel chose to negotiate its national interests in one and another international meeting. Compare China in relation to Taiwan, to Tibet, to the Spratly Islands, or to the Paracel Islands, none of which is permitted by China to be negotiated in an international meeting. The two-state solution is not applied by China to Tibet or to Taiwan.
 
The losing posture of Israel is not the posture of China, which annexed Tibet in 1950. In the decades since, there were sinofication of Tibet and strong measures against the Tibetan population. Tibet remains Chinese, under Chinese sovereignty, and the world accepts that circumstance.
 
Compare Russia in relation to Finnish territory taken by Russia during World War II, Japanese islands taken by Russia at the end of World War II, and Chechnia, none of which is permitted by Russia to be negotiated in an international meeting. The two-state solution is not applied by Russia to Chechnia.
The losing posture of Israel is not the posture of Russia, which fought two wars against Chechnia (1994-1996; 1999-2000). The wars were real wars, not Israeli-style quarter-measures. Thousands of Chechnians were killed by the Russians. Half of Grozny was leveled by the Russians. There was neither creation of a potentially-sovereign population nor creation of a potentially-sovereign Chechnia. Finnish territory, Japanese islands and Chechnia remain Russian, under Russian sovereignty, and the world accepts that circumstance.
Compare India and Pakistan in relation to Jammu and Kashmir. Neither India nor Pakistan permits negotiation of the dispute in an international meeting. The two-state solution is not applied by India or by Pakistan to Jammu and Kashmir.
The losing posture of Israel is not the posture of India or of Pakistan, which fought three wars (1947; 1965; 1999). Real wars, not Israeli-style quarter-measures. There is no potentially-sovereign population of Jammu and Kashmir, and there is no potentially-sovereign Jammu and Kashmir. India and Pakistan each retains sovereignty of its respective part of Jammu and Kashmir, and the world accepts that circumstance.
In light of history, it is strange for the United States to encourage Israel to negotiate its interests in an international meeting, and it is strange for the United States to support the two-state "solution" vis-à-vis Israel. When, in 1861, southern states of the United States seceded from the Union, the United States did not negotiate its national interest at an international conference. The United States did not entertain a two-state solution in relation to the Confederate States.
 
Rather, the United States denied entirely the right of the southern states to secede and to form the Confederate States. The United States fought to a complete victory over the Confederate States and it population.
"International law" has a private aspect (e.g., treaties concerning commercial relations) and a public aspect (e.g., treaties between countries). There is no "public international law" any more than there is an "international community." The sole use which the "international community" has for "public international law" is as a club with which to clobber Israel (mutatis mutandis, the United States). For example, around September 20, 2007, there was a declaration by Israel that Gaza is a "hostile territory." Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon stated that the declaration violates "public international law." The statement was made within a day of the Israeli declaration. Mr. Ban spent no time researching "public international law," and he did not offer a citation supportive of his statement. He manufactured that notion of "public international law" for the purpose of condemning a defense by Israel of itself.
It is asserted that "public international law" requires a two-state solution detrimental to Israel. There is no assertion by the "international community" that "public international law" requires a two-state solution detrimental to Spain or to France, concerning the Basque country, or requires a two-state solution detrimental to the Philippines, concerning Mindanao. Ditto for a two-state solution on Cyprus (Greeks and Turks), to the detriment of Cyprus; in Georgia (each of Abkhazia and South Ossetia), to the detriment of Georgia; and on Sri Lanka (Sinhalese and Tamils), to the detriment of Sri Lanka.
 
Jordanian Arabs occupy Judea and Samaria, and Egyptian Arabs occupy Gaza, yet the "international community" perceives the rightful Israeli presence in Judea and Samaria as an "occupation," as it did the former Israeli presence in Gaza. It is said over and over that the rightful presence is an "occupation," and against "public international law." Nothing at all is said about the United Kingdom contravening "public international law" by occupying Northern Ireland; or about Spain contravening "public international law" by occupying the Canary Islands, Melilla, and Ceuta; or about India contravening "public international law" by occupying Goa, Daman and Diu.
 
The two-state "solution" is a bill of goods, bought by Israel at a heavy price: thousands of post-1948, pre-1967 murders of Jews at the hands of Arabs, the throwing away of the post-1967 peace, and thousands of post-1967 murders of Jews at the hands of Arabs. The bill of goods is not yet paid in full by Israel. Despite the refusal by Israel to win the win two intifadas, and despite the disowning by Israel of Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, Israel will be expected, at a forthcoming international meeting, to make the "painful concessions" that the Golan Heights is Arab, that the Sheba'a Farms is Arab, that the essential part of Jerusalem is Arab, and that the Temple Mount is Arab.
 
The two-state "solution," if implemented, would find a vulnerable Israel, hemmed in by an non-rational border, and surrounded by a Hamas-controlled Gaza, a radicalized post-Abbas "Palestine," an Assad-controlled Syria, and a Hezbollah-controlled Lebanon. A coordinated ground attack from those four Arab quarters, coupled with a rain of rockets from Iran, would give rise to the Final Pogrom, the inevitable endgame of the two-state "solution."