Friday, 26 December 2008

HAPPY CHANUKAH!
HAPPY NEW YEAR
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SHABBAT SHALOM
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ANALYSIS / A hard look at Hamas' capabilities

By Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, Haaretz Correspondent Last update - 04:03
26/12/2008
http://haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1050282.html

Approximately 15,000 armed Palestinians. That's the size of the military
force the
Israel Defense Forces will face if a major operation in the
Gaza
Strip
goes forward. These militants, from various Hamas factions, will
presumably be aided by a few thousand militants from other Palestinian
groups.

For two years Hamas, with Iranian assistance, has been working hard on
developing its military power, using Hezbollah as a model.

Gaza Palestinians are preparing to step up their offensive, with rockets and
mortar shells directed at Israel's civilian population in the south, as well
as their defense, digging in to retard the IDF's progress and cause heavy
Israeli casualties.

Nevertheless, military experts in
Israel and the West believe the IDF is
capable of retaking
Gaza. Israeli reservations about a broad
military
operation
, therefore, are mainly linked to the question of what happens
afterward, when the IDF controls a large area that it doesn't want and is in
constant friction with terrorists and the civilian population.

The main components of the "Hamas Army":

?
Order of battle: Hamas is transitioning from a terror group to a
paramilitary guerrilla organization. The transition includes improvements to
the
command and control structure, the acquisition of better weapons and the
creation of a training program.

The core of Hamas' "army" is its military wing, Iz al-Din al-Qassam, which
the organization sees as its best trained and most disciplined force. It was
deployed against
Fatah in June 2007 and it will bear the brunt of any
engagement with the IDF. Iz al-Din does not generally perform unpopular
policing operations (such as the daily suppression of Fatah), instead
focusing on preparing for battle with Israel.

The estimated size of the force is about 1,000, divided into sectors and
from brigades down to companies.

- Training: Palestinian sources say Iz al-Din troops undergo rigorous
military training as well as participating in ideological classes held in
mosques. Hamas forces do six months of basic training that includes
live-fire exercises in which they learn to fire rockets, antitank missiles
and mortar shells.

They undergo
urban warfare training, including exercises simulating an
assault on a settlement complete with covering machine-gun fire and antitank
fire prior to the assault. Some of the instructors were trained in
Iran and
Lebanon. In recent years dozens of Gazans have traveled to training camps
run by terror organizations and Iran's
Revolutionary Guards.

IDF soldiers who have fought Hamas cells in the
Gaza Strip in the past two
years report an impressive improvement in their discipline and in their
equipment.

-  Other factions: Hamas and smaller organizations, starting with
Islamic
Jihad
, can be expected to cooperate in the event of an engagement with the
IDF. Two Popular Resistance Committee factions maintain close contact with
Hamas and are likely to subordinate themselves to the organization in a war
with Israel.

Three military groupings identified with global jihad (that is, Al-Qaida and
its offshoots), on the other hand, will not accept Hamas authority and will
continue to operate independently.

-Rocket attacks: The rockets and mortar shells were initially developed as a
way of bypassing the border fence, which prevented militants from entering
Israel to carry out attacks. Shin Bet security service head,
Yuval Diskin,
told the cabinet this week that Hamas already has rockets with a range of 40
kilometers, that are capable of reaching Ashdod and the outskirts of Be'er
Sheva.

These are advanced
Katyusha that were smuggled into Gaza in pieces through
the tunnels and assembled in Gaza. These rockets have not yet been fired at
Israel but Hamas and
Islamic Jihad already have dozens of 122 mm. Grad
rockets with a range of about 20 km. Gaza militants recently began using
another Iranian-supplied weapon, 120 mm. mortar shells with an 8-kilometer
range.

Hamas has also made significant gains in manufacturing its own rockets. It
has learned to create
Ammonium Perchlorate Compound, an advanced
rocket
propellant
that in addition to extending the Qassam's range beyond 20
kilometers also - and more importantly - increases the rocket's shelf life.

That means the organization can, for the first time, maintain a supply of
rockets for months at a time. Analysts believe Hamas currently has over
1,000 rockets. Islamic Jihad maintains its own production and storage
facilities, but both rely on Iranian experts for training. Sources in Gaza
say that Hamas' "military industry" is working overtime to manufacture
rockets, and that the organization can easily fire 80 rockets a day, as it
did on Wednesday.

- Defense: Hamas' defensive strategy includes an extensive underground
network of bunkers, tunnels and booby-trapped structures. The Palestinians
have proved their explosives capabilities, having destroyed three Israeli
tanks and two
armored personnel carriers using high-grade explosives.

Antitank missiles are an important component of Hamas' defensive strategy,
which takes on board the lessons learned by
Hezbollah in the Second
Lebanon
War
. Hamas has acquired antitank missiles from the Eastern bloc, although
the exact models and capabilities are not known.

Militants can be expected to employ antitank missiles against
Israel Air
Force
helicopters in the event of a confrontation, in the effort to delay
and obstruct the entry of the IDF.

- Offensive plans: Hamas' main weapon is its ability to launch dozens of
rockets a day at Israel. In the event of an escalation the organization can
be expected to try to prove that it can hit more distant targets, such as
Be'er Sheva. Ashkelon is liable to suffer massive rockets attacks. In
addition, Hamas is likely to target one kibbutz or moshav near the border in
an attempt to cause large numbers of residents to leave and weaken Israeli
morale. Israel must also be prepared for a surprise from Hamas, a la
Hezbollah, ranging from additional tunnels to facilitate abductions to
attacks on boats or aircraft and up to attacks on strategic targets in the
south.


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