Foreign Secretary David Miliband delivered a speech and took part in a debate hosted by Chatham House about the importance of global cooperation to meet global challenges.
Read the transcript
'Well thank you very much. Indeed, its a great pleasure to be here and a privilege to have such a distinguished panel discussing all that youve laid out. Are you sure thats all you want me to cover in just 10 minutes? I think that now most politicians are starting their speeches with quotations of Obama, and I want to do the same. Because there was an important line, of many, in his inaugural address last week, that has been highlighted in the UK media and that I think important, though it is a simple one, and it is that the world has changed, and we must change with it.
Obvious, but its important how you define the change, and I just want to say that three things define the change for me. One is global real-time interdependence, and the economic crisis is the best example of that, but if you want to see the difficulty of people in the Bangladesh delta with rising sea levels you can see another example. I think that is a big change.
The second big change is the shift in the balance of power. I think in the 1970s people got a bit over excited about the shift from the national to the international level, but there is a shift (Ill come back later to say why I think nation-states can still be a very important part of the answer, because I think they got dismissed out of hand in the 70s). Theres a second shift from west to east, but theres also a shift, and I think this is really important, from
governments and corporations to individuals. I call it the civilian surge, and I believe that that shift brought about by the freedom with which information and ideas move around the world is very, very significant indeed. It really is a small planet in this sense. So these are the second set of changes. The third set of changes, which are different now than when we met six months ago to talk about the book, is the obvious economic crisis, and in my
judgment there are two very different forces pulling in opposite forces as a result of the economic crisis and nobody knows what its geopolitical consequences are going to be. One force is pulling toward more nationalist
protection choose your metaphor: drawing up the bridge, creating the fortress. Thats real. People want to look after their own first. But, and maybe we feel this strongly because were hosting the second G20 summit in
London this 2nd of April, the opposite force is that its so obvious these international crises not just financial but economic, and with its roots in $147 barrels of oil theres an opposite force which is to move to a renewal of
multilateralism, and my view, which is in the book really, is that youre not going to solve the problems if that first force of the economic crisis wins out.
Its not that were all multilateralists now, but those of us on the panel and who worked on the book, and me from the British government, we think that unless multilateralism is renewed, were not going to tackle these problems. And I think its important if were going to win the case for multilateralism we have to pose the choice quite starkly. And I think that means recognizing that globalization does bring new vulnerabilities, but I think we should pose the question as whether or not we want to deepen globalization, or seek to roll it back. Because I think that is the choice we face. Deepening means developing political institutions that are able to guide and engage in questions of equity and security and stability: that are the essential province of the multilateral system. Especially if you define it so broadly - economic and social security - as you did. I think that, now Im not going to use these remarks to go into the details of some of the proposals that youve made (which I think are interesting and good), this is an important book, and I know that the timing was clearly intended to communicate with the new US president, though before you would have known who it would be. Now I think this is an important moment here, and there is a great deal of global engagement on these issues, and I do want to come back to this at the end. What I want to say for the middle part of my remarks is that with the word insecurity in your title, Managing Global Insecurity, I think it very important to be precise. If you think about most of the multilateral institutions, above all the UN, it was created to stop one state abusing the rights of another state, and
that remains an important function of a multilateral system. And there are some very major challenges, if you want to look to the next presidential term, in this period, to develop ways to ensure that states that have strength and are able to deploy it do so within a set of what you would call responsible rules.
Theres a second issue which you touched on only very glancingly but it is very, very important because its a different type of challenge and that is not of strong states but of weak states. The international system was not set up to take care of week states. I spend a lot of my time thinking about Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I think that in the issues of governance that are raised, there is something I want to say a word about. There is not an absence of multilateral engagement in Afghanistan. Well, someone said too much, but I think the issue of whether these multilateral institutions could coordinate better align better is a very profound issue. Its not just the UN, its not just NATO, its not just the EU. Weve got a wide range of institutions seeking to support good governance by the Afghan government - because no one wants to be in Afghanistan to create a new colony rather the international community is there to bolster a sovereign government. But I do think that this is a central theatre now where, though the international community makes demands of the Afghan government, obviously, it has got to look at itself as well. They should want to produce the right kind of support. One test of your proposals as I go through the summary, I was asking myself on the different tracks, how much difference will this make in Kabul; in Helmand. I think those are hard questions to ask because UN reform can seem a long, long way
away from those places.
I think one thing that adds to the mix is the very welcome decision by Obama to focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Their respective stability is mutually dependent. I think that is really an important test for the book.
After regularizing strong states and their behaviour, and supporting weak ones, the third great insecurity is the absence of a mechanism to deliver public goods. Economic stability is a global public good, nuclear nonproliferation
is a global public good, and climate change (or rather its global mitigation) is a global public good. And in a way its the easiest way to make the case for multilateralism, because no one country can meet these on its
own, but its also the hardest. If you thought the world trade deal was a tough negotiation, climate change is much more complex. And there are many difficult aspects to it. I actually think the fundamental issue is not a policy
question but is a political one, and is about fairness and equity in the global system.
The great fear of the developing countries is that climate change is going to be used as an excuse to hold them back. The challenge of the richer world is not just for us to get our own houses in order, but also to find ways of
financing adaptation and mitigation of climate change in the developing world. In this sense it is a profound political question. The cruel irony is that some of the richest countries are largely protected from the effects of climate change, while some of the poorest will be hit the most by climatic consequences. So, while Nick Sterns argument about the economics of climate change pointing towards action is true, the issue is most stark in the developing world - who have the least capacity to deal with it. A deal will be made or not made around the issue of the global financing of mitigation.
One quick word about the role of regional powers, because its not a strong feature of your report for reasons I can understand, but nonetheless I think its a little disappointing that we or put it this way (since Im here to praise not to bury) I think weve got to do more work on the role of regional bodies. Think about the situation in Africa at the moment. Youve got the worlds biggest peace-keeping operation in the world in the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) at about a billion dollars a year; youve got a massive set of commitments on paper to Sudan from the UN; and youve got the AU (African Union) in Somalia and the prospect of a decision by the UN in six to nine month time on whether or not to deploy a PKO (Peace-Keeping Operation) into Somalia. All this, bearing in mind, a very important issue for us, is Zimbabwe, which is both a strong state in its ability to abuse its citizens, and a weak one in terms of supporting them. And its an exporter of instability to its neighbours, as there are three to four million refugees in South Africa. Now there will never be African solutions to African problems unless there is a strong regional role for some organization like the African union and I think that as we think about the role the EU has played. I believe it was your former boss who once said it is not the example of our power but the power of our example.
In the EU the power of example has been very, very profound. Because the EU of now is a very different beast to that which it was 10 or 15 years ago: a union of 27, a motivator of reform, a threshold on human rights, and a discipline on governments in Eastern Europe. I think a major question is whether this model can be used elsewhere. Let me just finish on the following two notes. One, were actually talking about order and responsibility on the one hand, and freedom on the other, and they can seem like opposites. But if you have freedom without order you have anarchy, and if you have order without freedom you have authoritarianism.
And as I looked at the executive summary of the book I felt that was a real thread running through. Theres another final thread running through that I just want to mention and that is theres a transatlantic thread. Because I think that a lot of European foreign ministers feel that theres certainly a big chance but maybe the last chance to frame a global settlement on the basis of transatlantic values now. Its not just a transatlantic relationship because if were going to address our problems weve got to think more globally. But I do hope our American guests whove come here today will take back a very strong message (and youll go to Paris and Brussels I think next week), the very strong feeling in Europe that we want to work with the new administration on the kind of ideas that are in your book and founded on the idea of responsible sovereignty. The nation-states are still the locus of political activity, but they also need to know theyre own limits, and know when to work together.
I think this is an exciting time, actually, to be trying to address these issues.'
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Managing global insecurity (27/01/2009)
LOCATION Chatham House
SPEAKER David Miliband
EVENT Managing Global insecurity
DATE 29/01/2009
Foreign Secretary David Miliband delivered a speech and took part in a debate hosted by Chatham House about the importance of global cooperation to meet global challenges.
Read the transcript
'Well thank you very much. Indeed, it’s a great pleasure to be here and a privilege to have such a distinguished panel discussing all that you’ve laid out. Are you sure that’s all you want me to cover in just 10 minutes? I think that now most politicians are starting their speeches with quotations of Obama, and I want to do the same. Because there was an important line, of many, in his inaugural address last week, that has been highlighted in the UK media and that I think important, though it is a simple one, and it is that ‘the world has changed, and we must change with it.’
Obvious, but it’s important how you define the change, and I just want to say that three things define the change for me. One is global real-time interdependence, and the economic crisis is the best example of that, but if you want to see the difficulty of people in the Bangladesh delta with rising sea levels you can see another example. I think that is a big change.
The second big change is the shift in the balance of power. I think in the 1970s people got a bit over excited about the shift from the national to the international level, but there is a shift (I’ll come back later to say why I think nation-states can still be a very important part of the answer, because I think they got dismissed out of hand in the ‘70s). There’s a second shift from west to east, but there’s also a shift, and I think this is really important, from
governments and corporations to individuals. I call it the civilian surge, and I believe that that shift brought about by the freedom with which information and ideas move around the world is very, very significant indeed. It really is a small planet in this sense. So these are the second set of changes. The third set of changes, which are different now than when we met six months ago to talk about the book, is the obvious economic crisis, and in my
judgment there are two very different forces pulling in opposite forces as a result of the economic crisis and nobody knows what its geopolitical consequences are going to be. One force is pulling toward more nationalist
protection – choose your metaphor: drawing up the bridge, creating the fortress. That’s real. People want to look after their own first. But, and maybe we feel this strongly because we’re hosting the second G20 summit in
London this 2nd of April, the opposite force is that it’s so obvious these international crises – not just financial but economic, and with its roots in $147 barrels of oil – there’s an opposite force which is to move to a renewal of
multilateralism, and my view, which is in the book really, is that you’re not going to solve the problems if that first force of the economic crisis wins out.
It’s not that ‘we’re all multilateralists now’, but those of us on the panel and who worked on the book, and me from the British government, we think that unless multilateralism is renewed, we’re not going to tackle these problems. And I think it’s important if we’re going to win the case for multilateralism we have to pose the choice quite starkly. And I think that means recognizing that globalization does bring new vulnerabilities, but I think we should pose the question as whether or not we want to deepen globalization, or seek to roll it back. Because I think that is the choice we face. Deepening means developing political institutions that are able to guide and engage in questions of equity and security and stability: that are the essential province of the multilateral system. Especially if you define it so broadly - economic and social security - as you did. I think that, now I’m not going to use these remarks to go into the details of some of the proposals that you’ve made (which I think are interesting and good), this is an important book, and I know that the timing was clearly intended to communicate with the new US president, though before you would have known who it would be. Now I think this is an important moment here, and there is a great deal of global engagement on these issues, and I do want to come back to this at the end. What I want to say for the middle part of my remarks is that with the word insecurity in your title, Managing Global Insecurity, I think it very important to be precise. If you think about most of the multilateral institutions, above all the UN, it was created to stop one state abusing the rights of another state, and
that remains an important function of a multilateral system. And there are some very major challenges, if you want to look to the next presidential term, in this period, to develop ways to ensure that states that have strength and are able to deploy it do so within a set of what you would call ‘responsible rules.’
There’s a second issue which you touched on only very glancingly but it is very, very important because it’s a different type of challenge and that is not of strong states but of weak states. The international system was not set up to take care of week states. I spend a lot of my time thinking about Afghanistan and Pakistan, and I think that in the issues of governance that are raised, there is something I want to say a word about. There is not an absence of multilateral engagement in Afghanistan. Well, someone said too much, but I think the issue of whether these multilateral institutions could coordinate better – align better – is a very profound issue. It’s not just the UN, its not just NATO, it’s not just the EU. We’ve got a wide range of institutions seeking to support good governance by the Afghan government - because no one wants to be in Afghanistan to create a new colony – rather the international community is there to bolster a sovereign government. But I do think that this is a central theatre now where, though the international community makes demands of the Afghan government, obviously, it has got to look at itself as well. They should want to produce the right kind of support. One test of your proposals as I go through the summary, I was asking myself on the different tracks, how much difference will this make in Kabul; in Helmand. I think those are hard questions to ask because UN reform can seem a long, long way
away from those places.
I think one thing that adds to the mix is the very welcome decision by Obama to focus on Afghanistan and Pakistan together. Their respective stability is mutually dependent. I think that is really an important test for the book.
After regularizing strong states and their behaviour, and supporting weak ones, the third great insecurity is the absence of a mechanism to deliver public goods. Economic stability is a global public good, nuclear nonproliferation
is a global public good, and climate change (or rather its global mitigation) is a global public good. And in a way it’s the easiest way to make the case for multilateralism, because no one country can meet these on its
own, but it’s also the hardest. If you thought the world trade deal was a tough negotiation, climate change is much more complex. And there are many difficult aspects to it. I actually think the fundamental issue is not a policy
question but is a political one, and is about fairness and equity in the global system.
The great fear of the developing countries is that climate change is going to be used as an excuse to hold them back. The challenge of the richer world is not just for us to get our own houses in order, but also to find ways of
financing adaptation and mitigation of climate change in the developing world. In this sense it is a profound political question. The cruel irony is that some of the richest countries are largely protected from the effects of climate change, while some of the poorest will be hit the most by climatic consequences. So, while Nick Stern’s argument about the economics of climate change pointing towards action is true, the issue is most stark in the developing world - who have the least capacity to deal with it. A deal will be made or not made around the issue of the global financing of mitigation.
One quick word about the role of regional powers, because its not a strong feature of your report for reasons I can understand, but nonetheless I think it’s a little disappointing that we – or put it this way (since I’m here to praise not to bury) – I think we’ve got to do more work on the role of regional bodies. Think about the situation in Africa at the moment. You’ve got the worlds biggest peace-keeping operation in the world in the DRC (Democratic Republic of Congo) at about a billion dollars a year; you’ve got a massive set of commitments on paper to Sudan from the UN; and you’ve got the AU (African Union) in Somalia and the prospect of a decision by the UN in six to nine month time on whether or not to deploy a PKO (Peace-Keeping Operation) into Somalia. All this, bearing in mind, a very important issue for us, is Zimbabwe, which is both a strong state in its ability to abuse its citizens, and a weak one in terms of supporting them. And it’s an exporter of instability to its neighbours, as there are three to four million refugees in South Africa. Now there will never be African solutions to African problems unless there is a strong regional role for some organization like the African union and I think that as we think about the role the EU has played. I believe it was your former boss who once said ‘it is not the example of our power but the power of our example’.
In the EU the power of example has been very, very profound. Because the EU of now is a very different beast to that which it was 10 or 15 years ago: a union of 27, a motivator of reform, a threshold on human rights, and a discipline on governments in Eastern Europe. I think a major question is whether this model can be used elsewhere. Let me just finish on the following two notes. One, we’re actually talking about order and responsibility on the one hand, and freedom on the other, and they can seem like opposites. But if you have freedom without order you have anarchy, and if you have order without freedom you have authoritarianism.
And as I looked at the executive summary of the book I felt that was a real thread running through. There’s another final thread running through that I just want to mention and that is there’s a transatlantic thread. Because I think that a lot of European foreign ministers feel that there’s certainly a big chance but maybe the last chance to frame a global settlement on the basis of transatlantic values now. It’s not just a transatlantic relationship because if we’re going to address our problems we’ve got to think more globally. But I do hope our American guests who’ve come here today will take back a very strong message (and you’ll go to Paris and Brussels I think next week), the very strong feeling in Europe that we want to work with the new administration on the kind of ideas that are in your book and founded on the idea of responsible sovereignty. The nation-states are still the locus of political activity, but they also need to know they’re own limits, and know when to work together.
I think this is an exciting time, actually, to be trying to address these issues.'
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