FREEMAN CENTER BROADCAST- FEB 13, 2009
FREEMAN CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
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They deem him their worst enemy who tells them the truth. - Plato
"The hardest thing to explain is the glaringly evident which everybody had decided not to see." -- Ayn Rand
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Ignorance Is Weakness - Know The Truth
Self-Inflicted Ignorance Is Suicide
The Freeman Center Is A Defense Against Ignorance
Self-Inflicted Ignorance Is Suicide
The Freeman Center Is A Defense Against Ignorance
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SHABBAT SHALOM!
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Hillel Frisch
BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 67, February 12, 2009
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives67.html
BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 67, February 12, 2009
www.biu.ac.il/SOC/besa/perspectives67.html
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The election result this week confirms the emergence of a
one-block, right-of-center dominant political reality in Israel; a fact that
is likely to dominate for many years to come. Kadima's electoral achievement
is ephemeral; it masks the deeper and much more enduring socio-political
ascendancy of the political right, both nationalist and religious. Both
Livni and Netanyahu failed to sufficiently appreciate this reality, and as a
result, made strategic campaign mistakes.
one-block, right-of-center dominant political reality in Israel; a fact that
is likely to dominate for many years to come. Kadima's electoral achievement
is ephemeral; it masks the deeper and much more enduring socio-political
ascendancy of the political right, both nationalist and religious. Both
Livni and Netanyahu failed to sufficiently appreciate this reality, and as a
result, made strategic campaign mistakes.
As party activists cheered the initial election results, Kadima leader Tzipi
Livni must have realized in the privacy of her home the hollowness of her
victory. Instead of a Kadima win, the Israeli electorate had in fact led the
way towards the possibility of transforming Israel into a "one-block
state" - a state of the political right wing. More than 60 percent of the
electorate voted for parties on the nationalist, right and religious side of
the political spectrum.
Livni must have realized in the privacy of her home the hollowness of her
victory. Instead of a Kadima win, the Israeli electorate had in fact led the
way towards the possibility of transforming Israel into a "one-block
state" - a state of the political right wing. More than 60 percent of the
electorate voted for parties on the nationalist, right and religious side of
the political spectrum.
In the fifties and sixties, analysts spoke of Israel as a one-party dominant
Mapai (Labor party) state. Emerging now is the potential for a one-block
dominant variant: a soft right-wing block that spells an end to the Oslo era
of grandiose peacemaking with the Palestinians.
Mapai (Labor party) state. Emerging now is the potential for a one-block
dominant variant: a soft right-wing block that spells an end to the Oslo era
of grandiose peacemaking with the Palestinians.
(I say "soft right wing" because even parties of the Israeli right wing,
with the exception of the tiny National Unity party, today espouse
diplomatic positions that characterized the Labor Party before the Oslo
peace process.)
with the exception of the tiny National Unity party, today espouse
diplomatic positions that characterized the Labor Party before the Oslo
peace process.)
In addition to the likely emergence of a one-block dominant polity, the
February 2009 Israeli vote provides several other important lessons
regarding leadership, the Israeli electorate and society, and the future
course of regional and international affairs, as detailed below.
February 2009 Israeli vote provides several other important lessons
regarding leadership, the Israeli electorate and society, and the future
course of regional and international affairs, as detailed below.
Leadership: Livni and Netanyahu Strategic Mistakes
Both leading candidates made strategic mistakes. Netanyahu felt assured of a
Likud victory and put the electorate to sleep by dropping out of sight.
Thus, he turned down Livni's request for a television debate. This was one
of the reasons he lost votes to the very active leader of Israel Beiteinu,
Avigdor Lieberman.
Likud victory and put the electorate to sleep by dropping out of sight.
Thus, he turned down Livni's request for a television debate. This was one
of the reasons he lost votes to the very active leader of Israel Beiteinu,
Avigdor Lieberman.
When Netanyahu did start appearing in public and speaking out, very late in
the race, he sought to move to the center by attacking and marginalizing the
far right-wing within his party. Presumably the move to the center was the
lesson he learned from his 1999 election failure against Barak. However,
Netanyahu failed to fathom the extent to which the Israeli electorate had
moved to the right, due to accumulated waves of Arab violence - the al-Aqsa
Intifada, and the Lebanese and Gaza wars. Netanyahu thus deserves a failing
grade for strategic acumen; a worrisome failure for Israel's likely prime
minister.
the race, he sought to move to the center by attacking and marginalizing the
far right-wing within his party. Presumably the move to the center was the
lesson he learned from his 1999 election failure against Barak. However,
Netanyahu failed to fathom the extent to which the Israeli electorate had
moved to the right, due to accumulated waves of Arab violence - the al-Aqsa
Intifada, and the Lebanese and Gaza wars. Netanyahu thus deserves a failing
grade for strategic acumen; a worrisome failure for Israel's likely prime
minister.
Livni scores little better for much the same reason. She should have moved
to the center, when in fact she moved to the left. She drew off votes from
Labor without increasing the size of the center-left bloc she could lead.
What's the use of winning a battle only to lose the war? It is noteworthy
to mention that Livni, who failed to form a coalition government after the
resignation of Ehud Olmert in September 2008, is beginning to appear as one
who is forever near the pinnacle but never able to conquer it.
to the center, when in fact she moved to the left. She drew off votes from
Labor without increasing the size of the center-left bloc she could lead.
What's the use of winning a battle only to lose the war? It is noteworthy
to mention that Livni, who failed to form a coalition government after the
resignation of Ehud Olmert in September 2008, is beginning to appear as one
who is forever near the pinnacle but never able to conquer it.
As a member of the former ruling triumvirate and of the once hegemonic Labor
Party, Ehud Barak still deserves mention. Barak has outstanding virtues: he
was an excellent soldier, IDF chief-of-staff, and Minister of Defense. But
he's no politician or statesman. In many ways, Barak should have bolted to
the Likud long ago and sought to make Likud more centrist.
Party, Ehud Barak still deserves mention. Barak has outstanding virtues: he
was an excellent soldier, IDF chief-of-staff, and Minister of Defense. But
he's no politician or statesman. In many ways, Barak should have bolted to
the Likud long ago and sought to make Likud more centrist.
The Electorate
Appearances do not always make up for substance. The media made great
fanfare of Livni's campaign rounds in Tel Aviv bars and discotheques. But
Livni should have realized that most Israelis live at a standard and style
of living that is among the lowest of affluent Western states. Most never
make the same discotheque rounds - even young Israelis. Livni's Kadima
became a yuppie, Ashkenazi, secular party; which strategically is the wrong
image. Abraham Lincoln long ago said that God loves the common man, since he
made so many of them. This is especially true of the Jewish Israeli
electorate.
fanfare of Livni's campaign rounds in Tel Aviv bars and discotheques. But
Livni should have realized that most Israelis live at a standard and style
of living that is among the lowest of affluent Western states. Most never
make the same discotheque rounds - even young Israelis. Livni's Kadima
became a yuppie, Ashkenazi, secular party; which strategically is the wrong
image. Abraham Lincoln long ago said that God loves the common man, since he
made so many of them. This is especially true of the Jewish Israeli
electorate.
The Israeli common man is today mostly to be found in the Likud, Shas and
Israel Beiteinu parties. At Likud headquarters, supporters mostly of
Sephardic origin surrounded Benny Begin, hugging and chanting, "Bibi, Bibi,
Begin, Begin." In short, the two blocs represent two markedly different
cultures: a warm, traditional and brotherly culture, which includes the
Russian variant - which is the dominant culture in Israel; versus a cold,
achievement-oriented, secularized culture. Netanyahu is an oddity within his
own block (but so was Menachem Begin).
Israel Beiteinu parties. At Likud headquarters, supporters mostly of
Sephardic origin surrounded Benny Begin, hugging and chanting, "Bibi, Bibi,
Begin, Begin." In short, the two blocs represent two markedly different
cultures: a warm, traditional and brotherly culture, which includes the
Russian variant - which is the dominant culture in Israel; versus a cold,
achievement-oriented, secularized culture. Netanyahu is an oddity within his
own block (but so was Menachem Begin).
Livni also made the strategic mistake of writing off the religious public,
and by so doing, strengthened the center-right and religious alliance that
has dominated Israel for most of the past 25 years. Of course, Livni should
not take all of the blame. Ultra Orthodox parties certainly prefer a male
prime minister to a female one, the biblical Prophetess Devorah
notwithstanding.
and by so doing, strengthened the center-right and religious alliance that
has dominated Israel for most of the past 25 years. Of course, Livni should
not take all of the blame. Ultra Orthodox parties certainly prefer a male
prime minister to a female one, the biblical Prophetess Devorah
notwithstanding.
A one-block-dominated electorate is, by definition, less polarized than
Israel was during much of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. But these elections
also reveal a less-polarized Israeli society in several additional ways.
Israel was during much of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. But these elections
also reveal a less-polarized Israeli society in several additional ways.
Shas has long ago ceased to be an Ultra Orthodox party; it represents a much
broader swath of Sephardim. Even United Torah Judaism is seeking to broaden
its appeal. The Ultra Orthodox Ashkenazi party tried to win more votes by
stressing the role of the Ultra Orthodox in fighting for social welfare
benefits for all, irrespective of origin and religion. Israel Beiteinu,
formerly an almost exclusive Russian immigrant party, also succeeded in
winning a diverse vote. At least half of the national-religious (or "knitted
kippa") sector also voted for parties beyond the national-religious Bayit
Hayehudi and National Union. This raises the question as to whether the
national-religious can still be classified as a unified camp.
broader swath of Sephardim. Even United Torah Judaism is seeking to broaden
its appeal. The Ultra Orthodox Ashkenazi party tried to win more votes by
stressing the role of the Ultra Orthodox in fighting for social welfare
benefits for all, irrespective of origin and religion. Israel Beiteinu,
formerly an almost exclusive Russian immigrant party, also succeeded in
winning a diverse vote. At least half of the national-religious (or "knitted
kippa") sector also voted for parties beyond the national-religious Bayit
Hayehudi and National Union. This raises the question as to whether the
national-religious can still be classified as a unified camp.
Of course, the finding that there is less polarization in the electorate
does not apply to the Arab minority. The Jewish-Arab divide, worsened by the
recent Israel-Hamas war, will deepen in the coming years. The only saving
grace is that the multi-cultural Israeli Jewish political elite uphold the
liberal tenets of equal opportunity for all, with the net result that Arab
citizens are winning more equality of treatment than in years past, despite
the deepening political divide.
does not apply to the Arab minority. The Jewish-Arab divide, worsened by the
recent Israel-Hamas war, will deepen in the coming years. The only saving
grace is that the multi-cultural Israeli Jewish political elite uphold the
liberal tenets of equal opportunity for all, with the net result that Arab
citizens are winning more equality of treatment than in years past, despite
the deepening political divide.
Regional and International Ramifications
The one-block, right-wing-dominant state could have major bearing on
Israel's relations with the United States. Tensions can be expected between
an Obama administration that has announced its intention to refocus on
Israeli-Palestinian peace, and a Likud-led government.
Israel's relations with the United States. Tensions can be expected between
an Obama administration that has announced its intention to refocus on
Israeli-Palestinian peace, and a Likud-led government.
Such fears are probably exaggerated, because the Obama administration will
soon realize that the Hamas-Fatah civil war makes anything other than
conflict management unattainable. Therefore, Israel and the US should get
along fine, albeit, bumpily. In any case, both will be absorbed by their
common major concern - preventing a nuclear Iran. To meet that threat, a
one-block dominant right-wing government in Israel is as good as any other.
soon realize that the Hamas-Fatah civil war makes anything other than
conflict management unattainable. Therefore, Israel and the US should get
along fine, albeit, bumpily. In any case, both will be absorbed by their
common major concern - preventing a nuclear Iran. To meet that threat, a
one-block dominant right-wing government in Israel is as good as any other.
Prof. Hillel Frisch is a senior research associate at the Begin-Sadat (BESA)
Center for Strategic Studies, and the co-editor of the upcoming book Israel
at the Polls.
Center for Strategic Studies, and the co-editor of the upcoming book Israel
at the Polls.
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