Monday, February 23, 2009
Maoist Rebels Rule India-Nepal Region
Maoist rebels killed a village headman in India after ransacking villages on the country's border with Nepal. He was the 12th village headman to be shot in the region in the past five years.
The Maoists, known as Naxalites, have created a strong base in as many as 50 villages in districts bordering Nepal.
The open border allowis for free movement of people between Nepal and India.
The guerrillas travel back and forth from India to Nepal, often disguised as businessmen, villagers and travellers.Internal Divisions Hamper Chinese Stimulus Plan
By Rodger Baker and Jennifer Richmond
Due in large part to fears of dire consequences if nothing were done to tackle the economic crisis, China rushed through a 4 trillion yuan (US$586 billion) economic stimulus package in November 2008. The plan cobbled together existing and new initiatives focused on massive infrastructure development projects (designed, among other things, to soak up surplus steel, cement and labor capacity), tax cuts, green energy programs, and rural development.
Ever since the package was passed in November, Beijing has recited the mantra of the need to shift China’s economy from its heavy dependence on exports to one more driven by domestic consumption. But now that the sense of immediate crisis has passed, the stimulus policies are being rethought — and in an unusual development for China, they are being vigorously debated in the Chinese media.
Debating the Stimulus Package
In a country where media restrictions are tightening and private commentary on government officials and actions in blogs and online forums is being curtailed, it is quite remarkable that major Chinese newspaper editorials are taking the lead in questioning aspects of the stimulus package.
The question of stimulating rural consumption versus focusing the stimulus on the more economically active coastal regions has been the subject of particularly fierce debate. Some editorials have argued that encouraging rural consumption at a time of higher unemployment is building a bigger problem for the future. This argument maintains that rural laborers — particularly migrant workers — earn only a small amount of money, and that while having them spend their meager savings now might keep gross domestic product up in the short term, it will drain the laborers’ reserves and create a bigger social problem down the road. Others argue that the migrant and rural populations are underdeveloped and incapable of sustained spending, and that pumping stimulus yuan into the countryside is a misallocation of mo ney that could be better spent supporting the urban middle class, in theory creating jobs through increased middle-class consumption of services.
The lack of restrictions on these types of discussions suggests that the debate is occurring with government approval, in a reflection of debates within the Communist Party of China (CPC) and the government itself. Despite debate in the Chinese press, Beijing continues to present a unified public face on the handling of the economic crisis, regardless of internal factional debates. Maintaining Party control remains the primary goal of Party officials; even if they disagree over policies, they recognize the importance of showing that the Party remains in charge.
But, as the dueling editorial pages reveal, the Party is not unified in its assessment of the economic crisis or the recovery program. The show of unity masks a power struggle raging between competing interests within the Party. In many ways, this is not a new struggle; there are always officials jockeying for power for themselves and for their protégés. But the depth of the economic crisis in China and the rising fears of social unrest — not only from the migrant laborers, but also from militants or separatists in Tibet and Xinjiang and from “hostile forces” like the Falun Gong, pro-Democracy advocates and foreign intelligence services — have added urgency to long-standing debates over economic and social policies.
In China, decision-making falls to the president and the premier, currently Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao respectively. They do not wield the power of past leaders like Mao Zedong or Deng Xiaoping, however, and instead are much more reliant on balancing competing interests than on dictating policy.
Party and Government Factions
Hu and Wen face numerous factions among the Chinese elite. Many officials are considered parts of several different factional affiliations based on age, background, education or family heritage. Boiled down, the struggle over the stimulus plan pits two competing views of the core of the Chinese economy. One sees economic strength and social stability centered on China’s massive rural population, while another sees China’s strength and future in the coastal urban areas, in manufacturing and global trade.
Two key figures in the Standing Committee of the Politburo (the center of political power in China), Vice President Xi Jinping and Vice Premier Li Keqiang, highlight this struggle. These two are considered the core of the fifth-generation leadership, and have been tapped to succeed Hu and Wen as China’s next leaders. They also represent radically different backgrounds.
Li is a protege of Hu and rose from the China Youth League, where Hu has built a strong support base. Li represents a newer generation of Chinese leaders, educated in economics and trained in less-developed provinces. (Li held key positions in Henan and Liaoning provinces.) Xi, on the other hand, is a “princeling.” The son of a former vice premier, he trained as an engineer and served primarily in the coastal export-oriented areas, including Hebei, Fujian and Zhejiang provinces and Shanghai.
In a way, Li and Xi represent different proposals for China’s economic recovery and future. Li is a stronger supporter of the recentralization of economic control sought by Hu, a weakening of the regional economic power bases, and a focus on consolidating Chinese industry in a centrally planned manner while spending government money on rural development and urbanization of China’s interior. Xi represents the view followed by former President Jiang Zemin and descended from the policies of Deng. Under that view, economic activity and growth should be encouraged and largely freed from central direction, and if the coastal provinces grow first and faster, that is just fine; eventually the money, technology and employment will move inland.
Inland vs. the Coast
In many ways, these two views reflect long-standing economic arguments in China — namely, the constant struggle to balance the coastal trade-based economy and the interior agriculture-dominated economy. The former is smaller but wealthier, with stronger ties abroad — and therefore more political power to lobby for preferential treatment. The latter is much larger, but more isolated from the international community — and in Chinese history, frequently the source of instability and revolt in times of stress. These tensions have contributed to the decline of dynasties in centuries past, opening the space for foreign interference in Chinese internal politics. China’s leaders are well aware of the constant stresses between rural and coastal China, but maintaining a balance has been an ongoing struggle.
Throughout Chinese history, there is a repeating pattern of dynastic rise and decline. Dynasties start strong and powerful, usually through conquest. They then consolidate power and exert strong control from the center. But due to the sheer size of China’s territory and population, maintaining central control requires the steady expansion of a bureaucracy that spreads from the center through the various administrative divisions down to the local villages. Over time, the bureaucracy itself begins to usurp power, as its serves as the collector of taxes, distributor of government funds and local arbiter of policy and rights. And as the bureaucracy grows stronger, the center weakens.
Regional differences in population, tax base and economic models start to fragment the bureaucracy, leading to economic (and at times military) fiefdoms. This triggers a strong response from the center as it tries to regain control. Following a period of instability, which often involves foreign interference and/or intervention, a new center is formed, once again exerting strong centralized authority.
This cycle played out in the mid-1600s, as the Ming Dynasty fell into decline and the Manchus (who took on the moniker Qing) swept in to create a new centralized authority. It played out again as the Qing Dynasty declined in the latter half of the 1800s and ultimately was replaced — after an extended period of instability — by the CPC in 1949, ushering in another period of strong centralized control. Once again, a more powerful regional bureaucracy is testing that centralized control.
The economic reforms initiated by Deng Xiaoping at the end of the 1970s led to a three-decade decline of central authority, as economic decision-making and power devolved to the regional and local leadership and the export-oriented coastal provinces became the center of economic activity and power in China. Attempts by the central government to regain some authority over the direction of coastal authorities were repeatedly ignored (or worse), but so long as there was growth in China and relative social stability, this was tolerated.
With Hu’s rise to power, however, there was a new push from the center to rein in the worst of excesses by the coastal leaders and business interests and refocus attention on China’s rural population, which was growing increasingly disenfranchised due to the widening urban-rural economic gap. In 2007 and early 2008, Hu finally gained traction with his economic policies. The Chinese government subsequently sought to slow an overheating economy while focusing on the consolidation of industry and the establishment of “superministries” at the center to coordinate economic activity. It also intended to put inland rural interests on par with — if not above — coastal urban interests. When the superministries were formed in 2008, however, it became apparent that Hu was not omnipotent. Resistance to his plans was abundantly evident, illustrating the power of the entrenched bureaucratic interests.
Economic Crisis and the Stimulus Plan
The economic program of recentralization and the attempt to slow the overheating economy came to a screeching halt in July 2008, as skyrocketing commodity prices fueled inflation and strained government budgets. The first victim was China’s yuan policy. The steady, relatively predictable appreciation of the yuan came to a stop. Its value stagnated, and there is now pressure for a slight depreciation to encourage exports. But as Beijing began shaping its economic stimulus package, it became clear that the program would be a mix of policies, representing differing factions seeking to secure their own interests in the recovery plan.
The emerging program, then, revealed conflicting interests and policies. Money and incentives were offered to feed the low-skill export industry (located primarily in the southeastern coastal provinces) as well as to encourage a shift in production from the coast to the interior. A drive was initiated to reduce redundancies, particularly in heavy industries, and at the same time funding was increased to keep those often-bloated industrial sectors afloat. Overall, the stimulus represents a collection of competing initiatives, reflecting the differences among the factions. Entrenched princelings simply want to keep money moving and employment levels up in anticipation of a resurgence in global consumption and the revitalization of the export-based economic growth path. Meanwhile, the rur al faction seeks to accelerate economic restructuring, reduce dependence on the export-oriented coastal provinces, and move economic activity and attention to the vastly underdeveloped interior.
Higher unemployment among the rural labor force is “proving” each faction’s case. To the princelings, it shows the importance of the export sector in maintaining social stability and economic growth. To the rural faction, it emphasizes the dangers of overreliance on a thin coastal strip of cheap, low-skill labor and a widening wealth gap.
Fighting it Out in the Media
With conflicting paths now running in tandem, competing Party officials are seeking traction and support for their programs without showing division within the core Party apparatus by turning to a traditional method: the media and editorials. During the Cultural Revolution, which itself was a violent debate about the fundamental economic policies of the People’s Republic of China, the Party core appeared united, despite major divisions. The debate played out not in the halls of the National People’s Congress or in press statements, but instead in big-character posters plastered around Beijing and other cities, promoting competing policies and criticizing others.
In modern China, big posters are a thing of the past, replaced by newspaper editorials. While the Party center appears united in this time of economic crisis, the divisions are seen more acutely in the competing editorials published in state and local newspapers and on influential blogs and Web discussion forums. It is here that the depth of competition and debate so well hidden among the members of the Politburo can be seen, and it is here that it becomes clear the Chinese are no more united in their policy approach than the leaders of more democratic countries, where policy debates are more public.
The current political crisis has certainly not reached the levels of the Cultural Revolution, and China no longer has a Mao — or even a Deng — to serve as a single pole around which to wage factional struggles. The current leadership is much more attuned to the need to cooperate and compromise — and even Mao’s methods would often include opportunities for “wayward” officials to come around and cooperate with Mao’s plans. But a recognition of the need to cooperate, and an agreement that the first priority is maintenance of the Party as the sole core of Chinese power (followed closely by the need to maintain social stability to ensure the primary goal), doesn’t guarantee that things can’t get out of control.
The sudden halt to various economic initiatives in July 2008 showed just how critical the emerging crisis was. If commodity prices had not started slacking off a month later, the political crisis in Beijing might have gotten much more intense. Despite competition, the various factions want the Party to remain in power as the sole authority, but their disagreements on how to do this become much clearer during a crisis. Currently, it is the question of China’s migrant labor force and the potential for social unrest that is both keeping the Party center united and causing the most confrontation over the best-path policies to be pur sued. If the economic stimulus package fails to do its job, or if external factors leave China lagging and social problems rising, the internal party fighting could once again grow intense.
At present, there is a sense among China’s leaders that this crisis is manageable. If their attitude once again shifts to abject fear, the question may be less about how to compromise on economic strategy than how to stop a competing faction from bringing ruin to Party and country through ill-thought-out policies. Compromise is acceptable when it means the survival of the Party, but if one faction views the actions of another as fundamentally detrimental to the authority and strength of the Party, then a more active and decisive struggle becomes the ideal choice. After all, it is better to remove a gangrenous limb than to allow the infection to spread and kill the whole organism.
That crisis is not now upon China’s leaders, but things nearly reached that level last summer. There were numerous rumors from Beijing that Wen, who is responsible for China’s economic policies, was going to be sacked — an extreme move given his popularity with the common Chinese. This was staved off or delayed by the fortuitous timing of the rest of the global economic contraction, which brought commodity prices down. For now, China’s leaders will continue issuing competing and occasionally contradictory policies, and just as vigorously debating them through the nation’s editorials. The government is struggling with resolving the current economic crisis, as well as with the fundamental question of just what a new Chinese economy will look like. And that question goes deeper than money: It goes to the very role of the CPC in China’s system.
The above report was provided by Stratfor, the global intelligence news service.Hezbollah Expanding Across Western Hemisphere
Foreign Confidential....
Intelligence experts say clerical fascist (Islamist) Hezbollah has established a formidable presence in Chile, Venezuela, Panama, Ecuador, Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay.
Analysts report the existence of Hezbollah-run, terrorist training and indoctrination camps for adults, teenagers, and even children.
The Foreign Terrorist Organization (formal, U.S. State Department designation) also maintains cells in Canada. Moreover, Hezbollah operatives have penetrated the United States through the border with Mexico.Iran's Religious Persecution
More than 9 months have passed since 7 leaders of the Baha'i community in Iran were arrested and sent to prison with no access to legal counsel. Now the Iranian government has announced the 7 have been charged with espionage.
The move is the latest in decades of repressive measures against the Baha'is, the largest non-Islamic religious minority group in Iran. Those measures include barring Baha'is from attending public universities or working in public agencies, destroying or closing Baha'i places of worship, bulldozing Baha'i cemeteries, legally confiscating Baha'i property, and killing Baha'is with impunity.
Human Rights groups and others are outraged at the latest move by the Iranian government. Amnesty International said it considers the 2 women and 5 men accused of espionage by the regime to be prisoners of conscience held because of their beliefs or peaceful activities. Amnesty International expressed concern that the charges brought against the 7 could result in their execution.
The U.S.-based non-governmental organization Freedom House condemned the Iranian government for bringing the 7 Baha'is to trial on what it called "contrived" charges, and it demanded their immediate release. Earlier this month, a group of Iranian intellectuals living outside Iran signed a letter declaring they will be silent no longer in the face of the persecution of the Baha'is in their homeland.
In a written statement, U.S. State Department Acting spokesman Robert Wood condemned the Iranian government's decision to level what he called "baseless charges of espionage" against the 7 leaders of the Baha'i community in Iran. "The accusations against them," Wood said, "are part of the ongoing persecution of Baha'i in Iran."
"Thirty other Baha'i," noted Wood, "remain imprisoned in Iran solely on the basis of their religious belief."
Wood also expressed concern about other religious minorities who continue to be targeted by the government simply for what they believe. He cited the case of 3 Christians arrested in Tehran last month, as well as several members of the Gonabadi Dervishes, followers of Sufism, who were arrested on Kish Island in January.
Wood said the U.S. joins the international community in urging the Iranian authorities "to release all religious minorities who are currently in detention for peacefully exercising their human rights and fundamental freedoms."
Source: VOAMexican Governor Says He Was Not Shooting Target
Foreign Confidential....
The anarchy on America's doorstep appears to be intensifying.
As if to insult the intelligence of just about everyone, the governor of Mexico's most violent state said he was not the target of gunmen who opened fire on his convoy late Sunday night.
Jose Reyes Baeza Terrazas, governor of the northern state of Chihuahua, was uninjured when gunmen in a car fired at guards who were trailing him at some distance.
One of the governor's bodyguards died in the shootout, which occurred after Baeza's three-car convoy stopped at a signal in the state capital, also called Chihuahua. Two other bodyguards and one of the assailants were wounded.
Baeza, who was in the lead car, said shots were fired "many meters" behind him and aimed only at the trailing vehicle. He said "four or five" gunmen in a compact car never got close to him or gave chase when he drove off.
Heavily armed drug gangs have increasingly challenged the government on all levels, even ambushing troops sent to battle the cartels.
Baeza called on federal officials to investigate because he said the assailants fired high-powered weapons that Mexican law says can only be used by the military.
The convoy attack came two days after the police chief of Ciudad Juarez, the biggest city in Chihuahua, bowed to crime gang demands to resign because they threatened to kill at least one of his officers every 48 hours.North Korea Boosting Special Forces
South Korea says North Korea is enhancing its military strength by deploying a new missile and increasing its number of light and mobile elite forces.
As analysts warn of an imminent missile test by the North, officials in Seoul say Pyongyang's military remains a "serious threat."
Senior South Korean Defense Ministry official Shin Won-sik told reporters Monday North Korea has learned lessons from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
He said North Korea has boosted its special forces personnel by 50 percent since 2006, to 180,000 soldiers. In a possible conflict, he explained, those troops would focus on infiltrating South Korea quickly, to strike at U.S. and South Korean forces from behind.
The United States deploys about 28,000 military personnel here in South Korea to deter or defeat any repeat attempt of the North's 1950 invasion of the South.
Shin, who was presenting highlights of an annual South Korean defense white paper, said the point of Pyongyang's decision to boost special forces is confusion.
He said North Korea seems to want to blur the line between friend and foe in a conflict scenario. By spreading confusion, the North may believe it can compensate for its lack of advanced weaponry and other resources, Shin said.
The South Korean white paper says the North is also deploying a new kind of medium-range missile. The unnamed intermediate range ballistic missile announced on Monday has a range of about 3,000 km, putting U.S. military bases in Guam at risk. It has been deployed.
North Korea already has an extensive arsenal of medium-range missiles that can reach all of South Korea and most of Japan.
South Korea has been on high alert for several weeks, amid signs of a possibly imminent North Korean test of a long-range missile which could reach as far at the United States. A senior North Korean missile specialist with "Jane's Defense Weekly" warns the launch could be ready within days, by the looks of satellite imagery.
Escalating War of Words
North Korea is issuing more of what has become an almost daily stream of confrontational rhetoric. Pyongyang's official "Rodong Sinmun" newspaper Monday called conservative South Korean President Lee Myung-bak a "fascist dictator." It accuses him of pushing inter-Korean relations "to the phase of total collapse," and driving the situation "to the brink of war."
Lee ended 10 years of uncritical South Korean handouts to the impoverished North, saying future aid would be dependent on the North's progress in getting rid of its nuclear weapons.Pandemic of Anti-Semitism Threatens World Jewry
By Abraham H. Foxman
Coming just weeks after the explosion of global anti-Semitism that followed Israel’s military action in Gaza, the timing couldn’t have been better for the London Conference on Combating Anti-Semitism, held Feb. 16 and 17.
With Jewish communities around the world feeling insecure and vulnerable, with synagogues vandalized and an atmosphere of intimidation and fear permeating anti-Israel rallies, there was a sense that even though this conference had been months in the making, it was a propitious moment for deliberation and action.
Having just returned from the London meeting, where I chaired a working group on fighting anti-Semitism in the political sphere, I can say that there is at least a sliver of hope that these challenges can be met, that there is a willingness and a commitment by some in the international community who are ready to stand up and say “no” to anti-Semitism, and to put up a united front against bigotry and hatred.
More than 120 lawmakers from more than 40 nations spanning the globe came together to devise an effective framework and forge new strategies to confront anti-Semitism on a global scale.
Bleak Picture
This is the good news in an otherwise bleak picture, one that I fear is only going to get bleaker as world Diaspora Jewry faces this new threat.
Although the conference was planned months ago to deal with the growing and increasingly sophisticated manifestations of global anti-Semitism, it clearly took on much greater significance as a result of the pandemic of anti-Semitism that erupted during Israel’s Gaza offensive. As it happens, the Gaza reaction became the main focus of our discussions.
Let’s take a moment to revisit what happened in the weeks after Israel launched the Gaza offensive on Dec. 27.
It was as if the floodgates had been opened. Within days an open season had been declared on world Jewry. It started with criticism of Israel: Israel was wrong. Israel was evil. Israel was satanic and a violator of international human rights and international law. This theme quickly morphed into talk about war crimes and war tribunals.
In cities around the world, rhetoric at rallies and demonstrations against Israel reached a fever pitch with the most outrageous language imaginable and comparisons of Israelis and all Jews to Nazis, to Hitler, to swastikas. The language was unmistakable and ubiquitous -- the Star of David equals the swastika, the accusation that Gaza is the same as Auschwitz, the victims of the Holocaust are now the perpetrators of a new one. The shouts of “Jews to the Gas” -- shamelessly shouted in public, even in Fort Lauderdale, Fla. -- spread quickly across the Internet along with much worse expressions of hatred for Israel and Jews.
Nightmare in Caracas
Jewish communities felt pressure as never before. In Venezuela, the community of nearly 15,000 woke up to a nightmare of anti-Semitic expression aided and encouraged by President Hugo Chavez and his government, who expelled the Israeli ambassador and called on Jewish Venezuelans to renounce their allegiance to Israel. In Caracas, a synagogue was vandalized in an orgy of anti-Semitism: the Torah scrolls thrown to the floor, the walls daubed with anti-Jewish epithets and threats, the membership rolls stolen. The Venezuelan media and Web sites were filled with expressions of hatred for Israel and calls for Jews to be expelled from the country.
Venezuela was not an isolated case. Reports flooded in from Jewish communities around the world that were feeling similar pressures. European countries, including democratic, Western nations such as France, Belgium and Great Britain, witnessed an outpouring of hatred aimed at Jews. The hateful rhetoric at rallies often was followed by violence, sometimes by demonstrators, other times by unidentified perpetrators who aimed Molotov cocktails at synagogues and other visibly Jewish institutions and property.
This is why the word “pandemic” applies to what we are witnessing. Not only has it spread more widely than we have ever witnessed -- even during the second intifada, when Israel faced suicide bombings in the heart of Jerusalem, it was not this intense -- but it has metastasized with accusations of dual loyalty and Holocaust denial thrown into the mix.
This is the worst, the most intense, the most global hatred aimed at Jews in most of our memories. When was the last time we can remember Jews being beaten in the street, as happened in the United Kingdom, where 220 incidents were reported during the three weeks of Israel’s military operation, an eight-fold increase compared to the same period a year ago?
Likewise, in Amsterdam, Antwerp, Athens, Barcelona, Berlin, Caracas, Florence, Montevideo and Paris, Jews have been beaten on the street, synagogues have been firebombed and desecrated, and Jewish institutions, businesses and homes have been attacked.
And for what reason? Because Israel, a sovereign nation, sought to defend itself from the constant barrage of Hamas missiles threatening its cities.
Today, the sense of urgency has never been greater. We are fortunate to have a commitment from some leaders, those who gathered in London and others who have taken the time to understand the nature of the threat. From this I hope will come government action to put a damper on anti-Semitism.
Abraham H. Foxman is national director of the Anti-Defamation League and author of The Deadliest Lies: The Israel Lobby and the Myth of Jewish Control.Business Interest Behind Schroeder's Iran Trip
Foreign Confidential....
German political sources say there was a business interest behind Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder's meeting with Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and other Iranian officials.
The meetings were criticized today by a German Jewish leader and members of Schroeder’s own Social Democratic Party.
Ahmadinejad has repeatedly said the Holocaust is a “myth,” and called for the destruction of Israel.
Holocaust denial is a crime in Germany. Schroeder said the Holocaust was a “historical fact,” in a Feb. 21 speech in Tehran before meeting with Ahmadinejad, according to Agence France-Presse.
Iran's offer to form a nuclear consortium is acceptable and should be followed up, Schroeder said in a Saturday meeting with Iranian Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani in Tehran.
Schroeder's meeting with Ahmadinejad took place behind closed doors; the atmosphere was "cool and tense," according to a Schroeder spokesperson.
Tuesday, 24 February 2009
The following editorial reflects the views of the United States government.
Posts
