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PHOTOS AND DOCUMENTS   CLICK ON ANY PICTURE TO ENLARGE CLICK HERE TO VIEW DOCUMENTS See how these photos tie together visit our home page -  Pre-World War II Amin Al Husseini as officer of Ottoman Empire - 1915   1931 Amin Al Husseini is founder and President of the World Islamic Congress. After WWII, it will actively shape the agenda of the Muslim world. 1920 - Jerusalem, Palestine. Amin Al Husseini inciting the riots that pitted Palestinian Arab against Palestinian Jew.     World War II Muslim Soldiers reading German Propaganda. The name of the book isIslam Und Judentum (Islam and Judaism in German) Amin Al Husseini with one of his Nazi Muslim Troops - 1943 Hanzar SS Division. Amin Al Husseini meets Heinrich Himmler, Head of Nazi SS.     Berlin-1942 Amin Al Husseini spends WWII by Hitler's side. Amin Al Husseini inspecting Nazi Muslim troops - 1943   Nazi officer inspecting Muslim Bosnian SS troops.   Rashid Amin Al Husseini inspects his Muslim Nazi Hanzar troops 1943 Nazi propaganda poster featuring Amin Al Husseini recruiting young Muslims. Muslim soldiers with hat showing Nazi insigna- WW II. Bosnian Nazi Muslim Flag under Amin Al Husseini - 1943 Amin Al Husseini in Berlin during World War II. Amin Al Hussseini meets Croat Nazi A.Artukovic and M,Budak, planning Serbian genocide. Amin Al Husseini inspecting his Nazi Muslim troops- 1943 Bosnian Soldier posting picture of Amin Al Husseini - 1943 Amin Al Husseini at Nazi meeting in Berlin  during WW II. Muslim Nazi troops in traditional Muslim prayer -1943 Muslim Nazi troops in traditional Muslim prayer -1943   Amin Al Husseini Head of SS Muslim Hanzar Division Amin Al Husseini Head of SS Muslim Hanzar Division Amin Al Husseini Head of SS Muslim Hanzar Division   Amin Al Husseini Head of SS Muslim Hanzar Division Amin Al Husseini Head of SS Muslim Hanzar Division Amin Al Husseini Head of SS Muslim Hanzar Division POST World War II Amin al Husseini at Arab League meeting at its creation- 1944   1946. Key Picture of Amin Al Husseini with the Muslim Leaders of Post-WWII era. 1951. Karachi, Pakistan. Pakistan 1951. Amin Al Husseini is guest of honor as President of World Islamic Congress.   Karachi, Pakistan. 1951. Amin Al Husseini with Egyptian President Nasser. Leading and representing the Muslim Community: Amin Al Husseini.   1969. Amin Al Husseini with Prime Minister of Malaysia Rahman, First Secretary-General of (OIC) Organisation of Islamic Conferences.. 1966. Karachi, Pakistan. Amin Al Husseini continues to be central figure in Pakistani leadership.   1970. Karachi, Pakistan. Husseini with Pakistani leader.   Yasser Arafat (far-right) at Amin Al Husseini's funeral (with Mufti of Lebanon). 1974 Palestinian soldiers under Yasser Arafat doing Nazi salute- today   Mein Kampf by Adolf Hitler. Distributed by Palestinian Authority- 2003   DOCUMENTS Here is a premiliminary list of documents. This list will be updated often so please check back. Minutes of the meeting with Hitler and Husseini. H.I.M. Haile Selassie's appeal to The League of Nations against the Fascist invasion of Ethiopia 1936 - RETURN TO MENU -   Minutes of the meeting with Hitler and Husseini. Source: Documents on German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D, Vol XIII, London, 1964, pp.881 ff. German Chancellor Adolf Hitler and Grand Mufti Haj Amin al-Husseini: Zionism and the Arab Cause (November 28, 1941) Haj Amin al-Husseini, the most influential leader of Palestinian Arabs, lived in Germany during the Second World War. He met Hitler, Ribbentrop and other Nazi leaders on various occasions and attempted to coordinate Nazi and Arab policies in the Middle East. Record of the Conversation between the Fuhrer and the Grand Mufti of Jerusalem on November 28, 1941, in the Presence of Reich Foreign Minister and Minister Grobba in Berlin. The Grand Mufti began by thanking the Fuhrer for the great honor he had bestowed by receiving him. He wished to seize the opportunity to convey to the Fuhrer of the Greater German Reich, admired by the entire Arab world, his thanks of the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and especially the Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear expression in his public speeches. The Arab countries were firmly convinced that Germany would win the war and that the Arab cause would then prosper. The Arabs were Germany's natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely the English, the Jews, and the Communists. Therefore they were prepared to cooperate with Germany with all their hearts and stood ready to participate in the war, not only negatively by the commission of acts of sabotage and the instigation of revolutions, but also positively by the formation of an Arab Legion. The Arabs could be more useful to Germany as allies than might be apparent at first glance, both for geographical reasons and because of the suffering inflicted upon them by the English and the Jews. Furthermore, they had had close relations with all Moslem nations, of which they could make use in behalf of the common cause. The Arab Legion would be quite easy to raise. An appeal by the Mufti to the Arab countries and the prisoners of Arab, Algerian, Tunisian, and Moroccan nationality in Germany would produce a great number of volunteers eager to fight. Of Germany's victory the Arab world was firmly convinced, not only because the Reich possessed a large army, brave soldiers, and military leaders of genius, but also because the Almighty could never award the victory to an unjust cause. In this struggle, the Arabs were striving for the independence and unity of Palestine, Syria, and Iraq. They had the fullest confidence in the Fuhrer and looked to his hand for the balm on their wounds, which had been inflicted upon them by the enemies of Germany. The Mufti then mentioned the letter he had received from Germany, which stated that Germany was holding no Arab territories and understood and recognized the aspirations to independence and freedom of the Arabs, just as she supported the elimination of the Jewish national home. A public declaration in this sense would be very useful for its propagandistic effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It would rouse the Arabs from their momentary lethargy and give them new courage. It would also ease the Mufti's work of secretly organizing the Arabs against the moment when they could strike. At the same time, he could give the assurance that the Arabs would in strict discipline patiently wait for the right moment and only strike upon an order form Berlin. With regard to the events in Iraq, the Mufti observed that the Arabs in that country certainly had by no means been incited by Germany to attack England, but solely had acted in reaction to a direct English assault upon their honor. The Turks, he believed, would welcome the establishment of an Arab government in the neighboring territories because they would prefer weaker Arab to strong European governments in the neighboring countries and, being themselves a nations of 7 million, they had moreover nothing to fear from the 1,700,000 Arabs inhabiting Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, and Palestine. France likewise would have no objections to the unification plan because she had conceded independence to Syria as early as 1936 and had given her approval to the unification of Iraq and Syria under King Faisal as early as 1933. In these circumstances he was renewing his request that the Fuhrer make a public declaration so that the Arabs would not lose hope, which is so powerful a force in the life of nations. With such hope in their hearts the Arabs, as he had said, were willing to wait. They were not pressing for immediate realization for their aspirations; they could easily wait half a year or a whole year. But if they were not inspired with such a hope by a declaration of this sort, it could be expected that the English would be the gainers from it. The Fuhrer replied that Germany's fundamental attitude on these questions, as the Mufti himself had already stated, was clear. Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine, which was nothing other than a center, in the form of a state, for the exercise of destructive influence by Jewish interests. Germany was also aware that the assertion that the Jews were carrying out the functions of economic pioneers in Palestine was a lie. The work there was done only by the Arabs, not by the Jews. Germany was resolved, step by step, to ask one European nation after the other to solve its Jewish problem, and at the proper time to direct a similar appeal to non-European nations as well. Germany was at the present time engaged in a life and death struggle with two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain and Soviet Russia. Theoretically there was a difference between England's capitalism and Soviet Russia's communism; actually, however, the Jews in both countries were pursuing a common goal. This was the decisive struggle; on the political plane, it presented itself in the main as a conflict between Germany and England, but ideologically it was a battle between National Socialism and the Jews. It went without saying that Germany would furnish positive and practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle, because platonic promises were useless in a war for survival or destruction in which the Jews were able to mobilize all of England's power for their ends. The aid to the Arabs would have to be material aid. Of how little help sympathies alone were in such a battle had been demonstrated plainly by the operation in Iraq, where circumstances had not permitted the rendering of really effective, practical aid. In spite of all the sympathies, German aid had not been sufficient and Iraq was overcome by the power of Britain, that is, the guardian of the Jews. The Mufti could not but be aware, however, that the outcome of the struggle going on at present would also decide the fate of the Arab world. The Fuhrer therefore had to think and speak coolly and deliberately, as a rational man and primarily as a soldier, as the leader of the German and allied armies. Everything of a nature to help in this titanic battle for the common cause, and thus also for the Arabs, would have to be done. Anything however, that might contribute to weakening the military situation must be put aside, no matter how unpopular this move might be. Germany was now engaged in very severe battles to force the gateway to the northern Caucasus region. The difficulties were mainly with regard to maintaining the supply, which was most difficult as a result of the destruction of railroads and highways as well as the oncoming winter. If at such a moment, the Fuhrer were to raise the problem of Syria in a declaration, those elements in France which were under de Gaulle's influence would receive new strength. They would interpret the Fuhrer's declaration as an intention to break up France's colonial empire and appeal to their fellow countrymen that they should rather make common cause with the English to try to save what still could be saved. A German declaration regarding Syria would in France be understood to refer to the French colonies in general, and that would at the present time create new troubles in western Europe, which means that a portion of the German armed forces would be immobilized in the west and no longer be available for the campaign in the east. The Fuhrer then made the following statement to the Mufti, enjoining him to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart: 1. He (the Fuhrer) would carry on the battle to the total destruction of the Judeo-Communist empire in Europe. 2. At some moment which was impossible to set exactly today but which in any event was not distant, the German armies would in the course of this struggle reach the southern exit from Caucasia. 3. As soon as this had happened, the Fuhrer would on his own give the Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation had arrived. Germany's objective would then be solely the destruction of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection of British power. In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative spokesman for the Arab world. It would then be his task to set off the Arab operations, which he had secretly prepared. When that time had come, Germany could also be indifferent to French reaction to such a declaration. Once Germany had forced open the road to Iran and Iraq through Rostov; it would be also the beginning of the end of the British World Empire. He (the Fuhrer) hoped that the coming year would make it possible for Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate to the Middle East. For the good of their common cause, it would be better if the Arab proclamation were put off for a few more months than if Germany were to create difficulties for herself without being able thereby to help the Arabs. He (the Fuhrer) fully appreciated the eagerness of the Arabs for a public declaration of the sort requested by the Grand Mufti. But he would beg him to consider that he (the Fuhrer) himself was the Chief of State of the German Reich for five long years during which he was unable to make to his own homeland the announcement of its liberation. He had to wait with that until the announcement could be made on the basis of a situation brought about by the force of arms that the Anschluss had been carried out. The moment that Germany's tank divisions and air squadrons had made their appearance south of the Caucasus, the public appeal requested by the Grand Mufti could go out to the Arab world. The Grand Mufti replied that it was his view that everything would come to pass just as the Fuhrer had indicated. He was fully reassured and satisfied by the words which he had heard form the Chief of the German State. He asked, however, whether it would not be possible, secretly at least, to enter into an agreement with Germany of the kind he had just outlined for the Fuhrer. The Fuhrer replied that he had just now given the Grand Mufti precisely that confidential declaration. The Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion that he was taking his leave from the Fuhrer in full confidence and with reiterated thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause. SCHMIDT - Return to top -  H.I.M.  HAILE SELASSIE ‘S APPEAL TO THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AGAINST THE FASCIST INVASION OF ETHIOPIA 1936 I, Haile Selassie I, Emperor of Ethiopia, am here today to claim that justice  which is due to my people, and the assistance promised to it eight months  ago, when fifty nations asserted that aggression had been committed in  violation of international treaties. There is no precedent for a Head of State himself speaking in this assembly.  But there is also no precedent for a people being victim of such injustice  and being at present threatened by abandonment to its aggressor. Also,  there has never before been an example of any Government proceeding to  the systematic extermination of a nation by barbarous means, in violation of  the most solemn promises made by the nations of the earth that there should  not be used against innocent human beings the terrible poison of harmful  gases. It is to defend a people struggling for its age-old independence that  the head of the Ethiopian Empire has come to Geneva to fulfil this supreme  duty, after having himself fought at the head of his armies. I pray to Almighty God that He may spare nations the terrible sufferings that  have just been inflicted on my people, and of which the chiefs who  accompany me here have been the horrified witnesses. It is my duty to inform the Governments assembled in Geneva, responsible  as they are for the lives of millions of men, women and children, of the deadly  peril which threatens them, by describing to them the fate which has been  suffered by Ethiopia. It is not only upon warriors that the Italian Government has made war. It has  above all attacked populations far removed from hostilities, in order to  terrorize and exterminate them. At the beginning, towards the end of 1935, Italian aircraft hurled upon my  armies bombs of tear-gas. Their effects were but slight. The soldiers learned  to scatter, waiting until the wind had rapidly dispersed the poisonous gases.  The Italian aircraft then resorted to mustard gas. Barrels of liquid were hurled  upon armed groups. But this means also was not effective; the liquid affected  only a few soldiers, and barrels upon the ground were themselves a warning  to troops and to the population of the danger. It was at the time when the operations for the encircling of Makalle were  taking place that the Italian command, fearing a rout, followed the procedure  which it is now my duty to denounce to the world. Special sprayers were  installed on board aircraft so that they could vaporize, over vast areas of  territory, a fine, death-dealing rain. Groups of nine, fifteen, eighteen aircraft  followed one another so that the fog issuing from them formed a continuous  sheet. It was thus that, as from the end of January, 1936, soldiers, women,  children, cattle, rivers, lakes and pastures were drenched continually with  this deadly rain. In order to kill off systematically all living creatures, in order  to more surely to poison waters and pastures, the Italian command made its  aircraft pass over and over again. That was its chief method of warfare. Ravage and Terror The very refinement of barbarism consisted in carrying ravage and terror  into the most densely populated parts of the territory, the points farthest  removed from the scene of hostilities. The object was to scatter fear and  death over a great part of the Ethiopian territory. These fearful tactics succeeded. Men and animals succumbed. The deadly  rain that fell from the aircraft made all those whom it touched fly shrieking with  pain. All those who drank the poisoned water or ate the infected food also  succumbed in dreadful suffering. In tens of thousands, the victims of the  Italian mustard gas fell. It is in order to denounce to the civilized world the  tortures inflicted upon the Ethiopian people that I resolved to come to Geneva.  None other than myself and my brave companions in arms could bring the  League of Nations the undeniable proof. The appeals of my delegates  addressed to the League of Nations had remained without any answer; my  delegates had not been witnesses. That is why I decided to come myself to  bear witness against the crime perpetrated against my people and give Europe  a warning of the doom that awaits it, if it should bow before the accomplished  fact. Is it necessary to remind the Assembly of the various stages of the Ethiopian  drama? For 20 years past, either as Heir Apparent, Regent of the Empire, or  as Emperor, I have never ceased to use all my efforts to bring my country the  benefits of civilization, and in particular to establish relations of good  neighbourliness with adjacent powers. In particular I succeeded in concluding  with Italy the Treaty of Friendship of 1928, which absolutely prohibited the  resort, under any pretext whatsoever, to force of arms, substituting for force  and pressure the conciliation and arbitration on which civilized nations have  based international order. Country More United In its report of October 5th 193S, the Committee of Thirteen recognized my  effort and the results that I had achieved. The Governments thought that the  entry of Ethiopia into the League, whilst giving that country a new guarantee  for the maintenance of her territorial integrity and independence, would help  her to reach a higher level of civilization. It does not seem that in Ethiopia  today there is more disorder and insecurity than in 1923. On the contrary, the  country is more united and the central power is better obeyed. I should have procured still greater results for my people if obstacles of every  kind had not been put in the way by the Italian Government, the Government  which stirred up revolt and armed the rebels. Indeed the Rome Government,  as it has today openly proclaimed, has never ceased to prepare for the conquest  of Ethiopia. The Treaties of Friendship it signed with me were not sincere; their  only object was to hide its real intention from me. The Italian Goverment asserts  that for 14 years it has been preparing for its present conquest. It therefore  recognizes today that when it supported the admission of Ethiopia to the League  of Nations in 1923, when it concluded the Treaty of Friendship in 1928, when it  signed the Pact of Paris outlawing war, it was deceiving the whole world.  The Ethiopian Government was, in these solemn treaties, given additional  guarantees of security which would enable it to achieve further progress along  the specific path of reform on which it had set its feet, and to which it was  devoting all its strength and all its heart. Wal-Wal Pretext The Wal-Wal incident, in December, 1934, came as a thunderbolt to me. The  Italian provocation was obvious and I did not hesitate to appeal to the League of  Nations. I invoked the provisions of the treaty of 1928, the principles of the  Covenant; I urged the procedure of conciliation and arbitration.  Unhappily for Ethiopia this was the time when a certain Government considered  that the European situation made it imperative at all costs to obtain the friendship  of Italy. The price paid was the abandonment of Ethiopian independence to the greed of the Italian Government. This secret agreement, contrary to the  obligations of the Covenant, has exerted a great influence over the course of  events. Ethiopia and the whole world have suffered and are still suffering today its  disastrous consequences. This first violation of the Covenant was followed by many others. Feeling  itself encouraged in its policy against Ethiopia, the Rome Government  feverishly made war preparations, thinking that the concerted pressure which was beginning to be exerted on the Ethiopian Government, might perhaps not overcome the resistance of my people to Italian domination.  The time had to come, thus all sorts of difficulties were placed in the way with a  view to breaking up the procedure; of conciliation and arbitration. All kinds of  obstacles were placed in the way of that procedure. Governments tried to  prevent the Ethiopian Government from finding arbitrators amongst their  nationals: when once the arbitral tribunal a was set up pressure was exercised  so that an award favourable to Italy should be given. All this was in vain: the arbitrators, two of whom were Italian officials, were  forced to recognize unanimously that in the Wal-Wal incident, as in the  subsequent incidents, no international responsibility was to be attributed to Ethiopia. Peace Efforts Following on this award. the Ethiopian Government sincerely thought that an era  of friendly relations might be opened with Italy. I loyally offered my hand to the  Roman Government. The Assembly was informed by the report of the Committee of Thirteen, dated  October 5th, 1935, of the details of the events which occurred after the month of  December, 1934, and up to October 3rd, 1935. It will be sufficient if I quote a few of the conclusions of that report Nos. 24, 25 and  26 "The Italian memorandum (containing the complaints made by Italy) was laid on  the Council table on September 4th, 1935, whereas Ethiopia's first appeal to the  Council had been made on December 14th, 1934. In the interval between these two  dates, the Italian Government opposed the consideration of the question by the  Council on the ground that the only appropriate procedure was that provided for in  the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1928. Throughout the whole of that period, moreover,  the despatch of Italian troops to East Africa was proceeding. These shipments of  troops were represented to the Council by the Italian Government as necessary for  the defense of its colonies menaced by Ethiopia's preparations. Ethiopia, on the  contrary, drew attention to the official pronouncements made in Italy which, in its  opinion, left no doubt "as to the hostile intentions of the Italian Government."  From the outset of the dispute, the Ethiopian Government has sought a settlement  by peaceful means. It has appealed to the procedures of the Covenant. The Italian  Government desiring to keep strictly to the procedures of the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty  of 1928, the Ethiopian Government assented. It invariably stated that it would  faithfully carry out the arbitral award even if the decision went against it. It agreed  that the question of the ownership of Wal-Wal should not be dealt with by the  arbitrators, because the Italian Government would not agree to such a course. It  asked the Council to despatch neutral observers and offered to lend itself to any  enquiries upon which the Council might decide. Once the Wal-Wal dispute had been settled by arbiration, however, the Italian  Govemmcnt submitted its detailed memorandum to the Council in support of its claim  to liberty of action. It asserted that a case like that of Ethiopia cannot be settled by  the means provided by the Covenant. It stated that, "since this question affects vital interest and is of primary importance  to Italian security and civilization" it "would be failing in its most elementary duty,  did it not cease once and for all to place any confidence in Ethiopia, reserving full  liberty to adopt any measures that may become necessary to ensure the safety of its  colonies and to safeguard its own interests." Covenant Violated Those are the terms of the report of the Committee of Thirteen, The Council  and the Assembly unanimously adopted the conclusion that the Italian  Government had violated the Covenant and was in a state of aggression.  I did not hesitate to declare that I did not wish for war, that it was imposed  upon me, and I should struggle solely for the independence and integrity of  my people, and that in that struggle I was the defender of the cause of all  small States exposed to the greed of a powerful neighbour. In October, 1935. the 52 nations who are listening to me today gave me an  assurance that the aggressor would not triumph, that the resources of the  Covenant would be employed in order to ensure the reign of right and the  failure of violence. I ask the fifty-two nations not to forget today the policy upon which they  embarked eight months ago, and on faith of which I directed the resistance  of my people against the aggressor whom they had denounced to the world.  Despite the inferiority of my weapons, the complete lack of aircraft, artillery,  munitions, hospital services, my confidence in the League was absolute. I  thought it to be impossible that fifty-two nations, including the most powerful  in the world, should be successfully opposed by a single aggressor. Counting  on the faith due to treaties, I had made no preparation for war, and that is  the case with certain small countries in Europe. When the danger became more urgent, being aware of my responsibilities  towards my people, during the first six months of 1935 I tried to acquire  armaments. Many Governments proclaimed an embargo to prevent my doing  so, whereas the Italian Government through the Suez Canal, was given all  facilities for transporting without cessation and without protest, troops, arms,  and munitions. Forced to Mobilize On October 3rd, 1935, the Italian troops invaded my territory. A few hours  later only I decreed general mobilization. In my desire to maintain peace I  had, following the example of a great country in Europe on the eve of the  Great War, caused my troops to withdraw thirty kilometres so as to remove  any pretext of provocation. War then took place in the atrocious conditions which I have laid before the Assembly. In that unequal struggle between a Government commanding  more than forty-two million inhabitants, having at its disposal financial,  industrial and technical means which enabled it to create unlimited  quantities of the most death-dealing weapons, and, on the other hand, a  small people of twelve million inhabitants, without arms, without resources  having on its side only the justice of its own cause and the promise of the  League of Nations. What real assistance was given to Ethiopia by the fifty  two nations who had declared the Rome Government guilty of a breach of  the Covenant and had undertaken to prevent the triumph of the aggressor?  Has each of the States Members, as it was its duty to do in virtue of its signature appended to Article 15 of the Covenant, considered the aggressor  as having committed an act of war personally directed against itself? I had  placed all my hopes in the execution of these undertakings. My confidence  had been confirmed by the repeated declarations made in the Council to the  effect that aggression must not be rewarded, and that force would end by  being compelled to bow before right. In December, 1935, the Council made it quite clear that its feelings were in  harmony with those of hundreds of millions of people who, in all parts of the  world, had protested against the proposal to dismember Ethiopia. It was  constantly repeated that there was not merely a conflict between the Italian  Government and the League of Nadons, and that is why I personally refused  all proposals to my personal advantage made to me by the Italian Government,  if only I would betray my people and the Covenant of the League of Nations.  I was defending the cause of all small peoples who are threatened with aggression. What of Promises? What have become of the promises made to me as long ago as October,  1935? I noted with grief, but without surprise that three Powers considered  their undertakings under the Covenant as absolutely of no value. Their  connections with Italy impelled them to refuse to take any measures  whatsoever in order to stop Italian aggression. On the contrary, it was a  profound disappointment to me to learn the attitude of a certain Government  which, whilst ever protesting its scrupulous attachment to the Covenant,  has tirelessly used all its efforts to prevent its observance. As soon as any  measure which was likely to be rapidly effective was proposed, various  pretexts were devised in order to postpone even consideration of the  measure. Did the secret agreements of January, 1935, provide for this  tireless obstruction? The Ethiopian Government never expected other Governments to shed  their soldiers' blood to defend the Covenant when their own immediately  personal interests were not at stake. Ethiopian warriors asked only for means to defend themselves. On many occasions I have asked for financial  assistance for the purchase of arms That assistance has been constantly  refused me. What, then, in practice, is the meaning of Article 16 of the Covenant and of collective security? The Ethiopian Government's use of the railway from Djibouti to Addis Ababa  was in practice a hazardous regards transport of arms intended for the Ethiopian forces. At the present moment this is the chief, if not the only means of supply of the Italian armies of occupation. The rules of neutrality  should have prohibited transports intended for Italian forces, but there is  not even neutrality since Article 16 lays upon every State Member of the  League the duty not to remain a neutral but to come to the aid not of the  aggressor but of the victim of aggression. Has the Covenant been  respected? Is it today being respected? Finally a statement has just been made in their Parliaments by the  Governments of certain Powers, amongst them the most influential members  of the League of Nations, that since the aggressor has succeeded in  occupying a large part of Ethiopian territory they propose not to continue  the application of any economic and financial measures that may have  been decided upon against the Italian Government. These are the circumstances in which at the request of the Argentine  Government, the Assembly of the League of Nations meets to consider  the situation created by Italian aggression. I assert that the problem submitted to the Assembly today is a much wider  one. It is not merely a question of the settlement of Italian aggression. League Threatened It is collective security: it is the very existence of the League of Nations.  It is the confidence that each State is to place in international treaties. It  is the value of promises made to small States that their integrity and their  independence shall be respected and ensured. It is the principle of the  equality of States on the one hand, or otherwise the obligation laid upon  smail Powers to accept the bonds of vassalship. In a word, it is international  morality that is at stake. Have the signatures appended to a Treaty value  only in so far as the signatory Powers have a personal, direct and immediate  interest involved? No subtlety can change the problem or shift the grounds of the discussion.  It is in all sincerity that I submit these considerations to the Assembly. At a  time when my people are threatened with extermination, when the support of  the League may ward off the final blow, may I be allowed to speak with  complete frankness, without reticence, in all directness such as is  demanded by the rule of equality as between all States Members of the  League? Apart from the Kingdom of the Lord there is not on this earth any nation  that is superior to any other. Should it happen that a strong Government  finds it may with impunity destroy a weak people, then the hour strikes for  that weak people to appeal to the League of Nations to give its judgment  in all freedom. God and history will remember your judgment. Assistance Refused I have heard it asserted that the inadequate sanctions already applied  have not achieved their object. At no time, and under no circumstances could sanctions that were intentionally inadequate, intentionally badly  applied, stop an aggressor. This is not a case of the impossibility of  stopping an aggressor but of the refusal to stop an aggressor. When  Ethiopia requested and requests that she should be given financial  assistance, was that a measure which it was impossible to apply whereas  financial assistance of the League has been granted, even in times of  peace, to two countries and exactly to two countries who have refused  to apply sanctions against the aggressor? Faced by numerous violations by the Italian Government of all international  treaties that prohibit resort to arms, and the use of barbarous methods of  warfare, it is my painful duty to note that the initiative has today been  taken with a view to raising sanctions. Does this initiative not mean in  practice the abandonment of Ethiopia to the aggressor? On the very eve  of the day when I was about to attempt a supreme effort in the defense of  my people before this Assembly does not this initiative deprive Ethiopia of  one of her last chances to succeed in obtaining the support and guarantee  of States Members? Is that the guidance the League of Nations and each  of the States Members are entitled to expect from the great Powers when  they assert their right and their duty to guide the action of the League? Placed by the aggressor face to face with the accomplished fact, are  States going to set up the terrible precendent of bowing before force?  Your Assembly will doubtless have laid before it proposals for the reform  of the Covenant and for rendering more effective the guarantee of  collective security. Is it the Covenant that needs reform? What undertakings  can have any value if the will to keep them is lacking? It is international morality which is at stake and not the Articles of the Covenant.  On behalf of the Ethiopian people, a member of the League of Nations, I  request the Assembly to take all measures proper to ensure respect for the  Covenant. I renew my protest against the violations of treaties of which the  Ethiopian people has been the victim. I declare in the face of the whole world that the Emperor, the Government and the people of Ethiopia will not  bow before force; that they maintain their claims that they will use all means  in their power to ensure the triumph of right and the respect of the Covenant. I ask the fifty-two nations, who have given the Ethiopian people a promise  to help them in their resistance to the aggressor, what are they willing to do  for Ethiopia? And the great Powers who have promised the guarantee of  collective security to small States on whom weighs the threat that they may  one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia, I ask what measures do you intend to take?  Representatives of the World I have come to Geneva to discharge in your  midst the most painful of the duties of the head of a State. What reply shall I  have to take back to my people? June, 1936. -RETURN TO THE TOP-