Sunday, 15 February 2009

SUNDAY TELEGRAPH   15.2.09


1. A sorry parade of bankers can't put things right
The Government wrecked both our private and our public finances and 
if Gordon Brown doesn't get a better grip of the banking industry, 
the IMF will have to do it for him, says Michael Fallon.

By Michael Fallon MP


'We are profoundly and, I think I can say, unreservedly, sorry at the 
turn of events" was how the former chairman of HBOS put it. "I think 
I can say, unreservedly"? "The turn of events"? Only somebody as 
deeply immersed in the British establishment as Lord Stevenson of 
Coddenham could get away with destroying a great British bank, taking 
£17 billion of taxpayers' money, and then offering up the kind of 
shaded apology more appropriate for somebody caught out by a sudden 
cold snap.

This won't do, and the parade of hapless bankers in front of the 
Treasury Committee last week did not give us the answers we need to 
the crisis in British banking. Instead, we were shown a sorry picture 
of a sales-driven, deals-driven, bonus-driven culture wholly alien 
from the banks our fathers knew.

This isn't a crisis of capitalism. It is governments that control 
credit through their central banks and control capital through their 
regulators. It was this Government that encouraged borrowing, 
neglected saving, and ran up such a huge deficit in the public 
finances. Gordon Brown was responsible. He took banking supervision 
away from the Bank of England and ordered it to track inflation 
without reference to asset prices. His Government signed up to 
banking capital rules that fuelled the boom and allowed lazy 
directors to fall back upon self-serving credit rating agencies.

He had every interest in fuelling the credit boom. In 10 years he was 
able to double public expenditure on the proceeds, using stamp duty 
from the housing bubble, and income tax on those City bonuses to puff 
up our bloated public sector. He certainly wasn't bothered about 
tighter regulation. Quite the contrary: in a now-forgotten speech to 
the Wall Street Journal in November 2003 he argued: "Capital markets 
can and should help us manage risk more effectively between sectors, 
over time and across national boundaries . there is a need to remove 
barriers to diversification of investments across borders." He kept 
urging Europe to become more like America; he wanted more Lehmans here.

In the end, this was a failure of regulation and of government. Take 
Brown's own creation, the Financial Services Authority (FSA). This 
super-quango employs 2,500 staff, costs us a staggering £415 million 
a year, and is supposed to supervise the banks. So far, five out of 
the big 10 banks have crashed - that's some supervision.

Why weren't warnings enforced? Why didn't the FSA step in to block 
over-priced acquisitions? Why did they tolerate such enormous funding 
gaps? People such as Lord Stevenson became chairmen of these huge 
banking conglomerates without any financial qualifications. The FSA 
slept through Northern Rock, didn't challenge the Scottish banks, 
failed to warn about Iceland.

Above it sat the much vaunted Tripartite - FSA, Bank of England and 
Treasury, bound together in mystical confusion. Nobody was in charge; 
for 10 years they hardly met. The Chancellor,  - Brown - nominally 
its chairman, first learnt of the crisis engulfing Northern Rock from 
the newspapers. The result was that nobody really controlled lending. 
Following its government remit, the Bank of England made credit far 
too cheap and easy; British bankers lent it around the world, and 
came back for more.

But 10 years ago, the amount British banks lent out was matched by 
what they held on deposit.  [That was part of the "dreadfu;" Tory 
misrule, I suppose -cs] By 2008 they were lending £625 billion more 
than they had in. That's the funding gap that lies at the heart of 
this crisis; to bridge it, they depended on the wholesale markets and 
those exotic securitisation products they didn't really understand.

HBOS's Sir James Crosby drove up its loan to deposit ratio to 180 per 
cent - before he departed to become deputy chairman of the FSA. 
Barclays' funding gap soared from £26 billion to £76 billion in just 
three years. One third of the total funding gap of the big six banks, 
£164 billion, was down to one bank alone - Royal Bank of Scotland.

Indeed, HBOS, run by Brown's favourite banker, bet 40 per cent of its 
loan book on property and construction. It even took equity stakes in 
the businesses it was banking, thus conflicting its own interests. 
Remarkably, Britain's biggest property lender "did not foresee the 
deterioration in asset values that took place, it's as simple as 
that", simple Stevenson told us.

These were British mistakes, made under British supervision, nothing 
to do with the sub-prime lending in the United States. Not all banks 
were so blind. HSBC does not lend more than it holds on deposit, 
anywhere in the world; it hasn't asked for a pound of taxpayer help.

Putting this right is not too difficult. We must replace Brown's 
failed FSA. We need rules that prevent booms, boards of directors who 
understand risk, remuneration that does not distort judgment about 
controls, supervisors who will enforce.

Meantime, the Government is repeating its mistakes. To save Scottish 
jobs, HBOS was merged with Lloyds over a weekend without any due 
diligence. Billions went into these banks before the books were 
properly checked. This weekend, the £17 billion the taxpayer ploughed 
into Lloyds and HBOS is worth only £4.6 billion. Billions were also 
wasted last year in stamp duty relief, encouraging young couples to 
buy into a falling market, and on a meaningless cut in VAT - begging 
the rich to buy new Land Rovers. The Bank has cut rates to the bone, 
without waiting for each cut to take effect.

Now they're going to print more money and call it "quantitative 
easing". The last refuge of a scoundrel government is to subvert the 
currency, storing up inflation for the future. We've been here 
before: Labour pushed inflation to 25 per cent in 1975 and it took 
years of pain to squeeze it out of the system again.

This is a government that has now wrecked both our private and our 
public finances. And nationalising yet another bank, Lloyds, with 
more taxpayer billions will further wreck the credibility of 
sterling. If Gordon Brown cannot get a better grip of our banking 
industry and our public finances, then we'll be following Iceland and 
Serbia to the IMF and they'll do it for us.
----------------------------------------
Michael Fallon is MP for Sevenoaks and deputy chairman of the 
Treasury Select Committee
============

2. HBOS: Another debacle that will cost the taxpayer billions  
[Leading article]
Telegraph View: With so many political cross currents muddying the 
waters, it is unsurprising that the Lloyds/HBOS marriage has proved 
disastrous.

The malaise afflicting British financial institutions has taken a 
sharp turn for the worse, with Lloyds Banking Group forecasting an 
£11 billion loss for its subsidiary HBOS. This news provoked a fall 
on Friday afternoon of more than 32 per cent in its shares, to 61.4p, 
pulling down other banking stocks in its wake - Royal Bank of 
Scotland dropped 9.2 per cent - while the pound fell more than a cent 
against the dollar. These are extraordinary events which the public 
watches with concern and exasperation. How can this have happened?

Such huge losses look certain to lead to further pain for the 
taxpayer, already the reluctant subsidiser of financial institutions 
which, only a year ago, boasted themselves masters of the universe. 
The Government is expected by some to take majority ownership 
(controlling more than 50 per cent) of sickly Lloyds, although the 
Chancellor, Alistair Darling, says he wants to avoid full-blooded 
nationalisation.

To understand this appalling situation, it is necessary to examine 
how and why the Lloyds/HBOS merger was brokered - and by whom. 
Initially, it seemed fraught with too many obstacles. Lloyds TSB was 
leery of being subjected to a 12-month competition investigation. 
That problem was dispelled at a drinks party in the City last 
September 15, when the Prime Minister told Sir Victor Blank, chairman 
of Lloyds TSB, the competition rules would be waived, in return for a 
guarantee the merged institution would continue lending to first-time 
buyers. Gordon Brown later boasted of his intervention, when the deal 
faltered in late September, saying: "We have changed the competition 
law."

 From its outset, therefore, this was no normal operation of market 
forces, but a Government-brokered merger that was inevitably 
influenced by political as well as financial calculations. Gordon 
Brown's concern for first-time buyers, though legitimate, was a 
political rather than a market imperative. Yet there is evidence of a 
rawer political self-interest guiding the Prime Minister's conduct. 
When the announcement of Lloyds' proposed takeover of HBOS was sent 
to the stock exchange it contained the telltale commitment that "the 
management focus is to keep jobs in Scotland". This discriminatory 
policy towards employees in a UK-wide institution that must shortly 
shed thousands of staff infuriated Linda Riordan, the Labour MP for 
Halifax, who denounced it as "totally unacceptable".

Its context, however, was the run-up to the Glenrothes by-election, 
in the neighbouring constituency to Gordon Brown's own seat in Fife, 
where a significant number of HBOS employees live. After a series of 
by-election humiliations, the then orthodoxy was that defeat in 
Glenrothes could end Mr Brown's leadership. Against predictions, 
Labour later held the seat. So, while paying lip service to first-
time house buyers, the Prime Minister's priority was clear: Scottish 
jobs for Scottish workers.

With so many political cross currents muddying the waters, it is 
unsurprising that the Lloyds/HBOS marriage has proved disastrous. One 
healthy institution, Lloyds TSB, was manipulated by the Government 
into a merger with the terminally ill HBOS, the outcome being one 
large, toxic liability. Now the taxpayer is faced with paying out 
billions more of borrowed money, potentially putting pressure on the 
pound in the international markets. Tomorrow could be a hectic day 
for traders.

Contrary to the misrepresentations of the nay-sayers, this debacle is 
not evidence of the collapse of capitalism and free-market 
principles, but of the malign consequences of government manipulation 
of market forces.
But it does raise profound questions about political opportunism, the 
Prime Minister's judgment and how much worse this crisis will become 
before it gets any better.
============

3. As Rome burns, Gordon Brown keeps passing the buck
It is too late now for the public to acquit an increasingly petty and 
desperate Gordon Brown, says Matthew d'Ancona.

By Matthew d'Ancona

The pettiness is the giveaway. Later this month, Gordon Brown is 
hosting a dinner to mark the unveiling of a new portrait of Margaret 
Thatcher. Naturally, No 10 asked the Iron Lady for the names of 
guests she wanted to attend. No less naturally, it was suggested by 
her office that the present Conservative leader should be invited. 
But when Downing Street heard that David Cameron was on the list, 
there was, I gather, a preposterous attempt to strike him off. Did 
the Prime Minister seriously think he could exclude Mr Cameron from 
the dinner? And on what possible grounds? No 10 backed down grumpily, 
and the Tory leader will indeed be attending. But the damage - to Mr 
Brown's dignity, principally - is already done.

As Rome burns, the PM is fiddling with guest lists - and much else 
besides. When Mr Brown discovered that Owen Paterson, the Shadow 
Northern Ireland Secretary, was being given a briefing by MI5, No 10 
tried to limit the length of the meeting. This combination of 
petulance and micromanagement is meant to signal power, but - of 
course - signals precisely the opposite. As authority drains from the 
Prime Minister, he is reduced to tiny acts of churlishness unworthy 
of the office he holds.

On Thursday, Mr Brown made his third appearance as PM before the 
Commons Liaison Committee, the grand panel of select committee 
chairmen. The transcript, which can be read at www.parliament.uk
provides vivid case notes on the Prime Minister's state of mind, his 
growing testiness and his delusional insistence that repeatedly 
blaming other people, institutions and global forces for this 
recession will eventually persuade the voters of his own innocence.

The tell-tale signs were the occasionally captious moments and 
frissons of fury that peppered his familiar speak-your-weight 
answers. When Sir George Young asked him to rule out going cap in 
hand to the IMF, the PM growled that we were "reaching an absurdity 
when people make these comments or statements.just simply 
ridiculous." When he warned Sir George that he should "be careful 
about making those statements as well", he might as well have said: 
we know where you live, mate. you should keep away from the edge of 
the platform, accidents can happen.

As you would expect, Mr Brown was cross-examined at the hearing about 
the resignation on Wednesday of his adviser, Sir James Crosby, as 
deputy chairman of the Financial Services Authority. Sir James's 
hasty departure followed allegations that, when chief executive of 
HBOS, he had fired the bank's head of regulatory risk, Paul Moore, 
for raising heretical concerns about its rapid growth and reckless 
lending strategy. The gist of the MPs' questions to Mr Brown was that 
this was not exactly a PR triumph and dramatised all too clearly the 
impression of disreputable cosiness and neglect stretching right to 
the very top. As John McFall, Labour and Cooperative chair of the 
Treasury select committee, put it diplomatically: "Prime Minister, 
there is a long hard road to go to bring the public round on this 
issue."    I'll say.

The gist of Gordon's answers was that none of this was much to do 
with him, guv. He laboriously described the operations of the 
tripartite committee of Treasury, FSA and Bank of England like a 
plumber blaming the malfunctioning of a boiler he installed only a 
week ago on the manufacturers, or the scarcity of spare parts, or the 
alignment of the stars. "You may wish to ask questions about what 
happened within the FSA," the PM said, "but I have to say to you that 
on the basis of the information I have got the FSA went through all 
the allegations that were being made, they examined all the details 
of what happened and they reached a conclusion." In other words: ask 
them, not me.

The Prime Minister is the polar opposite to Harry Truman: there ought 
to be a sign on his desk that reads "The buck starts here." Part of 
Brown's political genius has always been his capacity to avoid taking 
blame - which is why the Blairites used to describe him furiously as 
Macavity. As Prime Minister, it is no longer open to him simply to 
disappear like the Mystery Cat: so he resorts to the tactic of Snitch-
in-Chief, blaming anyone or anything rather than himself. Was it 
necessary or wise, asked Keith Vaz, to publish the number of non-UK 
nationals in the workforce? "This is a decision that the independent 
Office of National Statistics has made," replied the Prime Minister. 
"This is not a decision that the Government has made to publish this 
information." I suppose when you are busy saving the world there 
isn't much time left to run the country.

Evasion, buck-passing, obfuscation: it won't do any more. The desire 
for a reckoning is simply too strong. On Tuesday, the Commons 
Treasury Select Committee grilled four bankers on their role in the 
collapse of the financial sector. The most visibly chastened of the 
quartet was Andy Hornby, the former chief executive of HBOS, whose 
face was pale and lower lip trembling. I recall meeting Mr Hornby at 
a dinner hosted by Mr Brown at No 11 before the financial heavens 
fell. He was so confident and ambitious that he practically squeaked 
when he moved. Indeed, he reminded me at the time of the Wall Street 
tycoon played by Dan Aykroyd in Trading Places. "Lucky you," says one 
of his friends. "It's not luck," Aykroyd replies.

But at least Mr Hornby has got his moment in the public stocks out of 
the way. The PM will do all in his power to postpone his own moment - 
not least because, apparently, he does not think that he should be in 
the dock in the first place. At Thursday's Liaison Committee hearing, 
Tony Wright asked him whether the time had come to acknowledge the 
need for a true calling to account. "This is a big catastrophe," said 
Dr Wright. "Do we not deserve an inquiry?"

And off Mr Brown went, as he always does, about "global issues. 
external imbalances. It started, as you know, in America .contagion 
across the system. the whole global picture. a global financial 
crisis that started as a global banking crisis." Yes, yes, we get the 
idea, Gordon. But how ironic that a Prime Minister who has had so 
much to say about "Britishness", national identity and (foolhardily) 
"British jobs for British workers" should try, no less brazenly, to 
deny that there is a specifically British dimension to the story of 
this economic disaster and to present himself, and us, as the victim 
of forces quite beyond his control.

Much good it will do him. The public was never going to acquit Gordon 
as readily as he does himself. They are already looking beyond his 
premiership to what might come next and whether the Tories are up to 
the task. The Tories, for their part, are privately wondering which 
of his prospective successors they should fear most: as it happens, 
Alan Johnson, interviewed in the current issue of The Spectator, is 
the figure who bothers the Cameroons most, although the Tory leader 
believes Harriet Harman is the Cabinet member running most 
aggressively for the job. An era has ended but the PM does not know 
it. And while the rest of us look ahead to the post-Brown world, the 
increasingly isolated Prime Minister sits in No 10 and broods angrily 
over whom to invite to dinner.
-------------------------------------------------------------
Matthew d'Ancona is Editor of 'The Spectator'