Wednesday, 11 March 2009


MEMRI Email Newsletter

Radicalization in Hizbullah's Positions Following the Gaza War: Hizbullah Must Be Independent of All State Institutions; 'Hizbullah Will Absorb All the Political Forces in the Country'

By: H. Varulkar*

Lebanon/Hizbullah | 504| March 11, 2009

Introduction

Recently, and in particular since the end of the Israel-Hamas war in Gaza, Hizbullah has radicalized its positions on the question of its weapons. This trend was heralded by statements made during the war by Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah and his deputy Na'im Qasim, who declared that the Gaza war had settled the debate in Lebanon over the necessary "defense strategies," that is, over the future of Hizbullah as a Lebanese resistance movement and over the question of disarming it. Since the war's end, Hizbullah leaders have been repeatedly emphasizing that there is no place for any discussion of dismantling it as a resistance movement, or of disarming it, and that Lebanon's future defense strategy will necessarily be anchored in the resistance movement. Senior Hizbullah official Mahmoud Qamati even announced explicitly that on no account would Hizbullah agree to subordinate itself to the Lebanese government, to its officials, or to state institutions.
  
The national dialogue sessions, devoted to "Lebanon's defense strategies," and in essence to the future of Hizbullah as a resistance movement, as well as to the dispute over its weapons, began September 16, 2008, in accordance with the May 2008 Doha agreement; so far five sessions have been held. During the sessions, the participants discussed Lebanon's defense strategy. It should be noted that, as early as 2006, a national dialogue took place in Lebanon with the participation of all the large Lebanese factions and parties. The dialogue, which began March 2006 and continued for several months, was devoted to such contentious issues as the  Palestinian weapons in Lebanon, the Shab'a Farms, Lebanon's relations with Syria, and the investigation of and tribunal for the assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Al-Hariri. However, about a week before the session on "Lebanon's Defense Strategy," at which Hizbullah's weapons were to be discussed, Hizbullah kidnapped the two Israeli soldiers, triggering the 2006 war, and the session was cancelled.(1)


A. Hizbullah Leaders During the Gaza War: The War Will Impact Lebanon and Its Defense Strategy

Nasrallah: The Debate on Lebanon's Defense Strategy Is Settled

In a speech delivered January 7, 2009, during the Gaza war, Hizbullah secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah stated: "Our experience in the July 2006 war [in Lebanon], and the experience of the Palestinian resistance in Gaza... have settled... all the arguments on Lebanon's [required] defense... Indeed, the formidable [Israeli] army – one of the strongest armies in the world and with the best air force in the region – has been unable to achieve its objectives in combating the resistance, [because the latter – though it has] limited resources and is besieged within a narrow geographical region, is endowed with strong faith and will. This proves that armed popular resistance, anchored in faith, determination, and popular support, is the strongest and best option for confronting the cruelest army in the world..."(2)
  
On January 13, 2009, Hizbullah's faction in the Lebanese Parliament, the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, held its weekly meeting, during which it issued an announcement that stated: "Gaza's steadfast endurance in the last 18 days, despite the siege and the meager resources at its disposal, in the face of the cruelest and most destructive war in the history of the region, is unambiguous proof that resistance is the best and most effective option for defending the land and safeguarding the national identity and honor."(3)


Na'im Qasim: The Gaza War Will Impact Lebanon's Defense Strategy

Hizbullah deputy secretary-general Sheikh Na'im Qasim stated, at a Hizbullah-organized symposium at the law faculty of the Al-Hadath campus of Lebanese University: "The results [of the Gaza war] will impact Lebanon and the [entire] region, since the issues are interrelated. The aggression against Gaza underscores the importance of Lebanon's strength – which is anchored in its resistance, people, and army – and will impact Lebanon's defense strategy [by tipping the scales] in favor of resistance. Gaza managed to withstand the Israeli aggression thanks to its resistance, [and this resistance] will triumph, as the future will prove."
  
Qasim continued: "Today, we live in the era of the resistance, and there is no turning back..."(4)


B. In the Wake of the Gaza War: Escalation in Hizbullah's Position in the Debate Over Its Weapons

As mentioned above, since the end of the Gaza war, Hizbullah's leaders have radicalized their positions regarding the future of the organization and its weapons. This is reflected in their insistence on three fundamental principles:
  
1.  Any defense strategy must be anchored in resistance.
  
2. Hizbullah will not relinquish its weapons.
  
3.   Hizbullah will continue making decisions independently and will be established as independent of the  state institutions.


1. The Resistance Movement is the Basis of Lebanon's Defense Strategy; "Hizbullah Will Absorb All the Political Forces in the Country"

Hassan Fadhlallah, member of the Loyalty to the Resistance bloc, said: "Any Lebanese defense strategy must be based upon resistance that is strong and capable, and possesses the [necessary] resources in order to defeat the Israeli army on every level." He added: "In the wake of the aggression against Gaza, the resistance is even more convinced that the only viable option for the Lebanese is to intensify their resistance [efforts], in which all [factions] must participate. In the dialogue [on Lebanon's defense strategy], we will listen to ideas and proposals and remain open to suggestions. [However,] we hold consistent and well-founded beliefs that are based on... our experience in previous years..."
  
Fadhlallah added: "After what happened in Gaza, no one has any grounds to question the effectiveness, importance, or necessity of the resistance..."(5)
     

Hizbullah Leaders: "We Will Strive to Incorporate All Political Forces in the Resistance"

The March 14 Forces have contended for a long time that a possible solution to the question of Hizbullah and its arms would be to incorporate them into the Lebanese military. Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, for example, said that following the signing of the Doha agreement, Hizbullah should be absorbed by the Lebanese state.(6) At a national dialogue session, March 14 Forces member Boutrus Harb proposed dismantling Hizbullah's military arm and establishing a national border guard that would be directly subordinate to the Lebanese army, and incorporating Hizbullah militants into it. He also suggested that Hizbullah's weapons be handed over to the Lebanese army.(7)
  
Since the end of the Gaza war, Hizbullah leaders have begun to entertain the opposite possibility, that is, instead of being incorporated into the military and state institutions, "Hizbullah will absorb all the political forces in the country." For example, Hizbullah Foreign Relations Bureau head Sayyed Nawaf Al-Moussawi stated: "When [during the Gaza war] it became clear that the defeatist Arab [countries] and the hypocritical Western governments were helpless and engaged in conspiracies, [it became equally clear] that, apart from the resistance and its weapons, there was no mechanism for defending [the country]. Today, more than ever, we insist that these weapons be preserved and reinforced. Moreover, we will strive to gradually absorb the political forces [in Lebanon] under the aegis of the resistance movement."(8)
    

"Defense Strategy" Must Be Replaced by "Resistance Strategy"

Sheikh Nabil Qaouq, a Hizbullah official in South Lebanon, stated that the organization strove to involve all the Lebanese political forces in the resistance, and coined the term "resistance strategy" – as opposed to "defense strategy" – for this concept. He said: "Today we are witnessing another success of the resistance strategy, and the nation has been increasingly embracing this concept." He emphasized that "a new [situation] has emerged, which will determine the future of the region in such a way that no superpower or formidable force will ever again [be able to] ignore the power of the resistance."
  
Qaouq added, "Hizbullah is eager to absorb all the political forces and factions in Lebanon [and involve them in implementing] the strategy of resistance... This [new situation], which has [emerged] in the wake of the Gaza events, will shift [the focus in the intra-Lebanese] dialogue from the issue of disarming Hizbullah to that of [inculcating] the resistance strategy among the Lebanese people and in all the countries in the region."(9)


2. As Long As Blood Flows in Our Veins, We Will Not Surrender Our Weapons

Hizbullah Shura Council member Sheikh Muhammad Yazbek stated at a Hizbullah ceremony in Al-Haramel: "Hizbullah will not surrender its weapons as long as blood flows in our veins and as long as [Lebanon] has not laid down the foundations for a strong and just state that can protect its citizens and its people..."(10)
  
Loyalty to the Resistance bloc chairman Muhammad Ra'd stated: "The arming of the resistance is both a privilege and a legitimate right which is anchored in all [international] conventions. Anyone seeking to deny [us] this right using [various] slogans or pretexts is perpetrating a terrorist act and supporting the terrorism embodied by the Zionist entity..."(11)


3. The Resistance Will Continue Making Decisions Independently

Hizbullah Political Bureau deputy head Mahmoud Qamati stated at a memorial ceremony for Islamic Resistance leaders: "[Today,] more than ever before, the resistance movement adheres to its weapons, its power, its capabilities, its independence, [and] its popular drive, since it sprung from the womb of the people and does not belong to any official institution. Indeed, if we become part of the establishment, we will be forced to abide by decisions of state that are dictated by international power balances. If its decisions are determined by the Lebanese state, they will [actually] be determined by the Security Council, the U.N., the Arab League, and all the other international institutions, which we regard as subservient to the policy of the U.S.. Why should we entrust our fate to the so-called international legitimacy, when it has suffered a defeat in Gaza?
  
"The decision of the resistance will remain independent; its weapons will remain in its possession, and we will not hand over a single bullet. We participate in the [national] dialogue [on Lebanon's defense strategy] in order to create a situation in which the official Lebanese decisions are supportive of the Lebanese army, the resistance, and the people..."(12)
  
The opposition-affiliated Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar wrote in a similar vein: "Throughout the recent period, Hizbullah leaders have been pointing out that, as far as Hizbullah is concerned, the best possible plan would be to establish the status of the armed resistance as independent of all state [institutions], in order to protect Lebanon and help it to defend itself and to restore its occupied territories... In the wake of the aggression against Gaza, Hizbullah's message has become clear: Only the resistance can lead the struggle. Our experience in July 2006 and in the 2009 Gaza [war] has proved that [the use of] arms can bring victories unprecedented in the Arab-Israeli conflict..."(13)


*H. Varulkar is a research fellow at MEMRI.


Notes

(1) Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), May 26, 2008; http://www.qatar-conferences.org/lebanon/speech2.doc.
(2) www.hizbollah.tv, January 7, 2009.
(3) www.hizbollah.tv, January 14, 2009.
(4) Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), Januray 15, 2009.
(5) Al-Safir, Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), January 26, 2009.
(6) Al-Mustaqbal (Lebanon), July 4, 2008.
(7) Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), January 27, 2009.
(8) Al-Safir (Lebanon), January 26, 2009.
(9) Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), January 26, 2009.
(10) www.hizbollah.tv, January 26, 2009.
(11) www.hizbollah.tv, January 25, 2009.
(12) www.hizbollah.tv, February 20, 2009.
(13) Al-Akhbar (Lebanon), January 26, 2009.