Duly Noted: Buy Into Piracy
From the desk of George Handlery on Sat, 2009-04-18 12:59
1. Sometimes, like a good snapshot, a single case might reveal more about a general occurrence than a long essay can. The item below fits the generalization. Interestingly, the source is an ex CP member and a valued colleague from my professorial escapade after the (official) fall of Communism. Instead of “Marxism-Leninism” my buddy now teaches “management science”.
In a recent exchange of notes pertaining to the current crisis, the case of irresponsibly granted credits came up. This happened in response to my claim that it all started with a Clinton decision. It was that, even those who cannot afford it, should become homeowners. Translate this into mindlessly extended easy credits. The revealing reaction “…here (Hungary is meant) they insanely granted credits not only to acquire houses but also to purchase LCD TVs, cell phones, Christmas decorations and Easter bunnies. When I wanted to change cars my sales rep made a handstand to convince me to purchase something on credit that was beyond my means and needs. I told him “I prefer first to earn the money and to spend it thereafter.” His response “then you are not my type of customer.” I left him by telling, “You are not my salesman either.” He continues, “Now the irresponsibly indebted are desperate. They deserve it that their remaining assets be auctioned off.”
2. The reaction of the Somali pirates to losing their hostage and the on-shore context in which they are embedded, make a point. These people feel that it is right to do what they do. How do they know this? Their entrepreneurial activity pays and they harbor contempt for their victims who, they think, owe them something. In the light of this, there is no chance for a negotiated cessation of the attacks. They will desist only when the risks grow to be devastating and the expected profit sinks to around zero. These conditions can only be achieved by the unhesitant application of overwhelming force with the intent to cause maximal damage. Admittedly, this approach ignores “multi-culti” norms. The recommendation also violates the self-imposed restrictions that are consistent with PC rules. Some of us need to realize this: the intended beneficiaries of multi-culturalism do not believe in “diversity” or in tolerance once the procedure gives an advantage to others. Furthermore, if PC is understood, the reaction to its premises elicits contempt.
3. Taking captured pirates to the home country of the captor to expose them to criminal charges there, amounts to a guarantee of “limited risks” to the pirates. Having to prove what is rationally an established fact by virtue of the circumstances of the capture, causes higher costs than the fees of a for-free defender. Good legal minds should be able to find numerous procedural loopholes based upon democratic due process rules. Additionally, endless litigations that exploit evidentiary gaps created by the conditions prevailing in the area of capture should also be possible to point out. Furthermore, assuming a conviction, what will happen after the release of the prisoner if held in an advanced country? Will they get refugee status? Count on litigation claiming that a return to the homeland is unfair. In jail the “victim” has gotten used to the country holding him. Therefore, deportation might endanger, in view of expected retaliation, the safety of the retired pirate who, if repatriated, might become exposed to double jeopardy. Additionally, holding pirates will provoke, as it did in the case of terrorists in the past, extortion to liberate such “hostages”. Once this happens, the local support for ending the “senseless and disproportional” incarceration of “poor ignorant fishermen” will put pressure on decision makers to engage in surprising indulgences.
4. We might have to learn a new definition of what “liability” means. The corrected application of the concept will come into play when more armed pirates and their vessels are annihilated. With their mission accomplished, navies will be charged with having destroyed vessels manned by frustrated fishermen looking for a modest income. The ensuing legal action will give us a perspective on what PC-defined legal responsibility is.
5. Is it unkind to suggest that, the failure to deal with piracy has causes and symptoms that reminds one of analogies found at home? What is meant is the inability to come to grips with the growing criminality of those who claim immunity from retaliation because of their physical or religious/cultural characteristics. In both cases, some ideas are invoked that are enshrined in laws pertaining to due process and that are the product of long development. These rules fail to deal with a reality created by elements that are not bound by, and are ignorant of, this tradition. The result will really become tragic the moment when majorities are made to conclude that the (abused) principle is at fault and not its misapplication.
6. Could it be? The instinct-driven policy objective of Russia for more recognition as a major world power, is realizable only if pursued by system akin to that of the Tsars or the Commissars. In this case, the limited existing resources allotted by lacking development (not the country’s unused potential) need to be enhanced by dictatorial methods. These can concentrate the available means to overcome qualitative handicaps. Essentially, like the sun’s ray’s are concentrated by a magnifying glass, “limited” resources become bundled by dictatorship to achieve maximal effect at a chosen point. The problem with using autocracy as a multiplier of laggard means pit against an advanced opponent, are twofold. (A) It diverts energies from stimulating general internal advancement for the pursuit of domination abroad. Thereby the developmental lag is perpetuated. (B) Playing a power-role not commensurate to the country’s comparative modernization, and not corresponding to her development, risks destroying the system. (World War One, Cold War.)
7. The decisive inadequacy in prosecuting the Iraq war might have been a consequence of its devastating success. Let us recall that, insolently contradicting the pundit-consensus, the operations to topple Saddam ended quickly and without getting caught in the popularly invoked “quagmire”. The problem might have been a consequence of the maneuvers that rapidly pulverized the Baathist system. The operations did more than to accomplish what wars need to achieve. That is the destruction of the enemy’s ability to wage war. The result of having been carried beyond this goal was that the entire Iraqi system disintegrated. This left no one in a position to capitulate and no local organization remained with the ability to implement the terms of surrender. By virtue of this, a failed state and the resulting chaos emerged. Unwilling to cow the population by indiscriminate brutality (Soviet-style, 1945 vintage) and due to the limited boots on the ground, the US could not cope with the results. The more so, since American policy vacillated between occupation, alliance, social welfare service and home-style police action.
8. There are several reasons why the armies of major (democratic) powers do better in conventional operations (such as the Golf war) against a foe (such as Iraq) than against the same conventionally defeated opponent in a guerrilla war. In “war” it is felt that all means of power need to be applied to defeat what is, in the classical sense, identifiable as “the enemy”. In a conflict with irregulars the same instruments of coercion may only be used with major limitations flowing from the legal procedures of the occupant’s home system. Furthermore, even in the case of authorized operations, politics puts a break upon military operations.
9. In the past, regarding Iran, the “moderates” argued that action against her alleged nuclear project is unnecessary. Iranian success was said to be remote and therefore there was enough risk-free time left to “give diplomacy a chance”. In the near future, those who pleaded the above, will change their tune. The claim for needing to exclude everything beyond political approaches, will receive a new justification. It will be that, it is too late for non-diplomatic measures because Iran has virtually achieved nuclear status. Any rash move – “effective measures” are meant – will only radicalize Tehran. Possibly to the extent that it resorts to violence. Does this not sound like something that we heard and hear in the case of North Korea?
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