Britannia Radio

Dr, Aaron Lerner - IMRA:

"The Iranians have no logical reason to bring about the total destruction of
their big cities, as could happen if Israel uses the means of deterrence at
its disposal. Neither the satisfaction of killing Zionist infidels, nor,
certainly, the promotion of Palestinian interests would justify that price.
Israeli deterrence in the face of an Iranian nuclear threat has a good
chance of succeeding precisely because the Iranians have no incentive to
deal a mortal blow to Israel."

Question: Does  Reuven Pedatzur mean that, based on his analysis of the
system of beliefs held by the Iranian leadership, they have no logical
reason to bring about the total destruction of their big cities - or is he
asserting that at the "moment of truth" those beliefs would be cast aside by
the Iranian leadership and they would base their actions on some universal
value system that would make it unacceptable to choose a path that might
cause the total destruction of their big cities? ]


Here's how Israel would destroy Iran's nuclear program

By Reuven Pedatzur

Haretz Magazine section Last update - 01:10 16/05/2009
www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1085619.html

Israeli government ministers and Knesset members who will help make the
decision about whether to attack Iran's nuclear facilities do not have to
wait any longer for a preparatory briefing by the Israel Air Force.

They can read about all the possible scenarios for a strike on Iran, and
about the potential risks and chances of success, in a study by Abdullah
Toukan and Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington.

Never before has such an open, detailed and thorough study of Israel's
offensive options been published. The authors of the 114-page study
meticulously gathered all available data on Israel's military capabilities
and its nuclear program, and on Iran's nuclear developments and aerial
defenses, as well as both countries' missile inventory.

After analyzing all the possibilities for an attack on Iran, Toukan and
Cordesman conclude: "A military strike by Israel against Iranian nuclear
facilities is possible ... [but] would be complex and high-risk and would
lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success rate."

The first problem the authors point to is intelligence, or more precisely,
the lack of it. "It is not known whether Iran has some secret facilities
where it is conducting uranium enrichment," they write. If facilities
unknown to Western intelligence agencies do exist, Iran's uranium-enrichment
program could continue to develop in secret there, while Israel attacks the
known sites - and the strike's gains would thus be lost. In general, the
authors state, attacking Iran is justified only if it will put an end to
Iran's nuclear program or halt it for several years. That objective is very
difficult to attain.

Intelligence agencies are also divided on the critical question of when Iran
will deliver a nuclear weapon. Whereas Israeli intelligence maintains it
will have the bomb between 2009 and 2012, the U.S. intelligence community
estimates it will not happen before 2013. If the Israeli intelligence
assessment is accurate, the window for a military strike is rapidly closing.
It is clear to everyone that no one will dare attack Iran once it possesses
nuclear weapons.

Since Iran has dozens of nuclear facilities dispersed throughout its large
territory, and since it is impossible to attack all of them, Toukan and
Cordesman investigated the option of hitting only three, which "constitute
the core of the nuclear fuel cycle that Iran needs to produce nuclear
weapons grade fissile material."

Destroying these three sites ought to stall the Iranian nuclear program for
several years. The three are: the nuclear research center in Isfahan, the
uranium-enrichment facility in Natanz, and the heavy water plant, intended
for future plutonium production, in Arak. It is doubtful whether Israel
would embark on an offensive with such major ramifications just to strike a
small number of facilities, when it is not at all clear that this will stop
Iran's nuclearization for a significant length of time.

The study analyzes three possible flight routes and concludes that the
optimal and most likely one is the northern one that passes along the
Syria-Turkey border, cuts across the northeastern edge of Iraq and leads
into Iran. The central route passes over Jordan and is shorter, but would
not be chosen for fear of political trouble with the Jordanians. Using the
southern route, which passes over Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, might
likewise lead to political entanglements.

To prevent the aircraft being detected en route to Iran, the IAF would use
advanced technology to invade and scramble communication networks and radar
devices in the countries over which the F-15s and F-16s fly, so even though
dozens of planes would pass through the countries' airspace, they will not
be detected. According to the authors, the IAF used this technology in the
raid on the Syrian nuclear reactor in Dayr az-Zawr, in September 2007. A
hacker system was installed on two Gulfstream G550 aircraft that the IAF
bought in recent years.

A strike mission on the three nuclear facilities would require no fewer than
90 combat aircraft, including all 25 F-15Es in the IAF inventory and another
65 F-16I/Cs. On top of that, all the IAF's refueling planes will have to be
airborne: 5 KC-130Hs and 4 B-707s. The combat aircraft will have to be
refueled both en route to and on the way back from Iran. The IAF will have a
hard time locating an area above which the tankers can cruise without being
detected by the Syrians or the Turks.

One of the toughest operational problems to resolve is the fact that the
facility at Natanz is buried deep underground. Part of it, the
fuel-enrichment plant, reaches a depth of 8 meters, and is protected by a
2.5-meter-thick concrete wall, which is in turn protected by another
concrete wall. By mid-2004 the Iranians had fortified their defense of the
other part of the facility, where the centrifuges are housed. They buried it
25 meters underground and built a roof over it made of reinforced concrete
several meters thick.

The Iranians use the centrifuges to enrich uranium, which is required in
order to produce a nuclear bomb. There are already 6,000 centrifuges at the
Natanz facility; the Iranians plan to install a total of 50,000, which could
be used to produce 500 kilos of weapons-grade uranium annually. Building a
nuclear bomb takes 15-20 kilograms of enriched uranium. That means that the
Natanz facility will be able to supply enough fissile material for 25-30
nuclear weapons per year.

Because the Natanz facility is so important, the Iranians have gone to great
lengths to protect it. To contend with the serious defensive measures they
have taken, the IAF will use two types of U.S.-made smart bombs. According
to reports in the foreign media, 600 of these bombs - nicknamed "bunker
busters" - have been sold to Israel. One is called GBU-27, it weighs about
900 kilos and it can penetrate a 2.4-meter layer of concrete. The other is
called GBU-28 and weighs 2,268 kilos; this monster can penetrate 6 meters of
concrete and another layer of earth 30 meters deep. But for these bombs to
penetrate ultra-protected Iranian facilities, IAF pilots will have to strike
the targets with absolute accuracy and at an optimal angle.

Additional challenges

But the challenges facing the IAF do not end there. Iran has built a dense
aerial-defense system that will make it hard for Israeli planes to reach
their targets unscathed. Among other things, the Iranians have deployed
batteries of Hawk, SA-5 and SA-2 surface-to-air missiles, plus they have
SA-7, SA-15, Rapier, Crotale and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.
Furthermore, 1,700 anti-aircraft guns protect the nuclear facilities - not
to mention the 158 combat aircraft that might take part in defending Iran's
skies. Most of those planes are outdated, but they may be scrambled to
intercept the IAF, which will thus have to use part of its strike force to
deal with the situation.

However, all these obstacles are nothing compared to the S-300V (SA-12
Giant) anti-aircraft defense system, which various reports say Russia may
have secretly supplied to Iran recently. If the Iranians indeed have this
defense system, all of the IAF's calculations, and all of the considerations
for and against a strike, will have to be overhauled. The Russian system is
so sophisticated and tamper-proof that the aircraft attrition rates could
reach 20-30 percent: In other words, out of a strike force of 90 aircraft,
20 to 25 would be downed. This, the authors say, is "a loss Israel would
hardly accept in paying."

If Israel also decides to attack the famous reactor in Bushehr, an
ecological disaster and mass deaths will result. The contamination released
into the air in the form of radionuclides would spread over a large area,
and thousands of Iranians who live nearby would be killed immediately; in
addition, possibly hundreds of thousands would subsequently die of cancer.
Because northerly winds blow in the area throughout most of the year, the
authors conclude that, "most definitely Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE will be
heavily affected by the radionuclides."

The difficulty involved in an IAF strike would become a moot point if
ballistic missiles wind up being used instead of combat aircraft. The
Iranians cannot defend against ballistic missiles. The study lays bare
Israel's missile program and points to three missile versions it has
developed: Jericho I, II and III. The Jericho I has a 500-kilometer range, a
450-kilogram warhead, and can carry a 20-kiloton nuclear weapon. Jericho II
has a 1,500-kilometer range, and entered service in 1990. It can carry a
1-megaton nuclear warhead. Jericho III is an intercontinental ballistic
missile with a range of 4,800-6,500 kilometers, and can carry a
multi-megaton nuclear warhead. The study says the latter was expected to
enter service in 2008.

The authors apparently do not insinuate that Israel will launch missiles
carrying nuclear warheads, but rather conventional warheads. By their
calculation it will take 42 Jericho III missiles to destroy the three
Iranian facilities, assuming that they all hit their marks, which is
extremely difficult. It is not enough to hit the target area: To destroy the
facilities it is necessary to hit certain points of only a few meters in
size. It is doubtful the Jerichos' accuracy can be relied on, and that all
of them will hit those critical spots with precision.

The study also analyzes the possible Iranian response to an Israeli strike.
In all likelihood the result would be to spur Iranians to continue and even
accelerate their nuclear program, to create reliable deterrence in the face
of an aggressive Israel. Iran would also withdraw from the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which until now has enabled its nuclear program to
be monitored, to a certain degree, through inspectors from the International
Atomic Energy Agency. An Israeli strike would immediately put a stop to the
international community's attempts to pressure Iran into suspending
development of nuclear weapons.

No Syrian response

Iran would also, almost certainly, retaliate against Israel directly. It
might attack targets here with Shahab-3 ballistic missiles, whose range
covers all of Israel. A few might even be equipped with chemical warheads.
In addition, the Iranians would use Hezbollah and Hamas to dispatch waves of
suicide bombers into Israel. The Second Lebanon War showed us Hezbollah's
rocket capability, and the experience of the past eight years has been
instructive regarding Hamas' ability to fire Qassams from the Gaza Strip.

Hezbollah launched 4,000 rockets from South Lebanon during the Second
Lebanon War, and their effect on northern Israel has not been forgotten:
Life was nearly paralyzed for a whole month. Since then the Lebanese
organization's stockpile was replenished and enhanced, and it now has some
40,000 rockets. Israel does not have a response to those rockets. The rocket
defense systems now being developed (Iron Dome and Magic Wand) are still far
from completion, and even after they become operational, it is doubtful they
will prove effective against thousands of rockets launched at Israel.

An Israeli strike on Iran would also sow instability in the Middle East. The
Iranians would make use of the Shi'ites in Iraq, support Taliban fighters
and improve their combat capabilities in Afghanistan. They also might attack
American interests in the region, especially in countries that host U.S.
military forces, such as Qatar and Bahrain. The Iranians would probably also
attempt to disrupt the flow of oil to the West from the Persian Gulf region.
Since the United States would be perceived as having given Israel a green
light to attack Iran, American relations with allies in the Arab world could
suffer greatly. Toukan and Cordesman believe, however, that Iran's ally
Syria would refrain from intervening if Israel strikes Iran's nuclear
facilities.

Regarding a possible time frame for an Israeli strike, the authors cited
factors that could speed up the decision in this matter. By 2010 Iran could
pose a serious threat to its neighbors and Israel, because it would have
enough nuclear weapons to deter the latter and the United States from
attacking it. Iran's inventory of effective ballistic missiles capable of
carrying nonconventional warheads could also be an incentive. The fear that
the country will procure the Russian S-300V aerial-defense system (if it has
not done so already) might also serve as an incentive for a preemptive
strike.

So what should Israeli policy makers conclude from this American study? That
an IAF strike on Iran would be complicated and problematic, and that the
chance of it succeeding is not great. That they must weigh all of the
far-reaching ramifications that an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear
facilities would have, and that they must not be fooled by promises, should
any be made, by Israel Defense Forces officers who present the attack plan
as having good odds for success.

One of the conclusions from Toukan and Cordesman's study is that it is
questionable whether Israel has the military capability to destroy Iran's
nuclear program, or even to delay it for several years. Therefore, if the
diplomatic contacts the Obama administration is initiating with Iran prove
useless, and if in the wake of their expected failure the American president
does not decide to attack Iran, it is likely that Iran will possess nuclear
weapons in a relatively short time. It seems, therefore, that policy makers
in Jerusalem should begin preparing, mentally and operationally, for a
situation in which Iran is a nuclear power with a strike capability against
Israel.

This is the place to emphasize Israel's mistake in hyping the Iranian
threat. The regime in Tehran is certainly a bitter and inflexible rival, but
from there it's a long way to presenting it as a truly existential threat to
Israel. Iran's involvement in terror in our region is troubling, but a
distinction must be made between a willingness to bankroll terrorists, and
an intention to launch nuclear missiles against Israel. Even if Iran gets
nuclear weapons, Israel's power of deterrence will suffice to dissuade any
Iranian ruler from even contemplating launching nuclear weapons against it.

It is time to stop waving around the scarecrow of an existential threat and
refrain from making belligerent statements, which sometimes create a
dangerous dynamic of escalation. And if the statements are superfluous and
harmful - then this is doubly true for a strike on Iran's nuclear
facilities.

Of course, none of this contradicts the possibility of taking covert action
to hamper the Iranians' program and supply routes. When the IAF destroyed
the Osirak reactor in Baghdad in 1981, the "Begin doctrine" came into being,
which holds that Israel will not let any hostile country in the region
acquire nuclear weapons. The problem is that what could be accomplished in
Iraq more than two decades ago is no longer possible today under the present
circumstances in Iran.

The continual harping on the Iranian threat stems from domestic Israeli
politics and a desire to increase investment in the security realm, but the
ramifications of this are dangerous when you analyze expected developments
in Iran's ballistics: It is impossible for Israel to ignore Iran's capacity
to hit it, and Jerusalem must shape a policy that will neutralize that
threat.

In another year, or three years from now, when the Iranians possess nuclear
weapons, the rules of the strategic game in the region will be completely
altered. Israel must reach that moment with a fully formulated and clear
policy in hand, enabling it to successfully confront a potential nuclear
threat, even when it is likely that the other side has no intention of
carrying it out. The key, of course, is deterrence. Only a clear and
credible signal to the Iranians, indicating the terrible price they will pay
for attempting a nuclear strike against Israel, will prevent them from using
their missiles. The Iranians have no logical reason to bring about the total
destruction of their big cities, as could happen if Israel uses the means of
deterrence at its disposal. Neither the satisfaction of killing Zionist
infidels, nor, certainly, the promotion of Palestinian interests would
justify that price. Israeli deterrence in the face of an Iranian nuclear
threat has a good chance of succeeding precisely because the Iranians have
no incentive to deal a mortal blow to Israel.

Therefore, all the declarations about developing the operational capability
of IAF aircraft so they can attack the nuclear facilities in Iran, and the
empty promises about the ability of the Arrow missile defense system to
contend effectively with the Shahab-3, not only do not help bolster Israel's
power of deterrence, but actually undermine the process of building it and
making it credible in Iranian eyes.

The time has come to adopt new ways of thinking. No more fiery declarations
and empty threats, but rather a carefully weighed policy grounded in sound
strategy. Ultimately, in an era of a multi-nuclear Middle East, all sides
will have a clear interest to lower tension and not to increase it.
--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il