Thursday, 14 May 2009

The press and public when hunting together like pack animals always  
get it wrong.  When governments join in it they look for non- 
political scapegoats for their own misdeameanours [NO I'm NOT writing  
about MPs' expenses though the same applies] .
All over the world governments have tried to shuffle off the blame  
onto somebody else and here the public, who had years of self- 
indulgence on borrowed money,  quietly forgot their own greed and  
joined the lynch mob to blame bankers,  thus letting governments off  
the hook.

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TELEGRAPH                        12.5.09

Ministers 'to blame' for financial crisis
Governments and central bankers must take the blame for the financial  
crisis - not bankers, investors and others in the market, according  
to a new study.

By Edmund Conway

In a comprehensive analysis of the causes for the financial and  
economic crisis, the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) has  
concluded that the disaster was caused by authorities' mistakes  
rather than market failures. In an associated letter to The Daily  
Telegraph, the IEA, supported by a number of leading economists,  
including Tim Congdon and John Kay, said that despite these failures  
regulators were being rewarded with more responsibilities.

The study suggests that hedge funds and tax havens should not be  
unduly punished, and that in the future central banks and regulators  
should pay greater attention to imbalances building up in the  
economy. The detailed analysis, Verdict on the Crash, will come as a  
further blow for Gordon Brown, claiming that the system he created to  
monitor the financial and economic system was found entirely wanting  
and is in need of a major overhaul.
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Economists' letter spells out what went wrong

Dear Sir,
The prevailing view amongst the commentariat (reflected in the recent  
deliberations of the G20) that the financial crash of 2008 was caused  
by market failure is both wrong and dangerous. Government failure had  
a leading role in creating the conditions that led to the crash.

    •    Central banks created a monetary bubble that fed an asset price  
boom and distorted the pricing of risk.
    •    US government policy encouraged high-risk lending through support  
for Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (which had explicit government targets  
of providing over 50pc of mortgage finance to poor households) and  
through the Community Reinvestment Act and related regulations.
    •    Regulators and central bankers failed to use their considerable  
powers to stop risks building up in the financial system and an  
extension of regulation will not make a future crash less likely.
    •    Much existing banking regulation exacerbated the crisis and  
reduced the effectiveness of market monitoring of banks. The FSA, in  
the UK, has failed in its statutory duty to “maintain market  
confidence”.
    •    The tax and regulatory systems encourage complex and opaque  
methods of increasing gearing in the financial system.
    •    Financial institutions that have made mistakes have lost the  
majority of their value. On the other hand, regulators are being  
rewarded for failure by an extension of their size and powers.
    •    Evidence suggests that serious systemic problems have not arisen  
amongst unregulated institutions.
As such, no significant changes are needed to the regulatory  
environment surrounding hedge funds, short-selling, offshore banks,  
private equity or tax havens.

A revolution in financial regulation is needed. The proposals of the  
G20 governments and the EU are wholly misconceived. Specific and  
targeted laws and regulations could restore market discipline. These  
should include:
    •    Making bank depositors prior creditors. This will provide better  
incentives for prudent behaviour and make a call on deposit insurance  
funds less likely.
    •    Provisions to ensure an orderly winding up, recapitalisation or  
sale of systemic financial institutions in difficulty. Banks must be  
allowed to fail.
    •    Enhancing market disclosure by ensuring that banks report relevant  
information to shareholders.
This should be reinforced with central bank action to ensure that:
    •    Proper use is made of lender-of-last-resort facilities to deal  
with illiquid banks.
    •    The growth of broad money is monitored together with the build-up  
of wider inflationary risks.

Yours faithfully,
Dr James Alexander, Head of Equity Research, M&G; Prof Michael  
Beenstock, Professor of Economics, Hebrew University of Jerusalem;  
Prof Philip Booth, Professor of Insurance and Risk Management, Cass  
Business School; Dr Eamonn Butler, Director, Adam Smith Institute;  
Prof Tim Congdon, Founder, Lombard Street Research; Prof Laurence  
Copeland, Professor of Finance, Cardiff Business School; Prof Kevin  
Dowd, Professor of Financial Risk Management, Nottingham University  
Business School; Dr John Greenwood, Chief Economist, Invesco; Dr  
Samuel Gregg, Research Director, Acton Institute; Prof John Kay, St  
John’s College, Oxford; Prof David Llewellyn, Professor of Money and  
Banking, Loughborough University; Prof Alan Morrison, Professor of  
Finance, University of Oxford; Prof D R Myddelton, Emeritus Professor  
of Finance and Accounting, Cranfield University; Prof Geoffrey Wood,  
Professor of Economics, Cass Business School.