TThe French Fleet VICHY WEB http://artsweb.bham.ac.uk/vichy/allies.htm#Briatin%20and%20Vichy INTRODUCTION Allied Policy Towards France Britain and the Vichy government Britain and support for de Gaulle Difficulties of the relationship between Britain and de Gaulle Allied Operations Against France British Commando Raids on France COMMENTS & DEBATES Philip Bell on Britain and de Gaulle Simon Berthon on relations between De Gaulle and the Allies Julian Jackson on De Gaulle’s attitude to the British Christine Levisse-Touzé on the consequences of Mers el-Kébir Gerwin Strobl on the use of Mers el-Kébir in German Propaganda Philip Bell on Britain and the Vichy government Christine Levisse-Touzé on Dakar Robert Frank on French public opinion towards the Allies Rod Kedward on Allied bombing raids Voldman on political exploitation of Allied bombings of France Robert Frank on French public opinion towards Allied bombings Maurice Larkin on US attitude to France during Operation Torch Luc Capdevila and Danièle Voldman on funerals of Allied pilots Richard Vinen on Americans in France at the Liberation Footitt and Simmonds on Franco-Allied relations after Liberation DOCUMENTATION André Maurois on Franco-British relations in 1940 ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- INTRODUCTION Britain and the Vichy government After the war apologists for the Vichy regime drew attention to secret meetings between representatives of Pétain and the British. They used these to infer that Pétain had been playing a ‘double-game’- that is to say speaking publicly in favour of collaboration but secretly working for an Allied victory. Most mainstream historians utterly reject this claim of a ‘double-game’ whilst acknowledging that there were some tentative contacts with the British after the armistice. Limited contacts between Vichy and the British began in September 1940 through the French and British Embassies in Madrid. A second round of contacts was established in October when the University Professor Louis Rougier met with British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, supposedly acting on instructions from Pétain. Finally the Canadian diplomat Pierre Dupuy was alleged to be bearing a message from Britain’s Foreign Minister Lord Halifax when he met with Pétain in December. Dupuy reported back to London that Pétain had made a cryptic remark to the effect that the British knew where his sympathies lay. Acting on Dupuy’s report Churchill decided it was worth sending a last message to Pétain offering British assistance if Vichy would rally the British cause. Pétain did not answer. All contact was effectively broken off from the end of 1940. Underlying the impossibility of establishing friendly relations between Britain and Vichy were a number of factors. There was fundamental disagreement on the two sides of the Channel as to whether Vichy had been freed of its obligations towards its erstwhile ally. By an agreement of early 1940 Britain and France had accpeted that neither country should be allowed to sue for a separate peace with the enemy. Vichy believed that the British failure to commit fully to the battle of France and the subsequent attack on the French fleet at Mers el-Kebir freed her of this obligation. The British viewed this question very differently. Churchill was furious that the French had refused to send their navy over to the British following her defeat and thereby ran the risk that this navy would fall into the hands of the Germans. Some members of the Vichy government were drawn from traditionally Anglophobic milieus but even others could see the advantage of a rapid British defeat. Hitler had delayed the discussion of a permanent peace settlement until the British were defeated. In the meantime France was stuck with the armistice, ie a temporary arrangement. Vichytes were also angry that the British offered support to de Gaulle. The General had after all been branded a traitor by Pétain’s government and sentenced to death in absentia.
Main article: French Navy
In January 1937, France began a program of modernization and expansion. This soon elevated the French Fleet to fourth largest in the world. However, the French Navy (formally the "National Navy," Marine Nationale) was still considerably smaller than the navy of its ally, Britain.
By agreement with the British Admiralty, the strongest concentration of French vessels was in the Mediterranean. Here the Italian Fleet posed a threat to the vitally important French sea routes from metropolitan France to North Africa and to the British sea routes between Gibraltar and the Suez Canal.[4]
[edit]The Vichy French Fleet
In 1940, after France fell to the Germans, the French Navy in the Mediterranean became the navy of the Vichy French government. As the Vichy French Navy, this force was considered a potentially grave threat to the British Royal Navy. As such, it was imperative to the British that this threat be neutralised.
As the opening phase of Operation Catapult, the French squadron at Alexandria in Egypt was dealt with via negotiations. This proved possible primarily because the two commanders, Admiral René-Emile Godfroy and Admiral Andrew Cunningham, were on good personal terms. In contrast, a British ultimatum to place the bulk of the remainder of the French fleet out of German reach was refused. The fleet was located atMers-el-Kebir in Algeria and on 3 July 1940 it was largely destroyed by bombardment by the British "Force H" from Gibraltar (Admiral James Somerville). The Vichy French government broke off all ties with the British as a result of this attack and the Vichy French Air Force (Armée de l'Air de Vichy) even raided British installations at Gibralter.
In June and July of 1941, a small Vichy French naval force was involved during "Operation Exporter." This was an Allied operation launched against Vichy French forces based in Lebanon and Syria. French naval vessels had to be driven off before the Litani River could be crossed.
In 1942, as part of the occupation of Vichy France during "Case Anton," the Germans intended to capture the French fleet at Toulon. This was thwarted by determined action by French commanders and the bulk of the fleet was scuttled at anchor.
Simon Kitson's Welcome to Simon Kitson's Vichy Web. This page deals with the relationship between France and the Allies. There are plans to develop it over time but at present it is divided into the following sections:
It might seem strange that Britain and Vichy should engage in contacts at all. The reality was that Vichy was trying to alleviate the effects of the British naval blockade. British strategy revolved around trying to starve Germany into submission by cutting off all supplies from the sea. In order for this policy to be effective the blockade had to also be applied to the countries occupied by Hitler- otherwise the Germans could simply commandeer supplies coming into those countries. Thus the blockade was applied to France. If the desire to have the blockade loosened explains Anglo-Vichy contacts from the French point of view how can Britain’s flirtations with Vichy be explained? From the British side there were those like Lord Halifax who were prepared to give Pétain’s regime the benefit of the doubt and believed that Vichy should be given a chance to come over to the Allied side. For others the main purpose of dealings with Vichy were to try to prevent any Vichy attacks on British or dissident Gaullist colonies. All contact was cut off once it became obvious that Vichy would not offer any guarantees on these points.
Tuesday, 26 May 2009
Posts
