I complained last weeek that all the commentators had taken a long and early weekend. I had, however. missed this prescient overview by the economist’s ‘Charlemagne’. He’s got the French sussed put all right and obviously shares my low opinion of the demagogic leader!
Christina Speight
ECONOMIST Charlemagne Blog 18.6.09
A Czech warning: out-voting Britain would break the EU
BRUSSELS is a town that thinks like herring swim: in unison. Right now, the whole city is filled with people who can find nothing good to say about the system of rotating EU presidencies, especially after nearly six months of the Czech presidency, with its moments of high drama (the mass resignation of the Czech government, mid-presidency), and low farce (the Czech presidency art exhibit that methodically insulted every EU nation in turn). Inside the Brussels bubble, everyone is longing for the Lisbon Treaty to be ratified by the Irish, whereupon the presidency of the European Council will rise above the messy uncertainties of national political systems and national cultures, and become a stable, supranational office held by a full-time president for up to five years.
Not for the first time, I wonder if my colleagues and neighbours are right to be so keen on a permanent, Brussels-based presidency, held by some former head of government who has been purged of national quirks and rendered purely European, in some act of Euro-transubstantiation.
Yes, rotating presidencies have their moments of chaos and frustration, but they also bring something real and usefully political to the sterile environment of Brussels. If you doubt this, consider how important it is that the Czechs will be in the chair for the EU leaders' summit that begins this afternoon, and runs on until tomorrow. A big item on the agenda will be an initial skirmish over European financial regulation. To simplify, the British are up against the French and the Germans when it comes to deciding whether EU institutions, including the European Central Bank, should take precedence over national governments as regulators of last resort.
The British take the view that they have a disproportionate interest in financial regulation because the City of London accounts for a disproportionate share of financial business in the EU. Their dispute with France and Germany turns on the creation of two new agencies, for the moment. Britain dislikes the proposal that the European Central Bank should always be in the chair of a new risk monitoring agency, arguing that the post should either rotate between countries or be elected. You do not have to be Machiavelli to guess why: the ECB has a much closer relationship with the 16 countries that use the single currency, than with the other nine eleven [typo corrected, see comments below] that do not (only eurozone central bankers sit on the ECB board, for example). And Britain does not use the euro. Then there is a fiddly but important argument about whether EU supervisors, charged with watching over the banking, insurance and securities industries, should have the final say on disputes involving cross-border institutions. If the EU supervisors have the final say, argue the Brits, that could lead to a Eurocrat ordering a national government to inject billions into a bank that it found to be insolvent. The view from London is that there is clearly a need for someone to referee disputes between two or more national supervisors (ie, when a bank with operations in several countries gets into trouble). But that it offends against fundamental principles to have the power to order bailouts taken at the EU level, when the money to pay for such bailouts comes from the national level.
What does this all have to do with the Czech presidency? Well, quite a lot. Decisions on internal market measures can, in theory, be taken by qualified majority vote. And it is not at all sure that Britain has enough allies to form a blocking minority (so far, only Slovenia, Slovakia and Romania have spoken out in support of Britain, though others appear to be reserving their judgement, diplomats say). Which means that in theory, when the 27 national leaders gather this afternoon, you could imagine a scenario in which the council presidency works to isolate Britain, by threatening to hold a vote.
But that does not seem to be the instinct of the Czechs at all. At the Brussels hotel where the Czech prime minister, foreign minister and delegation are staying, the mood is quite different, I can report. The talk is of working hard to avoid any 26 against one scenario, and to resist calls to push the British into a corner. In this, the Czechs seem to be reflecting two deeply held instincts: that hasty over-regulation is a bad thing, and—perhaps more importantly—that Euro-types have to be mad if they think they can build a united Europe by out-voting countries on issues of vital importance to them. Instituting qualified majority voting as the rule for big decisions would be the end of the EU, the Czechs believe.
I am not going to deny that as a journalist for a liberal British newspaper, these views are in tune with my own. For that reason, I freely concede that I see it as tremendously lucky that the Czechs are in charge of the EU this week (and that the Swedes are next holders of the presidency, until the end of 2009). That makes it less likely that hasty regulations will be rushed through to impose martial law in the City of London, under the command of a four star French general (or whatever the exact plan of Nicolas Sarkozy currently is).
The outcome of this financial regulation dispute might be very different if we were already in 2010, when the rotating presidencies fall to Spain and Belgium. Those countries are much keener on all forms of European integration, and believe that there is a majority out there for a more integrated, corporatist, regulated Europe. Spain and Belgium would dearly love to use majority voting to push doubters like Britain to one side.
But here is the thing: I could take my chances with that. My view is that British scepticism about regulation, Czech support for decision-making by consensus and Hispano-Belgian enthusiasm for ramming through more Europe are all big, important currents of political thought in the EU. Giving each of them a say, in rotation, is a more honest, transparent way of letting each ideological camp try to convince the rest, and tug the EU duvet in their direction. The alternative, to which we are probably doomed thanks to Lisbon, is to have a presidency who talks and acts like a grand coalition government, advocating a hybrid view that is not shared by any one individual voter. One final confession, I know this is a British way of looking at democracy: I come from a tradition of clear majority governments. But I think mushy coalitions are trouble in the long run, because no ordinary citizen looking at Europe sees themselves reflected in such a coalition. Coalitions are artificial beasts, whose final decisions are the stuff of late-night deals in smoke-filled rooms. Surely it is better to have decisions taken after the successive clash of distinctive positions, no? Europe needs organic politics. I am even prepared to welcome a Belgian presidency of the EU, if that is the price to pay (and believe me, that is quite a concession).
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