Helicopters: The True Story

Friday, July 17, 2009

Helicopters: The True Story

Iain Dale 8:02 PM

There has been a lot of hot air this week about helicopters and the armed forces. I have received an email from an authoritative source who outlines the current position. I thought you might be interested in its contents. The author has given me permission to use his name, but I am not going to in case he suffers any consequences. He served in the RAF for ten years and was involved intimately in the Chinook reversion programme.

Hi Iain

Having listened over the last couple of days to the arguments that have been taking place in the commons I thought I would bring some things that you may or may not know to your attention in relation to the state of the rotary lift capacity of the MoD.

The eight Chinook Mk3 special forces helicopters purchased in 1996 will potentially cost £363 Million when (if) they become operational. The Prime Minister, Secretary of State for Defence and the PUS for Defence Procurement stated that some of these helicopters will be available at the end of the year. ZH*** has just entered the beginning of flight trials. Aircraft 2-8 are in various states of reversion and aircraft 8 has been cannibalised to such an extent that it is very unlikely that it will ever become operational. The likelihood of any of these aircraft being ready and available for operations this year is very slim. The aircrews have to be trained and flight certified, the ground crews have to be trained and certified. The aircraft has to be released as fit to fly and has to be retrofitted with the required DAS equipment that is still in trial at ******* **** to get it to theatre entry standard.

The UAE offered to buy the aircraft off the MoD.

You can buy a CH-47D which is the US standard Chinook or what we call the Mk2a for £20 Million.

JHC current order of battle states that it has 29 Chinook helicopters at its disposal for the front line (Source MoD Defence Statistics 2008). Assume that a third of the fleet are at various states of, minor, major and primary star (categories of maintenance) so are unavailable for operations.
Assume that a third of the fleet is being used for continuation training, OCU and trials. That leaves roughly 10 aircraft that can be deployed. 10 Chinook helicopters are currently deployed on Op Herrick. Assume that a third of the deployed fleet are grounded due to maintenance etc
Therefore the UK Chinook force in Afghanistan is roughly 6 helicopters that can be provided by flight operations for duty.

JHC current order of battle states that it has 23 Puma helicopters at its disposal for the front line (Source MoD Defence Statistics 2008). The Puma is non deployable to Afghanistan. It does not have the required power to operate within the flight envelope required by the user.

JHC current order of battle states that it has 6 Lynx AH7, 59 Lynx AH7/9 and 42 Gazelle helicopters at its deposal for the front line (Source MoD Defence Statistics 2008). The Lynx and Gazelle helicopters are non deployable to Afghanistan. They do not have the required power to operate within the flight envelope required by the user.

JHC current order of battle states that it has 15 Merlin Mk3 (22 initial purchase) at its disposal for the front line. Assume that a third of the fleet are at various states of, minor, major and primary star (categories of maintenance) so are unavailable for operations. Assume that a third of the fleet are is being used for continuation training, OCU and trials. That leaves roughly 4/5 aircraft that can be deployed.

4 Merlin helicopters are currently deployed to Iraq. Assume that a third of the deployed fleet are grounded due to maintenance etc. Therefore the UK Merlin force in Iraq is roughly 3 helicopters that can be provided by flight operations for duty.

JHC current order of battle states that it has 3 Merlin Mk3a (6 purchased from Denmark). These aircraft were promised in 2008. Here we are in 2009 and still no deployable airframes.

JHC current order of battle states that it has 26 Sea King Mk4 at its disposal for the front line.
Assume that a third of the fleet are at various states of, minor, major and primary star (categories of maintenance) so are unavailable for operations. Assume that a third of the fleet is being used for continuation training, OCU and trials. That leaves roughly 8 helicopters that can be deployed.

CHF splits its time between supporting Op Herrick and supporting 3 Cdo Bde RM deployed at sea. They can only operate in Afghanistan with Carson Blades.

The MoD is spending £70 Million on re-engining (8) Lynx AH9 helicopters with uprated engines. These aircraft are delayed.

The MoD bought the Bell 412 (Huey) to be used in hot and high climates like, Cyprus, Belize and Brunei. These aircraft can be bought for £2 Million. The US Army is modernising Jordanian Huey aircraft for £2 Million with modern avionics, armour etc for the Iraqi air force.

The NH90 is available for £14 Million (Internet source) and shares the same engine as the Merlin. For £70 Million you could buy 5 NH90 and these aircraft come with the added bonus that they can be built at Westland.

The Puma fleet has had its day. They are short of Puma qualified pilots (11 short) and the aircraft is becoming more expensive to maintain. The MoD is short of rotary pilots. A pilot takes roughly 3 years to become combat ready. However OCU conversion to another type can take as little as 6 months.

The Lynx AH7/9 fleet is reaching the end of its operational usefulness. OCU conversion to another type can take as little as 6 months.

All military rotary pilots that use Chinook, Merlin, Sea King and Puma do their multi engine rotary training on the Bell 412 therefore they are type certified to fly it.

All Lynx AH7/9 pilots are introduced to the Bell 412 so are aware of it.

So there you have it. Defence of the Realm blog has been superb in covering this subject and showing what is happening at the sharp end. The Prime Minister's conduct has been shocking. At the Liason Committee hearing he ducked and dived, but in the end it is down to him that our armed forces have one helicopter to 400 troups, while the Americans have one for every 33. They cling to this 60% figure like a limpet, hoping that people won't know that the number of Chinooks he we have is actually only 10.

When I was speaking in Reading last night, I was asked a question about Afghanistan. I rabbited on for a bit and then realised that I couldn't actually articulate the mission we are undertaking in Afghanistan. I know what it was originally, back in 2001, but it seems to have changed beyond all recognition. Are we now sure we are there for the right reasons? I have yet to hear a government minister articulate the mission properly over the last couple of weeks. They need to do it quickly, otherwise there will be a growing clamour for a complete change of strategy.