The Gaza Strip after Operation Cast Lead
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
After Operation Cast Lead Egypt upgraded its activities to prevent arms
smuggling. Its security forces have operated along the border and stopped
smugglers on the Egyptian side, uncovering weapons intended for the Gaza
Strip. Egypt has also publicized the exposure of a Hezbollah network on its
territory, one of whose activities was smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip (primarily in the time leading up to Operation Cast Lead). However, the
Egyptian measures are not sufficiently effective to hamper the military
buildup undertaken by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations since the
end of Operation Cast Lead.
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
June 2009
The Gaza Strip after Operation Cast Lead:
smuggling. Its security forces have operated along the border and stopped
smugglers on the Egyptian side, uncovering weapons intended for the Gaza
Strip. Egypt has also publicized the exposure of a Hezbollah network on its
territory, one of whose activities was smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip (primarily in the time leading up to Operation Cast Lead). However, the
Egyptian measures are not sufficiently effective to hamper the military
buildup undertaken by Hamas and the other terrorist organizations since the
end of Operation Cast Lead.
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
June 2009
The Gaza Strip after Operation Cast Lead:
The rebuilding of the civilian and military infrastructure in
the Gaza Strip carried out by Hamas. At the same time, Hamas continues
entrenching its control of the Gaza Strip. (Updated to June 2009)
I. Overview
II. Section One - Hamas and the other Palestinian terrorist
organizations strive to rebuild and upgrade their military-defensive
capabilities
1) Overview
2) Rebuilding the defensive and emergency civilian
apparatuses.
3) Rebuilding Hamas's military-terrorist wing
i) Background
ii) Reestablishing rocket and mortar shell manufacturing
capabilities
iii) Smuggling weapons into the Gaza Strip
iv) Media exposure of the smuggling route from Iran to the
Gaza Strip via Sudan
v) Rebuilding the tunnels
vi) Renewing military training
vii) The terrorist organizations' return to routine
III. Section Two - Restoring everyday life and entrenching Hamas
control:
1) Providing for immediate civilian needs
2) Renewal of internal security forces
3) The struggle with the Palestinian Authority for control of
external assistance to the Gaza Strip
4) Restricting UNRWA's activities
5) Increasing Hamas control of NGOs and other organizations
6) Strengthening the control of the Hamas de-facto
administration
7) Continuing and intensifying the Islamization process of the
Gaza Strip
IV. Section Three - Rebuilding the infrastructure
1) The international community's commitments to rebuilding the
Gaza Strip and the difficulties encountered
2) "The resistance economy"
3) Financial support for various sectors and institutions
4) Immediate solutions for building problems
5) Restoring and strengthening Hamas's propaganda machine
6) Rebuilding the educational system
7) Rebuilding the agricultural system
V. Section Four - The influence of the rebuilding process on
Hamas's terrorist policy
Overview
1. Operation Cast Lead caused severe damage to Hamas's military,
security, administrative and civilian structures in the Gaza Strip, as well
as to the infrastructure and public installations from or near which Hamas
operated during the fighting. In the six months since the fighting ended,
Hamas has made an effort to restore its internal security forces and
military-terrorist wing (the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades) to their
previous strength and to upgrade their capabilities. At the same time, Hamas
strives to control and supervise the rebuilding process, while not allowing
the Palestinian Authority to gain a foothold.
2. However, in attempting to do so, Hamas has encountered basic
difficulties:
i) The internal Palestinian rivalry between Hamas and Fatah :
The rivalry did not abate after Operation Cast Lead but rather increased ,
and no real progress has been made so far at the internal Palestinian
dialogue held in Cairo . The separation process between the Gaza Strip and
Judea and Samaria , which intensified after Hamas took over the Gaza Strip
in June 2007, continued after Operation Cast Lead. Two separate
administrative entities have taken hold , each ruled by a different
establishment, each with its own policies and economy (although funds from
the Palestinian Authority continue flowing into the Gaza Strip). One of the
results is a fierce struggle between Hamas and the Palestinian Authority for
the generous amounts of financial aid ($4.5 billion) promised to the Gaza
Strip at the Sharm el-Sheikh conference, in effect preventing the money from
being used to rebuild the Gaza Strip infrastructure.
ii) Hamas's belligerent ideology and strategies have remained
the same : Hamas continues to adhere to its rigid fundamental positions,
including the use of terrorism ("resistance"), refusal to recognize Israel
and to accept previous agreements reached between Israel and the PLO. With
regard to practical matters, Hamas continues its intransigence, for example
the issue of Gilad Shalit, which is extremely sensitive for Israel . One
result is Hamas's continued isolation in the Arab world and in the
international arena, and so far no practical arrangements have been made
between Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority and Hamas which would
normalize the movements of civilians and merchandise through the Gaza Strip
crossings and make it possible for the raw materials needed for rebuilding
to enter (such as steel and concrete, prevented by Israel). The continued
restrictions on passage through the crossings and the difficulties posed by
Egypt on operating the tunnel industry (especially after a Hezbollah network
was uncovered in the region) also make it hard to rebuild the infrastructure
and Hamas's military capabilities damaged during the war.
3. The aforementioned difficulties not withstanding, to restore
normal life and advance rebuilding Hamas has adopted a policy of restrained
attacks in recent months which it tries to enforce (although not entirely
successfully) on rogue terrorist networks, especially those affiliated with
the global jihad. The policy is accompanied by presenting a Smiley face to
the Obama administration with the overall objective of achieving a time-out
, even if only a tactical one, to give Hamas the time to strengthen its hold
over the Gaza Strip, find solutions for the everyday problems of the
populace, and restore and even upgrade the security and military forces
damaged by Operation Cast Lead .
4. An interim summary of the rebuilding processes, which are
still far from complete , indicates the following:
i) With regard to the military networks : Hamas is rebuilding
and strives to upgrade its military-terrorist wing (the Izz al-Din al-Qassam
Brigades). That includes replacing the weapons lost with new ones (including
advanced weapons) by smuggling them in through the tunnels (despite Egypt 's
intensive counter-activities). So far Hamas has smuggled in dozens of
standard rockets, hundreds of mortar shells, dozens of anti-tank and
anti-aircraft missiles, and tens of tons of standard explosives and raw
materials for the manufacture of homemade weapons. The smuggling allows
Hamas to extend the range of its rockets and to improve its anti-tank and
anti-aircraft capabilities. In addition, the tunnel system in the Rafah
region is in use again and are a vital channel for smuggling weapons (as
well as food, equipment and fuel). Weapons are being manufactured again, and
military training and instruction have been renewed (although for the time
being the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades are keeping a lower profile than
they did before Operation Cast Lead).
ii) With regard to security systems : Hamas is particularly
concerned about restoring its internal security forces, which were severely
damaged by the fighting, and to strengthen its control over the Gaza Strip.
Five months after the end of Operation Cast Lead, Hamas succeeded in
restoring the forces' daily functioning, as can be seen by their increased
deployment and visibility. The oppression of Hamas opponents (primarily
Fatah) has been renewed to ensure that they do not try to regroup. In
addition, new operatives are being recruited and an emergency exercise was
being held to simulate emergency deployment and dealing with an Israel
attack (a lesson learned from the blow delivered by the IDF at the beginning
of Operation Cast Lead). Headquarters have been assigned temporary quarters,
most of them in civilian locations, to find solutions, even temporary, for
the problems involved in restoring the apparatuses which were attacked.
iii) With regard to administration and control : Hamas is
making an enormous effort to establish its political control by suppressing
its opponents. Fatah activists have been detained and executed and Hamas has
increased its control of various civilian systems (education, health,
unions, NGOS, clans). One of the ways it strengthens its control is by a
process of Islamization, turning radical Islam into an obligation whose
influence on Gazan daily life is increasing. Two of the manifestations of
Islamization after Operation Cast Lead were the establishment of new
national Islamic bank and of an Islamic insurance company, which promote
Hamas's objective of controlling the economy of the Gaza Strip (although
their activities are limited at this stage). In addition, local
reconciliation committees were established to operate according to Islamic
religious law, and are controlled by Hamas (in competition with the
traditional reconciliation committees), laws were passed against to keep
Internet surfers from logging on to sites considered immoral, the markets
were closed on Fridays and religious themes were imposed on youngsters'
summer camps. All of the above have enabled Hamas to retain its control of
the Gaza Strip, and today there is no internal threat to the stability of
its regime.
iv) With regard to the Gaza Strip's economy : In the months
since Operation Cast Lead, Hamas has transferred humanitarian assistance and
funds to many sectors of the population which were harmed during the
fighting. That has helped stabilize the situation and prevented an immediate
humanitarian crisis, but it has not provided fundamental solutions for
rebuilding housing and public institutions. Administrative functions and
symbols of power have not been restored (for example, constructing a
building for the Palestinian Legislative Council). At this stage it can be
said that during the period since Operation Cast Lead Hamas has not managed
to put into motion significant processes for rebuilding the Gaza Strip
(beyond immediate repairs to the infrastructure such as water and
electricity). In the absence of progress in physical rebuilding and because
of public criticism, Hamas has tried to market the idea of a "resistance
economy" to the Gazans. That involves constructing an economy which supports
Hamas's terrorist strategy and is based on the resources of the Gaza Strip
to reduce dependence on external aid to a minimum. In practical terms, it
means building mud huts for the homeless, employing the unemployed in local
agriculture, growing food demanded by the local market while banning the
cultivation of export growths, such as strawberries and flowers. The degree
to which the idea can be implemented is questionable, but it is a useful as
a propaganda tool to show that Hamas is coping with the economic constraints
of the Gaza Strip.
5. The political, social and military processes put into motion
by Hamas in the Gaza Strip (which continued after Operation Cast Lead) have
increased the separation between Hamas's political entity in the Gaza Strip
and the Palestinian Authority in Judea and Samaria . The separation has
created a fundamental difficulty for the Palestinians in implementing the
road map, because the Hamas de-facto administration in the Gaza Strip
continues its refusal to recognize Israel and stresses terrorism as the
solution to the conflict. That embarrasses and confuses the United States
and the international community because the Palestinian Authority does not
have effective tools, especially not at this stage, to change the
problematic situation in the Gaza Strip and to restore the status quo ante.
Thus efforts are being invested to strengthen the Palestinian Authority in
Judea and Samaria as the core of the "state in the making," with the hope
that the future will provide the tools and a chance to deal effectively with
the issue of the Gaza Strip.
To the Full Document in PDF Format Click Here
www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e074.pdf
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