European defence co-operation

Monday, July 20, 2009

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European defence co-operation

Major General Julian Thompson, victor in the Falklands and all-round good-egg, writes in the letters column of The Daily Telegraph today, asking whether the way to avoid casualties in Afghanistan was to "follow the German, French and Spanish example and not fight?"

He goes on to add that the government obsession with a European defence identity has wasted money on Euro-projects, instead of buying cheaper, better equipment off the shelf. He is thus answering the rush of propaganda from Nick Clegg, Lib-Dim leader, who has been exploiting the equipment "crisis" in Afghanistan, arguing for greater European defence co-operation as a way of resolving the problems.

He was, for instance, in full flow in The Independent on Saturday, asking: "why is Britain dragging its feet on European defence co-operation that would allow us to pool resources with the French and others so we can get more bang for our bucks?"

As a very rough estimate, however, we calculated that excess costs arising out of European defence co-operation came to £8.8 billion, either in failed projects or excess costs. That would buy a ridiculous 35,000 RG-31 mine protected vehicles or 350 Chinook helicopters.

Amongst the more egregious examples of waste were the "Trigat" projects - medium and long-range anti-tank missiles. British participation in these European projects (appropriately, developed by "Euromissile") cost us over £314 million before we had to pull out after the systems failed to deliver, leaving the MoD with a total loss. 

A rush purchase of US-built Javelin missiles had to be made to equip the Army, which now form a basic (if expensive) part of our armoury in Afghanistan.

With not so much as a blush, though, Clegg tells us that our priorities must change for a rapidly changing world, so that we invest in what's most likely to be needed: helicopters, mine-resistant armoured vehicles, unmanned aerial vehicles, intelligence gathering systems, strategic airlift, as well as the more traditional effect of manpower.

One wonders whether, in terms of "strategic airlift" he is thinking of that wonderful example of European co-operation, the A-400M. Clearly, that is the answer to all our problems.

When it comes to mine-resistant armoured vehicles though, the French do have the answer (pictured top), which we would do well to emulate. In April this year, they had delivered to Afghanistan three US-built Buffalo route clearance vehicles, plus Husky mine detection vehicles (which they call Souvims).


The vehicles were, incidentally, delivered in an Antonov 124 (pictured above), proudly announced by the French defence ministry, who seem to have no problems using this Russian-built strategic airlift. In fact, VAB armoured personnel carriers similar to that accompanying the Buffalo in the top picture were also delivered by an Antonov 124.

COMMENT THREAD

That's journalism!

As another British soldier is reported killed in Afghanistan, two investigative sleuths from The Daily Mail, Tim Shipman and Matthew Hickley, breathlessly tell us that the announcement came "as Lt Col Richardson revealed that American, Dutch and even Australian helicopters are being used to launch British combat operations in Afghanistan." UK forces have used coalition aircraft to "seize areas of ground" from the Taliban, said the Colonel.

The Daily Telegraph goes one further as star reporter Rosa Prince scribes these immortal words:

The Daily Telegraph understands that American Chinooks were used for a combat mission as part of the Panther's Claw operation within the last month. Lieutenant Colonel Nick Richardson, spokesman for Task Force Helmand confirmed that UK forces were forced to rely on foreign helicopters.

These fearless hacks can however, shelve their dreams for nominations for the next Pulitzer prize for investigative reporting. The MoD Website for 23 June – nearly a month ago – blandly informs us that:

More than 350 soldiers from The Black Watch, 3rd Battalion The Royal Regiment of Scotland (3 SCOTS), have launched an airborne assault into one of the last Taliban strongholds.

Twelve Chinook helicopters, supported by 13 other aircraft including Apache and Black Hawk helicopter gunships, a Spectre gunship, Harrier jets and unmanned drones, dropped the British soldiers into Babaji, north of Lashkar Gah, just before midnight on Friday 19 June 2009.

Not only did we rely on helicopters (with the MoD thoughtfully providing a pic – see above), we were "forced" to rely on a USAF Spectre gunship, Harriers (USMC – ours have gone home) and probably US Predator UAVs. Since 90 percent – or thereabouts – close air support is provided by US assets, we are routinely "forced" to rely on F-15s, F-16s, B-1 Lancers, A-10s ...

And then, of course, on the ground, we are "forced" to rely on Danish Leopard II tanks, on their APCs, on Estonian APCs and even the Ex-MoD Mamba mine protected vehicles which we sold off for a song.

But Hey! This is a coalition effort. We are not alone ... and have not been for some time. But then, here's another "scoop". During WWII, the US stripped out the armour from its one and only armoured division and sent the Shermans to the 8th Army. To win the battle of el Alamein, we were "forced" to rely on foreign tanks.

Shock! Hold the front page!

COMMENT THREAD

Where defence leads ...

According to The Daily Mail - admittedly not the most reliable of sources – the MoD has defended its decision not to buy Blackhawk helicopters on the basis that it has ordered 62 Future Lynx helicopters, due to enter service from 2014.

If this was actually what was said, then it confirms publicly the interplay between provision of immediate capacity in theatre and the acquisition of future capacity. From this, it would appear that the MoD believes that ordering kit for delivery (but not actual service) starting in 2014 is an answer to current problems.

In fact, we believe that this is the case – and have said so many times. The added strand fits the archetype. An alternative, peddled by The Independent, lacks plausibility. Here, the excuse is that, once the "cheaper" option of upgrading the Pumas had been selected, the Army was stuck with it because of the time it would take to re-train pilots to fly Blackhawks. 

The Mail comment, on the other hand, strengthens the assertions made by ex-Majors Will Pike and Patrick Little, who argue that many senior officers and civil servants "are distracted by wrangling over the defence budget, with its expensive equipment programmes; none of which will benefit the front line anytime soon."

But what it also suggests is that, despite the torrent of adverse publicity over the helicopter issue, the MoD has not changed its position one iota. It is completely impervious to outside influence or criticism and goes on just as before. If, say, the MoD was a commercial organisation reliant on its customer base for its survival,the CEO would by now be making statements on how he intended to deal with the problem.

In fact, the MoD has almost no room for manoeuvre. With other expenses crowding in on it, the one card it had up its sleeve was a pool of money - £1.9 billion over the procurement cycle – pencilled in for Future Lynx. Now this money has been committed, there is nothing left in the kitty. There is simply no money available. The Army has blown it.

Hence, the indications are that the government is going to try to tough it out, trimming here, fiddling there and accentuating the positives – such as Merlins being sent to theatre and the modified Chinooks coming on stream. But it looks increasingly likely that there will be nothing extra beyond that.

The MoD, or course, can rely on the fickle nature of the media, which will soon enough lose interest and move on, and the fact that we are moving into the long Parliamentary recess, which coincides with the "silly season". And, with Operation Panther's Claw coming to a climax, the MoD may also be hoping for a slackening in the casualty rate. With that, it perhaps predicts, Afghanistan might at last slip down the news agenda and the ministry can revert to business as usual.

However, there are other pressing issues. Although largely driven off the agenda by the focus on helicopters, the vehicle problem is far from resolved. Bearing in mind that the Taleban have got the measure of the Jackal, the next crisis might be just around the corner – notwithstanding that there is a clear and present danger of a Chinook being shot down. What disappears from the news can, just as quickly, come back.

Looking at the bigger picture though, beyond Afghanistan and beyond defence, what we are seeing here is a window into government – one effect of the cash crisis which is going to be repeated right across the board. More and more, government is going to find that it can no longer throw money at problems, no matter how pressing. The cupboard is bare. It is going to have to wriggle and dissemble, just as it is doing now.

Where defence leads, we may find, the rest of the country will have to follow.