... discussing it. The mighty Ministry of Defeat hath spoken:Thursday, July 23, 2009
http://eureferendum.blogspot.com/
Not a funding issue
It is easy to get seriously tired of the prevailing narrative, which is spreading like swine flu, completely out of control. A typical example comes in The Northern Echo, with an exclusive interview with Robin Fox, managing director of Northern Defence Industries – also a colonel in the Territorial Army, recently returned from active service in Afghanistan.
Mr Fox should know something about this issue from his unique perspective as a defence contractor and soldier. And he has absolutely no doubts as to the cause of the helicopter problem, declaring that the procurement system has cocked up in getting enough rotary wing assets for use in (Afghanistan). "We know well the story of the Chinooks that have sat in a hangar for years because nobody got it right," he says," but why the hell didn't we buy a shedload of Black Hawks from the Americans, which are cheaper and better than the alternatives?"
That we did not, according to Fox, is "a load of political nonsense." He then argues that the helicopter shortage is a symptom of "a greater disease across the support that is given to our troops on operations. It's a lack of funding across the whole… not just for helicopters."
As always though, this is just extruded verbal material – all you have to do is the basic arithmetic. Future Lynx is currently costed at £1.7 billion for 62 helicopters, with deliveries starting in 2014. A batch of 60 Blackhawks would cost £600 million and, with an order placed in late 2006 or early 2007, it could be in service now.
For a down payment, the £185 million spent on the six Danish Merlins could have bought the first batch of 18 machines, without raiding the Future Lynx fund.
The £100 million wasted on the Pinzgauer Vector would have bought another ten, the £166 million wasted on the useless Panther could have bought another 16 – with some change left over. The £314 million wasted on the "Trigat" anti-tank missile could have bought another 31 and, with the change left over from the Panther added, another machine could have been squeezed out of the system. Hey! That comes to 58 - we're nearly there, and we still have not touched the Future Lynx fund.
Over and over again, we have to repeat that this is not a funding issue. As long as the MoD procurement system is so wasteful and inefficient, there will always be cash problems, but throwing more money at the system just generates more waste. The Merlins are not only expensive to buy – they are extremely expensive to operate, at £34,000 an hour – a point made by Ann Winterton in today's letter column in the Telegraph.
For decades to come, therefore, these helicopters will be a hidden drain on the defence budget, soaking up money that could be spent elsewhere. The same will apply to the Future Lynx. While a Bell 212 costs £2,000 an hour to operate, the current (Army) Lynx models cost a staggering £23,000 an hour. The Future Lynx will perpetuate this waste. Even to contemplate £1.7 billion on a mere 62 helicopters is a higher kind of madness.
Perpetuating the "underfunding" narrative, therefore, is a cop-out. As with every other public sector organisation – from the NHS to the police and everywhere else – throwing money at a problem solves nothing. It has not worked with the NHS and it will not work with defence. The driver must be value for money, from which it is painfully evident that there is actually no shortage of cash – simply grossly inadequate management of the funds available.
Then, that is the malaise right through the public sector and one could argue that, if we get defence spending right, the lessons learned could be applied across the board. Purely on NHS procurement, billions could be saved without in any way touching service provision. But, as long as the insistent bleat of "underfunding" drowns out the sound of money pouring down the drain, we will get nowhere. It really is time the debate moved on, before we too follow the path our money is taking.
COMMENT THREADA dangerous self-indulgence?
Twice we've called "time" on the controversy over equipment for our troops in Afghanistan, yet it continues almost unabated. It was with more than some interest, therefore, that we watched author and analyst Michael Griffinon BBC News 24 yesterday, expressing similar puzzlement over the intensity of the "debate".
Viewed wholly objectively, with the focus narrowed down to whether troops have enough helicopters, there is nothing to sustain it. As it stands, there is no shortage of helicopters in theatre to support current operations. The prime minister is right on this.
That most of the helicopters are American is neither here nor there. But there are Dutch, Canadian and British as well, all "pooled" in a vast coalition fleet which is being used not for British or American operations, but forcoalition operations, of which the national contingents are an integral part.
In that sense, complaining about the shortfall of British helicopters is about as rational as anyone arguing against the use of B-17s of the US 8th Army Air Force to extend the strategic bombing campaign against Germany in 1943. Allies work together, and harness their collective assets to the common cause. That is what we did then and that is what we are doing now.
In seeking to explain the furore, however, Griffin linked the campaign in Afghanistan with Iraq, suggesting that in the latter, the British Army had not performed well, to the disappointment of the Americans. And in Helmand too, its grasp of counter-insurgency had been maladroit, again leading to a less than admiring response from the Americans.
To an extent, ventured Griffin, the military were seeking to transfer the blame for their own poor performance onto the politicians. Similarly, he felt, the military had some considerable control over the types of helicopters purchased and their deployment. Problems could not be laid entirely at the doors of the politicians.
If that is one element which is driving the controversy, the other is clearly the Conservative Party, anxious to find yet another stick with which to beat the government. The attitude is summed up in the recent comment from Liam Fox, who declares: "It is abundantly clear that we are asking our troops to fight a war for which Labour has not properly equipped them."
Notice there, the use not of the word "government" but of "Labour", revealing an overt partisanship which puts the alleged default wholly in a political context. There is no room in Fox's kitbag for any equivocation or shared responsibility.
Gordon Brown, nevertheless, is playing his own political games, relating helicopter requirements to current operations, but the distinction between these and the "general campaign" is becoming clear, with an acknowledgement that, while troops are able to fulfil their tasks at the moment, there is an overall shortfall of helicopters. This, we are told, is to be redressed by the Merlins which will at last be despatched by the end of the year, by the re-engined Lynxes and, next year, by additions to the Chinook fleet.
That things could have been done quicker, better and considerably more cheaply is indisputable, but the fact is that issues are being addressed, further confirming the "totemic status" of helicopters. In other words, this controversy isn't really about helicopters at all – or even about equipment.
Returning to Griffin, at the end of the interview – to the evident discomfort of his BBC interrogator – he broke away from the script to express his concern over the exaggerated level of publicity about an issue which lacked that substance. He warned that the Taleban would be monitoring programmes such as these, and the furore would improve their morale considerably.
Therein does lie a huge trap, created by the concern over casualties and the focus on helicopters. We have alluded to this before, in that if the Taleban were successfully to bring down a Chinook laden with troops, it is very hard to see how continuing the campaign could be politically sustainable.
The problem is that the Taleban know that, and they will do everything possible to make it so, while seeking generally to maximise the British casualty rate. This much is being recognised, with Dannatt at last taking the IED threat seriously.
As to the remarkable controversy that we have been witnessing for the best part of three weeks, this – if Griffin is right – is a dangerous self-indulgence which we simply cannot afford, motivating the Taleban to greater efforts on the basis that the home front can be so weakened that British troops will have to be withdrawn. We are, unwittingly, sending them a message that there is everything to gain from killing British troops.
This is not a happy message, and one that is difficult to change, as these media storms tend to have a life of their own. But the military, the politicians and the media – and indeed this blog – need to think very hard about the message they are sending, and to whom.
COMMENT THREADWednesday, July 22, 2009
Don't even bother ...
Ann Winterton: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what assessment has been made of the merits of deploying single propeller-driven aircraft in theatre for ground attack and surveillance.
And, as we well know, the MoD is never wrong. And since they cannot be, everybody else must be.
Bill Rammell: Commanders on the ground already have access to a broad range of surveillance and ground attack capabilities and, while we keep our requirements under constant review, there are currently no plans to deploy manned, single propeller-driven aircraft for ground attack or surveillance. We have though deployed the unmanned single propeller aircraft, UK Reaper and Hermes 450, in surveillance roles, with UK Reaper also providing a ground attack capability.
Thursday, 23 July 2009
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