AUGUST 13, 2009
NBC News: Iraqi insurgent spokesman open to better ties with U.S.
By Evan Kohlmann
In a videotaped response to questions from NBC News, a spokesman for Sunni insurgents in Iraq suggests that America's revamped diplomatic approach under the administration of President Barack Obama may be causing some of America's most vocal opponents in the Middle East to reappraise their tenor towards the United States.
Speaking from an undisclosed location in Baghdad, Dr. Ibrahim al-Shammari-official spokesman for the Sunni militant group known as the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI)-praised President Obama for promoting the ideals of "a shared community and mutual respect" between Muslims and non-Muslims, and called upon him to put these words into action...
In his videotaped response, al-Shammari, who kept his face concealed, commented on President Obama’s recent address to the Muslim world in Cairo: "His speech was presented in a polite and respectful language. It was very emotionally charged, and it offered respect towards Islam. The visit to our region was marked by an American modesty that we have never witnessed before."
Appealing directly to the American public, the IAI spokesman declared, "the world is large enough for all of us to thrive, and you can achieve your interests without further war, bloodshed, and wasted money…. If America or President Obama wants to start a new policy according to the platform he introduced, which we support and agree with, which is living together as a community and respecting each other, or promoting shared interests, we support that and welcome it highly."
The full story (and video) can be viewed on the NBC News website.
AUGUST 12, 2009
Much Ado About Something: Terror and Pakistan’s Nuclear Assets
By Animesh Roul
Every Pakistan watchers knew about those events. Bill Roggio has highlighted these events in his reports too (esp. in Long War Journal). But, Shaun Gregory (“The Terrorist Threat to Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons,” CTC Sentinel, Vol. 2 (7), July 2009) has analyzed these events to expose the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, the “pillar of Pakistan’s national security”.
The paper published in the CTC Sentinel (Combating Terrorism Center, West Point) has triggered a pitched debate in the region and in the Western World whether Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructures are secure or not , especially in the face of those (mentioned below) terror attacks that occurred in the last couple of years. Gregory’s article underscores three terror strikes on nuclear weapons facilities in Pakistan, questioning the physical security of the coveted nuclear assets:
“These have included an attack on the nuclear missile storage facility at Sargodha on November 1, 2007, an attack on Pakistan’s nuclear airbase at Kamra by a suicide bomber on December 10, 2007, and perhaps most significantly the August 20, 2008 attack when Pakistani Taliban suicide bombers blew up several entry points to one of the armament complexes at the Wah cantonment, considered one of Pakistan’s main nuclear weapons assembly sites.”
(Correction: The twin attack at the Wah Cantonment actually took place on August 21, Thursday, 2008, not on August 20 as chronicled in the paper).
Let’s revisit those terror events, all perpetrated by Taliban and Al Qaeda elements.
- November 1, 2007: Motorbike borne suicide bomber rammed his vehicle into a Pakistan Air Force (PAF) bus, killing seven PAF officers and three civilians on the Faisalabad Road in Sargodha (Punjab province). The bus was carrying PAF staff from the Mushaf Mir Airbase to Kirana Ammunition Depot. This Suicide attack was targeted at the air force officials and civilians, no intention to harm or steal nuclear material, or create a radiological emergency.
- December 10, 2007: At least five schoolchildren and three others were injured when a Car borne suicide bomber exploded his vehicle targeting a Pakistan Aeronautical Complex (PAC) bus carrying air force employees’ children at Kamra air base. The blast took place on the outskirts of the PAC factories on the Qutba-Attock Road and bus was going to the Attock city.
- August 21, 2008: This was the most severe suicide attack ever carried out against military establishments. Two suicide bombers blew themselves up near the gates of the Pakistan Ordnance Factories located in the military cantonment at Wah (Attock district), killing at least 70 persons. The POF at Wah is a cluster of industrial units producing variety of arms and ammunitions for the armed forces. Taliban spokesman Maulvi Omar claimed responsibility of the suicide attacks saying that they had been carried out in retaliation for military operations in Bajaur and Swat.
These terrorist acts mentioned by Gregory, were actually targeted at the security forces or civilians at the highly fortified military bases and not necessarily targeted with the aim of stealing nuclear material or creating nuclear disaster. But he has very rightly pointed out that these attacks highlighted the vulnerability of military/nuclear infrastructures in Pakistan and the myth of safety and security standard. What Gregory has missed here is that previous similar but ‘direct’ attacks on nuclear establishments by Baloch militants, e.g. mortar attack on the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) controlled establishment on the Dera Ghazi Khan-Quetta highway in May 2006. However, this event received scant media attention and subsequent cover up by Pakistan.
In all three attacks, which were very symbolic depicting‘Taliban-Military feud’ in Pakistan, these terrorists never showed the intention to create a nuclear disaster instead they claim responsibility of the mayhems and threaten for more such type of attacks against the military/police in future to avenge anti-terror operations. Of course their Al Qaeda friends have their goals intact for acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.
The point of debate: More than these three events which caught the attention of media, though lately (the paper published online on July 21, 2009) and triggered debates now especially in India, Pakistan and USA (Read News Links below) , the crux of the paper, I believe, somehow ignored or overlooked. The media picked up these terror events to highlight the vulnerability of Pakistan’s nuclear assets (lack of adequate physical security) which might fall in the hand of terrorists or extremists, but missed out the important point of Gregory’ article. The existential threat emanating from Pakistan, the nuclear power with abysmal proliferation track records, lies somewhere else. Gregory points out that Pakistan Army could decide to transfer nuclear weapons to a terrorist group. He mentioned in his paper (citing Philip Bobbitt’s ‘Terror and Consent', and reminding us about Mirza Aslam Beg’s case of passing nuclear weapons technology to Iran in the past) that "states can become pressurized or incentivized to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorist groups because they are responding to threats from an external power but fear the consequences of being identified as the origin of a nuclear strike.” This insinuation should be the point of debate which questions the nexus between the army and its proxy warriors.
Read More »
NEFA Foundation: Reports of Squabbling Over French Hostages in Somalia
By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new post from online jihadi discussion forums that describes a dispute over two French security consultants in Somalia who were kidnapped from a Mogadishu hotel on July 14. The dispute surrounding the hostages reportedly resulted in "disunity in Hizbul Islam that reached the limit of battle." July 2009 media reports provide additional context as a Somali police officer was quoted in the press as saying, "The higher-ranking French official was taken by al-Shabaab and the other remained with [Sheikh Hassan] Dahir Aweys," who is the leader of Hizbul Islam.
For more information about the Shabaab al-Mujahideen Movement, see my NEFA Foundation report, "Shabaab al-Mujahideen: Migration and Jihad in the Horn of Africa."
NEFA Foundation: Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) Claims China “Terrified by Our Operations”
By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated an article from the Turkestan Islamic Party’s (TIP) official magazine, "Islamic Turkestan", titled, “The Enemy Is Terrified by Our Operations” by Abdullah Mansur. In this article first published last November, Mansur described the wave of TIP attacks in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the Chinese government’s response. He noted, “…the Muslims of Eastern Turkestan are longing for a call to Jihad. The Chinese Communists have been oppressing them, but they have awoken from their deep sleep. There is nothing they like more than the noise of gunfire and the sound of guns and explosives. They have made up their minds and they are not hiding themselves behind their weapons.”
A copy of the article by Abdullah Mansur can be downloaded from the NEFA Foundation website.
NEFA "Target: America" Report: The Plot to Attack Jewish Centers in the Bronx and a Military Facility in Newburgh, New York
By Madeleine Gruen
Four Newburgh, New York men were arrested in the Riverdale section of the Bronx on the night of May 20, 2009 for attempting to bomb a Jewish community center with, what they believed to be, a 30-pound plastic explosive device, which they placed in a car positioned outside of the center. The conspirators also intended to attack the National Guard air base in Newburgh with a surface-to-air-missile, which they acquired from a dealer they believed to be affiliated with the Pakistani terrorist group, Jaish-e-Mohammed.
In this 20th report in the "Target: America" series, the NEFA Foundation explores the backgrounds of the men, all of whom converted to Islam while incarcerated, and their tactics, which had the potential to culminate in a viable attack despite the group’s lack of formal training. There are lessons to be learned from this plot for law enforcement, private business security directors, and religious institutions.
This case also demonstrates the necessity of further study of how some prison converts end up radicalized. The details of the conspirators’ backgrounds in the Bronx plot case makes it difficult to know how they became radicalized; whether it was during the terms of their incarcerations, or through their interactions post-incarceration. This is an important issue for exploration by those who study homegrown radicalization.
AUGUST 11, 2009
Why the "Merchant of Death" May Not Stand Trial
By Douglas Farah
Here is what I wrote today for Foreign Policy Magazine on the Thai judge's decision not to extradite Viktor Bout to the United States to stand trial:
Today, a Thai court ruled against extraditing notorious Russian weapons trafficker Viktor Bout to the United States -- a setback for the American legal system and a bad portent not just for U.S.-Thai relations, but also for relations between the United States and Russia.
James F. Entwistle, a senior U.S. official in Thailand, said he was "disappointed and mystified" at the ruling, which the United States intends to appeal. But the odds are in Bout's favor, as Thai appellate courts affirm lower-court rulings in the vast majority of cases.
Who is Viktor Bout and why does this case matter so much? The Russian dealer became known as the "Merchant of Death" for his exploits in delivering sophisticated weapons to war zones from Afghanistan to Colombia and Lebanon -- but mostly to Africa's most brutal thugs. Before he was finally nabbed last spring, Bout had been at work for decades, despite episodic Western efforts to stop him. He was the target of intelligence operations at the end of the Clinton administration. Several European governments, especially Belgium, have been after him for years. And, the United Nations has placed him on an international travel ban.
His extradition has become a top priority for an Obama administration seeking to prevent him from being released and further fanning conflicts around the world, particularly in his old stomping grounds of Afghanistan. The U.S. Justice Department had hoped Bout would stand trial after the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) caught him in a sting in March 2008.
Bout's capture was like a John Le Carré novel. In an elaborate ruse, DEA agents posed as guerillas from the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and contacted the Russian arms dealer. The Colombian group, infamous for its kidnappings and cocaine trafficking, is designated a terrorist organization by the United States and European Union. Bout, a former Soviet officer, stated he could sell the "FARC" intermediaries sophisticated weaponry to fight the U.S.-backed government in Colombia and to target U.S. military and civilian advisors. After having his intermediaries hop-scotch around the world to meet with them, Bout agreed to fly to Bangkok to seal the deal in person.
There, according to the indictment in Southern District of New York, he met with the undercover agents posing as FARC commanders for two hours in a luxury hotel. He offered to sell the group 700 to 800 surface-to-air missiles, millions of rounds of ammunition, AK-47 assault rifles, two cargo planes, and drone aircraft to bomb U.S.-built radar facilities in Colombia. He specifically stated he wanted to help kill Americans, who, he said, were his enemy too. He offered weapons-training classes. It is all on tape.
Hizb ut-Tahrir America Attempts to Control Dialogue and Spin Public Perception
By Madeleine Gruen
Since its July 19th Khilafah conference in Chicago, “The Fall of Capitalism and Rise of Islam,” Hizb ut-Tahrir America (HTA) has attempted to gain control of public discourse through press releases and online events. After the much-publicized conference, HTA was forced to go on the defensive in order to deflect accusations about ties to militancy and terrorism. It had been HTA’s hope that the conference would cause the media to act as its Trojan Horse by circulating the concept of a Khilafah to a wide American audience.
HTA held an online press conference from its base in Chicago last night. Questions were answered by Mohammed Malkawi, who has been HTA’s spokesman to the media since the group's public launch in June. (Malkawi was introduced to the virtual audience by his pseudonym, “Abu Talha”).
In the days leading up to the July 19th conference, some media outlets reported that HT had "ties" to 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and former al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarkawi. In his opening statement, Malkawi denied the accusations that HT had ties to any "militant groups," although he did not mention Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or Zarkawi specifically. He also took the opportunity to refute Hudson Institute scholar Zeyno Baran’s assessment that HT is a conveyor belt to terrorism. In response to one participant's question, Malkawi stated emphatically that HT had never “yielded to the influence of militancy.” Malkawi did not discuss the fact that HT has produced several militant offshoots, including al-Muhajiroun, based in London, and Akromiya, which was responsible for organizing protests against the Uzbek government that eventually led to the Andijan massacre in 2005. Nor did Malkawi mention individuals who were involved with HT and who went on to join more militant groups; such as, Omar Sharif and Asif Hanif, who participated in a suicide attack in Tel Aviv in 2003, and 9/11 planner Ramzi Binalshibh.
Hizb ut Tahrir (HT) has made inroads in other parts of the world by framing its boilerplate doctrine in a modern context. HT plays on the frustrations of Muslim populations in order to position itself as the vanguard of the aggrieved. Its blanket solution to all social, political, and economic problems is the establishment of an Islamic government, ruled by a Caliph, and run according to the laws of Shariah.
Much of HT’s strategic success in growing its support base and core membership can be attributed to its ability to control public dialogue through its aggressive production of leaflets and videos, web sites, and its public demonstrations. HT's communication campaigns attempt to stir controversy where there may have been none, attract media attention, and result in causing government agencies to react defensively; putting HT in the seat of control. HTA is clearly attempting to do the same in the United States. However, thus far, HTA has not been successful in assuming control of the tone or content of media reports, or in sparking positive discussions about its ideas.
AUGUST 10, 2009
Shadow Facilitators and Alternative Crops in Afghanistan
By Douglas Farah
One sign of how concerned the military and administration are about the situation is the new thinking that is going on while looking at old problems. Two important stories highlight just how sharp the change in strategy is.
The first is the New York Times piece on the addition of 50 drug lords to the list of Afghanis on the Pentagon's target list to kill or capture. This is recognition of the symbiotic and devastating link between the drug trade financing the Taliban (and al Qaeda). The 50 are what the DEA would call "shadow facilitators," those who are able to deal across criminal-terrorist-tribal-ethnic lines to buy opium, sell heroin, import surface-to-air missiles etc.
Lt. Col. Patrick Ryder, a Pentagon spokesman...said that “there is a positive, well-known connection between the drug trade and financing for the insurgency and terrorism.” Without directly addressing the existence of the target list, he said that it was “important to clarify that we are targeting terrorists with links to the drug trade, rather than targeting drug traffickers with links to terrorism.”
That may be a distinction without a difference in the Af/Pak region, and one that has been made for years as the U.S. military resisted efforts to get drawn into counterdrug operations. But the fact remains that, unless the vast pool of resources flowing from the drug trade is dried up, there is no hope of defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda.
One reason is that the corruption from the opium/heroin trade has also almost completely corrupted the current government, making it both more difficult to combat and more corrosive within society. Never mind the money is used to sustain an army that has few other revenue streams.
But an equally-important part of the new strategy was laid out by the Washington Post in describing the new efforts to wean the local population off of the poppy harvest. My full blog is here.
AUGUST 9, 2009
NEFA Foundation: Transcript of Latest Zawahiri Interview, "The Facts of Jihad and the Lies of the Hypocrites"
By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has obtained and translated a new video interview of Al-Qaida Deputy Commander Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri produced by Al-Qaida's As-Sahab Media Foundation. During the interview, al-Zawahiri strongly criticized Iran, noting, "Iran had her image scandalized in front of the entire world, and it has become clear that it is... ready to sell out the Muslims to the invading crusaders and assist them against the Muslims." Al-Zawahiri also attacked President Barack Obama and his continued policy of drone strikes in Pakistan and Afghanistan: "I see it as a new massacre of Muslims at the hands of the criminal, liar Obama who claims to seek the start of a new relationship with the Islamic world and Muslims, while every day his hands are dripping with their blood... We are not a nation of silly imbeciles who will permit Obama to fool us with vague phrases that have no meaning, when he is just a new face of the same old American criminality... He is like a wolf whose teeth are engrossed in your flesh, his claws are scratching your face, and both are dripping with your blood."
NEFA Foundation Report (Part 3 of 3): "Militant Groups Active in the Bajaur Region"
By Evan Kohlmann
The NEFA Foundation has released the final installment of a three part report by NEFA Senior Investigator Claudio Franco titled "Militant Groups Active in the Bajaur Region."The NEFA Foundation has closely followed the evolution of the Taliban insurgency in Pakistan’s west and recent developments in the region, and the result is a series of reports aimed at covering the situation in the field. The third part of this ongoing series examines the militants operating in the Bajaur region. Although the area in question is traditionally dominated by commanders who by and large hail from the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammed (TNSM) rank and file, the militants in Bajaur are not thehomogenous entity we may expect on the basis of media reports. The Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is surely dominated by the figure of Faqir Mohammed and his senior role within the overall movement guarantees effective representation to the agency within the TTP. Working together with the TTP insurgents, however, there are other significant groups based in one or the other of the area’s tehsils, or districts. These groups are often Taliban inspired and linked to former TNSM cadres, to the Afghan Taliban, and/or to foreign militants. Nevertheless, there are examples of Taliban-like entities having emerged purely to ‘protect’ the interests of a specific tribal group or potentate. In these cases, the emphasis on the Taliban brand of Deobandi ideology is clearly less marked and, at times, there appears to be a dangerous proximity to criminal elements, a proximity that has surely affected the Taliban’s credibility as a quasi-institutional actor.
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