Bogged down - by Richard... Sunday, August 23, 2009

Bogged down - by Richard... Sunday, August 23, 2009

In an exchange with a military expert today, one who describes himself as having made a good living critiquing UK MOD programmes, we agreed that the MoD – and the military generally (it is hard to draw a clear line between divisions and responsibilities) – is "essentially incompetent".

You have to look no further for confirmation of this than in today'sSunday Times, which has been able to get hold of a full copy of the 296-page Gray report on defence procurement.

Featured briefly by Channel 4 earlier this month, the benefit of far more detail the paper is able to tell us that the scale of MoD bungling is so severe it "is harming our ability ... to conduct difficult current operations". 

Using blunt language not normally seen in official documentation, the report by Bernard Gray, a former senior MoD adviser, talks of "lethal" weakness in government programmes and failings so bad they "cause damage to UK military output". 

The report goes on to claim that, on average, new equipment arrives five years late and costs 40 percent more than first estimated. The MoD equipment programme is £35 billion over budget and – most damning – the MoD's incompetence is helping our enemies who "are unlikely to wait for our sclerotic acquisition systems to catch up". 

The management is so poor, the projects so expensive and many items so out of date by the time they arrive that one defence expert is reported as saying sarcastically: "The system is failing to produce the equipment we don't need." 

The Sunday Times gives the report full treatment, with an additional feature-length article and aleader.

Interestingly, the paper notes that Labour politicians, including Gordon Brown, have insisted that the money is available for British forces to have what they need to fight the Taliban but, it says, the MoD is so incompetent at procuring equipment that billions of pounds are being wasted, the wrong systems are being ordered and soldiers' lives are being put at risk. 

Also of great interest, Gray dismisses claims — often made by Labour ministers — that cost overruns relate to projects inherited from the last Conservative government. "The analysis of the data suggests that the problems are widespread, affecting projects old and new, large and small, to a greater or lesser extent," he says.

However, The Sunday Times, in its own journalistic way, then seeks to makes political capital out of this. But to attach the whole blame to ministers is a travesty. The report does not do it. It focuses at least as much or more on senior military officers either working on procurement or making strategic decisions about procurement. In particular, it criticises inter-service rivalry, lack of commercial competence and other issues which drag the system down.

Despite this, Liam Fox and other politicians are given their say, making their usual party political points. They miss the point. The problems with the MoD are structural, spanning administrations and even generations. As it stands, the MoD is not so much out of control as beyond control. The last Conservative administrations failed to get to grips with the problems, the current Labour administration has failed and there is no indication whatsoever that the next Conservative administration will fare any better.

However, comprehensive though the Times report might be, this only deals with one aspect of the defence activity. As we have remarked previously, the military is equally sclerotic when it comes to devising and updating doctrines and, as one of our recent posts might indicate, lethally slow when it comes to adjusting tactics to deal with the realities of the battlefield.

Small anecdotes tend to confirm this. Recently, a soldier, who had completed tours in both Iraq and Afghanistan, found himself being instructed by seniors in tactics and procedures which had long been discarded in theatre, then being required to become proficient in them for his promotion examination.

Across the board, therefore, we are looking at an institution (or institutions) which are basically incapable of dealing with a lean, adaptive enemy such as the Taleban, and which will always be left floundering, behind the curve, as it has so often been.

It is on that basis that I came to the conclusion that we cannot win this conflict, and we should therefore withdraw. 

I have searched my heart and conscience long and very hard on this matter and while, intellectually, I remain convinced that this war is winnable, I cannot convince myself that our military, as an institution – saddled with its own corporate inertia and the incompetence of the MoD – is up to the task. It can no longer conduct effective operations and gain operational and thus strategic success.

On this, it would appear, I am in tune with public sentiment – if not necessarily for the same reasons. In a Mail on Sunday poll, more than two-thirds of respondents (69 percent) want our troops withdrawn from Afghanistan. Only 31 percent believe the mission is worthwhile. 

Downing Street advisers, we are told, had hoped that the prime minister could swing public support back behind the war by making the strategic objectives clearer. But 74 percent claim to understand the government's objectives, implying that they do not think them worthwhile or achievable. 

Previous polls, this paper reminds us, have shown opinion to be evenly split on the issue. It thus suggests the milestone of 200 British deaths, passed a week ago, has proved a tipping point. That is probably the case and sentiment, at least under this administration, is probably irrecoverable. It is unlikely even that the incoming government will be able to claw back support, especially if we see the casualty rate continue to climb.

Personally, I do not know what it would take to convince me that the mission is worth the grief, and I doubt very much whether there exists within the MoD with the ability to make the case that would bring people back on board.

In October 2007 the CDS was admitting in respect of Iraq that the government as a whole – including himself - had not communicated the strategic position very well. They have done no better with Afghanistan and now they appear to have left it too late. They are so bogged down in their own incompetence that they cannot even dig themselves out of their hole.

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The EU say "yes" - by Richard... Saturday, August 22, 2009

As the witness accounts continue to pour in from diverse sources all attesting to the sham of the Afghan election, in leaps the European Union Election Observation Mission (EUEOM)to declare the holding of elections "a victory for the Afghan people".

"These were the first Afghan-led elections, and the process seems at this stage to have been largely positive," the EUEOM statement said. Philippe Morillon, a former French general heading the EU mission, then insisted that they were "fair". "Generally what we have observed was considered by our observers with our methodology good and fair," he added.

This, of course, is part of an organisation which believes that a "no" response to a referendum on the constitutional Lisbon treaty is simply a signal to have another referendum, making sure the people get it "right" the next time round, as it is seeking to do in Ireland in just over a month's time.

But, in lending its voice of approval to the charade – where the "people" are crying out for the world to take notice of their fake election - the EU is simply joining the chorus of voices from the international "community", governments and institutions such as Nato which have invested far too much in the process to allow it to fail.

Thus, when by any normal measure the election should be declared void, in the fullness of time, Karzai or some other malleable puppet will be found to have garnered enough votes him to be installed in the dung heap of the presidential palace in Kabul, guarded by phalanxes of stern-faced CIA agents. 

The "community" will roll over and declare the result "valid" – allowing some mild reservations to be expressed about "irregularities", which will be judged not sufficiently grave as to have affected the result - and the charade will continue on to its pre-ordained conclusion.

Some clues as to the real agenda are given in an interesting article in the Asia Times, which discusses the "seven steps to peace" in Afghanistan, the first step being to "engage the Taleban and bring them into the mainstream political process."

Actually, this article sees this as the first step of the process but, while there may be a seven-stage process, we have already seen two of them rolled out. The first was the sham "surge", orchestrated by Obama with the maximum of publicity – of which Operation Panther's Claw was part - in a showy but wholly ineffective and ultimately futile attempt to "pacify" the country ahead of the presidential elections which were held on Thursday.

The second step was the high profile decision to build up the Afghani security forces – army and police – except that this is as much a sham as was the surge. Numbers may be increased – although only nominally, never matching the desertion rate – but the forces will never be properly equipped, trained or organised.

For one, the last thing the Western powers – and indeed the puppet government in Kabul – want is a powerful, effective army that can, on the lines of Pakistan, form a separate power base for ambitious generals, and challenge the status quo.

Then, there is always a fear that the Kabul government might break away and use the army to further its territorial squabbles, fighting neighbouring Pakistan – as it has done even in the recent past – rather than the Taleban. Crucially, also, no one wants an army that is actually capable of taking on and defeating the next government of Afghanistan – the Taleban.

The third step was, of course, to allow the elections to proceed, then to declare a "success" come what may, with the installation of a puppet president, preparatory to the next step, which is already in its opening stages – mounting high-level negotiations with the Taleban.

In this fourth step, attempts will be made to prevail upon the Taleban to adopt a more "moderate" face, ridding itself of its obvious "hard liners", who must be either sidelined, retired or murdered. The services of the CIA and its armed UAVs, or the special forces, may be offered to help remove any obstacles to "peace". 

Thus re-branded, the Taleban will be invited to join – in fact, take over – the government in Kabul, fortified by generous bribes masquerading as international aid. Part of the deal will be an agreement that the Taleban should scale back its attacks on coalition forces and the more obvious outrages such as suicide bombing, sufficient to give the appearance of normality.

Step five will then involve coalition forces ceasing aggressive operations, handing over security responsibilities to the Afghan forces who, with an unofficial cease-fire in place, will appear to be coping.

Foreign troops will progressively retreat to their bases and assume the passive and largely ineffective role of training the Afghan security forces – those that have not already deserted to the Taleban. Large numbers of coalition forces, including British and US troops, can then be withdrawn, leaving token forces and a strong air force presence, as a deterrent to a premature Taleban take-over.

The sixth step probably brings us to the next presidential elections, in five years time, when the rebranded Taleban will be allowed to win the elections and take overt power. 

The Western powers will pay them another shed-load of money and implement the seventh and final step - declaring a victory for "democracy" and an all but complete withdrawal. That will leave the Taleban free to take its country back into the Stone Age of Islamic fundamentalism, unmolested as long as it is not too blatant in running its terrorist training camps.

The success of these seven steps will, of course, rely on us being able to bribe the Pashtuns and their staying bribed – something which is difficult to achieve. But with the glittering prize of a nation on offer, with a multi-billion dowry and a promise of more to come, the "moderates" may be prevailed upon to slaughter their own hard-liners and play ball.

Failing that, we are in for a torrid time. We have neither the will nor the capability effectively to prosecute the war and install a stable, democratic state. Neither has the United States, nor any of our coalition partners.

Initially, there was probably a belief that we could prevail, but as the stalemate took hold, the realisation dawned that the war was unwinnable – at least, at the piece the Western powers were prepared to pay.

Thus, the name of the game is to devise an exit strategy, dressed up as a victory, which will hold long enough for no one to notice – or care – that it was a defeat. Here, having already practiced in Iraq, the British are ahead of the game and, no doubt, we are acquainting the Americans with our skills at "repositioning".

In the meantime, the military must hold the line, dying in sufficient numbers to make the whole process look credible, without losing so many that it will force a precipitate departure - keeping the population distracted with its tales of derring do, its parades and its funerals. 

When the whole shebang is over, the Army can go back to playing with its toys without getting them bent, the RAF will not have to let grubby little brown jobs into its wokkas without them wiping their feet first, and the admirals can take turns driving their new (and only) boat, while listening to their iPods. The service chiefs can then resume planning their pretend army (which they never really stopped doing) to fight their future wars, freed from the inconvenience of an enemy which does not play by the rules.

Our masters may then dream of their bright, shiny European Rapid Reaction Force, garlanded with rings of stars and, this time, they may succeed. The EU may well get the last laugh, when it say "yes".

Pic: Elmar Brok MEP, then Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee in the EU Parliament, and Abdullah Abdullah, then Foreign Minister of Afghanistan, signing the EU-Afghanistan Partnership Treaty in Strasbourg, 16 November 2005.

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Coming together - by Richard...

A strong feeling of the need to apologise for the obsession with Afghanistan on this blog is somewhat tempered by the realisation that, this week, we have had near-record hits, albeit that an increasing number are directed at Defence of the Realm.

Fortunately for the government, the Lockerbie affair has dominated the front pages this week, with the repatriation of Abdelbaset Ali Mohamed Megrahi and the faux indignation directed at the Scottish Executive for releasing a "mass murderer" to die (or not) with his family.

Since a huge number of people are convinced of Megrahi's innocence, including many of the relatives of the victims of the bombing, this affair has all the hallmarks of one of those grand political stitch-ups where no one in the corridors of power is particularly keen that the truth – much less the whole truth – should be known. We are but pawns in a bigger game.

Nevertheless the affair has had the merit of squeezing the train-wreck of the Afghan election out of the headlines, limiting analysis of what is turning out to be another of those grand political stitch-ups, as the Western powers manoeuvre themselves into a position where they can extricate themselves from an unwelcome commitment, without making it too obvious that they have been roundly defeated.

The additional merit of the affair is that, at a the tail end of the "silly season", it is keeping the political classes and their claque occupied and diverted. One notes that Cameron is demanding a statement from Brown on the release of Megrahi, but is seemingly uninterested in the fate of the peoples of Afghanistan and their "stolen election" - peoples who, like our troops, are mere cannon fodder in the greater game.

The strands here are beginning to come together, and one really must admire the way the governments of the coalition nations are keeping in the dark their own public – and the Afghan people – while the deals are stitched-up behind closed doors, preparatory to handing over the nation to a re-invented Taleban and declaring yet another grand victory for democracy in the style of Iraq.

It is going to take a few more posts to work this through, so we'll continue with the reporting and analysis, as we gradually put the pieces together.

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They mock themselves - by Richard...

In the aftermath of the Operation Panther's Claw, on 28 July, David Miliband, our current foreign secretary was full of himself, telling us that several hundred British troops will remain in the area to provide ongoing security. "Hopefully," he said, "there will be a credible turnout at the Afghan elections in August."

He then cited Brigadier Tim Radford, Commander Task Force Helmand, who had said: "We are creating the conditions, as we have done in many other campaigns, so that a political process can take place above us, and that security at the moment is going extremely well."

Radford went on to say that which has only recently been repeated by Nick Gurr, the MOD's Director of Media and Communication, viz:

As a result of our forces' efforts, around 80,000 more Afghans in Helmand now live in areas under government control, giving around 20,000 more the chance to vote, with 13 additional polling centres becoming useable. That does not mean that turnout in Helmand will match that in less troubled provinces. Helmand is at the heart of the insurgency and that is bound to have an effect. But more people will be able to exercise their democratic choice than was the case before Panther's Claw.

Now cut to The Times of yesterday, and we read: "... fewer than 150 people actually cast their ballots in Nad e-Ali (at the heart of the Panther's Claw operation) out of about 48,000 registered voters, according to Engineer Abdul Hadee, the local head of the Independent Election Commission.

Then we read: "Mullah Ghulam Mohamamd Akhund, a Taleban commander in the district, said: 'Everything was fine. There were no polling centres and no voting. We didn't face any problems.'"

That this might be empty rhetoric is not borne out by other reports. For instance, here we read that only one of the three polling stations in Babaji was open (the other area on which Panther's Claw concentrated), and in Nad-e Ali voting only took place in the centre of town, with outlying stations remaining closed.

The situation, however, is perhaps even worse than that. Kim Sengupta reports for The Independent that, at one polling station in Nad-e-Ali, just over 400 people had voted by 1pm.

Three hours later, he writes, the figure had apparently surged to some 1,200. This [was] despite the fact the streets were empty, all shops and businesses were shut and an Afghan army officer saying his men standing guard had hardly seen any civilians heading to these particular voting booths.

Heedless of the so-called "security envelope" provided by Panther's Claw, the largest election monitoring group had refused to come to the district, deeming it still too dangerous. On the day there were rockets, machine-gun fire and mortar fire, roadside bombs, deaths and injuries.

Thus, at the conclusion of the poll, Sengupta tells us that election officials were seen counting piles of ballot papers, without even checking the choices, simply declaring the votes had been cast for incumbent president Hamid Karzai.

Still we have the twittering of the ghastly Caroline Wyatt and the attempts of the BBC to downplay the violence, yet in Kandahar province, 122 Taleban rockets were fired, with 20 falling on the city. Four people were killed and 12 wounded. This has not stopped the BBC presenting the election as a success.

In the real world, such has been the effect of the Taleban that, despite the ballot stuffing and rigging, in the disputed provinces of Kandahar, Helmand, Uruzgan and Zabul, turnout is estimated to be as low as 5 to 10 percent. That is half of what it was in those regions in the first presidential election five years ago – the last three of which have seen intensive fighting and repeated claims of how the Taleban has been beaten.

The uncertainty has allowed Karzai and his leading rival, Dr Abdullah Abdullah, to claim victory but the official results will not be declared until 25 August, but there are no bets as to who will actually come out on top. Karzai will "win", coming out with a clear majority, even if the ink is still wet on the ballot papers.

The farcical and corrupt nature of this election - with Gerald Warner suggesting that an Afghan ballot box with an untampered seal would probably fetch a fortune at Christie's for its rarity value - puts into perspective Nick Gunn's spin on behalf of his masters. In the words of one of our forum members: "Quite how our troops in Afghanistan would manage without the Herculean efforts of Nick and his team I just don't know. We're obviously very lucky to have him. The only remaining mystery is how the bastard sleeps at night."

What applies to Gurr, however, must apply to the whole sorry crew. Either Operation Panther's Claw was grossly oversold and the stated objectives were unrealistic, or they simply were not attained. Either way, the hopes of Mr Miliband were not fulfilled, even though 13 men had died in the effort to bring them to fruition – with many more injured. As for the election itself, rather than a move closer to a solution, it looks to opening wide the divisions in Afghanistan and reducing still further the legitimacy of the central government.

Says The Times, the credibility of the election "hangs in the balance". But, for their exaggerated claims, the credibility of Mr Miliband and the rest of those who trot out their glib phrases is already shot to pieces. You do not have to mock them. They mock themselves and, sadly, those who died for their witless posturing.

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