Yesterday, confronted with the McChrystal assessment for the first time, we took the document at face value, starting on a process of reviewand analysis which is far from complete. Emerging through a number of blogs and other sites are reports of a Gael Poll on voting intentions for the Irish referendum. The poll, we are told (rather dubiously), suggests there has been a massive surge in support for the "no" campaign, with 59 percent against the treaty and only 41 percent prepared to vote "yes". "Climate change is here, it is a reality", reports John Vidal. As one devastating drought follows another, the future is bleak for millions in east Africa, he writes.
More than 24 hours later though, the document – seen through the prism of US political analysts – looks very different. From Spencer Ackerman of the Washington Independent, we see that the review itself is far from a neutral military appraisal of the situation on Afghanistan, and that the circumstances and the timing of the leakhave strong political dimensions.
Via James Joyner of the Atlantic Council, we see the view expanded that the leak was an attempt "to box President Obama in to a static request for more U.S. troops and dare him to refuse his chosen commander’s recommendations", with a strong suspicion that the military was behind the leak.
I make no apologies for what might seem to a US observer as a certain naivety in my work so far. Firstly, it is difficult enough to get a grip with British politics and the subtleties of US politics are a minefield for the outside observer – we only need to see the mess US commentators make trying to understand British and European politics to see the pitfalls.
Secondly, with a complex document such as the McChrystal assessment, thrust into a highly political environment, the only way to evaluate it properly is to start at the beginning, and take it stage-by-stage, unpeeling it like an onion to reveal the inner workings.
What is amusing to see though is that while McChrystal deliberately plays down the resource (i.e., more troops) issue, putting strategy at the top, either he or the authors of the leak seem to understand the media all too well, fully expecting the Washington Post to focus on the need for reinforcements.
All it then needed was to rely on the coprophagic tendencies of the rest of the media to spread the word and, within a very short time, "more troops" would become the only game in town, the hope being to bounce Obama into giving the go-ahead for another 30,000 "boots on the ground". Predictably, the media fell for it, either not realising or perhaps not caring that they have been well and truly manipulated.
Looking in more detail at the assessment document, the view is beginning to gel that, although McChrystal is arguing for a new strategy, he is actually not offering one.
It was Herschel Smith of the admirable Captains Journal who started me thinking, when he remarked that counterinsurgency (COIN) was not a "strategy", per se. Rather, it is a collection of tactics. Thus, when McChrystal calls for a COIN strategy, he is actually defining a need to do things in a different way, but is not setting out any strategic concepts, the lack of which is dogging the Afghan campaign.
It was pointed out on our forum that the assessment bears some resemblance to the Briggs Planof 1950, which shaped the Malaya campaign, and indeed it does. What is missing though is the all-important framework of the civilian role, in which context the military is supposed to be subordinate to the civilian power.
The McCrystal assessment, by contrast – and inevitably – is militarily orientated, which is what you expect from an army general. That notwithstanding, the Briggs Plan was framed by Lieutenant General Sir Harold Briggs, then retired, afterwards to become Director of Operations in Malaya.
Briggs, it seems, was able to transcend his military background. McChrystal, it seems, has not. What we have, on the face of it, is not a new strategy but simply a rag-bag of new tactics and a re-appraisal of tactical priorities.
One hates to concede that Paddy Ashdown (pictured) might have a point, but he is currently arguing for a proper political strategy for Afghanistan to support the military intervention in the country.
He has half a point – we need a proper political strategy, but not to support the military intervention. The military intervention should support the political strategy, and thus needs to be defined within the overall framework of a political strategy – not the other way around.
Emerging from the Malaya campaign were two basic precepts. Firstly, the government had to give priority to defeating political subversion, not the guerrillas. Secondly, to succeed, counterinsurgency efforts had to meet the true grievances of the people better than the insurgents.
McChrystal partially acknowledges these requirements, but he does not really spell out how they will be achieved, and it is not for the military to say. What we are missing, therefore, is that all-important civilian dimension, around which the military effort should be focused. All we are left with is a call for more troops. We have been had.
COMMENT THREAD
This is claimed to be one of the largest polls of its kind ever carried out and the pollster Gael Poll has a good record on the last referendum, predicting a 54-46 percent margin for the "no" campaign, against the actual result of 53.4 percent "no" and 46.6 percent "yes".
What is puzzling though is that, despite the profound implications of this poll, none of the media in Ireland or the UK seem to have reported it. That in itself is not unusual – these days, the media are more characterised by what they do not report, than what they do. But even our dire MSM might, one have thought, be vaguely interested in this piece of news. However, given the dubious nature, it is perhaps just as well.
Nevertheless, scanning the Irish media today, it is very hard to find any serious reporting of the referendum, and it has been the case that the issue has been played low-key by a media that is wholly in favour of the EU treaty. That might tell us something, a sign that the "yes" side lacks confidence and is expecting a thrashing.
A "no" victory would, of course, set the EU issue on fire in the UK, with the referendum coming just a few days before the start of the Tory conference. As always, there is no specific "Europe" debate on the conference agenda, but some statement on the result will be expected, possibly in the leader's speech on the final day. Then, no doubt, Cameron will be under pressure to make his intentions clear as to the UK referendum.
Although the offer on the table is for a referendum on the treaty, if it has not yet been ratified by the time a Tory administration takes over, there is no logic to this stance. If the Irish do vote "no", the treaty is effectively dead. There seems no particular advantage in having a referendum on something which is not going to happen.
In response to a "no" victory, the "colleagues" would, in any event, have to come up with a position – presumably at the autumn European Council, held under the Swedish presidency. Then it is possible that a formal obituary will be written, plus a term of mourning declared. It is hard to see how the "colleagues" could get away with another "period of reflection", although their capacity for navel gazing is endless.
The broader problem though is that ditching the constitutional Lisbon treaty solves nothing. We will still be in the EU and, as much of the new treaty has already been implemented, it will very much be business as usual. The only obvious effect is that the "colleagues" will not be able to preen themselves with a full-time council president and their new "foreign minister".
From the Tory perspective, however, the "death of Lisbon" might afford the opportunity to "park" the EU as an issue, which will be the default mode of a Cameron administration. This will leave us once again in that twilight world, where the EU remains a festering sore in the background, unloved and unresolved.
Against all that though, the "colleagues" will not take a defeat lying down. If Lisbon does fall, it will only be a matter of time before a replacement treaty is on the cards, and Cameron will have to look to fending off calls for a new IGC. That, though, is so far into the future that it is not even on the political horizon and, before even that, there is the little matter of a general election.
There, despite the very obvious lead in the polls, the outcome is not absolutely certain – and it is by no means guaranteed that Cameron can attract enough votes to give him a comfortable majority in the House.
The unknown factor is the behaviour of the electorate towards the minority parties – whether there is enough disaffection with the mainstream parties for the "UKIP effect" to kick in or whether, as in 1997, there is the classic "two party squeeze", with the tiddlers being left out in the cold.
Certainly, one detects in the general public mood a lack of enthusiasm for the Tories, and many people will be watching closely for Cameron's reaction to the Irish referendum, irrespective of the result. The EU may not be a battleground on which the Tories prefer to fight, but a very significant number of votes are going to be decided by what he says (or does not say).
As always, therefore, the "elephant in the room" will continue to cast its baleful effect and, sooner or later, the politicians are going to have to deal with the stink.
COMMENT THREAD
Describing the pitiful scenes, he recounts how, after three years of disastrous rains, the families from the Borana tribe, who by custom travel thousands of miles a year in search of water and pasture, have unanimously decided to settle down.
Back in April, they packed up their pots, pans and meagre belongings, deserted their mud and thatch homes at Bute and set off on their last trek, to Yaeblo, a village of near-destitute charcoal makers that has sprung up on the side of a dirt road near Moyale.
Now they live in temporary "benders" – shelters made from branches covered with plastic sheeting. They look like survivors from an earthquake or a flood, says Vidal, but in fact these are some of the world's first climate-change refugees.
Meanwhile, the UN is telling us that, three weeks after Burkina Faso, in West Africa , was hit by devastating floods, people in the worst-affected areas are struggling to get back to normal. Eight people died when heavy rains swept through Burkina Faso in early September. It was the heaviest rainfall in 90 years.
Earlier this month, the same UNannounced that heavy flooding had affected some 350,000 people across West Africa, killing at least 32 in Ghana and Burkina Faso.
Fortunately, help is at hand. Yesterday, the Church of England launched a "climate justice fund". It will, the earnest clerics tell us, support Anglican dioceses in Africa to respond to disasters caused by climate change, such as flooding.
Never mind the contradiction – the BBChas it sussed. Noting that West Africa has been hit by floods while the east of the continent is suffering from a drought, it airily informs us that "analysts say" that these "twin battles" will become more common as a result of climate change.
Come rain or shine, hot or cold, windy or calm ... there is only one cause.