The EU's power is at heart an agreement by the central member states that certain directions will be followed.
There is no need for coercion, though an underlying fear of larger neighbours, well-taught during the 20th century, certainly motivates many of the smaller nations.
The two key members, France and Germany, formalised their very curious alliance at the Elysee Treaty of January 1963.
The smaller and poorer original members, Benelux and Italy, were either economically, militarily or diplomatically overshadowed by the Franco-German partnership, which continues to be the heart of the project.
The origin of the EU's power lies in the joint recognition of France and Germany, and their establishments, that they cannot manage without each other, that Germany can have power if it exercises it through the EU but not if it does so openly, and that France can have standing, prestige (and considerable economic benefits) if it accepts an unstated but actual German political primacy.
Where does the EU get its power from?
I promised to give some replies to comments on the EU and Jury postings. As usual, there isn't really room to do justice to either of these vast subjects.
But let me begin with the EU, I'll concentrate on the contribution from John Davies, which lies outside the usual 'yes it is’, and 'no it isn't' bit of the debate. He says, rather surprisingly, that the EU is not in fact powerful at all. To justify this, he suggests that the power of the EU can be measured by such things as the size of its budget.
You might as well measure it by the number of people it directly employs, which is (like the budget) comparatively tiny. Much more significant is the number of people who actually abide by and enforce its decrees, and the quantities of national budgets which are devoted to its ends. The EU depends greatly, at this stage in its development, on keeping up the appearance that nations still have their own governments.
This is specially important here, where national independence is a treasured possession stretching back for unbroken centuries, and in Ireland where it is a hard-won prize. It is startlingly less important in France, invaded and subjugated twice in the past 150 years, in Germany, which learned that it must follow its national interests in more subtle ways after two attempts to impose them by force, and in Italy which only came into existence as a nation very recently and had (like Germany) a bad experience when it sought to assert itself. As I've said elsewhere, Britain is the only virgin in a continent of rape victims. As I haven't said elsewhere, that is why she needs to be drugged by deceit into acquiescence in the current process. But every so often she half wakes up, like poor Mia Farrow in Rosemary's Baby, to cry out ‘This isn't a dream. This is really happening!’ And so it is.
The EU's power is at heart an agreement by the central member states that certain directions will be followed. There is no need for coercion, though an underlying fear of larger neighbours, well-taught during the 20th century, certainly motivates many of the smaller nations. The two key members, France and Germany, formalised their very curious alliance at the Elysee Treaty of January 1963. The smaller and poorer original members, Benelux and Italy, were either economically, militarily or diplomatically overshadowed by the Franco-German partnership, which continues to be the heart of the project. The origin of the EU's power lies in the joint recognition of France and Germany, and their establishments, that they cannot manage without each other, that Germany can have power if it exercises it through the EU but not if it does so openly, and that France can have standing, prestige (and considerable economic benefits) if it accepts an unstated but actual German political primacy.
This relationship became more one-sided after German reunification, but has survived remarkably well considering the strains it could have imposed. The certainty, among France's elite, that conflict with Germany in future is futile, over-rode traditional French fears of a united Germany. (Arthur Koestler wrote interestingly about the doomed relationship of the two countries, one a land of bread and wine, the other a land of coal and iron, and their unequal populations, in the opening pages of his extraordinary book Scum of the Earth, which I thoroughly recommend to anyone interested in the darker corners of European history).
The absorption of Britain was almost certainly a mistake on the EU's terms. They were attracted by the access to British markets it offered, by the possibilities of absorbing our military capability into an all-Europe one, by the fishing grounds, by the large net contributions which we were bound to make. Above all, they wanted to end what they regard as annoying British attempts to prevent a single power dominating the continent, the principle of London's foreign policy since the days of the first Queen Elizabeth. What they didn't anticipate was the depth and strength of the incompatibility between the Continental approach to law, government and regulation, and British traditions.
It was undoubtedly a mistake on British terms. We gained nothing economically or politically by it, losing what remained of our special Commonwealth trading links, losing our territorial waters, our foreign policy independence and our ability to make our own arrangements for regulating and subsidising our industry and agriculture. We also lost our political independence, and control over our own borders. I could make a longer list if I thought it would help the argument, but most readers will get my point. British establishment enthusiasm for the European idea was rooted in chagrin, and in mistrust of the USA, following our defeat at Suez.
It was in a way a sort of British Vichy mentality, defeatist and self-denigratory. It became clear during the 1980s that we were quite able to recover from the economic and political sickness of the Eden-Macmillan-Home-Wilson-Callaghan era, and were also able to conduct ourselves effectively as a medium sized diplomatic and military power. It was also increasingly clear that the ever-closer union promised in the Treaty of Rome was becoming irksome because of its growing interference with British laws at home and with our freedom of action abroad. Meanwhile, the endless promises of greater access to markets in Europe never seemed to be fulfilled.
It is perfectly true that the EU has no power of any kind to force us to remain within it, and in fact the Lisbon Treaty for the first time codifies the procedure for a country which wishes to leave the EU. We could leave tomorrow, without damage, if we so wished. But the leaderships of all political parties refuse to countenance this. Why? Mr Davies is perfectly correct in saying that the British government and civil service gold-plate EU laws and regulations, because they like them so much and see them as opportunities to do what they wanted to do before. Also on occasion ministers like to claim that the EU is forcing them to do things they wish to do anyway (a very important reason why British politicians, unwilling to reveal or take responsibility for their own real aims, support EU membership so strongly. The Strasbourg Human Rights Court, a non-EU body, often performs the same function, 'forcing' British governments to do things they wanted to do anyway, but couldn't get past the voters. The Strasbourg Court has no power in Britain, except the power the British government wants to give it). But British politicians are not so keen to acknowledge their impotence over such things as Post Office closures, the wrecking of our fisheries, or the current rubbish collection mess, as they don't like admitting how much power they've handed over in return for the general irresponsibility the EU provides.
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