There are signs that some eurozone economies are unable to cope with the
single currency.
competitiveness.
there are rumours about a Greek default.
Argentina, Greece cannot devalue, and leaving the eurozone is not a realistic policy option either."
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Greece can expect no gifts from Europe
By Wolfgang Münchau
Published: November 29 2009 19:22 | Last updated: November 29 2009 19:22
After Dubai, will Greece be next? This question is technically a
category error, since Dubai World is not a state but a state-owned
company. But many investors rightly do not care about the difference.
Last week investors started to fret about sovereign default in earnest.
So what about Greece?
We were already wondering about a Greek default at the beginning of this
year, when eurozone bond spreads suddenly widened. In February Peer
Steinbrück, the former German finance minister, abruptly ended the
speculation by saying the eurozone would act if someone got into
trouble. There was no concrete action plan. No work had been done to
amend European treaties. There was no budgetary appropriation. Just a
sentence. Investors believed him and all was well – for a while.
The speculation is now back, but there is one difference. The eurozone
will not come to the rescue this time, verbally or otherwise, unless
Greece meets a number of conditions the European Union is likely to
impose in the coming months.
The EU's authorities, rightly or wrongly, are more afraid of the
moral hazard of a bail-out than the possible spillover effect of a
hypothetical Greek default to other eurozone countries. If faced with a
choice between preserving the integrity of the stability pact and the
integrity of Greece, they are currently minded to choose the former. To
safeguard what is left of the stability pact, they are determined to
link any help to a country's willingness to comply. Otherwise the EU
fears it might lose all leverage over budgetary processes elsewhere in
the eurozone. And no country in the eurozone has flouted the pact more
than Greece.
Here are the numbers. This year, the budget deficit will rise to 12.7
per cent of gross domestic product – and this assumes there are no
further accounting tricks to be uncovered. Deutsche Bank calculated in a
recent research note that the country's public debt-to-GDP ratio is
headed for 135 per cent. Gross external debt – private and public
sector debt owed to foreign creditors – was 149.2 per cent at the
end of last year. The real exchange rate has gone up by 17 per cent
since 2006, which means the country is losing competitiveness at an
incredible rate. Had Greece not been in the eurozone, it would be
heading straight for default.
The government's 2010 draft budget foresees a deficit reduction to
about 9.1 per cent of GDP. But the number is misleading. The lion's
share of the total deficit reduction effort is earmarked to come from
tax measures, and most of those from the fight against tax evasion. Tax
evasion is always the item first on the list of desperate governments.
The European Commission and Europe's finance ministers, who have
heard this story before, are rightly asking for genuine deficit
reduction. So is George Provopoulos, the Greek central bank governor,
who demanded that two-thirds of the entire deficit reduction effort
should come in the form of spending cuts. If the Greek parliament
confirms the government's soft budget next month, the European
Commission will almost certainly judge the effort insufficient and
demand a supplementary budget. It might also ask for structural reform,
including pension reform.
If the Greek government refused to comply, which is quite possible, the
next step could be the penalty procedure under the stability pact. So
instead of helping Greece, the EU might be asking Greece to pay a
penalty. This in turn would aggravate Greece's financial position in
the unlikely event that the government would agree to pay it.
The current strategy of the EU is to raise the political pressure –
perhaps even provoke a political crisis – with the strategic
objective that the Greek government might eventually relent. It is a
dangerous strategy that could easily backfire. Even if George
Papandreou, the Greek prime minister, were sympathetic to the EU's
demand, he would face enormous political headwinds if he tried to
implement draconian austerity measures. This would be the very opposite
of what he promised during the recent election. The real problem is that
the Greek people have not been prepared by their political leaders for
what lies ahead.
So what happens if Greece cannot meet a payment on its bonds, or fails
to roll over existing debt? About two-thirds of Greece's public debt
is held by foreigners. According to calculations from Deutsche Bank,
Greece is looking to raise some €31bn ($46bn, £28bn) in new
borrowing and €16bn to roll over existing debt next year. In the
absence of help from the eurozone, the Greek government would have to
resort to the International Monetary Fund if it were to encounter
difficulties refinancing the debt. Unlike Argentina, Greece cannot
devalue, and leaving the eurozone is not a realistic policy option
either. Latvian-style austerity could thus come one way or the other,
with or without default. But it might be politically easier for the
present government to have austerity imposed on it from the outside than
from the inside. This is another reason why the EU would be happy to let
the IMF take a lead.
Just as the Greek people are unprepared for austerity, investors are
unprepared for what awaits them. I would still bet that outright default
is unlikely. But I wonder whether the current Greek bond spreads reflect
the true risks.
munchau@eurointelli
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