The Naval Arena in the Struggle against Iran
INSS Insight No. 146, December 3, 2009
Guzansky, Yoel
www.inss.org.il/research.php?cat=3&incat=&read=3504
The seizure of the ship carrying weapons from Iran to Syria (intended
apparently for Hizbollah via Syria) in early November revealed something of
the scope of the struggle between Iran and Israel in general and on the high
seas in particular, a struggle that is steadily moving upstage. However, the
importance of the naval arena in the Iranian context lies not only in the
foiling of attempts of weapons shipments making their way to Hizbollah and
Hamas. The option of operating at sea allows Israel to refine its deterrent
and offensive capabilities with regard to Iran and would allow the West to
impose crippling sanctions on Iran if and when the need arises.
The efforts to foil the shipments of illegal weapons received new judicial
and political legitimacy after the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast
Lead, and are related to the Security Council resolutions on Iran's nuclear
program. Three incidents were reported this year where weapons shipments
from Iran to Hizbollah via Syria were intercepted at sea. The attempt to
vary the smuggling methods, the high signature of sending containers by land
and by air, and the ability to move large quantities of armaments by sea
have all contributed to Iran's increasing use of the maritime arena.
The seizure of the Francop - perhaps the biggest catch to date - followed a
seizure the previous month by the Maltese authorities who, acting on a
request from the United States, confiscated the Hansa India, a German-owned
merchant vessel carrying arms from Iran to Syria. In January 2009, Cypriot
authorities confiscated weapons and weapons-manufacturing equipment
originating with the Iranian military industries carried by the Russian
vessel Monchegorsk, after American ships of the 5th Fleet had previously
intercepted it in the Red Sea. As impressive as these successes are, they
likely represent only the tip of the iceberg of Iran's efforts. Israel is
well aware of this, and therefore since early 2009 the Israeli navy has
intercepted hundreds of suspicious vessels. Even if the successful
interceptions do not significantly alter the next battle in Lebanon or Gaza,
they serve to embarrass Iran and expose its intentions.
Hizbollah and Hamas are not the only organizations supported by Iran. At the
end of October, the government in Sana'a announced it had seized an Iranian
ship, the Mahan 1, carrying a wide range of ammunition intended for the
Shiite rebels in the northwest of the country. This is a struggle that has
recently spread and involves direct Saudi Arabian military activity, also at
sea, in order to prevent additional Iranian arms shipments from reaching
rebel hands.
The attack attributed to Israel in early 2009 on the convoy and vessels
carrying weapons to Sudan did not occur in a vacuum. In recent years
relations between Iran and the countries in the Horn of Africa have grown
warmer, and Iran is trying to establish a military presence along the
shipping routes in the region. There were reports of construction of an
Iranian seaport on the Eritrean coast in the port city of Assab for use by
the Revolutionary Guards. Iran's growing naval presence at the Red Sea's
southern point of egress caused several Arab nations to announce last month
the establishment of "an Arab naval taskforce in the Red Sea," the first of
its kind.
The Security Council's decision on Iran provides a legal basis for
increasing inspection of Iran. In addition, initiatives such as the PSI
(Proliferation Security Initiative), even if limited in their ability to
establish operational and intelligence gathering cooperation, are likely to
serve as a platform for moves to curb Iran's steps, especially with regard
to the proliferation of non-conventional arms. The failure of the talks with
Iran regarding its nuclear future may add to the West's willingness to take
these steps, especially in light of the low effectiveness of the economic
sanctions imposed on Iran to date. The House of Representatives has even
discussed a bill that would prevent oil distillates from entering Iran by
land, air, or sea, though for now that bill has been shelved.
Presumably as part of preparations for the day after the failure of the
dialogue with Iran, the 5th Fleet is currently holding war games and
discussing ways to increase the pressure on Iran, for example, by preventing
its import of oil distillates Despite the fact that it is easier to enlist
support (both internationally and within the United States) for a naval
blockade than for attacking nuclear installations, a naval blockade is a de
facto declaration of war. The blocking of distillates to Iran would be a
severe blow to Iran, to the point of representing an actual threat to the
stability of the regime. Therefore, even such a limited move is likely to
arouse an extreme reaction on Iran's part, whether by disrupting open
shipping in the Persian Gulf and in various oil conveyance, storage, and
production facilities, or by harming American interests in the region or the
Gulf states themselves.
Israel's campaign against arms smuggling from Iran has long taken place far
from Iran's shores, as in the seizure of the Karine A near Sharm a-Sheikh in
January 2002. However, after the Second Lebanon War, and even more so after
Operation Cast Lead, the efforts to foil smuggling attempts have been
stepped up and occur far from Iran with cooperation from friendly nations in
the region.
Israel is especially interested in naval activity in the Red Sea, both as a
way to deter Iranian activity in this arena and to serve whenever necessary
as a shipping route to Iran and back in the event that a military
confrontation develops. Israel's activities are meant to demonstrate to Iran
that Israel is capable of causing it severe damage from a location that is
less vulnerable to attack. In June 2009, the convoy of Israeli navy missile
ships and submarines making their way south towards the Red Sea was
highlighted, in order to signal to Iran that the Red Sea arena is important
to Israel as well as to the bloc of pragmatic nations (in this case, Egypt)
cooperating with it.
The sea is also of importance with regard to a possible attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities. Reports in recent years have generally focused on aerial
capability to damage the nuclear facilities, without discussing the
advantages inherent in the various options open for taking action from the
sea alongside the aerial possibilities.
The increasing use of the Red Sea arena is likely designed to signal to Iran
that Israel is capable of acting from the sea too.
Operating from the sea means operating from a space that is less vulnerable
than what airpower uses, and allows the launch - without the need to go
through the air space of other nations - of long range precision ammunition
to damage targets in Iran. Generally speaking, naval platforms allow larger
amounts of armaments, are more difficult to locate, and allow special
operations in order to attack targets such as command and control positions
and surface-to-surface missiles.
In the next battle Israel can expect most of its air force bases and
airfields to be exposed to long range rocket and surface-to-surface missile
fire over time and in ranges greater than ever before, and the importance of
maritime activity will rise. As to the struggle against Iran, Israel must
adhere to a policy that de facto expands its strategic borders and take
naval action in order to demonstrate more clearly than ever the dangers of
Iranian activity. This is also a signal that in terms of its nuclear
program, time is running out and all options, including naval, are on the
table.
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