Confidential intelligence documents obtained by The Times show that Iran is working on testing a key final component of a nuclear bomb. The notes, from Iran’s most sensitive military nuclear project, describe a four-year plan to test a neutron initiator, the component of a nuclear bomb that triggers an explosion. Foreign intelligence agencies date them to early 2007, four years after Iran was thought to have suspended its weapons programme. An Asian intelligence source last week confirmed to The Times that his country also believed that weapons work was being carried out as recently as 2007 — specifically, work on a neutron initiator. The technical document describes the use of a neutron source, uranium deuteride, which independent experts confirm has no possible civilian or military use other than in a nuclear weapon. Uranium deuteride is the material used in Pakistan’s bomb, from where Iran obtained its blueprint. “Although Iran might claim that this work is for civil purposes, there is no civil application,” said David Albright, a physicist and president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, which has analysed hundreds of pages of documents related to the Iranian programme. “This is a very strong indicator of weapons work.” The documents have been seen by intelligence agencies from several Western countries, including Britain. A senior source at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) confirmed that they had been passed to the UN’s nuclear watchdog. A Foreign and Commonwealth Office spokeswoman said yesterday: “We do not comment on intelligence, but our concerns about Iran’s nuclear programme are clear. Obviously this document, if authentic, raises serious questions about Iran’s intentions.” Responding to The Times’ findings, an Israeli government spokesperson said: “Israel is increasingly concerned about the state of the Iranian nuclear programme and the real intentions that may lie behind it.” The revelation coincides with growing international concern about Iran’s nuclear programme. Tehran insists that it wants to build a civilian nuclear industry to generate power, but critics suspect that the regime is intent on diverting the technology to build an atomic bomb. In September, Iran was forced to admit that it was constructing a secret uranium enrichment facility near the city of Qom. President Ahmadinejad then claimed that he wanted to build ten such sites. Over the weekend Manouchehr Mottaki, the Iranian Foreign Minister, said that Iran needed up to 15 nuclear power plants to meet its energy needs, despite the country’s huge oil and gas reserves. Publication of the nuclear documents will increase pressure for tougher UN sanctions against Iran, which are due to be discussed this week. But the latest leaks in a long series of allegations against Iran will also be seized on by hawks in Israel and the US, who support a pre-emptive strike against Iranian nuclear facilities before the country can build its first warhead. Mark Fitzpatrick, senior fellow for non-proliferation at the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, said: “The most shattering conclusion is that, if this was an effort that began in 2007, it could be a casus belli. If Iran is working on weapons, it means there is no diplomatic solution.” The Times had the documents, which were originally written in Farsi, translated into English and had the translation separately verified by two Farsi speakers. While much of the language is technical, it is clear that the Iranians are intent on concealing their nuclear military work behind legitimate civilian research. The fallout could be explosive, especially in Washington, where it is likely to invite questions about President Obama’s groundbreaking outreach to Iran. The papers provide the first evidence which suggests that Iran has pursued weapons studies after 2003 and may actively be doing so today — if the four-year plan continued as envisaged. A 2007 US National Intelligence Estimate concluded that weapons work was suspended in 2003 and officials said with “moderate confidence” that it had not resumed by mid-2007. Britain, Germany and France, however, believe that weapons work had already resumed by then. Western intelligence sources say that by 2003 Iran had already assembled the technical know-how it needed to build a bomb, but had yet to complete the necessary testing to be sure such a device would work. Iran also lacked sufficient fissile material to fuel a bomb and still does — although it is technically capable of producing weapons-grade uranium should its leaders take the political decision to do so. The documents detail a plan for tests to determine whether the device works — without detonating an explosion leaving traces of uranium detectable by the outside world. If such traces were found, they would be taken as irreversible evidence of Iran’s intention to become a nuclear-armed power. Experts say that, if the 2007 date is correct, the documents are the strongest indicator yet of a continuing nuclear weapons programme in Iran. Iran has long denied a military dimension to its nuclear programme, claiming its nuclear activities are solely focused on the production of energy for civilian use. Mr Fitzpatrick said: “Is this the smoking gun? That’s the question people should be asking. It looks like the smoking gun. This is smoking uranium.” http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6955706.ece (The Times) Translated: Iran's most sensitive nuclear document The Times had the documents which were originally written in Farsi translated into English and the translation separately verified by two Farsi speakers. This is a full translation of the main document: "In the name of God Outlook for special neutron-related activities over the next 4 years Introduction The general document that refers to the special duties of the neutron group mentions four main topics that cover special neutron-related activities, namely: 1. Calculation and simulation 2. Production of source materials 3. Source assembly 4. Design and performance of experiments to test the source The fourth item is dependent upon the ease of finding methods for detecting pulsed neutrons obtained from hot and cold sources at various stages. In this introduction we will describe below the programme for special neutron-related activities. We have also endeavoured to prioritise each subject in the light of the current political climate and our existing capabilities. Priority programmes for finding methods for detecting pulsed neutrons obtained from hot and cold sources 1-1 Providing the required detectors and electronic equipment At present, our capabilities are reasonably good, although obviously not complete. The rest of requirements must be defined as probable routine project requirements and purchased, designed and made accordingly. In order to achieve this goal, meetings must first be arranged between the Centre's neutron experts and its scientific consultants. On completing the required investigations, these shortcomings should be identified and a method of meeting our requirements should be investigated. 1-2 Designing and performing experiments to detect pulsed neutrons obtained from pulse sources, for example, from NG (neutron generator) and PF (plasma focus) pulsed sources The studies already performed, on which a report will be issued in the very near future, indicate that there should be no adverse or destructive consequences in using the existing NGs. As a result, provided that the necessary security and protective measures are adopted, we should be able to use the existing NGs to conduct the pulsed-neutron detection experiments and to complete some of the previous experiments. Performing these experiments would enable our personnel to gain more knowledge of the subject. In spite of this and considering the country’s present situation and considering the Centre's policy is to develop co-operation with research and univsersity centres in order to carry out the projects outside of the Centre and play a steering and leading role of the projects, it is better to carry out the work PF and NG systems at other research centres. To promote the Centre's aims, a reciprocal agreement should be drawn up between the Institute of Physics and the universities and research centres so as to facilitate the above-mentioned projects. In view of the existing co-operation between Shaheed Beheshti University and the Institute of Physics, initially a reciprocal agreement should be drawn up whereby, as soon as the situation allows and Shaheed Beheshti University is ready, the NG system should be transferred to the University and the relative projects be performed there with the co-operation of experts from the Centre. As regards the document that covers ordinary activities, the production of other PF samples is still achievable. It is possible, by protecting our capability regarding PFs at Shaheed Beheshti University, to produce more samples by mutual co-operation, then present these samples to other research centres for marketing purposes. 1-3 Creating experimental conditions similar to real conditions in order to detect pulsed neutrons obtained from hot sources 1-4 Designing and performing source detection experiments 1-4-1 Designing and performing detection experiments using NGs and PFs 1-4-2 Designing and performing detection experiments using a hot source 2 - Producing materials and assembling the source 2-1 Setting up the reactor again to produce D gas to meet the requirements of PF systems that cannot produce such gas 2-2 Designing and building suitable mobile laboratories 2-3 Setting up the reactor again that produces the materials and placing it in the Glove Box 2-4 Installing and setting up the equipment required to produce source materials in the mobile laboratories 2-5 Assembling the source for the required tests 2-6 Continuing the work of replacement materials such as TiD2 in order to avoid U contamination in the production of UD3 3 - Performing the calculations and special simulations 3-1 Performing calculations and completing the neutron-related calculations regarding the source 3-2 Performing calculations regarding source hydrodynamics 3-3 Designing the system for testing source materials Requirements to achieve the programme's goals 1 - Creating the appropriate conditions for conducting the experiments 2 - Providing the manpower to carry out the research and perform the work required to protect the scope of the activities. This work cannot usually be defined and performed by other research centres so essentially needs to be carried out by trustworthy personnel within the organisation. In some areas, there are currently insufficient numbers of personnel to cover the field of neutron calculation. Of course, it is not necessary to employ official staff but, if they are to be employed, specific safeguards must first be put in place. The most appropriate way of obtaining the required personnel is to employ individuals who were involved in the relevant calculation projects in the past. 3 - Taking decisions on finding the appropriate location to conduct experiments which cannot in practice be conducted within the Institute. Furthermore, decisions must be taken regarding the locations where such experiments used to be conducted. Important considerations For this project we require two individuals with doctoral degrees. Each of them must work 80 hours per month for a total of 4,160 man-hours, of which 1,280 man-hours must be provided by the Institute (900 man-hours in the form of specialised work and 380 man-hours in the form of ordinary work). This work will be performed with the co-operation of Messrs ……… from the Institute. The remaining work (2,880 man-hours) will be performed in the form of calculation activities, shared between hourly-paid workers under the responsibility of Dr M. For this project we also require four individuals with masters degrees. Each of them must work an average of 230 hours per month. These individuals must work a total of 21,920 man-hours, of which 3,920 man-hours must be provided by the Institute (2,220 man-hours in the form of specialised work and 1,700 man-hours in the form of ordinary work). This work will be performed with the co-operation of Messrs ……. from the Institute. The remaining work (18,000 man-hours) will be performed in the form of calculation activities, shared between hourly-paid workers under the responsibility of Dr M. For this project we require two individuals with masters degrees. Each of them must work an average of 50 hours per month. These individuals must work a total of 2,525 man-hours, which must be provided by the Institute (1,250 man-hours in the form of specialised work and 1,275 man-hours in the form of ordinary work). This work will be performed with the co-operation of Messrs ……… of the Institute. The calculation work (Sections 21 to 45) will be performed under the direction of Dr M, after the Committee has approved the recruitment of the required personnel." http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6955236.ece The moment is fast approaching when Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, may have to make the most difficult decision of his career — whether to launch a military strike against Iran’s nuclear facilities and risk triggering a conflagration that could spread across the Middle East. Israeli experts believe the point of no return may be only six months away when Iran’s nuclear programme will have — if it has not already — metastasised into a multitude of smaller, difficult-to-trace facilities in deserts and mountains, while its main reactor at Bushehr will have come online and bombing it would send a radioactive cloud over the Gulf nations. Mr Netanyahu has consistently called Iran the most serious threat Israel faces. President Ahmadinejad of Iran has called for Israel to be obliterated and his Revolutionary Guards supply training, money and weapons to both Hezbollah in Lebanon, on Israel’s northern border, and to Hamas in the Gaza Strip, whose missiles are believed to be capable of reaching Tel Aviv. In the run-up to his election this year, Mr Netanyahu promised that “under my Government, Iran will not be allowed to go nuclear”. Yet Mr Ahmadinejad has promised to produce 20 per cent enriched uranium: a big step towards weapons-grade fuel. With the Iranian threat at the front of his strategic thinking, Mr Netanyahu has surrounded himself with old comrades from Israel’s most prestigious military unit, the Sayeret Matkal, or General Staff Reconnaissance. Mr Netanyahu served in the elite unit in the 1970s under Ehud Barak, who went on to become Israel’s most decorated soldier and later Prime Minister in his own right. When Mr Netanyahu came to power, he made great efforts to recruit his former commander as Defence Minister. Mr Barak serves with another former leader of the unit, the Deputy Prime Minister, Moshe “Bogie” Yaalon. The Israeli Prime Minister has hard-wired his core Cabinet with so much military experience for a good reason. Striking Iran’s nuclear facilities would be a huge military and political gamble. Although Russia has delayed supplying Iran with S300 anti-aircraft missiles, which could weaken any Israeli attack, the air force would have to mount one of its largest long-range attacks to have a chance of disabling Iran’s nuclear installations. Earlier this year a report by Anthony Cordesman of the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, warned that “a military strike by Israel against Iranian nuclear facilities is possible . . . (but) would be complex and high-risk and would lack any assurances that the overall mission will have a high success rate”. At roughly the same time, Leon Panetta, the head of the CIA, went on a covert visit to Israel to seek assurances that the new Government would not surprise the Obama Administration with a sudden unilateral attack. In 2007, in what is often seen as a trial run for an attack on Iran, an Israeli squadron flew undetected through Turkish airspace and over Syria’s unprotected border to destroy what was thought to be a nuclear facility under construction with Iranian and North Korean support. In June 2008, the air force staged exercises over the Mediterranean, with dozens of fighters, bombers and refuelling tankers flying roughly the same distance as between Israel and Iran. Earlier this year, Israeli jets again carried out a long-range bombing mission, hitting trucks in Sudan that were believed to be bringing Iranian weapons to Hamas via Egypt. In the immediate term, the threat of a strike has receded. Israel is satisfied that Iran’s hostile stance towards the international community has increased the chances of serious, crippling sanctions. Officials noted that for the first time Russia seemed to be serious about isolating Tehran. But that international front could easily crack, and then Mr Netanyahu would be faced with the decision on whether to order his bombers into action. Iran has already threatened to bomb Israel’s cities with its long-range missiles should its nuclear facilities come under attack. It could also, in stages, order Hezbollah to launch rockets across the northern border. The attack could come in conjunction with a Hamas assault from the Gaza Strip. Alternatively both sides may choose to do nothing. Some analysts believe that Israel might tolerate Iran as a “threshold nuclear state”, capable of building a bomb but not testing it. Iran could opt for the path chosen by Syria in 2007, if Israel strikes at isolated facilities miles from an urban areas, where the only casualties would be technicians and guards. After the strike against Syria, neither side admitted what had happened, thereby avoiding a war and saving face http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/article6955238.ece One formula stands out in the documents obtained by The Times: UD3, or uranium deuteride. Independent experts have confirmed that the only possible use for UD3 is as a neutron source, the trigger to the chain reaction for a nuclear explosion. Critically, while other neutron sources have possible civilian uses, UD3 has only one application — to be the metaphorical match that lights a nuclear bomb. UD3, when used in a neutron initiator, emits a stream of neutrons that ignite the core of a bomb, either weapons-grade uranium or plutonium. The stream of neutrons is released using high explosives to compress a core of solid UD3, creating fusion. Foreign intelligence agencies are closely monitoring all of Iran’s weapons activities and a test explosion would not go unnoticed, which poses a problem to the covert development of a nuclear weapon. An explosion could be explained as conventional weapons testing, but not if traces of uranium were left behind from the use of UD3. Such a discovery would be regarded as proof of weapons testing, and as a statement of Iran’s nuclear intent. In the documents obtained by The Times, Iranian military scientists suggest a way around the problem: by running surrogate tests that substitute titanium deuteride for the uranium compound. They suggest “continuing the work of replacement materials such as TiD2 [titanium deuteride] in order to avoid U [Uranium] pollution in the production of UD3”. Titanium deuteride would behave in the same way, producing a measurable flow of neutrons, but without leaving the traces of uranium. The explosion would also be smaller. “They want to test the match without burning it,” a Western intelligence source said. “Then they can take it to the Supreme Leader and say, ‘We know it all works now.’ Then he has everything he needs for the moment, if it comes, that he gives the order to build a bomb.” That order, according to the source, does not appear to have been made, and there is no evidence that it will. But even without it Iran is edging closer to nuclear latency — the immediate potential to assemble a bomb — effectively giving it a nuclear deterrent. The last ingredient Iran requires is enough fissile material to arm a weapon. Estimates vary, but at present Iran’s known stockpile of low-enriched uranium is only just enough to arm one warhead — if that material were enriched further to weapons-grade. That stockpile of low-enriched uranium is under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) supervision at Iran’s enrichment plant at Natanz. However, the recent discovery of a nuclear facility near Qom, which was due to come online next year as a back-up enrichment plant, has renewed fears that Iran may have other secret sites where it is enriching or preparing to enrich uranium. A proposal backed by the United Nations to remove Iran’s stockpile failed last week when President Ahmadinejad said that Iran would begin enriching its uranium to a higher grade, bringing it a step closer to producing the 90 per cent weapons-grade fuel needed for a bomb.Secret document exposes Iran’s nuclear trigger
Iran's secret nuclear trigger: translation of full document
Leaked memo identifies man at head of Iran’s nuclear programme
Discovery of UD3 raises fears over Iran’s nuclear intentions
Tuesday, 15 December 2009
The Times (UK) Secret document exposes Iran’s nuclear trigger, Iran's secret nuclear trigger: translation of full document,Leaked memo identifies man
l saw this on the front page of the Dominion Post's World section, so after scanning the article and what it was about, l thought it was time to pay the website the London times website a visit and then l realised there was a video clip from Sky news on it which detailed the report, which l thought was certainly worth watching. All the information is detailed below.
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December 14, 2009
December 14, 2009
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December 14, 2009
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