The actual evidence didn’t lay a glove on Blair who was therefore always likely to be exonerated, as I observed in an article for the Spectator before its conclusions were published. People reacted to this article with astonishment. How ridiculous to say this, they scoffed, when the evidence had been conclusive that Blair was guilty as charged. Hutton was a wise, robust and independent- minded character who, on the basis of the media reports of the evidence, would undoubtedly find against Blair who would most likely be forced out of office as a result. When Hutton finally reported and all but totally exonerated Blair, this formerly wise, robust and independent-minded paragon was immediately denounced as an establishment stooge who had flown in the face of the evidence. Now the same thing is happening again. Having forced the establishment of this inquiry, the anti-war mob are spitting tacks that it has not in fact been set up to find Blair guilty of ‘war crimes’ in Iraq or the crime of ‘talking us to war on a lie’. They have complained that it is not objective because two of its members had supported the war (and even, in one disgusting article, because they were Jews); it goes without saying, of course, that if these members had opposed the war they would be hailed as wise, robust and independent-minded. As far as the anti-war brigade from both left and right are concerned, it’s a case of verdict first, evidence nowhere. And in the media coverage of the Chilcot inquiry, the evidence – much of it itself from bitterly hostile and anti-war diplomats -- is in turn accordingly being cherry-picked, distorted and misrepresented to an astounding degree to produce the running narrative libel that Blair led Britain into an illegal war on a lie. As I said, the Rentoul blog has a running commentary on a number of these distortions. But the ones I personally have been picking up on include these: Misleading and wrong. America had committed itself to regime change in Iraq in 1998 under President Clinton because Saddam was seen as such a threat to the west. Blair agreed with Clinton’s assessment and came to power therefore believing that Saddam was a threat who needed to be removed. The legality of the eventual war in Iraq rested however on a series of UN resolutions, the last of which -- Resolution 1441 which reactivated the earlier ones – was not passed until November 2002. So the fact that regime change may have been deemed ‘illegal’ in the spring of 2002 is totally irrelevant. Indeed,Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain’s former ambassador to the UN, told the inquiry that the war was legal – evidence downplayed by the media in favour of his remark that it was nevertheless not ‘legitimate’ because it did not enjoy the support of the public (itself a deeply arguable ex post facto point). The war was legal when it was waged in 2003. No witness to Chilcot has said that war in 2003 was illegal. That impression has been given solely by the malevolent media coverage. And if people are so exercised that the Iraq war was ‘illegal’, why aren’t there calls for an inquiry into the ‘illegal’ war in Kosovo which was undertaken with no basis in any UN resolutions at all? As for Blair apparently supporting war/regime change before Resolution 1441 was passed, the implied suggestion that it should have been the other way round is ludicrous. There would have been no need for Resolution 1441 unless war was being proposed; the reason it was proposed was because of the perceived threat from Saddam and the exhaustion of 12 years of fruitless attempts to defang Saddam through negotiation. Wrong. The inquiry was told that the British government’s view that it could not support regime change in Iraq had reversed by March 2002 – a month before the Crawford meeting – because 9/11 had changed everything. The UK could no longer oppose regime change because 9/11 had changed the calibration of the risk posed by a rogue Islamic state possessing WMD. As Sir Christopher Meyertold the Chilcot inquiry, by March 2002 the British government had independently of the US decided that containment and sharper sanctions had run its course. It simply wasn't practical to pursue this at the UN... It was a fact that 9/11 had happened and it was a complete waste of time, therefore, in those circumstances, if we were going to be able to work with the Americans, to come to them and say any longer -- and bang away about regime change and say, "We can't support it", and the way I think the attempt was made to square the circle of supporting something to which the Foreign Office, and maybe other lawyers objected, was actually so to wrap it, so to contextualise it, that regime change, if and when it happened, would be with the benefit of the support of the international community in the framework of UN action, quite possibly through a Security Council Resolution. In other words, 9/11 had caused the British government to abandon its opposition to regime change in Iraq. It was now on side with the Americans. The only reason it wanted to gain the endorsement of the UN was to defuse the hostility from the ‘Foreign Office and other lawyers’ -- ie, a tactical move to counter the voices of appeasement from within, whose interpretation of international law was always inseparable from a deeply questionable ideological stance and whose poisoned antagonism has been dripped into the ears of journalists throughout this entire period -- and which has now been exposed for all with eyes to see at the Chilcot inquiry. Wrong. And wrong again. The evidence did not say Saddam was shown not to have had WMD any more or couldn’t use them. What was said was that on the eve of war, intelligence revealed that some of Saddam’s chemical weapons had been dismantled and therefore could not be used instantaneously. But as was also said, that was irrelevant to the case for war; the crucial fact was that he still had the stuff, a fact which he had denied and which was in breach of the UN resolutions – the case for war. Indeed, as the Butler report revealed in March 2002, British intelligence officials advised that the risk from Saddam was that he could activate his WMD material within a few days: ‘Iraq continues to develop weapons of mass destruction, although our intelligence is poor... Iraq continues with its [biological warfare] BW and [chemical warfare] CW programmes and, if it has not already done so, could produce significant quantities of BW agents within days and CW agent within weeks of a decision to do so. We believe it could deliver CBW by a variety of means, including in ballistic missile warheads. There are also some indications of a continuing nuclear programme. Saddam has used WMD in the past and could do so again if his regime were threatened.’ Sir John Scarlett, the chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee at the time of the war and now head of MI6, gave evidence to Chilcot that such ‘dismantling’ or ‘dispersal’ – of which there was intelligence evidence at the time – is recognised as a way of concealing such material. Such dismantling therefore did not mean the WMD no longer existed. On the contrary, the dismantling meant it continued to exist and was being hidden. This is hardly rocket science; it falls into the category of the bleedin’ obvious, but is nevertheless ruthlessly ignored or denied by the anti-war, anti-truth and anti-reason mob -- who have simply and shockingly reversed the meaning of the evidence given to Chilcot. Sir John said this: Now, there was a paper, an assessment, on 9 September 2002, which reaffirmed and that was on Saddam’s options for using chemical and biological weapons. But it was in fact a separate judgment on capabilities which existed. I know that it has been described as a possibly a worst case scenario paper, but it wasn't intended to be that. That paper reaffirmed existing judgments on the ability, if so decided to produce agent the availability of a range of delivery systems and the development of missiles beyond the permitted limits. The change was in the judgment on current possession, which now became firm: "Iraq has currently available a number of CW and BW agents and weapons from pre-war stocks or recent production." And the paper referred to recent intelligence on the production of weapons now taking place, the development of a mobile systems and then, importantly, on the regime and Saddam's intent: The great importance that he attached to the possession of chemical and biological weapons and his readiness to use them if necessary, including to defend the regime from attack: "He saw possession as a central feature of his regional power position and continuing ability to project influence." That intelligence on intent was significant -- taken to be significant. It was also noted that we did not know specific plans for CBW use in the event of conflict, the location of production facilities, the size of stocks. ... "It was also noted that further intelligence might be forthcoming in the near future." And, indeed, further intelligence did come in in September, which reported on the acceleration on the production of chemical and biological agent. And that too was regarded as significant. As for the very late intelligence which came in on the eve of war, Sir John said this: Now, an update, an assessment staff update on 10 March noted the report, which in fact was issued on 7 March yes, intelligence, which was issued on 7 March actually it was, I think, two reports that it was essentially saying there were two versions of the same report, that Iraq had no missiles which could reach Israel and none which could carry germ or biological weapons. The leadership had ordered the dismantlement of the missiles known Al Hussein, 600kilometre range missiles, to avoid discovery and they thought that they could be quickly reassembled. The JIC had over many months throughout this period reported the assessed existence of these missiles, up to 20 was the expectation. But all along, it had been reported that they had been disassembled and concealed. ... Defence Intelligence Staff advised, and this was noted in the update, that depending on the method of disassembly used, it might be possible to reassemble in one or two days. But if it was very complex disassembly, then it would be longer. SIS advised that the reference to "germ and biological" might also refer to chemical, just from the context, although that was speculative. So that was what the 10 March reference was about. On 17 March, intelligence was received that chemical weapons had been disassembled and dispersed and would be difficult to reassemble. Saddam had not yet ordered reassembly nor, indeed, asked about chemical weapons. The reports were assessed in the context of the policy of dispersal and concealment. They were not understood to be an indication that chemical and biological weapons did not exist. Indeed, they didn't say that but, of course, it was clear from the reports that they might be difficult to find (my emphasis). In any event – and this is absolutely crucial to the general madness now gripping Britain about the war in Iraq -- the idea that the case for war rested on the belief that Saddam possessed stocks of WMD is a rewriting of history. WMD was only part of the story; if people like the current Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth thought that was the key element, that merely shows just how dumb some MPs are. The case for war was set out by the speeches made at the time by both Bush and Blair. Their overwhelming emphasis was on Saddam’s refusal to obey the binding UN resolutions showing he had dismantled his WMD programmes and the need to enforce the authority of the UN; Saddam’s concomitant failure to prove that he had destroyed his stocks of WMD and renounced his intention to continue developing such weapons; and the unconscionable danger posed by the ‘triple lock’ of his attachment to such weapons and past record in using them, his regional ambitions and hostility towards the west, and his connections to terrorism. Wrong. Blair said specifically in that interview he would have invaded anyway because of the 12 years in which Saddam defied the UN resolutions to disarm -- the core of the legal case for war. And he indicated there were other reasons for thinking Saddam was dangerous -- which he didn’t amplify on this occasion, but did in spades in the run-up to the war. The terrifying thing about such media misrepresentation is that people have not only come to believe the lies but because this is a uniform media line they have no idea that this is the very opposite of much of what is actually being said to the Chilcot inquiry. So the belief that Blair lied in order to wage an illegal war is now fixed in the public mind. Hence the tirade this morning by the former Director of Public Prosecutions Ken Macdonald, who before he was a Law Officer was a barrister in the ultra radical Matrix chambers and who has previously expressed boiler-plate anti-Iraq war views. In the Times this morning, he raged: The degree of deceit involved in our decision to go to war on Iraq becomes steadily clearer. On the contrary: the deceit is being promulgated by the media. We were not taken to war on a lie. We are instead being lied to about that war – and about the evidence being given about that war -- as history is steadily and shamefully rewritten, even as it is being made. 
Verdict first, evidence nowhere
I have only just caught up with John Rentoul’s excellent ‘Iraq inquiry rebuttal’ blog, which I recommend as essential reading to help combat the hallucinatory distortions now taking place almost every day in the media reporting of the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war. For me, it’s a case of déjà vu all over again. During the Hutton inquiry into the death of the WMD expert Dr David Kelly, I read, watched and listened in disbelief as the coverage of that inquiry systematically wrenched and distorted the evidence to fit the prior conclusion by the media that ‘Blair lied and people, including Dr Kelly, died as a result’.
Monday, 14 December 2009
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