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According to various assessments, around 20 such batteries will be needed in
order to provide proper defense in the north and the south, costing in
excess of NIS 1 billion. Full deployment of such batteries is not expected
to be implemented in the foreseeable future,


An Incremental Leap in Defense Deployment of the Civilian Front

INSS INSIGHT No. 157, January 20, 2010
Elran, Meir

www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=3720

In early 2010 the Israeli public and the country’s enemies learned of two
important developments with regard to intensified protection of the civilian
front. It was reported unofficially that the security cabinet decided to
distribute protection kits to the public beginning in February 2010, over a
period of three years and costing some NIS 1 billion. Immediately thereafter
it was announced that the Iron Dome mobile air defense system, developed by
Rafael Advanced Defense Systems to intercept mortar fire and short range
(4-70 km.) rockets, succeeded in intercepting an integrated barrage of
missiles simulating Qassam and Grad rockets. It was also reported that
following the success of the trial, the system would be proclaimed
operational in the near future and the first batteries will be deployed in
the coming months, initially in southern Israel and later in the north as
well.

These announcements join a series of other developments that collectively
indicate a more serious approach by the defense authorities than in the past
with regard to the home front’s readiness to deal with the growing
challenges of Hamas, Hizbollah, Syria, and Iran. Among these are the series
of intense regional and national exercises initiated and operated in various
areas by the Home Front Command and National Emergency Authority (NEA) that
addressed various threat scenarios, including non-conventional. These
exercises demonstrated enhanced professionalism among the different civilian
systems and familiarized much of the general public with what is required in
real emergency situations.

There was also a recent report of improvement in the discovery and
identification capabilities of the Arrow missile (whose production has
recently increased) and Patriot missile batteries, offering greater
flexibility in defense against long range ballistic missiles. This
improvement was reflected in the last joint exercise with the US Army,
Jennifer Cobra, which also involved American radar units permanently
stationed in Israel. In addition, development of the Magic Wand medium range
active defense system continued, and the system should be operational by
2012. Work was also maintained on the warning system for the general public
which, in the next two years, is designed to produce focused alerts for more
specific areas. This will make it possible to alert people under real threat
and to allow the others to carry on with their lives as usual.

All this indicates a planned, orderly, and ongoing effort to maintain
readiness for war on the home front. It is hoped that within three years
this will lead to a significant reduction in the gap between the improved
ability of the enemy to strike civilian targets in the periphery and center
of the country, and Israel’s civilian defense abilities. Of course the
defense capabilities do not stand alone and must combine with the IDF’s
deterrent and offense abilities. Yet their contribution is crucial to the
prevention or postponement of a military confrontation and to the provision
of a suitable response for renewed escalation where there is a high
probability of extensive attack scenarios on the home front.

This encouraging picture of progress regarding civil defense capabilities in
Israel indicates that Israel’s decision makers have come to the realization
that in the age of asymmetric confrontations, civil defense capabilities
must be established. The Meridor committee on Israel's defense doctrine
(2006) updated the doctrine by including a recommendation in this regard.
Something has apparently shifted in the traditional debate on the importance
that should be attached to the various components of Israel’s overall
defense force: Since 2006 Israel has invested more resources in constructing
a military and civil defense capability. The turning point undoubtedly
followed the Second Lebanon War which set off shockwaves not only as to
aspects of the IDF’s offensive abilities and limitations but also with
regard to the defense limitations of the home front. It is also clear that
conveying the Iranian threat, directly and indirectly – through its local
“emissaries” – did the trick. Overall, the general orientation is
fundamentally correct and balanced and the progress toward a strategic
solution is noteworthy.
Nevertheless, a number of reservations balance the picture, particularly as
to the future:

-        Developing active defense operational systems is of the utmost
importance. The true test will be the actual extent and rate of equipment
procurement. In order to generate effective defense cover against the
various threats and for the different ranges, it will be necessary to deploy
large numbers of different types of batteries at high costs. The assumption
is that the IDF’s force development programs will continue to focus on
building deterrent and offensive abilities. The rest will first and foremost
be devoted to the strategic active defense systems, mainly against the
Iranian threat. This will probably be indicated by attributing relatively
low priority to acquiring tactical defense systems such as Iron Dome.
According to various assessments, around 20 such batteries will be needed in
order to provide proper defense in the north and the south, costing in
excess of NIS 1 billion. Full deployment of such batteries is not expected
to be implemented in the foreseeable future, with the many considerations
always including the discrepancy between the high cost of the interception
missile (tens of thousands of dollars for each) and the negligible cost of
the attacking rocket. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the IDF will be
limited in terms of acquiring the new tactical defense system and will
prefer to view it as a means of providing a deterrent, limiting damage –
particularly with regard to national infrastructures – and enhancing the
population’s sense of security, rather than as a full defense solution.

-        The economic consideration – or the order of priorities, to be
determined by the government – will also apparently be decisive with regard
to distribution of defense kits. Even though the media reported that the
operation will be completed within three years, it has not yet been fully
budgeted and as of now the kits can be distributed to no more than two
thirds of the population. Declarations create an optimistic image that
impact on the public’s perception of the leadership's degree of commitment
to provide it with the protection it deserves. Exposure of a significant gap
between words and actual deeds with regard to protection of the home front
is liable to generate mistrust in this crucial area, and lead to a negative
effect on the Israel's social robustness. The absence or deferment of
realization of the plans will not only harm the physical defense
capabilities but also public morale and the ability to confront the real
situation successfully by optimizing social resilience, which is measured by
society's ability to resume a normal routine quickly following traumatic
events. Increasing resilience requires constant investment, particularly
during times of calm.

-        This leads to a final and crucial reservation: assembling the home
front’s defense system is not only a technical matter of constructing and
deploying active and passive defense means. In essence, it addresses the
establishment of an image and positions of the general public that will have
to contend with a supreme and direct test during a war. The words and
actions of the leadership, on a national level and to no lesser a degree on
a local level, also during periods of calm, directly impact on the public’s
resilience and ability to cope with the expected challenges. In order to
convey this matter consider the definitions of Leonard Marcus and Barry Dorn
from Harvard University, who developed a triangular model of meta-leadership
for preparing the public for emergency situations: meta-leaders assume
responsibility for leading in emergency situations, meta-leaders generate
social (community) strength, and meta-leaders coordinate their work and
their positions with the other parties working on building up the home front
and directing it in emergency situations. As long as it is not understood
and inculcated in Israel on a national level and local authority level that
active, committed, and reliable meta-leadership is the principal means of
establishing civil robustness, the incremental technological leap in
developing civil defense systems will not be fully realized.

The Institute for National Security Studies  •  40 Haim Levanon St.  •  Tel
Aviv 61398  •  Israel  •  03-640-0400  •  e-mail: info@inss.org.il