FACING IRAN: LESSONS LEARNED SINCE IRAQ'S 1991 MISSILE ATTACK ON ISRAEL
Moshe Arens
Jerusalem Issue Brief, March 8, 2010
Today, in 2010, in the United States and the Western world there is a very real and acute awareness of the danger that Iranian nuclear activity-which is clearly designed to achieve a nuclear military capability-poses to the world, not just to Israel. Some people like to think that Israel has nothing to worry about because of the sizable Muslim population in the area and that the Iranians would not dare to cause massive destruction in an area where many Muslims might get injured or killed. However, as Prof. Bernard Lewis has said on a number of occasions, this kind of immunity is imaginary because radical Muslims are convinced that God knows how to tell the difference between Jews and Muslims.
What Iran Learned from the Israeli Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor
The Iranians learned a great deal from the destruction of Iraq's Osirak reactor by the Israel Air Force in 1981, which set back Saddam Hussein's nuclear project very significantly.... The Osirak reactor was the key element in the Iraqi nuclear program: a single target which, when it was destroyed, set that program back very substantially. The Iranians saw this and they dispersed their nuclear program. There is no single element or target which, if destroyed, would substantially set back the Iranian nuclear program. Much of it is deep underground. So the Iranians have done their best to obtain immunity from the possibility of an aerial attack of the kind that destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor, making any military move, regardless of who might consider taking it, substantially more difficult.
Changing U.S. Attitudes toward the Osirak Attack
I came to Washington as Israel's ambassador in 1982, a little over a year after the destruction of the Osirak reactor. The atmosphere in Washington at the time was one of hostility, anger, even antagonism-and this was the Reagan administration, an administration correctly considered as very friendly towards Israel. The administration thought Israel's action was ill-conceived, a mistake that could only cause problems rather than solve them. When I arrived in Washington there was talk of actually imposing sanctions against Israel as a reaction to this unilateral action by Israel against the Osirak reactor.
After a few years the view in Washington on that particular action had changed completely. It is difficult to envision the Americans undertaking Operation Desert Storm in the Gulf in 1991 if the Iraqi nuclear reactor had still existed, if the Iraqi nuclear program had continued beyond 1981, and if that program had not been so seriously set back by the Israeli action.... People's views changed with time, and what started out with feelings of antagonism and even hostility changed to strong appreciation for what was done for the benefit of everybody, certainly for the benefit of the Western world and, of course, Israel....
The Drive to Develop Missile Interceptors...
Some say that while the missile we intend to intercept is a relatively cheap weapon, we are launching a very expensive weapon against it, which does not seem very wise at first sight. However, the damage that might be caused by the missile may far exceed the cost of the anti-missile system.
Israel's missile interceptor system poses a dilemma to anybody who decides to launch missiles against Israel, especially a missile that has a nuclear warhead. The dilemma is posed by the knowledge that the missile may very well be intercepted and thus expose the launching of a nuclear missile, even if it didn't reach its target, which could bring about the response that could be expected for committing this deed. When this is taken into account, a decision might very well be made that this chance should not be taken and such a missile should not be launched.
There are many ways of trying to fool a missile interceptor, such as the use of decoys and the use of maneuvering reentry vehicles that will try to escape the interceptor. But for every measure there is a countermeasure, and the people who are developing the Arrow system are taking all that into consideration....
Israeli Plans to Attack Iraqi Missile Sites...
In order to neutralize the launching of the [Iraqi] Scuds [in 1991], it became clear very quickly that the only way this could be done would be by ground troops. Ground troops would have to search for the places where the launchers were being hidden and take action on the ground. That is no simple operation. It is 1,000 kilometers from Israel to Baghdad and it would involve landing ground troops in western Iraq.... I was for an Israeli response. I gave instructions to prepare a military operation in western Iraq, a very difficult and dangerous one, mainly because I thought it would be wrong for Israel to be hit without responding for the first time in its history. I thought this would send the wrong message to Israel's enemies.
In the meantime, we have taken actions against terrorists in military operations in the West Bank, Lebanon, and Gaza. So I don't think that the fact that we did not respond during the Gulf War in 1991 permanently damaged Israel's deterrent capability.
Prof. Moshe Arens was Israel's defense minister during the 1991 war with Iraq.
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