Thursday, 18 March 2010
JERUSALEM IS OURS
GET USED TO IT!
==========
Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran
Shalom, Zaki and Schachter, Jonathan
INSS Insight No. 169, March 18, 2010
www.inss.org.il/publications.php?cat=21&incat=&read=3893
In a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on February 26,
2010, Defense Minister Ehud Barak made extensive reference to Iran, its
attempts to obtain nuclear capabilities, and the policy ramifications for
the major powers and Israel towards Iran. Despite a certain measure of
opacity in his address, Barak did make some unequivocal statements of
interest. These express the situation assessment prevalent in Israel
regarding Iran's nuclear goal and the gaps between Israel and the American
administration and their implications from Israel's perspective. What
follows are highlights:
a. Iran is a threat challenging not only Israel but also the entire
international community. It is hard to imagine a stable world order with a
nuclear Iran. Iran is attempting to "defy, deceive, and deter" the entire
world with its nuclear ambitions and gain time in order to attain military
nuclear capabilities.
b. Iran's objective is not merely the construction of a "Manhattan
project-like crude nuclear device." Its goal is to skip to the "second or
second and a half generation" of nuclear warheads that can be mounted on
surface-to-surface missiles with ranges covering not only Israel but also
Moscow and Paris.
c. A nuclear Iran will lead to the elimination of the non-proliferation
regime. Saudi Arabia, and perhaps another state or two in the region, will
also feel obligated to acquire nuclear capabilities of their own. At a later
stage this might lead to third-tier dictators acting in the same manner.
d. The model Iran looks to is that of Pakistan rather than that of North
Korea. The meaning of this distinction is almost certainly that Iran strives
for a solid nuclear capability based on a large number of nuclear warheads
and the capacity for launching them at remote targets rather than on single
launchers for purposes of show.
e. These circumstances obligate adoption of a clear policy toward Iran
before it manages to realize its nuclear ambitions. Such a policy must be
"intensive, concrete and conclusive."
f. There is real activity aimed at instituting sanctions against Iran. The
severity of these sanctions - from "targeted," to "hurting," "crippling,"
and "paralyzing" - remains unclear. Israel prefers the most severe option.
g. Israel will not deny its own responsibility or enter into a cycle of
self-delusion and turn a blind eye to what is happening right before it.
Therefore, it recommends not removing any option - i.e., the military
option - from the table.
Barak's statements suggest a gap between US and Israeli perspectives on Iran's
nuclear activity, in terms of its significance and severity. The United
States, so it seems from Barak's address, can live with a nuclear Iran -
despite its declarations to the contrary. Israel, by contrast, cannot accept
such a reality. In any event, Israel must first and foremost see to its own
existential interests, even to the point of not coordinating its every move
with the American administration.
Barak and other senior Israeli government figures have presumably
transmitted similar messages, if not even more unequivocal ones, to senior
personnel in the administration. The visible result is that Israel has
succeeded in convincing the administration that its threat of a unilateral
move against Iran is a credible one. If so, this constitutes an impressive
Israeli strategic achievement and implies that the American administration
assumes that Israel has first, sufficient military capability in order to
create a real threat to Iran's nuclear project, and second, the requisite
determination to carry this option out. This means that Israel's threats to
attack Iran do not only express a tactic of "hold me back" intended to force
the administration to take aggressive measures against Iran; rather, it is
necessary to relate to Israel's threats as having a high degree of
credibility.
This assessment explains the sequential visits of senior American
administration personnel to Israel in recent months:
a. CIA director Leon Panetta visited Israel in May 2009 and again in
January 2010.
b. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen has visited
Israel three times since assuming his post, most recently in March 2010 at
the height of the extensive US ground offensive in Afghanistan.
c. President Obama's national security advisor, Jim Jones, visited
Israel in July 2009 and again in January 2010.
d. The chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator John
Kerry, visited Israel in February 2010. He spoke explicitly about the
administration's intention of preventing an Israeli attack against Iran.
e. Similarly motivated, Vice President Joe Biden visited Israel in
early March 2010.
The officials' meetings in Israel complement the many meetings held by
senior Israeli personnel in the United States, including Chief of Staff Gabi
Ashkenazi.
At the same time, this strategic achievement on Israel's part creates great
expectations regarding a military action against Iran. Should it emerge - as
is likely - that the efforts to halt Iran's nuclear activity have failed,
Israel will find it difficult to avoid acting. Absent any unusual
circumstances, an Israeli avoidance of fulfilling its threats against Iran
is liable to damage the nation's credibility and deterrent capability.
The Institute for National Security Studies . 40 Haim Levanon St. . Tel
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