The Armageddon Scenario:
Israel and the Threat of Nuclear Terrorism
Chuck Freilich
BESA Center Perspectives Papers No. 104, April 8, 2010
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: The Iranian nuclear threat has obscured the possibility
of waging nuclear terrorism against Israel. There is a clear rationale for
employing nuclear terrorism and countering it needs calibrated policies of
prevention and possibly US-Israeli cooperation. The time to prepare for the
Armageddon scenario is now.
For the past 15 years, Israel's focus on the Iranian nuclear threat has been
nearly all-encompassing, eclipsing virtually all other threats. While
understandable, this preoccupation may have distracted Israel from a threat
which may be no less likely and actually far more dangerous; nuclear
terrorism. Unlike "traditional" terrorism, nuclear terrorism poses a
catastrophic threat to the state.
Moreover, those most likely to conduct nuclear terrorism (al-Qaeda,
Hizballah, Hamas, Iran, and others) may be fundamentally nihilistic and thus
undeterrable. As millennial movements who believe that Israel's destruction
is a sacred mission, they may view a nuclear attack, even assuming a
devastating Israeli response, to be a worthy means of ushering in a
messianic era.
A nuclear terrorist threat against Israel might be designed for:
· Actual Use – to deal Israel a devastating blow
· Deterrence – to counter Israel's conventional superiority and
purported nuclear capability, to deter Israeli attacks, or to conduct
attacks with relative impunity · Compellence – to exert a decisive
influence on Israeli decision making during crises or over fundamental
issues, holding it hostage by the threat of an attack
· Weakening – to severely erode Israel's national resilience due to
the ongoing need to live in the shadow of nuclear terrorism
· Back Up – to strengthen the deterrent value of a state-based
(Iranian or Syrian) capability
· Decapitation – to remove the Israeli political and/or military
leadership
The potential means of conducting nuclear terrorism against Israel would be
similar to those applicable to other countries (sea, air, and land-based),
with one important addition: rockets. Rockets, such as those already in
Hizballah's possession, could be fitted with nuclear warheads. Though
unsuited for ordinary military purposes, they could be effective weapons of
terror.
Policy Options
Prevention
Prevention includes a variety of intelligence, interdiction, and other
offensive measures to detect and prevent a nuclear terrorist capability from
being developed or used. If still under development, Israel will have
sufficient time to pursue a range of preventative options, alone and in
conjunction with the US, from targeted to massive military operations. Once
a capability exists, the window for action will be severely attenuated and
preventative efforts will have to include any and all capabilities to
guarantee success at all costs. While a unilateral Israeli operation might
be sufficient if the capability is still being developed, the need for
immediate and guaranteed success to thwart an operational capability may
require American involvement. The challenges posed by detection and
elimination of a terrorist nuclear weapon are hugely difficult.
Deterrence
Deterrence is commonly thought to be ineffective against nuclear terrorism,
due to the presumed nihilistic nature of potential perpetrators. However,
Hizballah and Hamas, while certainly extremist, have populations for which
they take responsibility and have proven over the years to be deterrable.
Although their acquisition of a nuclear capability would pose severe
threats, such as the ability to terrorize Israel's population with relative
impunity, it does place them in the appropriate context.
Iran would presumably be willing to suffer great losses in pursuit of
Israel's destruction, but would have to take into account that Israel is
considered by the international community to be a nuclear power and that a
nuclear crisis could lead to a devastating exchange. While a precise
assessment of Iran's cost-benefit analysis is unknowable, it does appear to
be fundamentally rational and thus deterrable.
The biggest question mark is in regard to al-Qaeda, whose presumed nihilism
may indeed make it undeterrable. It is questionable whether this would truly
be the case in the face of threats of annihilation of their leadership and
families, Muslim population centers, and sites of major importance to the
Muslim world.
Potential perpetrators of nuclear terrorism must be convinced that Israel
will preempt/retaliate devastatingly. For Israel, this means a “shoot first,
no questions asked” policy. Both those clearly responsible for an actual
attack (if any) and those reasonably suspected of involvement must be held
accountable, and Israel must retaliate with all the means at its disposal.
In the absence of irrefutable and immediate evidence to the contrary, Israel’s
retaliatory policy should hold Iran and/or al-Qaeda responsible with an
absence of irrefutable and immediate evidence to the contrary. In the event
of a declared nuclear terrorist capability, a stated intention to acquire
one, or an advanced suspected one, the known or suspected perpetrator and
host country should be attacked in advance with the amount of all of the
force necessary to prevent the threat’s materialization.
As a global power, the US will be unlikely to adopt such a “no questions
asked” policy and will require nuclear forensics. Nevertheless, American
determination to prevent nuclear terrorism and retaliate devastatingly
against those responsible must be beyond question. US declaratory policy on
the nuclear terrorist threat to Israel would not need to be significantly
different from its posture on nuclear terrorism generally, but could be
further elucidated.
US-Israeli Cooperation
As with so many other areas of Israeli national security, cooperation with
the US is a primary option for dealing with nuclear terrorism. In this case,
however, the US would only be able to provide limited assistance. “Extended
deterrence” would have little if any value in the face of nihilistic
terrorists. Heightened cooperative preventative efforts, while important,
may not suffice when the US lacks a satisfactory response to nuclear
terrorism.
Conversely, global American efforts to minimize the threat of nuclear
terrorism might be of significant indirect benefit for Israel. These efforts
include, inter alia: heightened diplomacy to make better international use
of existing diplomatic tools and to adopt new ones; intensified pressure on
states to deny terrorists assistance and sanctuary; improvements in control
over nuclear facilities, stockpiles and personnel; strengthening the NPT;
heightened international cooperation regarding border security, export
controls, intelligence sharing, and interdiction; and a variety of covert
operations.
Ending Nuclear Ambiguity
Israel is widely thought by foreign observers to be nuclear and any
potential perpetrator of nuclear terrorism must take this into account. It
is doubtful whether ending nuclear ambiguity would be of significant
deterrent value.
Defensive Measures
Israel has an extensive operational homeland security system (Arrow and Iron
Dome) and an attacker must consider the probability of interception and
massive retaliation. However, if “only” one nuclear warhead got through,
this would constitute unacceptable failure for Israel, rendering defensive
measures an insufficient option.
Conclusion
To date, no terrorist group has apparently acquired a nuclear weapon or the
materials needed to make one. Al-Qaeda has tried repeatedly, but currently
the technical challenges are daunting. This good news comes with a crucial
caveat; it is true only “as far as we know.” Even if the risk may be low at
this time, the potential costs are monstrous and the threat assessment is
likely to change significantly in the coming years. Israel must take into
account that a nuclear terrorist threat could emerge in the foreseeable
future and therefore devote greater attention and resources to it, in order
to develop the necessary doctrine and undertake the preparations possible.
The time to act is now.
Chuck Freilich is a Senior Fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, an Adjunct
Professor at New York University, and a former Deputy National Security
Adviser in Israel. This perspective is based on a more comprehensive study
to be published by the Begin-Sadat (BESA) Center for Strategic Studies.
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BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family.
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