Berlin, the Ayatollahs, and the Bomb
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The Journal of International Security Affairs, No. 18, Spring 2010
BERLIN, THE AYATOLLAHS, AND THE BOMB
By Matthias Küntzel
When Chancellor Angela Merkel addressed both houses of the U.S. Congress on November 3, 2009, her remarks on Iran set off enthusiastic applause.
“A nuclear bomb in the hands of an Iranian President who denies the Holocaust, threatens Israel and denies Israel the right to exist is not acceptable,” she explained. “Not only Israel but the entire free world is threatened. This is why the free world is meeting this threat head on, if necessary with tough economic sanctions.”
In 2010, Iran and the topic of tough sanctions will be at the top of the international agenda. Will the German Chancellor this year follow through on what she said?
On the one hand, virtually no other country is in a position to exert more effective pressure on Tehran than Germany. In the 1920s Germany built Iran’s industrial infrastructure and since then Germany has remained by far Tehran’s most important high-tech partner.
According to the German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Tehran, two thirds of Iranian industrial enterprises and three quarters of its small and medium-sized firms use machines and systems of German origin. As Berlin’s Federal Agency for Foreign Trade affirmed in 2007, Germany is still Iran’s No. 1 supplier of almost all types of machinery apart from power systems and construction, where Italian manufacturers dominate the market.
Even in 2008, more than 7,150 Iranian companies visited trade fairs in Germany “in order to find out about new technologies and products,” as the Chamber’s home page boasted in January 2010. “The Iranians are totally dependent on German spare parts and suppliers,” confirms Michael Tockuss, the Chamber’s former President – spare parts and suppliers that could not, without further ado, be replaced by Russia or China.[1]
This dependency means that a German-Italian unilateral economic embargo might be enough to paralyze the Iranian economy within a few months and make the theocratic regime seriously consider whether compliance with UN Security Council decisions requiring it to halt its nuclear program might not be the better alternative.
Berlin has consistently chosen another path, however. Over the past 15 years, it has done far more to oppose efforts to stop the mullahs’ nuclear program than to contribute to such efforts. The applause with which Congress greeted the Chancellor was a snapshot. It may temporarily drown out the bitter German-American dispute over Iran taking place behind the diplomatic scenes, but it does not end it.
As long as President Obama remained determined to confine himself to talking to Tehran, this dispute had seemed to be over. Now, however, at the start of what may turn out to be the decisive confrontation, it could well erupt anew. So let’s take a closer look at Germany’s past role in the nuclear dispute with Iran.
1993-1998 – the Clinton-Kohl controversy
The German-American conflict over Iran first broke into the open in November 1992 at a G-7 conference in Munich, when the German delegation’s refusal to support a US-initiated resolution criticizing Iran led to strong verbal protests from Washington. Subsequent years saw consistent intransigence from Berlin to the application of diplomatic pressure on Iran.
By the spring of 1995, it had become apparent that a common Western approach was impossible. Accordingly, Washington pressed ahead with unilateral measures: that spring, U.S. President Bill Clinton prohibited all American firms from trading with Iran. He justified this step with the observation that every diplomatic attempt in recent years to persuade Iran to moderate its policies had failed. “Iran’s appetite for the acquisition and the development of nuclear weapons has only grown greater,” explained the President, while the country continued to be the “instigator and paymaster” of terrorists.[2] Clinton, moreover, announced “that he would make further efforts to put pressure on America’s allies, above all Germany and Japan, to persuade them to follow the U.S. lead in cutting back their trade relations with Iran.”[3]
The German Government, however, resisted the mounting American pressure. In fact, the American sanctions effort was systematically undermined by an intensified German export drive.
In his recently published memoirs, Iran’s former ambassador to Germany, Hossein Mousavian, mischievously records the great delight this caused in Tehran. “Iranian decision-makers were well aware in the 1990s of Germany’s significant role in breaking the economic chains with which the United States had surrounded Iran … Iran viewed its dialogue and relations with Germany as an important means toward the circumvention of the anti-Iranian policies of the United States.”[4]
On August 5, 1996 Clinton further toughened his stance, by signing the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, or ILSA, into law. That piece of legislation allowed the U.S. to boycott firms based in foreign countries that did at least $40 million worth of business a year with the Iranian or Libyan oil or gas industries. This threat of sanctions impacted Germany as well.
In response, the German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel, traveled to the United States, where he warned “that Europe would respond with sharp retaliatory measures” if the measure were applied.[5] Two weeks later, Chancellor Helmut Kohl also flew to the U.S. in order to lend extra weight to this threat. They were successful. At the end of the Kohl-Clinton summit the American President retreated, promising that “[he wished] to apply the laws in a way that does not harm our partners.”[6]
Although the new sanctions law thereby lost its teeth, Washington persisted. As former Secretary of State Warren Christopher detailed in his memoirs, “We constantly prodded them to distance themselves from Iran and to suspend trade, as we had done… Unfortunately, the struggle to stop our allies from doing business with Iran has not yet succeeded.”[7]
The U.S. focus was not confined to technologies specifically related to weapons production, but was aimed at the Iranian nuclear program as a whole. The assumption was that the regime would sooner or later divert any “civilian” assistance for its nuclear program to military uses.
Germany, however, had other ideas. Because the Islamic Republic was a party to the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Berlin supported the Iranian nuclear program since, in a legalistic sense, it did not contradict the NPT.
That analysis was a mistake. While the NPT was aimed at stabilizing the international system, the Iranian regime clearly desires the opposite, namely to abolish this “Satanic” secular world order and replace it with a sharia-based system of Islamic rule. “The struggle will continue,” the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini promised in his day, “until the calls ‘There Is No God but God’ and ‘Muhammad Is the Messenger of God’ are echoed all over the world.”[8]
The nuclear program is part of this revolutionary quest. “Iran’s nuclearization,” President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad told his supporters not long ago, “is the beginning of a very great change in the world.” It would “be placed at the service of those who are determined to confront the bullying powers and aggressors.”[9]
2003-2006: Europe as a “protective shield“
In 2003, it became publicly known that Tehran had been operating a clandestine nuclear program for some 18 years in violation of the terms of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The United States pressed for the matter to be referred to the Security Council. Under the IAEA statute, the Iranian violation ought to have been taken up by the UN Security Council by November 2003 at the latest.
But on October 21, 2003, the foreign ministers of Great Britain, France and Germany—Jack Straw, Dominique de Villepin and Joschka Fischer—travelled to Tehran, despite major reservations on the part of the Bush Administration, to “recognize the right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,” as the text of a declaration agreed to by Iran and the three foreign ministers put it. In return, the Iranian regime agreed to make two pseudo-concessions: it signed a new oversight treaty with the IAEA – without, however, ever ratifying it – and voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment for a few weeks.
These diplomatic niceties were matched by economic ones. Instead of immediately cutting technology transfers to Iran following the discovery of Iran’s secret nuclear facilities, European exports to Iran rose 29 percent to €12.9 billion, between 2003 and 2005. German exports to Iran, meanwhile, increased by 20 percent in 2003 and another 33 percent in 2004.
Germany and other European states also increased their export guarantees for enterprises doing business with Iran. “The volume of coverage in relation to Iranian orders increased by nearly three and a half times to around €2.3 billion,” stated the 2004 annual report on Germany’s program of so-called Hermes export credits [Hermes-Bürgschaften]. “Thus the Federal Government guaranteed 65% of all German exports to the country. Iran enjoyed the second-highest level of coverage for 2004, only slightly behind China.”[10]
Between November 2003 and March 2006, the EU succeeded in preventing the Iranian nuclear question from being referred to the UN Security Council: 28 months that the Iranian regime used to rapidly develop its nuclear facilities.
Germany’s Foreign Minister at the time, Joschka Fischer, found the most fitting expression to describe the parallel activism of Iran and the Europeans. “We Europeans,” he said, “have always advised our Iranian partners that it is in their considered self-interest to regard us as a protective shield.”[11]
2006-2007: How Germany “ran from the flag”
Nonetheless, on December 23, 2006, American diplomacy achieved an important success with the unanimous passage of UN Security Council Resolution 1737. This resolution called on the mullahs to cease all uranium enrichment and plutonium projects without delay, and classified Iran’s nuclear program as a threat to international peace. At the same time, the resolution levied sanctions on the Iranian regime. In the event that Tehran failed to comply with international demands, the resolution for the first time threatened additional pressure under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the UN Charter.
No sooner had Resolution 1737 been passed than a dispute about its meaning erupted between Washington and Berlin. The Americans attempted to derive the maximum possible pressure from the resolution, and therefore dispatched envoys to China and the industrialized world to attempt to convince banks and major companies to stop doing business with Iran. Moreover, they also called on European governments to cease underwriting exports to Iran. “Britain is also backing the new push, as is France, although to a lesser extent. Germany, with far more business interests in Iran, is not quite as eager”, reported the New York Times.[12]
Berlin, however, opposed American attempts to win over the major European banks: “A direct attack by U.S. officials on European firms and banks is not acceptable,” insisted a policy paper from the Chancellor’s Office.[13] On the Hermes issue, Washington also ran into a brick wall: Berlin was not ready “unilaterally and without UN sanction fully to stop underwriting business with Iran,” wrote the influential Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung newspaper: “That would mean surrendering the field to the competition.”[14]
The 60-day period set by the Security Council for the mullahs to meet the demands of UNSCR 1737 ran out at the end of February 2007. Iran didn’t budge. Everything now depended on how the “5+1” – the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany – would react to its intransigence. Would they back off, thus undermining the credibility of the UN? Or would they do what Resolution 1737 required, and “adopt further appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations” to persuade Iran to comply with this resolution and the requirements of the IAEA?
The answer was not long in coming. The United States, France and Britain advocated far stronger sanctions against Iran. Russia, China and Germany, on the other hand, rejected a punitive response.
A “5 + 1” meeting in London ended without agreement. On March 6, 2007, discussions resumed in New York, but again without success. Three videoconferences followed, but again failed to produce agreement. After another two weeks of negotiations a new resolution was agreed, which the Security Council passed unanimously on March 24, 2007. But the new measure, UNSCR 1747, added hardly anything of substance.
At this moment, however, a new player exploded onto the political scene: newly elected French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
The conflict with Tehran is the “most dangerous in international politics,” warned Sarkozy on August 27, 2007. Sarkozy spoke of a “catastrophic alternative” – either “the Iranian bomb” or “the bombing of Iran” – unless Iran were forced to change course in time by non-violent means.[15] Paris instructed major French firms such as Total and Gaz de France to freeze their investments in Iran. At the same time, the French leader advocated “tougher” European sanctions that “should be adopted outside the UN Security Council”.[16]
European sanctions could indeed exert effective pressure. In 2005 40 percent of all Iranian goods imports came from the EU, with the United Arab Emirates in second place with a mere eight percent. In addition, community-wide sanctions would remove the possibility of European exporters deriving competitive advantage from the situation. However, here too, everything hinged on Germany, the traditional and by far the largest exporter to Iran. “For this reason, French diplomats made special efforts in Berlin to win over the Federal Government to the cause of unilateral sanctions,” reported the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung in mid-September. “The Chancellor, however, reacted hesitantly.”[17]
While Britain and the Netherlands, among others, supported the French initiative, Germany, Austria and Italy opposed independent EU sanctions. When the EU Foreign Ministers met in Brussels in mid-October 2007, the French effort had already failed: sanctions continued to be considered exclusively within the UN framework.
Their effectiveness, however, depended upon agreement among the “5+1” countries, and there was none in sight. America’s German ally again “ran from the flag.”[18] In fact a new lineup was taking shape. On one side were the Western powers: the U.S., France and Britain. On the other Russia, China and Germany.
This became abundantly clear on September 28, 2007, when the divergent interests of the six powers clashed in a meeting. While “the USA, Britain and France pushed for a third [Security Council] resolution imposing tougher sanctions, Germany rejected this proposal.”[19] According to the New York Times, the three Western powers – the United States, France and Britain – only reluctantly agreed to a further postponement of the UN sanctions issue until November 2007. “The delay, a concession to Russia, China and Germany … came after a week of haggling on the outskirts of the General Assembly.”[20]
Germany had now not only prevented EU sanctions, but had also, in cahoots with Russia and China, hindered agreement in the “5+1” framework.
The international sanctions cooled down from there. The sanctions came to a halt, when U.S. presidential candidate Barack Obama announced that if he won he would enter into negotiations with Iran without preconditions. On September 27, 2008, the Security Council adopted its third and – at least at the time of this writing – most recent sanctions resolution (1835), an expression of impotence which confined itself to reiterating the previous decisions that Tehran had ignored.
How Obama has affected Berlin
In Berlin, the Obama Administration’s new Iranian policy was greeted with relief. His readiness to talk with Tehran made it easier for Germany to “defend itself against the charge of appeasement and maintain its basic position of the non-exclusion of Iran,” Johannes Reissner of the leading German thinktank Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik observed. A burst of activity followed, beginning with a four-day visit to Iran by former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder on February 19, 2009.
This visit had been organized in close coordination with the German Foreign Office. The economic actors who accompanied Schröder had reason to feel satisfied with the results of this visit. “Schröder was serving in Tehran as the emissary of exporters keen to invest,” reported the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. “Particularly in the gas sector” his visit “opened a new chapter in German-Iranian relations,” added the Tehran Times.[21]
Just two month later, energy-sector cooperation between the two countries assumend a new dimension. On April 16th, it became known that Bayerngas would take part in the conversion of the Iranian petrol station network from gasoline to natural gas. On April 27th, a major German-Iranian economic meeting was hosted by the Near and Middle-Eastern Association (Numov) in Düsseldorf, on which Gerhard Schröder serves as chairman. Here, according to Iranian sources, “representatives of over 200 German firms and many Iranian industrial managers” discussed “how bilateral industrial ties could be further developed.”[22]
In May 2009 Numov continued its Iranian offensive with an investors’ conference in Berlin presided over by Schröder and the Iranian oil minister, Gholam-Hossein Nozari. At the meeting, Nozari advocated a strategic German-Iranian alliance, with Iran supplying the natural gas and Germany the technology.
In June 2009, the Berlin chapter of the Europe-based campaign “Stop the Bomb” revealed that five days before the Iranian presidential elections the German firm Basell Polyolefine had signed a record-breaking €825 million (approximately $1.18 billion) deal on high-tech goods with Iran’s state-owned National Petrochemical Company (NPC). They were egged on by Gerhard Schröder’s call to “be somewhat bolder in seizing and not missing their opportunities” in doing business in Iran.[23]
The new economic activism reflected Berlin’s true stance on sanctions and Iran’s nuclear program. As Der Spiegel put ist: “Berlin doubts that Tehran can be forced to make concessions by tougher sanctions. They are just the price that has to be paid so that the Americans at least stay peaceful.”[24]
Accepting the bomb?
An Iranian nuclear bomb “is not acceptable,“ Chancellor Angela Merkel assured the US congress in November 2009. In Germany, however, a majority of the foreign policy establishment has already come to terms with the Iranian bomb. Some quotes:
Rudolf Adam, President of the German Federal Academy for Security Policy: “The question is, how will we deal with a nuclear-armed Iran?”[25]
Volker Perthes, head of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik: “An Iranian nuclear bomb … would not be an ‘Islamic bomb’, but an instrument for the defence of the Islamic Republic’s national interest”.[26]
Christoph Bertram, Perthes’ forerunner in this post: “A usable nuclear bomb would…not be a strategic disaster for Germany and Europe, for the region and the world.”[27]
Karl-Heinz Kamp, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation: “The use of Iranian nuclear weapons in a conflict is rather unlikely – as is the supply of nuclear weapons to terrorists”.[28]
Michael Bröning, Friedrich-Ebert Foundation, Berlin: “Is it not conceivable that the region can, not, admittedly, learn to love a nuclear Iran, but find a way to live with it?”[29]
Why German elites prefer to accept a nuclear Iran over a rupture in German-Iranian relations is unclear.
The economic explanation is unconvincing. The value of German exports to Iran reached its historical high (€ 4.4 billion) in 2005. For that year, the total value for all German exports was € 720 billion. The Iranian share of the total, therefore, was just 0.6 percent. “Economic interests cannot fully account for why Germany has adhered to a policy so much criticised in the United States,” confirmed Peter Rudolf, a member of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik as early as 1997.[30]
Two other explanations come to mind. The first is the mistaken belief that it is in Germany’s interest to ally itself with a nuclear Iran. University of Bonn political science professor Kinan Jaeger spelled out the rationale behind this approach in Der Mittler-Brief, a quarterly newsletter widely read in the German foreign policy community. “Anyone who is capable of bringing Iran to its side is not only ‘set up for life’ as far as energy logistics are concerned, but could also face the U.S. in a different way.” Iran would through the “attainment of an atom bomb …become a hegemonic power in the Gulf and would be capable of confronting the U.S. in the Gulf region more or less ‘as an equal.’”[31]
The second interpretation assumes a stubborn adherence to what is apparently tried and tested. Under this view, Germany continues to do what it has gotten used to doing without deviating from the parameters previously established during the Iran dispute between Chancellor Kohl and President Clinton. Among these parameters is the readiness to view Iranian nuclear policy through rose-colored glasses, and to impute good will to the mullahs. Thus, Iranian infringements of the NPT are treated as minor offenses, clear evidence of a weapons program trivialized and the conclusions of IAEA inspectors downplayed.
Today, however, the June 2009 uprising in Tehran and many other Iranian cities has thrown not only the Islamic Republic, but also the friendship between Germany and Iran, into crisis. While the face of the Iranian President has remained the same, the country at large has not.
Iran is divided into two hostile camps and every foreign government and company has to decide which one it intends to support. At the same time, the danger of nuclear adventurism on the part of the Iranian regime has risen. What has been apparent since at least 2005 is now clearer than ever: the prevention of the Iranian nuclear option is a categorical imperative of our time.
Yet, even as the necessity of stopping the nuclear program has dramatically increased, the potential of success through dialogue is blocked. This leaves just two ways to stop the Iranian bomb. A military strike, and with it the risk of a long war, or the use of tools designed to pressure and isolate the Iranian regime. What Germany does, or refrains from doing, carries particular weight. The many ties between Tehran and Berlin can either serve as a safety net for the Iranian regime, or as a means for exerting pressure on Tehran to change course.
————————————
[1] Interview mit Michael Tockuss, Focus Online, February 12, 2006.
[2] Archiv der Gegenwart 1995, p.39937.
[3] Leo Wieland, ‚Clinton verfügt Handelsembargo gegen Iran’, [Clinton Orders Commercial Embargo against Iran,“] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung [FAZ], May 2, 1995.
[4] Seyyed Hossein Mousavian, Iran-Europe Relations, Milton Park (Routledge) 2008, p. 133.
[5] Carola Kamps, ´ Kinkel warnt vor Wirtschaftskrieg,’ [Kinkel Warns of Economic War], FAZ, May 10, 1996.
[6] Claus Gennrich, ‘Amerika hat keinen besseren Freund in der Welt als Deutschland,’ [America Does Not Have a Better Friend in the World Than Germany], FAZ, May 25, 1996.
[7] Warren Christopher, In the Stream of History, Stanford, 1998, p. 442.
[8] Farhang Rajaee, Islamic Calues and World View. Khomeyni on Man, the State and International Politics, Lanham 1983, p. 83.
[9] Y. Mansharof and A. Savyon, Escalation in the Positions of Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad – A Special Report, MEMRI, Inquiry & Analysis – Iran, Nr. 389, 17 September 2007, pp. 1ff.
[10] German Federal Government, Annual report on Hermes export guarantees, 2004, p. 60.
[11] German press office: Speech of the German Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer, at the opening of the Embassadors’ conference on September 6, 2004 in Berlin.
[12] Helene Cooper and Steven R. Weisman, ´West tries a New Tack to Block Iran’s Nuclear Agenda,’ New York Times (NYT), January 2, 2007.
[13] ´USA drängen deutsche Firmen aus Iran, Handelsblatt [The U.S. Urges German Companies out of Iran), January 11, 2007.
[14] Rainer Hermann und Matthias Rüb, ´Beratungen über Iran-Saktionen in London, [Consultations over Iran Sanctions in London], FAZ, February 27, 2007.
[15] Klaus Frankenberger, ´Düstere Aussicht, ‘ [Dark Prospect], FAZ, August 29, 2007.
[16] ´Paris treibt die Europäer im Atomstreit zur Eile an,’ [Paris Propels the Europeans in the Nuclear Dispute to Hurry], FAZ, September 14, 2007.
[17] Ibid.
[18] Matthias Rüb, ´Im irakischen Treibsand,’ [In the Iraqi Quicksand] FAZ, November 1, 2007.
[19] Horst Bacia, ´Reichlich offene Fragen,’ [Plentifully Open Questions], FAZ, September 22, 2007.
[20] Helene Cooper, ´Split in Group Delays Vote on Sanctions Against Iran,’ NYT, September 29, 2007.
[21] Jasper von Altenbockum, ´Mehrspurig,’ FAZ, February 23, 2009 and ´Iran-German Ties Entering New Chapter, Especially in Gas Sector, in: Tehran Times, February 22, 2009.
[22] Iranian-German Businessmen to Discuss Joint Ventures, www.farsnews.com, April 27, 2009.
[23] Rainer Hermann, ´Deutsch-emiratische Dynamik’, FAZ, June 10, 2009.
[24] ´Neue Unübersichtlichkeit,’ Der Spiegel, November 19, 2009.
[25] ´Sicherheitsexperte Rudolf Adam hält atomare Bewaffnung Irans kaum noch abwendbar,’ Saarbrücker Zeitung, April 22, 2007.
[26] Volker Perthes, ‚Iran – Eine politische Herausforderung’, Frankfurt/M.2008, p. 110.
[27] Christoph Bertram, Partner, nicht Gegner, Berlin 2008, p. 11.
[28] Karl-Heinz Kamp, ´Wenn der Iran Atommacht würde…,’ Internationale Politik, September 2007, p. 113.
[29][29] Michael Bröning, ´Irans Atomprogramm: Können wir lernen, die Bombe zu lieben?,’ Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft 1/2009, p. 162. I added these quotes from my manuscript. They are not included in the article published by The Journal of International Security Affairs.
[30] Peter Rudolf, ‘Managing Strategic Divergence: German-American Conflict over Policy towards Iran’, American Institute for Contemporary German Studies, The Iranian Dilemma. Challenges For German and American Foreign Policy, Conference Report, Washington, D.C., 21 April 1997, p. 3.
[31] Kinan Jaeger and Silke Wiesneth, ´Energiesicherheit für Europa. Geopolitische Implikationen,’ Der Mittler-Brief. Informationsdienst zur Sicherheitspolitik, Nr. 3/ 2007, p. 7.
Home | Deutsche Texte | Textes en Français | About the author | Impressum | Search:
RECENT BOOK:
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BERLIN, THE AYATOLLAHS, AND THE BOMB
Who is Who in German trade with Iran?
Iranian Antisemitism: Stepchild of German National Socialism
Obama's Search for Peace in Our Time
Iran Has No Right to Nuclear Technology
The West Betrays the Iranian Protest Movement
New Coalition Raises The Alarm Against Globalized Antisemitism
February 4, 2010
Who is Who in German trade with Iran?
A dossier on the branch offices and agencies of German companies in Iran ·By Matthias Küntzel
As the saying goes, a single swallow does not make a spring. Siemens AG’s withdrawal from Iran is not in itself enough to get Tehran to change course. What about all the other companies? They are silent: the noisier the Mullah regime becomes, the more quietly they conduct their business with it.
Now, however, an official list from the “German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Teheran” is available. Its title: “Branch offices, Agencies, and Missions of German Companies in Iran”. Published in July 2009, it provides the names and specific fields of activity of 200 companies active in Iran.
In Germany, despite its explosive content, the list has so far gone unremarked. Trading with a regime which denies the Holocaust and promotes antisemitism is frowned upon. Moreover, German companies with links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guards, the very forces that played the key role in the bloody suppression of the democracy movement, run the risk of finding themselves denounced as profiteers of terrorism and dictatorship.
It is common knowledge that much of Iran’s economy, 75% of which is in state hands, is under the control of the Revolutionary Guards. Their presence is especially strong in the export business and in airports and seaports. In 2009, a Revolutionary Guards general was appointed manager of the country’s largest seaport in Bandar Abbas.[1] Anybody who wants to do business with Iran cannot avoid dealing with this elite corps, which the Dutch parliament wishes to see added to the EU’s list of terrorist organizations.
Although the Chamber of Commerce’s list is not comprehensive, it is unique in the clarity and detail with which it exposes the scale and moral perfidy of German-Iranian business relations.
For example: What business does the company Babcock Borsig Service GmbH conduct in Iran given that it advertises itself as a provider of “magnet – and nuclear technology and service”? There is good reason to suspect that German companies are involved in developing nuclear installations. A uranium enrichment site discovered in September 2009 was hidden in an extremely deep tunnel near Qum. For such purposes, the company Wirth Maschinen- und Bohrgeräte-Fabrik based in Erkelenz can provide “Drilling machines for tunnelling from 3-16 m.”, while market leader Herrenknecht, which is represented by two subsidiaries in Iran, describes its activities as “Design, manufacturing and technical support of all types and sizes of tunnelling”.
Several German companies compete for the sale of truck mounted cranes:Ruthmann GmbH & Co. from Gescher (“truck mounted and mobile cranes”),Atlas Terex GmbH from Delmenhorst (“truck mounted cranes”) and the company ZF Friedrichshafen AG, which supplies “truck cranes” to Iran. Are these companies unaware of the fact that the Iranian regime uses such cranes for public executions?
Among the firms which are providing the Iranian regime with security technology are not only Nokia Siemens, but also Rohde & Schwarz, which is renowned for its broadcasting technology and which as late as 2009 appeared on the list of exhibitors at the Iranian Police Trade fair IPAS.[2] On its Internet website in Farsi the company Megaforce GmbH from Krefeld offers GPS-navigation systems as well as tracking- and telematic systems.
The publication of the list of German companies comes at a time when the promoters of partnership with Teheran are facing unprecedented opposition. The declaration by Siemens AG that it will stop doing business with Iran in the foreseeable future reflects a shift in attitude in parts of the German business community. While a few years ago, the scary prospect of the loss of “more than 10.000 jobs in Germany” if sanctions were imposed was being widely touted and as late as the summer of 2009 the “Verband Deutscher Maschinen- und Anlagenbau” (VDMA) [the association of German machinery and plant construction] was still referring to Iran’s “strategic importance for German machinery manufacturers”, a new note has become apparent since January 2010.[3]
Ulrich Ackermann, the manager of the VDMA’s Department of Foreign Trade, now says that German companies need to take into consideration the possibility “that sanctions might be more strongly enforced, and that business could be reduced. Most companies”, Ackerman continued, “would be able to absorb this loss of business, since Iran does not represent their core market. Iran’s share of German machinery exports, for example, is below one percent.”[4] F. Börner, President of the Federal Wholesale Trade, Foreign Trade and Services Association, expressed himself in a similar fashion. “There have to be robust sanctions against Iran”, he declared. “Only then would the dollar not fall.[5]
In at least one respect too there has been a shift in the approach of the Federal Government from that followed by the Grand Coalition. On 26 January 2010 Chancellor Merkel announced that it would no longer make tighter sanctions dependent on a US Security Council resolution, but would, if necessary, support them in the framework of a group of like-minded countries, i.e. a “coalition of the willing”.[6]
The reasons for this change of tune are easily found:
The movement for democracy in Iran has caused a crisis not only for the Islamic Republic but also for the special relationship between Germany and Iran. Politicians and the business community have to decide on which side they want to be: on that of the repressors of democracy and freedom or that of the people fighting to achieve those goals. According to reports from inside Iran, the announcement of Siemens AG’s withdrawal from Iran on opposition websites was understood and greeted as a sign of support for their movement.
The moral pressure was increased by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Berlin in mid-January 2010 as well as by President Shimon Peres’ important speech to the German Parliament on January 27, 2010 on the occasion of 65th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. The following day, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (FAZ) emphasized that, “the nuclear conflict with Iran will be the litmus test for the German-Israeli relationship which is and will remain a special one”.[7]
At the same time, pressure from the USA is having an increasingly painful impact. German companies who engage in shady deals with the mullahs run an increasing risk of incurring severe financial losses. On January 28, 2010, the House of Representatives followed the Senate in passing a bill which imposes a two-fold penalty on international companies that provide Iran with gasoline or invest in the energy sector: in the future, they will receive no assistance from American financial institutions and will be unable to do business with federal and state agencies.[8]
There is a fourth factor too: the Siemens conglomerate was facing mounting criticism of its business with Iran. According to the FAZ, “Siemens’ decision was also a result of criticism expressed at its annual general meeting where shareholders condemned its business deals with Iran.”[9] The “STOP THE BOMB” group’s strategy of purchasing shares so as to be able to attend the AGM and make their protest has proved efficacious.
Nevertheless, the scale and intensity of German economic relations with Iran are more scandalous than ever:
- In 2007 statistics from the Federal Office for Exports revealed that Germany dominates the market in seven out of nine machine manufacture sectors.[10]
- In 2008 the value of German exports to Iran increased by 8.9 percent over the previous year, to almost 4 billion Euros.
- In 2009, while total German exports fell by 18.8 percent due to the financial crisis, exports to Iran held up well, registering only a 5.3 percent decrease.[11] Germany kept its place as Iran’s second largest source of imports – ahead of China, with the United Arab Emirates in first place. However, an ever-growing proportion of German export business to Iran is now conducted via Dubai, one of the seven Emirates. According to a press release of November 30, 2009 from the German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce: “The bulk of shipments from the United Arab Emirates are re-exports from third parties, among them Germany and China”.[12]
- While German exports to Iran increased by 8.9 percent in 2008, German exports to the United Arab Emirates increased by 48 percent in the same year, to a value of 8.16 billion Euros – twice that of all exports to Iran.[13] In the same year, the Ministry of Economics in Berlin decided to establish an “Emirate-German Chamber of Industry and Commerce”. The official report of a meeting of this Chamber on November 17, 2009, in Dubai reveals what may well be the most important reason for its establishment in May 2009. “How to do business in Iran through Dubai. … Practical steps to do business in Iran.”[14] These documents reveal that in all probability Germany is exporting far more to Iran than the official data indicate.
- In 2008, Gholam-Hossein Nejabat, the spokesman of the state-owned Iranian National Petrochemical Company NPC declared that, “We have never had any difficulties in acquiring any and all the technologies we want. … After all, American technology is available from other countries as well. …. We are getting it from companies such as Basell, Technip, Linde and Uhde.“[15] Three of these companies – Basell, Linde and Uhde – are German. The bilateral technology links have been boosted by a stream of visits to Germany by Iranian enterprises. The German-Iranian Chamber of Industry and Commerce in Teheran’s homepage proudly announces that, “In 2008 alone, more than 7,150 Iranian companies visited trade fairs in Germany in order to learn about new technologies and products.”[16] This means that in that year an average of 20 Iranian companies per day visited Germany in search of technological information!
The above data show that German companies and institutions are making a major contribution to sustaining the present Iranian regime. As long as this situation continues, the credibility of Germany’s commitment towards Israel is in doubt. Who would shower the enemy of a friend, an enemy who is threatening the burn the friend’s house down, with technology and goods instead of breaking off the relationship?
But here we come to the nub of the matter. Since 1984, Germany has of its own free will forged a particularly close relationship with the Islamic Republic. No one else can end this special relationship for it. If the German government fails to take this step, it will be unable to convince anyone else of the need for stronger sanctions and will be the permanent foot-dragger in any coalition of the willing.
Instead of putting all possible pressure on the illegitimate regime, the German government seems to want to go on doing only what it is obliged to do by the UN or the EU. During her joint press conference with Shimon Peres on January 26, 2010, chancellor Angela Merkel did not announce a single legally binding measure to restrict German trade with Iran, promising merely that Germany would “comply with the [prospective] sanctions within all areas”.[17]
When Shimon Peres stated in his speech to the German parliament that, “Iran presents a danger to the entire world”, he reaped unanimous applause; but to what effect? The Auschwitz commemoration over, has the Parliament slumped back into the political coma regarding Iran that marked the entire period of the Grand Coalition? Where is the law that would temporarily stop the granting of visas to Iranian industrialists wishing to visit German trade fairs? Where is the law forcing all companies engaged in business with Iran to operate with total transparency? Where is the law banning any trade with companies owned by the Revolutionary Guards? Where is the proposal, following the Dutch parliament’s example, for the Revolutionary Guards to be added to the EU’s list of terrorist organizations?
The excerpts in the following three attachments are intended to inspire not only political decision makers, but also all thoughtful people to conduct further research and action. One swallow does not make a spring but it does herald change. Let us hope that the “Who is Who of Trade with Iran” will reinforce the impetus provided by the Siemens AG announcement of its withdrawal from trade with Iran.
Hamburg, February 4, 2010
APPENDIX I: MERCANTILE DIRECTORY
The industry directory in the brochure “Branch Offices, Agencies, and Missions of German Companies in Iran” lists more than 400 items, although the list of companies does not include more than 200 companies. The reason: Many companies work in multiple industries. In addition, the industry directory also lists the Iranian dependencies of German companies. The following list documents the different areas of bilateral economic relationships as well as their quantitative weight in each case.
Vehicle manufacturing, mechanical engineering, machine and plant manufacture: 95 entries.
Equipment for hospitals, surgical wards, medical supply companies: 55 entries.
Electrical engineering, precision engineering, optical equipment and measuring devices: 46 entries.
Chemical industry- and drugs including incl. machinery: 34 entries.
Planning, consulting and services: 34 entries.
Agriculture and foodstuffs: 34 entries.
Transportation, freight forwarding and shipping: 27 entries.
Construction, roadworks and mining machineries: 24 entries.
Textiles and shoe industrie: 15 entries.
Print Shop & Packing: 14 entries.
Trading houses: 13 entries.
Acceptance- and inspection agencies and insurances: 10 entries.
Home appliances: 9 entries.
„Miscellaneous“: 5 entries.
Banks: 3 entries.
APPENDIX II: GERMAN COMPANIES WITH THEIR OWN BRANCHES OR AGENCIES IN IRAN
The majority of companies listed in the Chamber brochure are represented by an Iranian company. These companies or company offices have names such as “Iran Industries Support,” “Tech Control Consultants Co.,” or “Iran Technical Supply Co.” and thus indicate even in their names what the regime is interested in: the acquisition of technological expertise. By contrast, 45 German companies have an independent business office (= branch) or an independent mission (= agency) in Iran. Appendix II lists those 45 German companies and their branches or agencies in Tehran.
The Babcock Borsig Service GmbH is represented by the BABAK – FANAVAR,
the BASF SE by BASF IRAN AG,
the Bayer AG by BAYER PARSIAN AG,
the Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG by a REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE,
the Bergrohr GmbH Siegen by BERGROHR IRAN BRANCH OFFICE,
the Bioprodukte Steinberg GmbH by IRANIAN’S GREEN FUTURE,
the Bosch Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. by the BOSCH LIAISON OFFICE,
the Buehler GmbH by BUEHLER (P.J.S.C.),
the Cemag Anlagenbau GmbH by CEMAG TEHRAN,
the Commerzbank AG by COMMERZBANK REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE,
the Daimler AG by the DAIMLER AG,
the Deutsche Lufthansa AG by the LUFTHANSA GERMAN AIRLINES,
the Deutz AG by the DEUTZ AG,
the Dimex Handelsgesellschaft GmbH by the DIMEX IRAN,
the Elastogran GmbH by the ELASTOGRAN PARS COMPANY (J.V.C.),
the Europäisch-Iranische Handelsbank AG by the EIHBANK,
the E & Z-Industrie-Lösungen GmbH by the TESSAG INA IRAN,
the Festo AG & Co. by the FESTO PNEUMATIC S.K.,
the Fritz Werner Industrieausrüstungen GmbH by the FRITZ WERNER OFFICE TEHRAN,
the Galatea GmbH by the GALATEA GmbH,
the Henkel KGaA by the HENKEL INDUSTRIE AG,
the Herrenknecht AG by the HERRENKNECHT AG-IRAN, and the HERRENKNECHT IRAN (PJS),
the Humboldt Wedag GmbH (KHD) by the HUMBOLDT WEDAG GmbH (KHD),
the Karl Mayer Textilmaschinen AG by the SULTEX (IRAN) LIMITED,
the Lahmeyer International GmbH by the LI REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE,
the Linde Group by THE LINDE GROUP, IRAN BRANCH,
the Man Ferrostaal AG by the MAN FERROSTAAL AG,
the Minimax GmbH & Co. KG by the MINIMAX GmbH & Co. KG,
the Nibana Techno-Trade B.V. by die NIBANA P.J.S. Co./OTIS,
the Osram GmbH by the OSRAM LAMP P.J.S. Co. IRAN,
the Primex Steel Trading GmbH by the PRIMEX STEEL TRADING,
the Project Materials GmbH by PROJECT MATERIALS,
the Rexroth AG Deutschland by the REXROTH AG,
the Rhode & Schwarz GmbH & Co.KG by the ROHDE & SCHWARZ IRAN,
the Schaeffler KG by the SCHAEFFLER KG IRAN,
the SGS Germany GmbH by the SGS (IRAN) LIMITED TEHRAN,
the Siemens AG by the SIEMENS S.S.K.,
the Tetra Pak GmbH & Co. by the TETRA PAK IRAN,
the Thyssenkrupp Mannex GmbH by the THYSSEN REPRESENTATIVE OFFICE TEHRAN,
the TIB Chemicals AG by BASF IRAN AG,
the TÜV Nord GmbH, the TÜV Nord AG, and the TÜV Nord e.V. by TÜV NORD IRAN,
the Voith Turbo GmbH & Co. KG by the VOITH TURBO IRAN CO. LTD.,
the Wirtgen Group (Wirtgen GmbH, Vögele AG, Hamm AG) by WIRTGEN QESHM CO.,
the Wirth Maschinen- und Bohrgeräte-Fabrik GmbH by IRANIAN WIRTH (WPS GROUP LTD.) and the
ZF Friedrichshafen AG by the ZF-IRAN S.S.K.
APPENDIX III: COMPANIES IN THE AUTOMATIVE, MECHANICAL ENGINEERING, AND PLANT CONSTRUCTION FIELD
The catalog of the German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce and Industry also lists companies that are less likely to be considered for sanctions, such as providers of medical devices or businesses in the food industry. In the automotive, mechanical engineering, and plant construction field, however, this looks different. The following includes all German companies that are involved in Iran in this field. The companies that operate in sectors especially relevant to sanctions such as oil and gas production include well-known names such as Fritz Werner, Siemens, Linde, ThyssenKrupp, and MAN Ferrostaal as well as lesser-known businesses such as Bergrohr GmbH, Gestra AG, Prominen Dosiertechnik GmbH, Minimax GmbH & Co. KG, Mannex GmbH, as well as Voith Thurbo GmbH & Co. KG.
The information in this list set in parentheses describes “areas of operations of German companies in Iran” and according to the Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Tehran was “made based on information from the companies.” These areas of operation are generally described in Farsi and additionally in English or German. I have corrected obvious typographical errors silently. I added text set in italics after viewing the companies’ own Web portals.
Be warned against hasty conclusions: A company that describes its area of operations with “manufacturer of centrifuges”, as does Sigma Laborzentrifugen GmbH from Osterode, need not be a supplier for the Iranian nuclear program. It is true that the products that this company uses for attention online include rotors with speeds of up to 18,000 rpm. However, an ultracentrifuge needed for uranium enrichment must reach 100,000 rpm to be relevant to the nuclear program. Indeed, a review of all of the companies listed below should be done to see whether military use of their products can be excluded.
A special category whose relative importance surprised me includes the area of plant construction. Plant construction relates to the planning and building of ready-to-occupy industrial facilities. Thus, Fritz Ferner Industrieausrüstungen provides the ready-to-occupy transfer of entire petrochemical and metallurgical factories. Based on information from the brochure, additional plant construction companies include Cemag GmbH, Dimex GmbH, E & Z Industrielösungen GmbH, Huboldt Wedag GmbH, Linde Gruppe, MAN Ferrostaal, and Nibana Techno-Trade B.V. Each of these companies has its own branch or agency in Tehran.
I have added a few companies listed in the catalog under other industry sections to the catalog’s list for the field of automotive, mechanical engineering, and plant construction. These include Festo AG from Esslingen, which pushes its high-tech products in Farsi (http://www.festo.ir); IKA-Werkefrom Staufen,, which promotes itself as a “market-leading company in laboratory technology and analysis technology as well as in mechanical engineering”; Berlin-based Knauer GmbH, which is specialized in laboratory technology and scientific device construction; as well as Leoni-Kerpen GmbHfrom Stolberg, which recommends itself as a specialist for broadband data transfer on LANs or city networks. In addition, there are Multi Metall, which has a Web portal in Farsi, and NIBANA Techno-Trade, whose products cannot be established in detail online, both of which export primarily to Iran and the UAE. Furthermore, I have added the rail construction company Rodel, cellular technology specialist Rohde & Schwarz, and control and ventilation technology company Samson AG onto the list, as well as laboratory technology company Senso Quest, plasma and laser specialist Sentech Instrument, Siegert Consulting based in the technology hub of Aachen, surface specialist Specs GmbH, machine construction company Tünkers, andWerth Messtechnik GmbH, which is incorrectly presented in the catalog as Werth Messetechnik GmbH (Messtechnik meaning “measurement technology” and Messetechnik meaning “trade show technology”).
AMF – Andreas Maier GmbH & Co. KG, 70734 Fellbach (Manufacturer).
Atotech Deutschland GmbH, 10553 Berlin (Raw Material, Machinery and Know-How for Electroplating).
Babcock Borsig Service GmbH, 46049 Oberhausen (power plant and environmental technology, steam generation technology, – new construction, renovation/modernization; – maintenance, renovation, updates, and repairs; – magnet and nuclear technology and service; – replacement parts).
Bergrohr GmbH, 57076 Siegen (Producer and sale of large diameter steel pipe for pipeline application – gas, oil, water, petrochemical refinery…).
Bosch Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S., Bursa Türkei (Automotive Technologies).
Buehler GmbH, 38023 Braunschweig (… ship loading and unloading equipment …).
Cemag Anlagenbau GmbH, 31789 Hameln, (Turnkey plant, market analysis, feasibility study, planning, engineering, assembly, supervision, plant maintenance, delivery of components/spare parts, plant optimization, refurbishment, modernization for the following industries: Cement industry, dry mortar industry, lime industry, gypsum industry and any raw material, … high-performance kiln technology, grinding Technology and reliable classification Technology and material handlings).
Daimler AG, 70546 Stuttgart (Automotive industry, services).
Dantherm Filtration GmbH, 77948 Friesenheim (… Air Cleaning Systems, Flue Gas Cleaning and Environmental Protection).
Dataphysics Instruments GmbH, 70794 Filderstadt, boundary surface chemistry.
Deutz AG, 51149 Köln (Production and sales of air/oil/water-cooled Dieselengines from 4 to 440 kw).
Dimex Handelsgesellschaft GmbH, 80333 München (planning and supplying small industrial and production equipment as well as accompanying raw materials, oil and gas furnace components, gas pipelines).
Drägerwerk AG, 23452 Lübeck (Medical equipment, industrial safety equipment).
Elastogran GmbH, 49448 Lemförde (manufacturing and distributing ready-to-use polyurethane (PU) systems… distribution of polyurethane basic products, thermoplastic polyurethane granulates [TPU] and elastomers [Cellaslo]).
ENTHONE-OMI (Deutschland) GmbH, 40764 Langenfeld (Producing Electro Plating Chemicals & Additives).
Euroroll GmbH & Co. KG, 59387 Ascheberg-Herbern (Main Products Range: – Wheel Rails & Tracks, – Steel/Plastic Rollers, – Carton Flow Storage, – Pallet Flow Storage, – Gravity Conveyors …).
E & Z-Industrie-Lösungen GmbH, 47051 Duisburg (planning and constructing ready-to-occupy industrial facilities in the area of cellulose, petrochemicals, steel, automotive supply industry, gas/storage/process engineering, consultant in the area of transportation and industrial waste water).
Festo AG & Co, 73734 Esslingen (Industrial automation products, training equipments and seminars).
FHR Anlagenbau GmbH, 01458 Ottendorf-Okrilla (PVD, CVD), vacuum technology and plasma technology.
Fritz Werner Industrieausrüstungen, 65366 Geisenheim (Design, planning, financing and turnkey delivery of major industrial projects: – Petrochemical plants, – Metallurgical plants, – Aluminium plants, – Mechanical manufacturing plants, – Foundry plants, – Vocational training, – Training centres).
GEA WestfaliaSurge Deutschland GmbH, 59199 Bönen (... milking equipments in industrial milk farms)
GESIPA Blindniettechnik GmbH, 64546 Mörfelden Walldorf (manufacturing rivets, blind rivets, and rivet tools).
Gestra AG, 28215 Bremen (Manufacturer of Steam Traps, Check Valves, Tank Car and Tank Containers, Valves, Electonics for Boilers …, Continuous and Intermittent Blow Down Valves, Oil and Turbidity Monitoring and Special Equipment and Vessels for Heat Recovery).
Getriebebau Nord GmbH & Co. KG, 22941 Bargteheide (Manufacturer of Gear Units, Geared Motors, Electro Motors, Frequency Inverter, etc.).
GFL Gesellschaft für Labortechnik mbH, 30938 Burgwedel (Manufactorer of laboratory equipment such as Water Baths, Shaking Water Bath, Water Stills, Shakers, Incubators and Deep Freezers).
HOMA Pumpenfabrik GmbH, 53819 Neunkirchen-Seelscheid (Submersible pumps for handling of water, waste water, drainage sewage and multistage borehole pumps).
Humboldt Wedag GmbH (KHD), 51067 Köln (developing, manufacturing, and distributing industrial equipment and machines of all types as well as providing other related technical and commercial services …).
IKA-Werke GmbH & Co. KG (Yellowline), 79219 Staufen (Manufacturer of all kinds of lap equipment, Hot plates, Hot plates Magnet, Mechanical Stirrer, Erley shaker and tube shaker, Homogenizer and lab grinder).
Kardex GmbH, 76756 Bellheim (… automated storage, retrieval and materials handling solutions…).
Keller Lufttechnik GmbH & Co. KG, 73230 Kirchheim unter Teck (… reduction of emissions in industrial applications).
Knauer ASI GmbH, 14163 Berlin (Manufactorer of all type of Liquid Chromatorgraphy systems (HPLC) & Osmometers).
Kraussmaffei Technologies GmbH, 80997 München (Plastic machinery technologies).
KSB AG, 91267 Frankenthal (Pumps and valves).
Lahmeyer International GmbH, 61118 Bad Vilbel (engineering consulting for planning, international bids and contracts, construction oversight and management, financing and operation of power plants [water, thermal, wind, and solar], energy transfer, traffic equipment, water supply and removal, environment, control and communications systems, industrial buildings).
LENZE AG, 31855 Aerzen (Industrial automation electronics & electromechanic. Sole agent for sale, distribution, service, maintenance and repair-project, consultation, installation & commissioning). Mit eigenem Farsi-Portal unter www.lenze.ir.
Leoni-Kerpen GmbH, 52224 Stolberg (Manufacturer of Industrial Cables such as Low Voltage, Instrument and Control, Fiber Optic and Field Bus Cables).
Linde Group, 82049 Pullach (Licence, design, engineering and construction of plants in the sectors of ethylene and polyolefin, synthesis gas, hydrogen, pressure swing adsorption, gas separation, natural gas, LNG, air separation, fired heaters, reformers, cold boxes, vacuum insulated cryogenic storage tanks, aluminium plate fine heat exchangers. Supply of industrial gases, argon, helium, gas mixtures and calibration gases).
Linde Material Handling GmbH, 63743 Aschaffenburg (Material handling solutions in field of forklifts, towtrucks, pallet trucks, order pickers, reach trucks, reachstackers, containerhandler, telehandler and overhead cranes).
Maiko Engineering GmbH, 38112 Braunschweig (Tool making, can seaming technology and special purpose machines).
MAN Ferrostaal AG, 45128 Essen (Design, planning, financing und turnkey delivery of major industrial-, infrastructure- and shipbuilding projects: – Petrochemical plants, – Metallurgical plants, – Building materials plants, – Material handling plants, – Power plants, Renewable Energies, – Facilities for the gas and crude oil industry, – Road and track-based passenger and freight transport systems; Supply of merchant vessels and port/shipyard equipment). Construction of a compressor facility to convert natural gas into export gas that is supplied by Korpedje (Turkmenistan) to Iran.
Megaforce GmbH, 47809 Krefeld (Import: stainless steel: sheets, coils, pipe flanges & fittings …). Das Portal in Farsi bietet zudem GPS Navigationssysteme sowie Tracking- und Telematicsysteme an.
MEP-Olbo GmbH, 36043 Fulda (Manufacture of Tire Cord & Liner Fabric).
Mina, Inh. Salaheddin Mohammadi (sole proprietorship), 04249 Leipzig (power, cold & environmental technology).
Minimax GmbH & Co. KG, 23840 Bad Oldesloe (development, supply, assembly, startup, and maintenance of fire protection equipment and components as well as related consulting and services, in particular in the following areas: – gas and oil transportation, – manufacturing, – processing, – storage, – transportation; petrochemical equipment, – manufacturing, – processing, – storage, transportation; power generation & distribution (power plants, substations); – Equipment in the processing industry (especially pharmaceuticals, automotive, textiles, and paper); – infrastructure (e.g. metro equipment, airports, especially hangars).
MultiMetall Reiner Schulze e.K. („eingetragener Kaufmann“), 41720 Viersen (Producer of advanced PolymerMetals and metallic repairing mortars for maintence of metals and alloys.) Mit Internetportal auf Farsi.
Nibana Techno-Trade B.V. (B.V. is a company type in the Netherlands comparable to the German GmbH or American LLC), 53757 Sankt Augustin (industrial high technology, turnkey projects), with branches exclusively in Iran and the UAE.
Particle Metrix GmbH, 40668 Meerbusch (Zeta Potential), nanoparticle analytics.
Primex Steel Trading GmbH, 40212 Düsseldorf (steel products), industrial use; previously: Primary Industries Trading GmbH.
Project Materials GmbH, 40549 Düsseldorf (Sale of pipes, seamless and welded (ERW, HFI, DSAW) to ASTM, DIM, EN. Heat exchanger tubes, Buttweld Fittings, Elbows reducers, tees, caps, orifices, bolts, gaskets, valves. Structural projects: Tubulars, Cans, Cones, Piles, Pile Sleeves, Plates, Sheets, Sections, Beams and profiled components).
PROMINENT DOSIERTECHNIK GmbH, 69123 Heidelberg (Chemical Fluid Handling and Water Solutions), also produces process and security technology for the oil and gas industry..
QUALITY CARGO INTERNATIONAL GmbH, 70794 Filderstadt (Int. transportation).
REXROTH AG Deutschland, 60325 Frankfurt/M. (consulting, industrial use, trade), styles itself as “consulting partner for the Iranian market”; no connection with former economics minister Günter Rexrodt.
RITZ-ATRO GmbH, 90471 Nürnberg (Archimedian Screw Pumps, Hydrodynamics Screws, Booster Stations).
ROBEL Bahnbaumaschinen GmbH, 83395 Freilassing (rail engineering, rail power cars).
ROHDE & SCHWARZ GmbH & Co. KG, 81614 München (HF, VHF, UHF radio systems, radio location, direction finding, radio and TV technology, electronic measurement devices and systems (HF, VHF, UHF), trunked radio system, ATC radio system, training and calibration institute (HF-VHF-UHF).
RUTHMANN GmbH & Co. KG, 48712 Gescher (Manufacturer of industrial & firefighting hydraulic aerial work platforms, truck mounted & mobile cranes, airport equipments & machineries, agricultural transport vehicles & work trucks).
SAARSTAHL-EXPORT GmbH, 40213 Düsseldorf (steel and steel manufacturing products, nonferrous metals, technical products).
SAMSON AG, 60314 Frankfurt/M. (Manufacturer of Control Valves, On-Off Valves, Self Operated Regulators, Control Valves Accessories such as Positioners, Limit Switches, Solenoid Valves and Air Filter Regulators, Transmitters and Controllers).
Schaeffler KG, 97419 Schweinfurt (ball bearings & roller bearings of all design types and precision classes from 1 mm drill diameter to 15 m exterior diameter, special bearings, bearing units, bearing housings, assembly devices, FAG roller grease, Arcanol).
SensoQuest GmbH, 37085 Göttingen (Manufacturer of Laboratory Equipment Thermocycler PCR).
SENTECH Instrument GmbH, 12489 Berlin (Ellipsometry), SENTECH’s ellipsometers, reflectometers, plasma etchers and plasma deposition systems are designed for use in research, development and production.
Siegert Consulting e.k. am Technologiezentrum Aachen, 52068 Aachen (Production of water for thin film diposition), they mean wafer and not water; Silicon-, Glass-, SOI- and Sapphire- Wafer Specialist.
Siemens AG, 80333 München (- Construction, Operation & Maintenance of Stream, Gas & Combined cycle power plants, – Supply of Equipment and Providing Solutions for Oil & Gas Industry, – Power Transmission & Distribution, – Industrial Automation, – Drive Technologies, – Industrial Solutions, – Building Technologies, – Mobility).
Sigma Laborzentrifugen GmbH, 37520 Osterode (Manufacturer of Centrifuges).
SPECS GmbH, 13355 Berlin (UHV Surface analyses equipment), electron spectroscopy, nano and quartz sensor, ion, and X-ray technology.
STERLING Sihi GmbH, 25524 Itzehoe (Chemical and process pumps, side channel pumps, liqued ring vacuum pumps and compressors, engineered packages).
SUNSET-SOLAR Energietechnik GmbH, 91325 Adelsdorf (importing and exporting solar desalination equipment with service, importation of measurement and control units for electric equipment service).
SWF Krantechnik GmbH, 68307 Mannheim (Material handling solutions in field of forklifts, towtrucks, pallet trucks, order pickers, reach trucks, reachstackers, containerhandler, telehandler and overhead cranes).
Thyssenkrupp Mannex GmbH, 40235 Düsseldorf (Marketing of steel products for Head Office), pipes, tubes, structural elements for offshore applications.
TKA Wasseraufbereitungssysteme GmbH, 56412 Niederelbert (Manufacturer of Water Purification System).
TÜNKERS MASCHINENBAU GmbH, 40880 Ratingen (automation engineering, pile driving and extraction technology, electric cars, paper technology).
U.I. Lapp GmbH, 70565 Stuttgart (Manufacturer of special control & highly flexible cables up to 1 KV).
Unigrind GmbH & Co., 52224 Stolberg (Manufacturer of portable valve lapping grinding and testbench machine).
VOITH Turbo GmbH & Co. KG, 89510 Heidenheim (Power transmission & control, – transmission for commercial vehicles, retarders, marine, trains axle drives, starts up turbo couplings, converters, geared variable speed couplings, gearboxes, high pressure hydraulic pumps, universal jount shafts, safe set turbo machinery control & actuators in oil gas, energy and industry).
WERTH MESSETECHNIK GmbH, 35394 Gießen (Manufacturer of highly presise multi sensor coordinate measuring machines).
WILO Pumpen Intelligenz SE, 44263 Dortmund (Pump Manufacture).
WIRTGEN GmbH, 53578 Windhagen (cold milling, heat recycling machines, cold recycling machines, surface miners, slipform pavers).
ZF Friedrichshafen AG, 88038 Friedrichshafen (circuit and automation drives for trucks, buses, heavy gear boxes, additional gear boxes, valves, side drives, hydraulic pumps, work cylinders, axles and self-locking differentials for trucks, loaders, haulers, construction machines, cranes, axle distribution drives, and wheel drives, mixers, ship drives, mechanical and hydraulic controls for cars, trucks, and buses, couplings, brakes and drives for tool machines, elevator drives, replacement part and customer service).
—————————————
[1] Rainer Hermann, ‚Privilegien und Pfründe für die Pasdaran’ (privileges and benefits for the Pasdaran), Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 26, 2009.
[2] Norbert Hahn, Jan Schmitt, ‘High-Tech für Ahmadinejad: Überwachung made in Germany’ (High-Tech for Ahmadinejad: Monitoring systems made in Germany), Monitor TV, July 2, 2009.
[3] ‘Sanktionen gegen Iran könnten 10.000 deutsche Arbeitsplätze kosten’ (Sanctions against Iran could cost the loss of 10.000 German jobs), Süddeutsche Zeitung, September 1, 2006; VDMA: ‘Iran hat strategische Bedeutung für den deutschen Maschinenbau’ (Iran is of strategic importance of German production of heavy machinery), compare www.openautomation.de/1185-0-vdma-iran-hat-strategische-bedeutung-fuer-den-deutschen-maschinenbau.html
[4] ‘Siemens zieht sich zurück’, Manager Magazin, January 27, 2010.
[5] ‘BGA erwartet 2010 Umsatzplus beim Grosshandel und Export,’ compare: http://finanznachrichten.de/nachrichten-2010/15873936-update-bga-erwartet-2010-umsatzplus-beim-grosshandel-und-export-015.htm
[6] ‘Mitschrift der Pressestatements von Bundeskanzlerin Angela Merkel und dem israelischen Präsidenten Shimon Peres 25. 01. 2010’, www.bundesregierung.de . “I consider the idea of a ‘coalition of the willing’ wholly inappropriate”, the Grand Coalition’s Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier declared in June 2006. See his interview in Der Spiegel 25/2006, 19. June 2006.
[7] Klaus-Dieter Frankenberger, ‘Lackmustest’, FAZ, 28. January 2010.
[8] ‘U.S. Senate Approves Stronger Penalties Against Iran’, New York Times, January 29, 2010
[9] Rüdiger Köhn und Rainer Hermann, ‘Siemens schließt keine neuen Geschäfte mehr mit Iran ab’, FAZ, January 27, 2010
[10] Compare: Matthias Küntzel, Die Deutschen und der Iran, Berlin 2009, p. 39.
[11] Michael Shields and Rene Wagner, ‘German firms in no rush to follow Siemens Iran Exit’, compare www.reuters.com
[12] Compare the webpage of the German-Iranian Chamber of Commerce in Tehran: http://www.iran.ahk.de/index.php?id=50&L=2http%3Ap&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=1335&tx_ttnews[backPid]=46&cHash=3eca48e342
[13] Martin Böll, ‘Wirtschaftstrends Vereinigte Arabische Emirate Jahresmitte 2009’, publication of the Germany Trade & Invest association, which reports to the Economics Minister. See: http://www.gtai.de. The UAE is about 5 percent of the size of Iran and, with under five million inhabitants, the size of its population is about 7% of that of Iran.
[14] ‘AHK UAE, Protocol, Iran Working Group meeting 1st session of the Deutsch-Emiratische Industrie- und Handelskammer’, November 18, 2009, p. 3. The explosiveness of the topic was clear to the participants in the session chaired by Dr. Peter Goepfrich, managing director of the Chamber of Foreign Trade. Thus one comment on the lobby project regarding the “booming market of Iran” was: “Yet, this needs to be done very tactfully due to the sensitivity of the subject.”
[15] ‘Iran seeks top petrochemical spot in ME’, PressTV, June 16, 2008, www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx
[16] www.ahk.iran.de, [January 31, 2010]
[17] Compare footnote 7.
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