It was not the Israeli government's intention to leak intelligence that Syria had transferred the missiles, which can hit every city in Israel with a one-ton payload. The Israeli defense establishment was particularly keen to keep the matter quiet to protect its sources and methods. But in the way these things often happen in Israel, President Shimon Peres decided for reasons of his own that the issue belonged in the public domain. There it is now, raising a number of interesting questions. The first question is: Is it true? The Israelis say it is, the Syrians hotly deny it, Hezbollah remains coyly noncommittal, and the U.S. says it cannot confirm the report. But it is highly unlikely that Mr. Peres would have made the allegation without solid evidence to support it. Particularly given Mr. Peres's cautious style, not to mention the parlous state of U.S.-Israel relations, the last thing Israel needs is to be seen trafficking in bogus or alarmist claims. Next comes the question: Why would Syria risk war with Israel by transferring the sorts of weapons it doubtlessly knows could provoke a sharp Israeli reprisal? It is no secret that since Israel's summer 2006 war with Hezbollah, Syria has helped to rearm its Lebanese ally with as many as 50,000 rockets and missiles, many of them hidden—at the unwitting recommendation of last year's Goldstone Report—in homes, hospitals and schools. But the transfer of Scuds, which can be tipped with chemical or biological weapons, poses a threat to Israel of a different order of magnitude. The prosaic answer is that Syrian President Bashar Assad has a reckless streak. He was reckless in allowing Syria to become a way station for Iraq-bound jihadists, reckless in (almost certainly) ordering the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, reckless in attempting to build a covert nuclear facility, and reckless in pursuing a no-wriggle-room alliance with Hezbollah and Iran. Then again, Mr. Assad has never had to pay the ultimate political price for those gambles. Now the Syrian may reckon that he can find a way to restore Damascus's suzerainty over Beirut by goading Israel into a fresh round of fighting with Hezbollah. Another destructive war over Lebanon might just be sufficient to topple Beirut's fragile pro-Western governing coalition, enhance Hezbollah's prestige, and perhaps give Damascus the cover it needs to re-enter Lebanon militarily by posing, as it so often has in the past, as a force for "stability." Which raises the third question: Will Israel be goaded into such a conflict? There is, I am very reliably told, "no appetite" in Israel for another war in Lebanon—"none whatsoever." The prospect of a war offers Israel the unenviable choice of a militarily decisive blow against Hezbollah that would likely also be a diplomatic debacle, or else a diplomatically acceptable surgical option that would offer little by way of long-term military advantage. But Israel also runs serious risks to its deterrence if it allows relatively smaller provocations to go unanswered. What happens, for instance, if Hezbollah blows up an Israeli diplomatic or cultural facility—as it twice did in Buenos Aires in the 1990s and nearly did last year in Azerbaijan? In that event, Israel would be as hard-pressed to resist retaliating as it would be to limit the consequences of its retaliation. One of the more easily imaginable consequences is that a war in Lebanon could very quickly involve Syrian and Iranian participation. So the next question is: How might that play out? Here Israel could conceivably reap certain advantages, which in turn calls into question whether Israel might not want a wider war over Lebanon after all. Today, Jerusalem's two supreme strategic objectives—preventing Tehran's nuclear bids from reaching fruition while also preventing any further deterioration in the relationship with Washington—are very far from being in synch. But in a scenario in which Israeli cities are hit by Hezbollah's Scuds, Israel would have ample justification and cover to strike back at the ultimate source of those missiles—not just Damascus, but Tehran. As Rahm Emanuel likes to say, a crisis can be a terrible thing to waste. And that raises a final question: What does the Obama administration do? So far, it hasn't helped matters by giving the impression of a clear wedge between Israel and the U.S. Nor has the administration's assiduous courtship of Damascus done anything other than embolden Mr. Assad's taste for adventure. Is the president capable of learning from his Mideast failures so far? That one's worth $64,000. In 1967, a series of seemingly minor events, tactical misjudgments, and particularly an Arab perception that the West would not honor its international commitments or come to Israel's defense triggered a war the consequences of which have defined the Middle East ever since. We are adrift in those same waters today.
Thursday, 22 April 2010
Plotting the Next Mideast War
Syria's alleged transfer of Scuds to Hezbollah could spark an uncontrollable chain reaction
Bret Stephens - The Wall Street Journal, April 20th, 2010
In the matter of Syria's alleged shipments of Scud missiles to Hezbollah, it bears noting how often the fate of the Middle East has turned on seemingly trivial or nearly imperceptible events. There's a simple explanation for this: That which cannot be seen or understood at first can rarely be contained in time.
U.S. defends Syria envoy plan despite reports of Scud transfer
April 21, 2010 By Natasha Mozgavaya, Haaretz
Correspondent http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1164436.html
Although the Obama administration has spoken out against Syria's alleged transfer of Scud missiles to the Lebanon-based Hezbollah militant group, it is unlikely to derail the instatement of an ambassador to Damascus.
U.S. Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs Jeffrey Feltman told a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs panel that the United States would regard any Syrian transfer of Scud missiles to Hezbollah very seriously and would keep "all options on the table" to pressure Damascus to reverse course."
"All options are going to be on the table looking at this," Feltman told a House of Representatives Foreign Affairs panel, while declining to say whether the United States had confirmed that any such transfers had taken place.
However, Feltman defended the administration's firm resolution to pursue with the reinstatement of the US Ambassador to Damascus, pending Senate confirmation.
"We want to show them it's not in their interest to facilitate giving weapons to Hezballah" said Feltman. "If these reports are true I?d argue that Syria made a mistake. Syria has made mistakes in the past. We need to have an access to the leadership in Syria in order to voice our concerns. We need to deliver our message to him [Assad] loud, clear and directly. We would like the ambassador to be conformed and placed now. I disagree that sending an ambassador is a reward."
"Israelis did not raise any objections to this, I don?t think it?s a serious issue for them," he said.
Meanwhile, State Department spokesman Philip J.Crowley said Wednesday that the U.S. administration has been reviewing reports of the alleged transfer and "continues to study the matter," "We've had multiple conversations with Syria this week. I'm not aware of any particular contacts with Lebanon," he added.
Feltman's defense of instating an ambassador raised criticism from other participants in the hearing of Congress subcommittee on the Middle East.
Congressman Eliot Engel asked why the U.S. would need an ambassador when Feltman had managed to have a direct phone conversation with Syrian foreign minister just hours before the hearing.
"If you had a phone call with foreign minister, why do we need an ambassador to communicate with them?"
"We have other channels to Syrians," replied Feltman. "But these issues are so important to us that we can't rely only on the third party and whatever their ambassador in Washington is telling them."
"They need to hear directly from us what the consequences of their actions are. Syria is not Iran. We do not accept that their alliance is a permanent fixture in the Middle East. There is obviously different calculus at play.
"We want to see a comprehensive peace in the region and it will have to include Syria. But Syrians actions fall short of its words. The Syrian government associates itself with one of the most dangerous and destabilizing players in region, Hezballah. It facilitates many of Iran?s aggressive policies. The question is how we deal with it. The engagement with Syria doesn?t come at the expense of our friends in region."
Engel responded: "You said it doesn?t come at the expense of our friends in region, Iraq and Lebanon. Does it include Israel? Because sometimes I wonder if this administration defines Israel as friend."
"Yes, absolutely and unequivocally," said Feltman.
Engel, who announced his intention on Wednesday to introduce a resolution calling for additional pressure on Damascus responded: "Do we actually have a policy towards Syria?"
Senator. Dianne Feinstein (D-Ca.), chair of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said Wednesday that she believed there to be a "high likelihood" the missiles were sent to Hezbollah in Lebanon.
"I believe there is a likelihood that there are Scuds that Hezbollah has in Lebanon. A high likelihood. The rockets and missiles in Lebanon are substantially increased and better technologically than they were and this is a real point of danger for Israel," she told the AFP.
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