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http://noto55.com/

No to 55%

Yes to accountable government.

Introducing an ‘enhanced majority’ for confidence votes in* dissolution of the Commons may be politically expedient, but it’s not democratic.

Conservatives make up 47% of our MPs. This change in the law would make it impossible for Parliament to hold the government to account through a confidence vote.

'No confidence threshold to rise' - BBC News

*Confused? Click here

Our demands are simple:

1. We believe that our government should remain accountable to Parliament.

2. If a majority votes against the government on a confidence vote, 

we should hold an election.

3. That's it.

Agree? Spread the word!

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Posted byAfua Hirsch Thursday 13 May 2010 18.08 BSTguardian.co.uk

55% to dissolve parliament - are new numbers unconstitutional?

There is nothing in the constitution to stop new rules like 55% from being introduced. But the "No to 55" campaign raises serious questions about parliamentary sovereignty

Have we just witnessed dangerous tinkering with the UK's constitution? It's not often this allegation is made, and ever since I first heard about the 55% rule in the Lib Dem – Conservative coalition agreement from my colleague Alan Travis, I have been listening closely to reactions.

The loudest reaction is a general sense of outrage. This is mainly a result of the view that requiring 55% of Commons' votes to dissolve parliament is contrived and undemocratic. A simple majority system makes sense where power is won by first-past-the-post voting. This new figure is not part of any legacy in our democracy, but instead reflects the fact that, were the Lib Dems to join forces with other opposition parties in an attempt to force a general election before 2015, they could only muster 53% of the vote.

The introduction of 55% protects the Queen from being dragged into a dissolution scenario in the event of a collapse in the coalition – which may be constitutionally important but doesn't provoke an overwhelming emotional response in this anti-55% camp. And there is deep disquiet about the ability of a transient coalition to introduce such a novel concept through a simple commons motion and Act of Parliament.

This view is everywhere. A "noto55" campaign is steadily mustering momentum on Twitter. Jack Straw's performance on BBC4's Today program stoked the fires calling it a "fundamental alteration to our constitution", as you'd expect a Labour lawyer would. Carl Gardner,writing on his Head of Legal blog, describes it as "constitutional whimmery" which – if you're unfamiliar with the term – is not supposed to be complimentary.

On the other hand, I have spent much of the day talking to constitutional lawyers, like Vernon Bogdanor and Jeffrey Jowell. Their views were the complete opposite of the noto55 brigade. Which is not to say that they thought 55% was a good idea. Instead they said that changing the current rule is no different from changing anything else. The overriding legal principle is parliamentary sovereignty, which means parliament can do what it likes.

Parliamentary sovereignty though, is the real issue here. I'm often surprised that there is not more disquiet about the fact that parliament really can do what it likes. Usually the constraints on an all-powerful parliament are political, not legal, and rest on the fact that there are things no parliament could realistically do if it hoped to get re-elected one day. But we are in new coalition territory here. Who knows what future alignments might try to introduce to cling onto more fractious power?

And Richard Gordon QC – the only constitutional lawyer I spoke to today who shared sentiments of hostility to the proposals – pointed out that parliamentary sovereignty is essentially incompatible with the introduction of a written constitution.

Such a constitution, he points out, would necessarily entrench principles and protection regarded as permanent, like human rights and – if they were included – fixed-term parliaments. In the event of a written constitution these principles could not simply be amended by a simple majority in the Commons, something he describes as "the exercise of parliamentary sovereignty by a dominant executive".

The idea of a written constitution is something long-favoured by the Liberal Democrats; presumably in part to prevent rules like this being introduced on a whim.

As for whether the calls for a written constitution will survive the party's newfound political buddies, that remains to be seen. And in the meantime, the party will benefit from a fixed-term parliament with a 55% that is unconstitutional, or not – depending on who you ask.

The 55% rule? 

It shouldn't scare voters

Denounced as a fix, this constitutional tinkering serves as a stabiliser for the coalition; it wouldn't stop a no-confidence vote

• 
• • Alan Travis
  • guardian.co.uk, Thursday 13 May 2010 13.30 BST
  • Article history

Jack Straw has already shouted "fix" and a Scottish legal expert has warned that it is a "dangerous" and "fundamental alteration to our constitution".

But it is worth asking if the controversial 55% rule set out in the Lib-Con coalition agreement needed to force an early general election really is a conspiracy against the opposition parties or a legitimate stabiliser for an infant coalition taking its first steps.

The first thing to clear up is that there does not appear to be any change in the rules surrounding a vote of no confidence. A government could still fall on a simple majority of MPs. The text of the coalition agreement appears clear. It only refers to providing a vote for the dissolution of parliament, that is, the calling of a general election. The "political reform" section of the agreement says:

"The parties agree to the establishment of five-year fixed-term parliaments. A Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government will put a binding motion before the House of Commons in the first days following this agreement stating that the next general election will be held on the first Thursday of May 2015. Following this motion, legislation will be brought forward to make provision for fixed-term parliaments of five years. This legislation will also provide for dissolution if 55% or more of the house votes in favour."

This is a fundamental change in British constitutional tradition. But it is not necessarily one to frighten the voters. The unwritten convention has been since 1782 that a significant defeat on a major issue can lead to a vote of no confidence in the government. If the prime minister loses that vote he is then obliged to resign, or call a general election. This happened twice in the last century – the last time when the Scots Nats brought down Jim Callaghan's Labour government in 1979.

So why is the 55% rule needed? With a fixed-term parliament the power of the prime minister to call an early election – a massive advantage for the incumbent – is abolished. In other coalition countries, the head of state is given the power to call a general election in these circumstances. But there is no appetite to drag the Queen into these matters and so the Lib Dems have proposed that the Commons should have the power to vote to dissolve itself.

So far so good. But why a 55% threshold? Why not a simple majority of 51%, which natural justice would appear to demand? Well, the given explanation is that it provides a safeguard for the Lib Dems and the Tories that neither partner can collapse the coalition and force an immediate general election. The Tories have 47% of the Commons votes and so the Lib Dems combined with the opposition parties would only be able to muster 53% of the vote – 2% short of 55% with some headroom to allow for byelection attrition over time.

This has the advantage for the opposition parties that they, with the support of rebel Lib Dems, could inflict a no-confidence defeat on the coalition without pressing the nuclear button of forcing an immediate general election. Defeat on the no-confidence vote would lead to Cameron trying to form a new coalition, perhaps with the DUP or other minority parties, or trying to carry on as a minority administration.

The 55% figure may seem arbitrary, but if we are going to have fixed-term parliaments then some mechanism to allow for an early election needs to be in place.

There are other ways of doing this. In Scotland, dissolution of parliament requires a two-thirds majority – significantly higher than 55% proposed for Westminster, and that threshold was set by Labour-Liberal coalition. If it is a conspiracy or fix against the opposition in London, it is even more so at Holyrood.