Westphalian sovereignty is the concept of nation-state sovereignty based on two principles: territoriality and the exclusion of external actors from domestic authority structures. Scholars of international relations have identified the modern, western originated, international system of states, multinational corporations, and organizations, as having begun at thePeace of Westphalia in 1648.[1] Both the basis and the result of this view have been attacked by some revisionist academics and politicians, with revisionists questioning the significance of the Peace, and some commentators and politicians attacking the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states. Adherents to the concept of a Westphalian system trace it back to the Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648, in which, according to the conventional account, the major European powers came together and agreed to abide by the principle of territorial integrity. In the Westphalian system, the interests and goals of states (and later nation-states) were widely assumed to transcend those of any individual citizen or even any ruler. States, in effect, became the primary institutionalized actors in an interstate system of relations. The Peace of Westphalia is said to have ended attempts at the imposition of any supranational authority on European states. The "Westphalian" doctrine of states as independent actors was bolstered by the rise in 19th century thought of nationalism, under which legitimate states were assumed to correspond to nations—groups of people united by language and culture.Benedict Anderson refers to these putative nations as "imagined communities." The Westphalian system reached its apogee in the late 19th century. Although practical considerations still led powerful states to seek to influence the affairs of others, forcible intervention by one country in the domestic affairs of another was less frequent in the period between 1850 and 1900 than in most previous and subsequent periods (Leurdijk 1986). The Peace of Westphalia is crucially important to modern international relations theory, with the Peace often being defined as the beginning of the international system with which the discipline deals.[2][3][4] International relations theorists have identified the Peace of Westphalia as having several key principles, which explain the Peace's significance and its impact on the world today: These principles are common to the way the "realist" international relations paradigm views the international system today, which explains why the system of states is referred to as "The Westphalian System". Both the idea of Westphalian sovereignty and its applicability in practice have been questioned from the mid-20th century onwards from a variety of viewpoints. Much of the debate has turned on the ideas of internationalism and globalization which, in various interpretations, appear to conflict with Westphalian sovereignty. A notable defense of Westphalian sovereignty is to be found in John Rawls' 1999 book, A Law of Peoples. The Westphalian System is used as shorthand by academics to describe the system of states which make up the world today.[5] In 1998, at a Symposium on the Continuing Political Relevance of the Peace of Westphalia, then-NATO Secretary General Javier Solana said that "humanity and democracy [were] two principles essentially irrelevant to the original Westphalian order" and levied a criticism that "the Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; exclusion, not integration."[6] In 2000, Germany's then Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer referred to the Peace of Westphalia in his Humboldt Speech, which argued that the system of European politics set up by Westphalia was obsolete: "The core of the concept of Europe after 1945 was and still is a rejection of the European balance-of-power principle and the hegemonic ambitions of individual states that had emerged following the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, a rejection which took the form of closer meshing of vital interests and the transfer of nation-state sovereign rights to supranational European institutions."[7] In the aftermath of the 11 March 2004 Madrid attacks, Lewis ‘Atiyyatullah, who claims to represent the terrorist network al-Qaeda, declared that "the international system built-up by the West since the Treaty of Westphalia will collapse; and a new international system will rise under the leadership of a mighty Islamic state".[8] It has also been claimed that globalization is bringing an evolution of the international system past the sovereign Westphalian state.[9] However, some others speak favorably of the Westphalian state, notably European nationalists and American paleoconservative Pat Buchanan.[10][11] Supporters of the Westphalian state oppose socialism and some forms of capitalism for undermining the nation state. A major theme of Buchanan's political career, for example, has been attacking globalization,critical theory, neoconservatism, and other philosophies he considers detrimental to today's Western nations. The above interpretation of the Peace of Westphalia is not without its critics. Revisionist historians and international relations theorists argue against these points : 1. Neither of the treaties mention sovereignty. Since the three chief participants (France, Sweden and Holy Roman Empire) were all already sovereign, their representatives saw no need to clarify this situation. In any case, the princes of Germany remained subordinate to the Holy Roman Emperor per the constitution. 2. While each German principality had its own legal system, the final Courts of Appeal applied to the whole of the Holy Roman Empire — the final appellate was the Emperor himself, and his decisions in cases brought to him were final and binding on all subordinates. The Emperor could, and did, depose princes when they were found by the courts to be at fault. 3. Both treaties specifically state that should the treaty be broken, France and Sweden held the right to intervene in the internal affairs of the Empire. Rather than cementing sovereignty, revisionists hold that the treaty served to maintain the status quo ante. As such, the treaty cemented the theory of Landeshoheit, in which state-like actors have a certain (usually high) degree of autonomy, but are not sovereign since they are subject to the laws, judiciary, and constitution of a higher body. During the 1980s and early 1990s, the emerging literature on globalization focused primarily on the apparent erosion of interdependence sovereignty and Westphalian sovereignty. Much of this literature was primarily concerned to criticize realist models of international politics in which the Westphalian notion of the state as a unitary actor are taken as axiomatic (Camilleri and Falk 1992). The European Union concept of shared sovereignty is also somewhat contrary to historical views of Westphalian sovereignty.[citation needed] In a 2008 article Phil Williams [1] links the rise of terrorism and other violent non-state actors (VNSA's), which pose a threat to the Westphalian sovereignty of the state, toglobalization. Since the late 1990s, the idea of Westphalian sovereignty has been brought into further question by a range of actual and proposed military interventions in the former Yugoslavia,Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan among others. The partial list includes interventions in Cambodia by Vietnam (Cambodian–Vietnamese War), Bangladesh (then a part of Pakistan) by India (Indo-Pakistani War of 1971), Kosovo by NATO (1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia), Iraq by U.S. (2003 invasion of Iraq) and Georgia by Russia (2008 South Ossetia war). These interventions had a questionable or weak basis in international law, but were defended on the basis that they constituted humanitarian intervention, aimed at preventing genocide, large-scale loss of life, ethnic cleansing or the use of weapons of mass destruction. Neoconservatism in particular has developed this line of thinking further, to assert that a lack of democracy may foreshadow future humanitarian crises, or that democracy constitutes a human right on its own.[citation needed] However, proponents of neoconservatism have been accused of being concerned about democracy, human rights and humanitarian crises, only in countries where American global dominance is challenged, such as the now defunct Yugoslavia, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, Russia, China, Belarus, North Korea, Sudan, Venezuela, etc., while largely ignoring the same issues in other countries more in line with their interests, such as Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Jordania, Egypt, Georgia, and Colombia. There is, however, debate about whether recent infringements of state sovereignty, such as 1999 NATO bombing of Yugoslavia and subsequent de facto partition of Kosovo and the 2003Iraq War, really reflected these higher principles, or whether the real justification was simply that of self-defense or the promotion of political and economic interests, which is more consistent with the traditional rivalry within Westphalian system. A new notion of contingent sovereignty seems to be emerging in international law, but it has not yet reached the point of legal legitimacy. A further criticism of Westphalian sovereignty arises in relation to allegedly failed states, of which Afghanistan (before the 2001 US-led invasion) is often considered an example. In this case, it is argued that no sovereignty exists and that international intervention is justified on humanitarian grounds and by the threats posed by failed states to neighboring countries and the world as a whole. Some of the recent debate over Somalia is also being cast in these same terms.Westphalian sovereignty
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Contents
[hide][edit]Traditional view
[edit]Modern views on the 'Westphalian Systems'
[edit]Other views
[edit]Globalization and Westphalian sovereignty
[edit]Military intervention
[edit]Humanitarian intervention
[edit]Failed states
[edit]See also
[edit]Further Reading
[edit]References
[edit]External links
Treaty of Westphalia | |
---|---|
Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster | |
Type of treaty | Peace treaty |
Drafted | 1646-1648 |
Signed Location | 15 May 1648 (Osnabrück); 24 October 1648 (Münster) Osnabrück and Münster, Westphalia, modern-day Germany |
Parties | 109 |
Languages | French |
The term Peace of Westphalia denotes the two peace treaties of Osnabrück(15 May 1648) and Münster (24 October 1648) that ended the Thirty Years' War(1618–1648) in the Holy Roman Empire, and the Eighty Years' War (1568–1648) between Spain and the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands.
The Peace of Westphalia treaties involved the Holy Roman Emperor, Ferdinand III (Habsburg), the Kingdoms of Spain, France, Sweden, the Dutch Republic and their allies, the Princes of the Holy Roman Empire, and sovereigns of the Free imperial cities.
The treaties resulted from the first modern diplomatic congress, thereby initiating a new political order in central Europe, based upon the concept of a sovereign state governed by a sovereign. In the event, the treaties’ regulations became integral to the constitutional law of the Holy Roman Empire. Moreover, the Treaty of the Pyrenees (1659), ending the Franco–Spanish War (1635–59), is considered part of the Peace of Westphalia, which ended the European wars of religion.
Contents[hide] |
[edit]Locations
Peace negotiations between France and the Habsburgs, provided by the Holy Roman Emperor and the Spanish King, were to be started inCologne in 1636. These negotiations were blocked by France.
Cardinal Richelieu of France desired the inclusion of all its allies, whether sovereign or a state within the Holy Roman Empire. In Hamburgand Lübeck, Sweden and the Holy Roman Empire negotiated the Treaty of Hamburg. This was done with the intervention of Richelieu.
The Holy Roman Empire and Sweden declared the preparations of Cologne and the Treaty of Hamburg to be preliminaries of an overall peace agreement. This larger agreement was to be negotiated in Westphalia, in the neighbouring cities of Münster and Osnabrück. Both cities were to be maintained as neutral and demilitarized zones for the negotiations. Münster was, since its re-Catholization in 1535, a strictly mono-denominational community. It housed the Chapter of the Prince-Bishopric of Münster. Only Roman Catholic worship was permitted. No places of worship were provided for Calvinists and Lutherans.
Osnabrück was a bidenominational Lutheran and Catholic city, with two Lutheran and two Catholic churches for its mostly Lutheranburghers and exclusively Lutheran city council and the Catholic Chapter of the Prince-Bishopric of Osnabrück with pertaining other clergy and also other Catholic inhabitants. In the years of 1628-1633 Osnabrück had been subjected by troops of the Catholic League and the Catholic Prince-Bishop Franz Wilhelm, Count of Wartenberg, imposed the Counter-Reformation onto the city with many Lutheran burgher families being exiled. While under following Swedish occupation Osnabrücks's Catholics were not expelled, but the city severely suffered from Swedish war contributions. Therefore Osnabrück hoped for a great relief becoming neutralised and demilitarised.
Both cities strove for more autonomy, aspiring to become Free Imperial Cities, so they welcomed the neutrality imposed by the peace negotiations, and the prohibition of all political influence by the warring parties including their overlords, the prince-bishops.
Since Lutheran Sweden preferred Osnabrück as a conference venue, its peace negotiations with the Empire, including the allies of both sides, took place in Osnabrück. The Empire and its opponent France, including the allies of each, as well as the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands and its opponent Spain (and their respective allies) negotiated in Münster.[1]
[edit]Delegations
The peace negotiations had no exact beginning and ending, because the participating total of 109 delegations never met in a plenary session, but dropped in between 1643 and 1646 and left between 1647 and 1649. Between January 1646 and July 1647 probably the largest number of diplomats were present. Delegations had been sent by 16 European states, sixty-six Imperial States, representing the interests of a total of 140 involved Imperial States, and 27 interest groups, representing the interests of a variety of a total of 38 groups.[2]
The French delegation was headed by Henri II d'Orléans, duc de Longueville and further comprised the diplomats Claude d'Avaux and Abel Servien. The Swedes plenipotentiaries sent Johan Oxenstierna, the son of chancellor Axel Oxenstierna, and Johann Adler Salvius. The head of the delegation of the Holy Roman Empire for both cities was Count Maximilian von Trautmansdorff; in Münster, his aides wereJohann Ludwig von Nassau-Hadamar and Isaak Volmar (a lawyer); in Osnabrück, his team comprised Johann Maximilian von Lamberg andReichshofrat Johann Krane, a lawyer.
The Spanish delegation was headed by Gaspar de Bracamonte y Guzmán, and besides included the diplomats and writers Diego de Saavedra Fajardo, and Bernardino de Rebolledo. The nuntius of Cologne, Fabio Chigi, and the Venetian envoy Alvise Contarini acted as mediators. Various Imperial States of the Holy Roman Empire also sent delegations. Brandenburg sent several representatives, including Vollmar and Joachim Friedrich von Blumenthal. The Republic of the Seven United Netherlands sent a delegation of eight, and Johann Rudolf Wettstein, the mayor of Basel, represented the Old Swiss Confederacy.
[edit]Results
[edit]Internal political boundaries
The power taken by Ferdinand III in contravention of the Holy Roman Empire's constitution was stripped and returned to the rulers of the Imperial States. This rectification allowed the rulers of the Imperial States to independently decide their religious worship. Protestants and Catholics were redefined as equal before the law, and Calvinism was given legal recognition. Also, each of the 400 or so princes of the Holy Roman Empire were given equal authority to that of the Emperor, de-centralizing the government and effectively ending the power of the Holy Roman Empire.[3] [4]
The Holy See was very displeased at the settlement, with Pope Innocent Xreportedly calling it "null, void, invalid, iniquitous, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time".[5]
[edit]Tenets
The main tenets of the Peace of Westphalia were:
- All parties would recognize the Peace of Augsburg of 1555, in which each prince would have the right to determine the religion of his own state, the options being Catholicism, Lutheranism, and now Calvinism (the principle ofcuius regio, eius religio).[3][4]
- Christians living in principalities where their denomination was not the established church were guaranteed the right to practice their faith in public during allotted hours and in private at their will.[3]
There were also territorial adjustments:
- The independence of the Netherlands, Switzerland, Savoy, Milan, Genoa,Mantua, Tuscany, Lucca, Modena and Parma from the Empire was formally recognized; many of these territories had enjoyed de facto independence for decades.
- The majority of the Peace's terms can be attributed to the work of Cardinal Mazarin, the de facto leader of France at the time (the king, Louis XIV, being a child). Not surprisingly, France came out of the war in a far better position than any of the other participants. France won control of the Bishoprics of Metz, Toul and Verdun near Lorraine, and the cities of theDécapole in Alsace (but not Strasbourg, the Bishopric of Strasbourg, orMülhausen).
- Sweden received an indemnity of five million talers, used primarily to pay her troops.[6] Sweden further received Western Pomerania (henceforth Swedish Pomerania), Wismar, and the Prince-Bishoprics of Bremen and Verden as hereditary fiefs, thus gaining a seat and vote in the imperial diet (Reichstag) as well as in the respective circle diets (Kreistag) of the Upper Saxon, Lower Saxon and Westphalian circles.[7] However, the wording of the treaties was ambiguous:
- Whether or not the city of Bremen was included in Swedish Bremen-Verden remained disputed. Facing the Swedish take-over, Bremen had claimed Imperial immediacy, which was granted by the emperor and thus separated the city from the surrounding bishopric with the same name. Sweden understood that Bremen was nevertheless to be ceded to her, and started the Swedish-Bremen wars in 1653/54.[8]
- The treaty also delegated the determination of the Swedish-Brandenburgian border in the Duchy of Pomerania to the parties. At Osnabrück, both Sweden and Brandenburg had claimed the whole duchy, which was under Swedish control since 1630 despitelegal claims of Brandenburgian succession. While the parties settled for a border in 1653, the underlying conflict continued.[9]
- The treaty ruled that the Dukes of Mecklenburg, owing their re-investiture to the Swedes, cede Wismar and the Mecklenburgian port tolls. While Sweden understood this to include the tolls of all Mecklenburgian ports, the Mecklenburgian dukes as well as the emperor understood this to refer to Wismar only.[9]
- Wildeshausen, a petty exclave of Bremen-Verden and fragile basis for Sweden's seat in the Westphalian circle diet, was also claimed by the Bishopric of Münster.[9]
- Bavaria retained the Palatinate's vote in the Imperial Council of Electors (which elected the Holy Roman Emperor), which it had been granted by the ban on the Elector Palatine Frederick V in 1623. The Prince Palatine, Frederick's son, was given a new, eighth electoral vote.
- The Palatinate was divided between the re-established Elector Palatine Charles Louis (son and heir of Frederick V) and Elector-Duke Maximilian of Bavaria, and thus between the Protestants and Catholics. Charles Louis obtained the Lower Palatinate, along the Rhine, while Maximilian kept the Upper Palatinate, to the north of Bavaria.
- Brandenburg-Prussia (later Prussia) received Farther Pomerania, and the Bishoprics of Magdeburg, Halberstadt, Kammin, and Minden.
- The succession to the United Duchies of Jülich-Cleves-Berg, who had died out in 1609, was clarified. Jülich, Berg, and Ravenstein were given to the Count Palatine of Neuburg, while Cleves, Mark, and Ravensberg went to Brandenburg.
- It was agreed that the Prince-Bishopric of Osnabrück would alternate between Protestant and Catholic holders, with the Protestant bishops chosen from cadets of the House of Brunswick-Lüneburg.
- The independence of the city of Bremen was clarified.
- Barriers to trade and commerce erected during the war were abolished, and "a degree" of free navigation was guaranteed on theRhine.[10]
[edit]See also
- Peace of Augsburg
- Adam Adami - German diplomat in the peace negotiations
- Charter of Liberties
- Concordat of Worms
- Eighty Years' War
- History of Sweden 1648-1700
- List of treaties
- Peace of Münster
- Thirty Years' War
- Westphalian sovereignty
[edit]References
- ^ Konrad Repgen, 'Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia: A Survey with an Examination of the Major Problems', In: 1648: War and Peace in Europe: 3 vols. (Catalogue of the 26th exhibition of the Council of Europe, on the Peace of Westphalia), Klaus Bußmann and Heinz Schilling (eds.) on behalf of the Veranstaltungsgesellschaft 350 Jahre Westfälischer Friede, Münster and Osnabrück: no publ., 1998, 'Essay Volume 1: Politics, Religion, Law and Society', pp. 355-372, here pp. 355seq.
- ^ Konrad Repgen, 'Negotiating the Peace of Westphalia: A Survey with an Examination of the Major Problems', In: 1648: War and Peace in Europe: 3 vols. (Catalogue of the 26th exhibition of the Council of Europe, on the Peace of Westphalia), Klaus Bußmann and Heinz Schilling (eds.) on behalf of the Veranstaltungsgesellschaft 350 Jahre Westfälischer Friede, Münster and Osnabrück: no publ., 1998, 'Essay Volume 1: Politics, Religion, Law and Society', pp. 355-372, here p. 356.
- ^ a b c Treaty of Munich 1648
- ^ a b Barro, RJ and McCleary, RM 'Which Countries have State Religions? Page 5. Uchicago.edu - URL Accessed 7 November 2006
- ^ [World religions and democracy, Larry Jay Diamond, Marc F. Plattner, Philip J. Costopoulos, 2005]
- ^ Böhme, Klaus-R (2001). "Die sicherheitspolitische Lage Schwedens nach dem Westfälischen Frieden". in Hacker, Hans-Joachim (in German). Der Westfälische Frieden von 1648: Wende in der Geschichte des Ostseeraums. Kovač. p. 35. ISBN 3830005008.
- ^ Böhme, Klaus-R (2001). "Die sicherheitspolitische Lage Schwedens nach dem Westfälischen Frieden". in Hacker, Hans-Joachim (in German). Der Westfälische Frieden von 1648: Wende in der Geschichte des Ostseeraums. Kovač. p. 36. ISBN 3830005008.
- ^ Böhme, Klaus-R (2001). "Die sicherheitspolitische Lage Schwedens nach dem Westfälischen Frieden". in Hacker, Hans-Joachim (in German). Der Westfälische Frieden von 1648: Wende in der Geschichte des Ostseeraums. Kovač. p. 37. ISBN 3830005008.
- ^ a b c Böhme, Klaus-R (2001). "Die sicherheitspolitische Lage Schwedens nach dem Westfälischen Frieden". in Hacker, Hans-Joachim (in German). Der Westfälische Frieden von 1648: Wende in der Geschichte des Ostseeraums. Kovač. p. 38. ISBN 3830005008.
- ^ Gross, Leo (1948), "The Peace of Westphalia" The American Journal of International Law 42(1):20–41
[edit]External links
Wikimedia Commons has media related to: Peace of Westphalia |
- Treaty Text (PDF)
- Treaty Text
- Treaty Text (Yale University)
- Texts of the Westphalian Treaties
- Peace Of Westphalia - Firmly Plants Protestantism in Europe
- High Resolution Map of Germany after the Treaty of Westphalia
- Peace Treaty of Osnabrück (Full Text)
- Peace Treaty of Münster (Full Text)
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