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Turkey, Europe, and the United States in a Multipolar World
Gilles Andreani
Trilateral Strategy Group
6/11/2010
The main focus of the January Trilateral Strategy Group meeting was to confront the expectations of participants that "Western" views could be defined on a number of issues, with what seems to be a more complex reality; despite a shared preference for a continued unity of the West in order to solve these problems and, more generally, to provide an anchor of stability to the international system, it is apparent that policymakers and governments tend to think and act less "Western" than ever before.
Download File, Format: PDF, Size: 148 KBThe Mediterranean and the Middle East
Saturday, 12 June, 2010 11:27
For those that this might be of interest to. Anne
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)---just a little here
From page 20
A shift in EU regional security policy—The last factor of change in
Mediterranean relations regards the shift in EU security perceptions
following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the subsequent attacks in
Europe, and the extraordinary increase
in immigration that has taken place since the beginning of this
century. Both terrorism and immigration have been securitized all over
Europe.51 Furthermore, almost everywhere, immigration generates
various kinds of anxiety (cultural, economic, identity) in receiving
societies.
As a result, both the EU and member countries to various extents—are
committed broadly to restricting legal immigration and strongly
controlling illegal immigration.
Control is carried out by means of preventive policies and “forward”
measures: in addition to readmission agreements with sending
countries, the EU and its members provide partners with instruments
and resources for controlling people emigrating from their own
territory (e.g., by providing surveillance vessels) or for retaining
them on their territories (e.g., by setting up detention camps) or
preventing them from crossing their territories when coming from
farther afield (i.e.,. traversing North
African countries from sub-Saharan Africa).
Outsourcing and externalization are dominating EU policies to control
and avert immigration. In this endeavor, bilateral cooperation in the
framework of the ENP and the Association Agreements is very
important: all plans for cooperation between the EU and partner
countries (Action Plans), be they in Eastern Europe or the
Mediterranean, include an important section dealing with reforms to
improve the performance of the judiciary and the police, for the dual
purpose of promoting democratic reform and increasing the country’s
ability to help the European Union and its members to control
immigration and terrorism.
From pages 23 and 24
EU and Turkey—A third aspect is related to EU Turkey relations.
Revamping these relations may help the United States and Europe to
deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, more in general,
conflicts in the Middle East, on the assumption,
though, that including Turkey more firmly in the EU would shape
Turkish foreign policy and make it more functional to transatlantic
requirements. Let’s look briefly, first, at the current state of
EU-Turkey relations and their prospects and then reflect on the
functional link between Turkey’s possible link to the EU and its
foreign policy.
How are Turkish-EU relations actually doing? Sadly, the answer is not
very well.
During the Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s first mandate,
EU-Turkey relations entered a virtuous circle.58 The AKP enforced
political reforms, as demanded by the European Union, and deepened
economic integration with it and globally.
Reforms in an EU membership perspective made the AKP win support from
the liberal and secularist sectors of Turkish society and strengthened
the government. The latter was also encouraged to change Turkey’s
long-standing opposition to a
settlement in Cyprus. In fact, in 2004, Ankara decided to fully
support the Annan Plan for the island’s reunification. All this
brought the AKP far more votes than Islamist votes alone and resulted
in the sweeping victory in the 2007 elections.
Yet, as of 2004-2005, the picture began to reverse because of the new
French President’s position (coupled with that of German Chancellor
Merkel),
which strongly opposes Turkish membership in the EU as a matter of
principle, and because of the Greek Cypriot vote against the Annan
Plan. While the opposition of France and other EU countries
constitutes a more long-term factor, the evolution
of the Cyprus issue is threatening EU-Turkey relations more immediately.
From page 25
To conclude, one might wonder how important a stronger bond between
European Union and Turkey and the latter’s inclusion in the former
actually is for Turkey and its continued firm and reliable membership
in the transatlantic coalition of
nations. Anchoring Turkey to the European Union may stop the country’s
drift out of its long-standing Euro-Atlantic affiliation. It would be
wrong to expect EU membership to fundamentally alter Turkish national
interests and change its foreign
policy, though. At the end of the day, this is not happening even with
the current EU members.
However, the EU compels members to negotiate and, if necessary,
moderate or even renounce their national interests. Member states
cannot straightforwardly assert their interests in the EU framework;
they have to promote them. The European Union is above all a learning
process and a discipline. Bringing Turkey into this framework
would be beneficial in any case to western solidarity. The same cannot
be said of the ideas presently circulating in France, Germany,
Austria, and other countries firmly opposed to or strongly skeptical
of Turkey’s membership in the European
Union, which envisage a “privileged partnership” with Ankara like the
one between the European Union and the Russian Federation. This would
mean managing the interests that Turkey and the West have in common
without any institutional
association. Such a solution would certainly single Turkey out with
respect to the West and replace a close, albeit difficult,
relationship with a distant and dubious one.
For those that this might be of interest to. Anne
Union for the Mediterranean (UfM)---just a little here
From page 20
A shift in EU regional security policy—The last factor of change in
Mediterranean relations regards the shift in EU security perceptions
following the September 11, 2001, attacks, the subsequent attacks in
Europe, and the extraordinary increase
in immigration that has taken place since the beginning of this
century. Both terrorism and immigration have been securitized all over
Europe.51 Furthermore, almost everywhere, immigration generates
various kinds of anxiety (cultural, economic, identity) in receiving
societies.
As a result, both the EU and member countries to various extents—are
committed broadly to restricting legal immigration and strongly
controlling illegal immigration.
Control is carried out by means of preventive policies and “forward”
measures: in addition to readmission agreements with sending
countries, the EU and its members provide partners with instruments
and resources for controlling people emigrating from their own
territory (e.g., by providing surveillance vessels) or for retaining
them on their territories (e.g., by setting up detention camps) or
preventing them from crossing their territories when coming from
farther afield (i.e.,. traversing North
African countries from sub-Saharan Africa).
Outsourcing and externalization are dominating EU policies to control
and avert immigration. In this endeavor, bilateral cooperation in the
framework of the ENP and the Association Agreements is very
important: all plans for cooperation between the EU and partner
countries (Action Plans), be they in Eastern Europe or the
Mediterranean, include an important section dealing with reforms to
improve the performance of the judiciary and the police, for the dual
purpose of promoting democratic reform and increasing the country’s
ability to help the European Union and its members to control
immigration and terrorism.
From pages 23 and 24
EU and Turkey—A third aspect is related to EU Turkey relations.
Revamping these relations may help the United States and Europe to
deal with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and, more in general,
conflicts in the Middle East, on the assumption,
though, that including Turkey more firmly in the EU would shape
Turkish foreign policy and make it more functional to transatlantic
requirements. Let’s look briefly, first, at the current state of
EU-Turkey relations and their prospects and then reflect on the
functional link between Turkey’s possible link to the EU and its
foreign policy.
How are Turkish-EU relations actually doing? Sadly, the answer is not
very well.
During the Justice and Development Party (AKP)’s first mandate,
EU-Turkey relations entered a virtuous circle.58 The AKP enforced
political reforms, as demanded by the European Union, and deepened
economic integration with it and globally.
Reforms in an EU membership perspective made the AKP win support from
the liberal and secularist sectors of Turkish society and strengthened
the government. The latter was also encouraged to change Turkey’s
long-standing opposition to a
settlement in Cyprus. In fact, in 2004, Ankara decided to fully
support the Annan Plan for the island’s reunification. All this
brought the AKP far more votes than Islamist votes alone and resulted
in the sweeping victory in the 2007 elections.
Yet, as of 2004-2005, the picture began to reverse because of the new
French President’s position (coupled with that of German Chancellor
Merkel),
which strongly opposes Turkish membership in the EU as a matter of
principle, and because of the Greek Cypriot vote against the Annan
Plan. While the opposition of France and other EU countries
constitutes a more long-term factor, the evolution
of the Cyprus issue is threatening EU-Turkey relations more immediately.
From page 25
To conclude, one might wonder how important a stronger bond between
European Union and Turkey and the latter’s inclusion in the former
actually is for Turkey and its continued firm and reliable membership
in the transatlantic coalition of
nations. Anchoring Turkey to the European Union may stop the country’s
drift out of its long-standing Euro-Atlantic affiliation. It would be
wrong to expect EU membership to fundamentally alter Turkish national
interests and change its foreign
policy, though. At the end of the day, this is not happening even with
the current EU members.
However, the EU compels members to negotiate and, if necessary,
moderate or even renounce their national interests. Member states
cannot straightforwardly assert their interests in the EU framework;
they have to promote them. The European Union is above all a learning
process and a discipline. Bringing Turkey into this framework
would be beneficial in any case to western solidarity. The same cannot
be said of the ideas presently circulating in France, Germany,
Austria, and other countries firmly opposed to or strongly skeptical
of Turkey’s membership in the European
Union, which envisage a “privileged partnership” with Ankara like the
one between the European Union and the Russian Federation. This would
mean managing the interests that Turkey and the West have in common
without any institutional
association. Such a solution would certainly single Turkey out with
respect to the West and replace a close, albeit difficult,
relationship with a distant and dubious one.
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