Wednesday, 23 June 2010


In the closing stages of the film, A Bridge Too Far, we saw Generals Urqhart and Browning starting to distance themselves from what was then evident as a military disaster, with Browning uttering the immortal words: "I always felt we tried to go a bridge too far."

There seems to me to be something of this with Gen Stanley McChrystal and his interview withRolling Stone magazine. With the man admitting that everything said was on the record, and the magazine checking back with the General's aides before using the quotes, we have on the face of it an example of a senior soldier committing professional suicide.

On the other hand, we could be seeing something more subtle – devious even, on the lines of the "bridge too far" excuse. It is very much an open secret that McChrystal's "surge" is going belly-up and, in the fullness of time, is going to fail. As did the British military in Iraq, the US military are going to need an alibi and a "scapegoat" – they need to dump the blame on the politicians.

McChrystal has put Obama in an impossible position. With the president's popularity evaporating, if he fires McChrystal – still a popular General – he takes the blame for when the campaign finally falls apart. If he doesn't fire our Stan, in effect he is endorsing (or not denying) the "contemptuous" comments about the National Security Team, which can then be held responsible for the disasters to come. Obama still gets it.

Basically, it's a win-win for the military, and a sign that the military has lost faith in its own ability to prevail in Afghanistan. The end is nigh and McChrystal may be signalling that all that matters now is who takes the blame. And, from our own domestic perspective, how utterly bizarre it is that Cameron has bought into the campaign just as everyone else is planning on bailing out.

Comment: Afghanistan thread


On 31 January, The Sunday Times published an article headed "UN climate panel shamed by bogus rainforest claim", the essence of which was reproduced in this post. This launched "Amazongate" in The Sunday Times, the substantive article was being based largely on work published in this blog, in two posts here and here, which must be read together.

The details were also published in the Booker column and had previously been publishedelsewhere, including Watts up with that.

Subsequently, one of persons cited in the ST article decided to complain to the press complaints commission. In last weekend's edition, the newspaper chose to issue an "apology" and has removed the original article from its website.

No complaint, to my knowledge, has been made to The Sunday Telegraph, nor to any other newspaper or blogger who carried the piece – nor, significantly, to myself directly. 

And, although the complaint was clearly supported by the WWF – which had most to lose from the criticism – no complaint was made about several more articles, including further references in the Booker column, plus these pieces herehere and here.

Had the WWF sought direct confrontation with myself, or Booker in The Sunday Telegraph, it would have received a robust response, but the complaint was directed at the weakest link, The Sunday Times, which had made some errors in attribution. 

Although these errors did not affect the substance of the case, the paper has chosen to go far beyond that needed, and conceded that "the IPCC’s Amazon statement is supported by peer-reviewed scientific evidence." This simply is not true.

However, the central falsehood having been endorsed now by The Sunday Times, this has been sufficient for the WWF to declare a victory and cut and run, thus displaying the corporate cowardice and mendacity that one would expect of this odious organisation.

The "usual suspects" have climbed on the bandwagon, with The GuardianNew York Times andNDTV having pitched in.

Interestingly, Delingpole, who also ran the Amazongate story, writes in his latest post that when dealing with the Warmist lobby, always remember these helpful tips: sup with a long spoon, know that they're lying from the fact that their lips are moving, and when they leave, make sure to count your fingers and your silverware.

Know also that they are cowards (and bullies), incapable of taking on a direct challenge and dealing with it honestly.

COMMENT THREAD


We saw recently another example of the vulnerability of the coalition supply chain in Afghanistanand now, under the pretext of news, the BBC, the Washington Post, the New York Times and others, tell us that the US military has been giving tens of millions of dollars to Afghan security firms who are channelling the money to warlords. 

Truckers carrying supplies to US troops – according to a Congressional report entitled "Warlord, Inc: Extortion and Corruption Along the US Supply Chain in Afghanistan" - allegedly pay the firms to ensure safe passage in dangerous areas of Afghanistan. And what is more, the convoys are attacked if payments are not made.

Well, we are shocked, shocked, I tell you. In fact, we're so shocked that we were writing about this in June 2008 and then in more detail on 3 September 2009, again on 13 September 2009(based in part on reports from February 2009, with references from the previous year) and then again on 10 December 2009.

Apart from the obvious comment – like "what took you so long?" – the issue here is of some considerable importance. We are six months into McChrystal's so-called "surge" and even before it started, we knew that huge bribes were being paid to the Taliban, effectively enabling them to keep the war going.

It would have been such a good idea to chop off the flow of funds, before we started pouring men and materiel into the "surge", but no ... such logic is clearly quite beyond the military and political geniuses running this war. So, six months in, the Taliban are likely better off, better equipped and richer than they were before the surge started.

And, while the evidence here is focused on US payments, it is equally the case that the UK is making similar payments. Thus, not only are we the taxpayers funding our own troops in the Afghan adventure, we are also helping to fund the Taliban, alongside the Americans.

Despite this, we have Lieutenant-General Nick Parker tell us that the most important ingredient of success (in Afghanistan) is "an aggressive political strategy that can build on the improving security." He adds: "It should draw further strength from improvements in governance and development and a sense of the inevitability of progress."

I might have written in these terms before, but either the general is irredeemably stupid – which he must be if he believes this guff – or he thinks we are stupid if he is expecting us to believe it. But even someone as thick as an Army Lieutenant-General should be able to understand that paying your enemy to fight you is not a recipe for instant peace or military success.

How then can there be "improving security" when he and his over-paid, over-promoted mates can't even sort out the basics? How can any current plans have any credibility whatsoever when this situation has been known about for years and still nothing is done about it?

Short of stupidity, there can only be massive self-delusion here, which brooks no confidence whatsoever in the conduct of the Afghan mission.

Comment: Afghanistan thread

Another Royal Marine has been killed – once again in Sangin, and once again by an IED. A short report is here. You are now getting some half-witted and superficial pieces about Sangin and its dangers, with the number of troops killed in that locale now at 97.

Needless to say, I've been writing about this issue for some time, viz this piece in August 2009, when I cited ministers claiming that the "relative stability" of the Sangin area was evidence that British troops were "winning the battle against the Taliban."

Presumably, this latest death is still evidence that British troops are winning the battle against the Taliban – or maybe not. To my mind, the tactics are wrong, the thinking is wrong and the equipment is wrong. Never in history has it been possible to win this sort of fight withoutengineering solutions - which out people are reluctant to use.

Our application of science is limited – a lot more is happening than is being openly declared, but there is still not enough being done, and there are time when you seriously wonder what the Army does for brains, while some of the kit we have is pathetic.

We are not going to win this war ... and the experience of Sangin tells us why. The Army is neither intellectually, morally nor physically equipped to deal with the issues.

Comment: Afghanistan thread

Alright, I’ve just come away from a very good friend, and rather too many pints in a pleasant atmosphere. Inevitably, as it does, the subject of the blog came up – which he reads avidly and for which he is a valuable critic. You are posting too much stuff on Afghanistan, he says – that is probably putting readers off.

This is an interesting observation. The MSM is actually covering the campaign if not well, certainly with a lot of space. The blogs are doing less – who is getting it right?

This notwithstanding, writing in The Times Lieutenant-General Nick Parker, the deputy commander of Nato-led troops in Afghanistan, predicts further casualties during a tough summer but warns that "poor judgments influenced by grief over the loss of life would result in even more tragic consequences for the wider Afghan campaign".

Is this what the Army thinks of us ... making "poor judgments influenced by grief" ... or can't they cope with the fact that we are influenced by their poor judgements arising out of what seems very like incompetence. And, it would appear, we are not alone.

Does it matter? Does anybody really care? I dunno ... I just write this blog – you tell me. I'm going to bed. 

Comment: Afghanistan thread