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Special Dispatch|3104| July 19, 2010 Urdu-Pashtu Media Project

Senior Pakistani Editor Rahimullah Yusufzai on the U.S. Policy of Recruiting Lashkars (Village Militias) in Afghanistan: '[In Pakistan,] Lashkars, Comprising Men of the Same Pashtun Stock Harboring Strong Feelings of Honor and Revenge, Have Been Equally Vindictive' During a recent meeting in Kabul, General David Petraeus, the commander of the U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, was rebuffed by Afghan President Hamid Karzai, who opposed the U.S. tactic of recruiting village militias to act against the Taliban militants. The Interior Ministry of Afghanistan, which is the key agency for ensuring law and order across the country, later backed Karzai's opposition to the U.S. forces' initiative to recruit villages as part of local defense teams.[1] Zemarai Bashari, a spokesman for the ministry, said: "The Ministry of Interior, as a member in the Afghan cabinet, supports all the decisions taken by the Afghan president... We will strictly implement any decisions taken by the Afghan president."[2] The idea of recruiting villagers into local defense programs is a key part of the U.S. military strategy in Afghanistan. However, the Karzai government fears that the local defense programs may lead to the emergence of new warlords in the country. In recent years, the U.S. military has successfully tested the policy of recruiting villagers into armed militias to manage local security and confront militants, notably in Iraq. However, Afghanistan is a different case, where the presence of warlords is already one of the reasons for lawlessness. Later reports indicate that Karzai, under pressure from the U.S., has reversed his initial opposition to the U.S. plan to recruit village militias. In recent years, Pakistan has also experimented with the policy of arming villagers to take on the Taliban. In a recent article, senior Pakistani editor Rahimullah Yusufzai, who is a prominent expert on Taliban-related issues, examined the relevance of village militias in the Pakistani and Afghan policies against militants. In an article, titled "Lashkars, Private Militias and Militants," Yusufzai observed that such militias sometimes succeed, at least temporarily, against the militants, while at other times act as mercenaries for whoever is the highest bidder willing to pay them. Following are excerpts from the article:[3] "Many Tribal Elders Often Wonder for How Long They Would Have to Mobilize Their Young Men to Take On an Enemy as Determined as the Taliban" "The desperate American idea of raising village militias to fight the Taliban in Afghanistan is reportedly being opposed by President Hamid Karzai at a time when Pakistan is suffering from the consequences of this policy. "The brutal bombings in Ekkaghund town in the [Pakistani] tribal region of Mohmand Agency on July 9 in which 106 people, mostly civilians, were killed was a consequence of the initiative sponsored by the Pakistan government and the military to mobilize the tribes to take on the Taliban militants. The attack was a botched Taliban attempt to target the Utmankhel tribal jirga [meeting of elders] from the Ambar area in Mohmand Agency, where the militants had met tough resistance and suffered considerable losses at the hands of the local lashkar, or armed force, ironically referred to as 'amn,' or peace, committee. "Ikramullah Mohmand, the spokesman of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) for the Mohmand Agency chapter, while claiming responsibility for the attack, made it clear that the Utmankhel jirga elders from Ambar were the target of the suicide bombings. The Taliban normally don't make such claims when market-places are bombed and many civilians are killed and wounded, but in this case the TTP accepted responsibility for the attack and at the same time expressed regrets over the civilian deaths. This was something rare, though there is no way any repentance on the part of the Taliban would satisfy the bereaved families or change public opinion about the horrible Ekkaghund bombings that turned a bustling rural town into a graveyard. "With the exception of Malik Sahibzada Utmankhel, who had been instrumental in raising the anti-Taliban lashkar in his native Prang Ghar area, all the jirga members and the government officials holding a meeting at the time of the attack in the compound of ... [local government officials'] offices survived the twin bombings..." "The government-backed lashkars [armed militias] of tribal and village communities have sometimes been effective in tackling the Taliban militants in parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), but the cost of this initiative in terms of human and material losses has been unusually high. The lashkars in Dhog Darra in Upper Dir district, Salarzai area in Bajaur Agency and Ambar in Mohmand Agency have been notably effective, even though the tribes involved in the effort suffered huge losses and are still required to be battle-ready all the time. At times, the support promised by the government didn't materialize. Many tribal elders often wonder for how long they would have to mobilize their young men to take on an enemy as determined as the Taliban. "Some of them complain that they were forced by the authorities to raise lashkars and fight the militants. In their view, they were being asked to do something that the government and its security forces have been largely unable to accomplish. "Blood-feuds have been the bane of the Pashtun society, which must be the most heavily armed in the world, but the kind of feuds triggered by the enmities involving the Taliban militants and the lashkars are unparalleled. The militants, ruthless and revengeful, have retaliated with a vengeance through suicide bombers to attack jirgas while in session, kill pro-government tribal chiefs and intimidate the common people." "More than 250 Tribal Elders Lost Their Lives in the Tribal Areas Because They Defied the Militants or Continued to Interact with Government and Military Officials Despite Being Warned" "Though exact figures aren't available, more than 250 tribal elders lost their lives in the tribal areas because they defied the militants or continued to interact with government and military officials despite being warned. Some of the major TTP attacks on jirgas included the one in Darra Adamkhel in March 2008, when more than 40 tribal elders were killed in a suicide bombing, and another targeting the Salarzai jirga in Bajaur that caused the deaths of 22 tribal chieftains in November 2008. The biggest loss of tribal elders and commoners was in Khadezai area in Orakzai Agency in the same year when a Taliban suicide bomber mowed down a lashkar being raised to fight the militants and killed around 140 people. "The lashkars, comprising men of the same Pashtun stock harboring strong feelings of honor and revenge, have been equally vindictive. Revenge killings are now the order of the day as militants and their facilitators are hunted down, their houses are demolished and their families are banished from ancestral villages. The Taliban are being paid back in the same coin and punishment meted out to them is justified on the ground that they did the same to their opponents while in control of places like the Swat, Bajaur, Darra Adamkhel, and Bara areas. "In neighbouring Afghanistan, the private militias coming to the aid of the military are as old as the three-decade-old Afghan conflict. Afghan communist rulers under the guidance of the Soviet Red Army raised such militias, including the one led by a former factory worker Abdul Rasheed Dostum, to fight the Afghan mujahideen in the 1980s. The Dostum militia, or Gilum Jam as it was commonly called, comprised Uzbek and Turkmen fighters who not only tried to keep the mujahideen out of their own neighborhoods in northern Afghanistan but also served as mercenaries deployed in Pashtun-populated areas. Dostum and commanders of other militias lacked ideology and principles and joined whoever was willing to pay the price. "A Japan-funded disarmament and demobilisation program in Afghanistan implemented a few years ago is now generally categorized as a failure, as private militias continue to exist. The U.S. and its NATO allies in desperate attempts to control the growing Taliban insurgency also resorted to campaigns to mobilize Afghan villagers to take on the militants in their areas. These militias were given different names, though the Afghans normally call them arbaki. The U.S. Special Operations forces are behind the latest effort to train, arm and assist the village defence militias." "The Beleaguered Afghan President is Worried It Could Lead to Even More Warlordism, Already a Challenge for the Weak Central Government..." "General David Petraeus implemented a similar plan in Iraq by arming and paying Sunni tribes to fight Al-Qaeda in Al-Anbar and other provinces. Now that he has taken charge from the sacked General Stanley McChrystal in Afghanistan, he is keen to widen this program and double the number of places where the village militias would be equipped and paid to fight the Taliban. "However, President Karzai is reported to have reservations about the plan. The beleaguered Afghan president is worried it could lead to even more warlordism, already a challenge for the weak central government, and out-of-control private militias. If he had his way, he would want a strong national army loyal and accountable to the government instead of private militias answerable to warlords. But the Americans, with General Petraeus leading the way, are unlikely to put this plan on hold. In fact, they see it as part of their strategy to reverse the Taliban momentum and at the same time reduce their own losses. General Petraeus may incorporate some Karzai suggestions to build safeguards to prevent the village militias from defying state authority, though this won't be enough to reassure the Afghan government and people. "In Pakistan, there has been no debate on the issue of lashkars as many people see it as a legitimate and effective way to tackle the militants. There isn't much concern for the consequences of arming villagers and encouraging them to seek revenge against militants who may have wronged them. In fact, bombing incidents like the one in Ekkaghund are seen as justification for pursuing the same policy of raising lashkars in a bid to defeat the militants. The Taliban militants have done terrible things and prompted most Pakistanis to believe that they deserve no mercy and that every measures needs to be undertaken to put them out of business."   [1] www.quqnoos.com, Afghanistan, July 11, 2010. [2] www.quqnoos.com, Afghanistan, July 11, 2010. [3] The News, Pakistan, July 13, 2010. The text of the article has been lightly edited for clarity.