[Dr. Aaron Lerner - IMRA:
Dr. Aaron Lerner -
Gaza's burgeoning domestic weapons production -
No Israel reaction
Please take note that there is a burgeoning domestic weapons production
industry in the Gaza Strip. The quality of the rockets being manufactured
in Gaza is constantly improving in terms of payload and range as well as
accuracy.
So here is the puzzle: what is Israel's policy regarding the domestic Gaza
weapons industry? Is it Israel's policy, for example, not to tolerate the
existence and operation of the industry?
Before we turn to the answer, consider this excerpt from Prime Minister
Netanyahu's remarks today:
"As the Prime Minister of Israel, responsible for the security of the state
and its citizens, I certainly cannot ignore the true character of Hamas and
the threat it presents Israel.
When I began my tenure as Prime Minister, I determined Israel’s policy with
regard to this threat according to the following principles:
1.. Acting to secure the release of Gilad Shalit.
2.. Immediately responding to firing on Israel from the Gaza Strip
3.. Acting to prevent the entry of weapons and war materiel into Gaza
4.. Preventing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. "
Yes. Preventing the entry of weapons is on the "do list". Also preventing
the entry of "war material" is on the "do list".
But what about a policy not to tolerate the manufacture of rockets in Gaza?
Not on the list.
What is Israel's policy about weapons factories in Gaza?
The IDF includes them in its target bank.
That's to say: Israel won't actively take measures against a weapons factory
in the Gaza Strip except as part of a reprisal attack.
This is nothing new.
From the very first day Israel retreated from the Gaza Strip it took a very
clear policy: if the Palestinians don't shoot we will leave them alone.
Leave them alone to build rockets, prepare bunkers, tunnels, etc. and do
pretty much anything else they want to as long as they don't shoot.
Sound like an incredibly shortsighted policy?
Welcome to Israel. The land of the 24 hour planning horizon. ]
=========================
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s 9.8.10 Statement Before the Turkel Commission
(Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser)
"Members of the Commission,
I am the first person to appear before this distinguished commission. Many
others will appear after me, and I am sure that you will uncover all the
facts and bring the truth to light.
I am convinced that at the end of your investigation, it will be clear that
the State of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces conducted themselves in
accordance with international law and that the IDF fighters who boarded the
Marmara displayed a rare courage in fulfilling their mission and in
defending themselves against a real threat to their lives. I have full
confidence in our soldiers, and the State of Israel is proud of them.
The appearance of Israel’s Prime Minister before this committee today is the
best evidence of the high standards by which Israel’s democracy functions.
In the Middle East, democracy remains an endangered species. Unfortunately,
in this region, governments shoot their political opponents in broad
daylight, brutally repress women and stone them to death, and systematically
deny their minorities and entire populations the most basic human rights.
In these countries, there is no free press to expose such crimes, no genuine
parliaments to hold hearings, no independent courts to give the accused a
fair trial, and no local human rights organizations to file reports. There
is only tyranny and terror.
Israel has always been different -- very different. Israel is a liberal,
democratic country governed by the rule of law, with independent courts, a
bona fide parliament, and a free press.
Israel is an example of a democratic nation subject to unprecedented threats
of war and terrorism that simultaneously defends the security of its people
and protects its democratic values. Democratic nations that in recent years
have had to address the challenge of maintaining their values in the face of
increasing terrorism can learn much from Israel, a democracy that has been
successfully meeting this challenge for 62 years.
One of the reasons why we are so successful at meeting this challenge is
that we constantly examine our own actions. My testimony here today, as
well as the upcoming appearances of the political and military leadership of
Israel before this committee, is the best answer to those who raise
questions about the readiness and willingness of Israel to examine itself.
No country or army examines itself more thoroughly than Israel and the IDF.
To those who would point an accusatory finger at Israel, I ask: How many
countries would be willing to establish a truly independent commission such
as this one? How many countries would invite foreign observers to
participate in such a commission? How many Prime Ministers and Presidents
would appear before such a commission?
To those who argue that Israel does not investigate itself according to
accepted international standards, I say: It would be good if many countries
around the world were investigating themselves according to the high
standards set by Israel.
Gentlemen, in order to answer the Commission’s questions, I would first like
to clarify our policies concerning the Hamas regime in Gaza, on which we
based our actions regarding the flotilla.
Hamas is a terrorist organization that calls for and works toward the
destruction of Israel. The Hamas charter calls for the annihilation of the
Jewish people.
Over the past decade, Hamas has received increasing assistance from Iran,
which also calls to wipe Israel off the map. Iran has equipped Hamas with
thousands of rockets, missiles, and other weapons. Hamas has transformed
the Gaza Strip into a terrorist enclave sponsored by Iran, which I referred
to in January 2006 as “Hamastan”. In addition, Iran provides Hamas with
intelligence assistance, military training, political support and
significant funding.
Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 through military force. It expelled
the Palestinian Authority and denied it any effective presence there. Since
that time, Hamas has increasingly fortified its hold on the Gaza Strip and
has turned it into a huge weapons depot and a base from which to attack
Israel.
From the Gaza Strip, Hamas fired thousands of rockets, missiles and mortars
that harmed Israel’s towns and citizens. At first, the fire rained down on
Sderot and the communities abutting Gaza. Later on, Ashkelon, Beer-Sheva
and Ashdod were also attacked. Today, Hamas has stockpiled weapons that can
reach Tel Aviv and other distant areas inside of Israel.
Despite a significant decrease in the number of rocket and missile attacks
over the past 18 months, the firing has not stopped. Just a few days ago,
without any provocation, Hamas permitted the firing of a Grad missile at
residential areas of Ashkelon and covertly dispatched a terror cell from
Gaza into the Sinai that fired missiles at Eilat and Aqaba.
Much of the time, the firing at Israel emanates from populated areas in
Gaza – from homes and schools, from sites adjacent to hospitals, mosques, UN
facilities, etc.
In 2006, Hamas kidnapped our soldier Gilad Shalit, and for the past four
years has held him in a cruel captivity, complete isolated, without even a
single visit by the Red Cross, in blatant violation of international law and
the most basic human values.
As the President of the Supreme Court, Justice Dorit Beinish, said: “The
Gaza Strip is controlled by a murderous terrorist organization which acts
tirelessly to harm the State of Israel and its residents and which, through
its violent actions directed indiscriminately at citizens – men, women and
children – violates every possible rule of international law.”
Since this Commission is dealing with the question of international law, I
would like to point out that Hamas is guilty of at least four war crimes:
inciting to genocide; systematically and intentionally firing on civilians;
using civilians as human shields; and preventing visits by the Red Cross to
kidnapped IDF soldier, Gilad Shalit.
These are not merely past crimes. They are being committed today as well,
and I hope this Commission will deem it appropriate to emphasize these
points in its report. I ask this only because other commissions, which
claimed that the question of human rights and international law were so dear
to their hearts, for some reason almost entirely ignored these central
issues. I am convinced that a credible investigation like yours –
independent, transparent, impartial and responsible – will certainly not
ignore them.
As the Prime Minister of Israel, responsible for the security of the state
and its citizens, I certainly cannot ignore the true character of Hamas and
the threat it presents Israel.
When I began my tenure as Prime Minister, I determined Israel’s policy with
regard to this threat according to the following principles:
1.. Acting to secure the release of Gilad Shalit.
2.. Immediately responding to firing on Israel from the Gaza Strip
3.. Acting to prevent the entry of weapons and war materiel into Gaza
4.. Preventing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza;
Let me begin with Gilad Shalit.
This is a subject which touches the hearts of all the people of Israel.
When I began serving as Prime Minister, I appointed Hagai Hadas to head the
efforts to secure Gilad’s release and I welcomed the appointment of a German
mediator with proven experience.
Within six months, we made a deal in which received a video that showed
Gilad talking and functioning both physically and cognitively. I attribute
great importance to this tape because the entire world now knows that Hamas
is holding Gilad and is responsible for his welfare.
Three months later, I agreed to the mediator’s proposed deal in which 450
Hamas prisoners would be released, along with an additional 550 Palestinian
prisoners, in exchange for Gilad’s release. At the same time, I insisted on
security demands that would prevent dangerous prisoners who would be
released from harming Israeli citizens again.
Eight months after we agreed to accept the mediator’s proposal, we are still
waiting for Hamas’s answer. At the same time, we are working on various
other ways to secure Gilad’s release.
Regarding our policy of responding to missile attacks: It has always been my
belief that a policy of not responding to attacks would soon turn a trickle
of missiles into a rain, and that the rain would eventually become a storm.
That is why I instituted a policy in which the IDF would respond to each
missile strike on our territory and, as much as possible, close to the time
of attack.
Regarding preventing the entry of weapons: We continued the previous
government’s policy of preventing the entry of weapons and war materiel into
the Gaza Strip. Our efforts include intelligence and operational
activities, as well as extensive diplomatic activities vis-à-vis many
countries, the most important of which is Egypt.
I attribute great importance to strengthening Israel’s ties with Egypt,
first and foremost to strengthen the forces of peace and stability in our
region and also to increase the efforts to prevent the smuggling of weapons
from the Sinai into the Gaza Strip. I raised this subject in each of my
five meetings with President Mubarak over the past 18 months. I would like
to note that during the past year, Egypt has increased its efforts to
prevent the entry of weapons into territory controlled by Hamas.
As part of the effort to prevent the entry of weapons into the Gaza Strip,
my government has continued the naval blockade that was imposed by the
previous government during “Operation Cast Lead” in January of 2009 as well
as continuing the limitations and oversight on the movement of goods at land
crossings that was put in place in September 2007. I will have more to say
on this point later.
The fourth principle of our policy was to avoid a humanitarian crisis in
Gaza.
When I began serving as Prime Minister, I quickly understood that many of
our friends around the world were repeating the Hamas claim that the
limitations imposed in 2007 and the naval blockage imposed in January of
2009 had created a humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
However, the information we obtained clearly proved that this claim was
baseless. There was no hunger in Gaza and there was no lack of medicines or
other essential items.
Though the territory in question is controlled by a hostile terrorist force
that calls for our destruction, Israel did not stop supplying electricity,
water or fuel to Gaza, and we enabled the entry of food, medicine and other
basic goods.
We also continued to accept patients from Gaza in our hospitals in both
life-threatening cases or to treat unique medical problems. On average,
1,500 patients and accompanying family members come into Gaza each month.
There is nothing that more clearly proves the absurdity of the claim that
Israel is acting inhumanely toward Gaza. If only Hamas’s terrorist regime
would act towards Israel’s population and our kidnapped soldier, Gilad
Shalit, with a fraction of the humane sentiment Israel has shown towards the
population of Gaza and towards the prisoners of Hamas.
For both my government and the previous government, preventing a
humanitarian crisis in Gaza was both an obligation and a desire. While we
did prevent a humanitarian crisis, we did not succeed in preventing the
image of a humanitarian crisis – an image that was entirely false.
Even though there was not a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, I decided to
gradually ease the limitations and the movement of goods through the land
crossings.
I did so because gradually these limitations turned into a diplomatic and
public relations burden. They were used in a mendacious propaganda campaign
that began to undermine international support for our policy to prevent the
entry of weapons into Gaza.
Accordingly, we expanded the list of food items in 2009 and we increased the
number of trucks entering Gaza by approximately 30% over the five months
preceding the flotilla incident.
However, our decision to ease limitations on the entry of civilian goods had
little impact on the international discourse. Despite these steps and the
photographs of the marketplaces of Gaza filled with goods which we
distributed to the world, the perception in the international community that
there was a humanitarian crisis in Gaza increasingly took root.
Forces hostile to Israel used the baseless allegation of a humanitarian
crisis to try and break the naval blockade. This was and remains the
primary motivation of Hamas in its efforts to encourage the various
flotillas. From time to time, these things are even said explicitly, as a
spokeswoman for the flotilla said on May 27, 2010: “Our mission is not to
provide humanitarian aid, but rather to break the blockade.”
It is worth mentioning that it was Israel, through the UN, and not the
flotilla organizers, that sought to ensure that the goods aboard the
flotillas were ultimately transferred to Gaza.
At the meeting of senior ministers called “the Seven” that was held before
the flotilla arrived on May 26, 2010 -- I presume you will read the protocol
of that meeting - I stressed the need to clarify Israel's policy in light of
the attempts to undermine the security blockade through the false claim of a
humanitarian crisis.
The discussion in “the Seven” was a continuation of a discussion held that
same morning by the same forum regarding our general policy towards the
Hamas regime in Gaza, during which I determined the need “to examine the
blockade policy and its security and diplomatic ramifications”.
In the discussion held by “the Seven”, I said that the principle that should
guide us is “the prevention of weapons smuggling." I also said that this
was the only explanation that will be understood by the international
community and that the right policy would be one in which Israel would
“screen and inspect" goods to prevent the entry of weapons into the Gaza
Strip.
After the flotilla, we continued this discussion and made the decision in
the Cabinet - the direction of which was already clear in the discussion of
“the Seven” - to complete the removal of the limitations on civilian goods
and leave the security blockade in force.
Obviously, the flotilla incident and the international discourse that
followed accelerated this decision. However, as you can see from the
discussions held by “the Seven”, the direction of the decision was already
clear beforehand.
Our policy, therefore, is intended to maintain the naval blockade which
supports the security blockade.
I would like to explain how dangerous an open sea lane to Gaza is for the
security of the State of Israel. On one ship, the Karin A, Iran tried to
send dozens of tons of weapons to Gaza. On another ship, the Francop, Iran
tried to send Hezbollah hundreds of tons of weapons, approximately
two-thirds of the total ammunition fired at Israel during the Second Lebanon
War.
Due to all these security considerations, my government continued to enforce
the naval blockade imposed by the previous government. We did so for the
flotilla in question, as well as with the two ships that followed – the
Irish ship and the Libyan ship.
Before this flotilla, the IDF prepared to enforce the blockade, as it had
during previous flotillas.
Given the number of ships, their size, the number of passengers on board and
their stated intentions, we saw the need to make a special diplomatic effort
to try and prevent the flotilla’s arrival to the shores of Gaza – or at the
very least to convince its organizers to dock at Ashdod or El-Arish and from
there to direct the goods through land crossings after the appropriate
security checks.
During the month of May, a continual diplomatic effort to this end was made
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vis-a-vis many countries, including
countries whose citizens were onboard or whose harbors could be used by the
flotilla at any stage of its voyage – including Egypt, Greece, Cyprus,
Ireland, Britain, the United Nations, and above all with Turkey. The
Minister of Defense even participated in these efforts.
Given the importance I attributed to Turkey’s central role in this flotilla,
my office worked directly to assist in the diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis
Turkey.
Beginning on May 14, my office was in contact with the highest echelons of
the Turkish government. These contacts, and later on the contacts of our
Minister of Defense with the Turkish Foreign Minister whom he has known for
many years, were intended to prevent any conflict with the Marmara flotilla.
They continued up until the eve of the flotilla's arrival off the coast of
Gaza. I too personally appealed to a senior official in the Egyptian
government on May 27 so that he would intervene with the Turkish government.
However, as the date of the flotilla’s arrival neared, it became clear that
diplomatic efforts would not stop it.
In contrast, diplomatic efforts did assist in preventing violent
confrontations with the two ships that came after this flotilla – because
the Irish government and parties in Libya acted responsibly and helped
prevent a confrontation and also because the organizers of those flotillas
did not have any intention of confronting our forces – unlike the organizers
of the flotilla in question, or more precisely, unlike the IHH activists on
the flagship, the Mavi Marmara.
In fact, even in that flotilla, the passengers on the other five ships did
not want a violent confrontation, and therefore there was no such
confrontation. That was not the case on the Marmara.
Despite our ongoing diplomatic efforts, ultimately the Turkish government
did not prevent the Marmara’s attempt to break the naval blockade. All our
suggestions to re-route the ship’s cargo to undergo a security inspection in
Ashdod and then be transferred to Gaza through the land crossings were in
vain. We also did not hear a public message from the Turkish government to
cool the heated tempers of the activists onboard.
Apparently the Turkish government did not see that a possible incident
between Turkish activists and Israel was against their interests, and
certainly not something that justified exerting effective pressure of the
IHH activists.
I must point out that on the 17th of that month, the Turkish prime minister
met with Iranian president Ahmadinejad and with the Brazilian president to
make a joint statement regarding an Iranian nuclear that was opposed by the
United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Turkey thereby strengthened its identification and cooperation with Iran
just days before the flotilla.
Regarding the IHH activists, not only did they not prevent a confrontation,
they announced their intention to seek one -- they announced that they
wanted to break the blockade and that “the Jews need to go back Auschwitz."
Given the lack of effective pressure by the Turkish government and the lack
of any desire on the part of the flotilla organizers to redirect their ships
to alternative ports, none of the diplomatic efforts were effective:
a.. We tried to prevent the launch of the flotilla at the diplomatic and
security levels. We did not succeed.
b.. We suggested transferring the goods through the Ashdod and El-Arish
ports. We did not succeed.
c.. We held continuous contacts vis-à-vis and with the most senior levels
of the Turkish government. We did not succeed.
During the closed forum, I will expand on my statement and explain why none
of our diplomatic efforts would have prevented the Marmara’s desire to try
to break the blockade.
When it became clear several days before the flotilla’s arrival that this
was the situation, I decided to convene “the Seven” in order to prepare for
the event in a coordinated manner in terms of the media, public relations
and diplomacy. Since this would be a media event surrounding a military
operation, in addition to the Ministers, I invited the Chief of General
Staff, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and members of the
National Information Directorate to the discussion.
I asked to receive an update regarding recent diplomatic and communication
efforts, and to hear additional ideas as to how to minimize the public
relations and diplomatic costs of a confrontation that already seemed
inevitable.
At the end of the meeting, I authorized diplomatic and communication
assignments as I was about to leave for a very important meeting with the
President of the United States.
I asked that the confrontation be minimized as much as possible and “that a
supreme effort be made to avoid harming anyone”. I know that the Minister
of Defense and Chief of General Staff gave the same order.
I also authorized a number of actions in order to reduce the damage to
Israel's public diplomacy efforts.
I would like to call your attention to one of those directives: embedding
foreign reporters with IDF forces so that they could record and film the
unfolding events in order to prevent the dissemination of false reports.
I wanted to ensure that there would be complete coverage of what would
happen when our soldiers boarded the ships because I was afraid that, once
again, there would be an attempt to try to slander IDF soldiers as part of
the ongoing propaganda war against Israel.
Unfortunately, slandering the IDF and the State of Israel happens time after
time. It happened during “Operation Defensive Shield” when a mass slaughter
in Jenin was invented. It happened during the Second Lebanon War and during
“Operation Cast Lead”, when Israel was falsely accused of intentionally
harming civilians.
It started to happen on the morning of May 31. Preliminary reports of the
event published around the world claimed that our soldiers killed innocent
peace activists.
It was only when videos were distributed several hours later that this lie
began to be exposed. Imagine what would have happened if we did not have
these videos.
Once they were published, fair-minded and honest people around the world
began to understand that the Marmara was no love boat and that the IHH
activists were not exactly innocent peace activists.
It was only then that many people understood that our soldiers faced a very
real danger to their lives from brutal attacks with clubs, metal rods and
knives and - as you have no doubt learned - from live weapons. IDF soldiers
acted in self-defense. We made tremendous efforts to prevent injuries, but
the IDF soldiers have the right to defend themselves.
I have no doubt that once the Commission hall uncovers all the facts and the
whole truth comes to light, all the slanders related to the flotilla that
have been directed at Israel and the IDF will dissipate."
--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il
Please take note that there is a burgeoning domestic weapons production
industry in the Gaza Strip. The quality of the rockets being manufactured
in Gaza is constantly improving in terms of payload and range as well as
accuracy.
So here is the puzzle: what is Israel's policy regarding the domestic Gaza
weapons industry? Is it Israel's policy, for example, not to tolerate the
existence and operation of the industry?
Before we turn to the answer, consider this excerpt from Prime Minister
Netanyahu's remarks today:
"As the Prime Minister of Israel, responsible for the security of the state
and its citizens, I certainly cannot ignore the true character of Hamas and
the threat it presents Israel.
When I began my tenure as Prime Minister, I determined Israel’s policy with
regard to this threat according to the following principles:
1.. Acting to secure the release of Gilad Shalit.
2.. Immediately responding to firing on Israel from the Gaza Strip
3.. Acting to prevent the entry of weapons and war materiel into Gaza
4.. Preventing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza. "
Yes. Preventing the entry of weapons is on the "do list". Also preventing
the entry of "war material" is on the "do list".
But what about a policy not to tolerate the manufacture of rockets in Gaza?
Not on the list.
What is Israel's policy about weapons factories in Gaza?
The IDF includes them in its target bank.
That's to say: Israel won't actively take measures against a weapons factory
in the Gaza Strip except as part of a reprisal attack.
This is nothing new.
From the very first day Israel retreated from the Gaza Strip it took a very
clear policy: if the Palestinians don't shoot we will leave them alone.
Leave them alone to build rockets, prepare bunkers, tunnels, etc. and do
pretty much anything else they want to as long as they don't shoot.
Sound like an incredibly shortsighted policy?
Welcome to Israel. The land of the 24 hour planning horizon. ]
=========================
Prime Minister Netanyahu’s 9.8.10 Statement Before the Turkel Commission
(Communicated by the Prime Minister's Media Adviser)
"Members of the Commission,
I am the first person to appear before this distinguished commission. Many
others will appear after me, and I am sure that you will uncover all the
facts and bring the truth to light.
I am convinced that at the end of your investigation, it will be clear that
the State of Israel and the Israel Defense Forces conducted themselves in
accordance with international law and that the IDF fighters who boarded the
Marmara displayed a rare courage in fulfilling their mission and in
defending themselves against a real threat to their lives. I have full
confidence in our soldiers, and the State of Israel is proud of them.
The appearance of Israel’s Prime Minister before this committee today is the
best evidence of the high standards by which Israel’s democracy functions.
In the Middle East, democracy remains an endangered species. Unfortunately,
in this region, governments shoot their political opponents in broad
daylight, brutally repress women and stone them to death, and systematically
deny their minorities and entire populations the most basic human rights.
In these countries, there is no free press to expose such crimes, no genuine
parliaments to hold hearings, no independent courts to give the accused a
fair trial, and no local human rights organizations to file reports. There
is only tyranny and terror.
Israel has always been different -- very different. Israel is a liberal,
democratic country governed by the rule of law, with independent courts, a
bona fide parliament, and a free press.
Israel is an example of a democratic nation subject to unprecedented threats
of war and terrorism that simultaneously defends the security of its people
and protects its democratic values. Democratic nations that in recent years
have had to address the challenge of maintaining their values in the face of
increasing terrorism can learn much from Israel, a democracy that has been
successfully meeting this challenge for 62 years.
One of the reasons why we are so successful at meeting this challenge is
that we constantly examine our own actions. My testimony here today, as
well as the upcoming appearances of the political and military leadership of
Israel before this committee, is the best answer to those who raise
questions about the readiness and willingness of Israel to examine itself.
No country or army examines itself more thoroughly than Israel and the IDF.
To those who would point an accusatory finger at Israel, I ask: How many
countries would be willing to establish a truly independent commission such
as this one? How many countries would invite foreign observers to
participate in such a commission? How many Prime Ministers and Presidents
would appear before such a commission?
To those who argue that Israel does not investigate itself according to
accepted international standards, I say: It would be good if many countries
around the world were investigating themselves according to the high
standards set by Israel.
Gentlemen, in order to answer the Commission’s questions, I would first like
to clarify our policies concerning the Hamas regime in Gaza, on which we
based our actions regarding the flotilla.
Hamas is a terrorist organization that calls for and works toward the
destruction of Israel. The Hamas charter calls for the annihilation of the
Jewish people.
Over the past decade, Hamas has received increasing assistance from Iran,
which also calls to wipe Israel off the map. Iran has equipped Hamas with
thousands of rockets, missiles, and other weapons. Hamas has transformed
the Gaza Strip into a terrorist enclave sponsored by Iran, which I referred
to in January 2006 as “Hamastan”. In addition, Iran provides Hamas with
intelligence assistance, military training, political support and
significant funding.
Hamas took over the Gaza Strip in 2007 through military force. It expelled
the Palestinian Authority and denied it any effective presence there. Since
that time, Hamas has increasingly fortified its hold on the Gaza Strip and
has turned it into a huge weapons depot and a base from which to attack
Israel.
From the Gaza Strip, Hamas fired thousands of rockets, missiles and mortars
that harmed Israel’s towns and citizens. At first, the fire rained down on
Sderot and the communities abutting Gaza. Later on, Ashkelon, Beer-Sheva
and Ashdod were also attacked. Today, Hamas has stockpiled weapons that can
reach Tel Aviv and other distant areas inside of Israel.
Despite a significant decrease in the number of rocket and missile attacks
over the past 18 months, the firing has not stopped. Just a few days ago,
without any provocation, Hamas permitted the firing of a Grad missile at
residential areas of Ashkelon and covertly dispatched a terror cell from
Gaza into the Sinai that fired missiles at Eilat and Aqaba.
Much of the time, the firing at Israel emanates from populated areas in
Gaza – from homes and schools, from sites adjacent to hospitals, mosques, UN
facilities, etc.
In 2006, Hamas kidnapped our soldier Gilad Shalit, and for the past four
years has held him in a cruel captivity, complete isolated, without even a
single visit by the Red Cross, in blatant violation of international law and
the most basic human values.
As the President of the Supreme Court, Justice Dorit Beinish, said: “The
Gaza Strip is controlled by a murderous terrorist organization which acts
tirelessly to harm the State of Israel and its residents and which, through
its violent actions directed indiscriminately at citizens – men, women and
children – violates every possible rule of international law.”
Since this Commission is dealing with the question of international law, I
would like to point out that Hamas is guilty of at least four war crimes:
inciting to genocide; systematically and intentionally firing on civilians;
using civilians as human shields; and preventing visits by the Red Cross to
kidnapped IDF soldier, Gilad Shalit.
These are not merely past crimes. They are being committed today as well,
and I hope this Commission will deem it appropriate to emphasize these
points in its report. I ask this only because other commissions, which
claimed that the question of human rights and international law were so dear
to their hearts, for some reason almost entirely ignored these central
issues. I am convinced that a credible investigation like yours –
independent, transparent, impartial and responsible – will certainly not
ignore them.
As the Prime Minister of Israel, responsible for the security of the state
and its citizens, I certainly cannot ignore the true character of Hamas and
the threat it presents Israel.
When I began my tenure as Prime Minister, I determined Israel’s policy with
regard to this threat according to the following principles:
1.. Acting to secure the release of Gilad Shalit.
2.. Immediately responding to firing on Israel from the Gaza Strip
3.. Acting to prevent the entry of weapons and war materiel into Gaza
4.. Preventing a humanitarian crisis in Gaza;
Let me begin with Gilad Shalit.
This is a subject which touches the hearts of all the people of Israel.
When I began serving as Prime Minister, I appointed Hagai Hadas to head the
efforts to secure Gilad’s release and I welcomed the appointment of a German
mediator with proven experience.
Within six months, we made a deal in which received a video that showed
Gilad talking and functioning both physically and cognitively. I attribute
great importance to this tape because the entire world now knows that Hamas
is holding Gilad and is responsible for his welfare.
Three months later, I agreed to the mediator’s proposed deal in which 450
Hamas prisoners would be released, along with an additional 550 Palestinian
prisoners, in exchange for Gilad’s release. At the same time, I insisted on
security demands that would prevent dangerous prisoners who would be
released from harming Israeli citizens again.
Eight months after we agreed to accept the mediator’s proposal, we are still
waiting for Hamas’s answer. At the same time, we are working on various
other ways to secure Gilad’s release.
Regarding our policy of responding to missile attacks: It has always been my
belief that a policy of not responding to attacks would soon turn a trickle
of missiles into a rain, and that the rain would eventually become a storm.
That is why I instituted a policy in which the IDF would respond to each
missile strike on our territory and, as much as possible, close to the time
of attack.
Regarding preventing the entry of weapons: We continued the previous
government’s policy of preventing the entry of weapons and war materiel into
the Gaza Strip. Our efforts include intelligence and operational
activities, as well as extensive diplomatic activities vis-à-vis many
countries, the most important of which is Egypt.
I attribute great importance to strengthening Israel’s ties with Egypt,
first and foremost to strengthen the forces of peace and stability in our
region and also to increase the efforts to prevent the smuggling of weapons
from the Sinai into the Gaza Strip. I raised this subject in each of my
five meetings with President Mubarak over the past 18 months. I would like
to note that during the past year, Egypt has increased its efforts to
prevent the entry of weapons into territory controlled by Hamas.
As part of the effort to prevent the entry of weapons into the Gaza Strip,
my government has continued the naval blockade that was imposed by the
previous government during “Operation Cast Lead” in January of 2009 as well
as continuing the limitations and oversight on the movement of goods at land
crossings that was put in place in September 2007. I will have more to say
on this point later.
The fourth principle of our policy was to avoid a humanitarian crisis in
Gaza.
When I began serving as Prime Minister, I quickly understood that many of
our friends around the world were repeating the Hamas claim that the
limitations imposed in 2007 and the naval blockage imposed in January of
2009 had created a humanitarian crisis in Gaza.
However, the information we obtained clearly proved that this claim was
baseless. There was no hunger in Gaza and there was no lack of medicines or
other essential items.
Though the territory in question is controlled by a hostile terrorist force
that calls for our destruction, Israel did not stop supplying electricity,
water or fuel to Gaza, and we enabled the entry of food, medicine and other
basic goods.
We also continued to accept patients from Gaza in our hospitals in both
life-threatening cases or to treat unique medical problems. On average,
1,500 patients and accompanying family members come into Gaza each month.
There is nothing that more clearly proves the absurdity of the claim that
Israel is acting inhumanely toward Gaza. If only Hamas’s terrorist regime
would act towards Israel’s population and our kidnapped soldier, Gilad
Shalit, with a fraction of the humane sentiment Israel has shown towards the
population of Gaza and towards the prisoners of Hamas.
For both my government and the previous government, preventing a
humanitarian crisis in Gaza was both an obligation and a desire. While we
did prevent a humanitarian crisis, we did not succeed in preventing the
image of a humanitarian crisis – an image that was entirely false.
Even though there was not a humanitarian crisis in Gaza, I decided to
gradually ease the limitations and the movement of goods through the land
crossings.
I did so because gradually these limitations turned into a diplomatic and
public relations burden. They were used in a mendacious propaganda campaign
that began to undermine international support for our policy to prevent the
entry of weapons into Gaza.
Accordingly, we expanded the list of food items in 2009 and we increased the
number of trucks entering Gaza by approximately 30% over the five months
preceding the flotilla incident.
However, our decision to ease limitations on the entry of civilian goods had
little impact on the international discourse. Despite these steps and the
photographs of the marketplaces of Gaza filled with goods which we
distributed to the world, the perception in the international community that
there was a humanitarian crisis in Gaza increasingly took root.
Forces hostile to Israel used the baseless allegation of a humanitarian
crisis to try and break the naval blockade. This was and remains the
primary motivation of Hamas in its efforts to encourage the various
flotillas. From time to time, these things are even said explicitly, as a
spokeswoman for the flotilla said on May 27, 2010: “Our mission is not to
provide humanitarian aid, but rather to break the blockade.”
It is worth mentioning that it was Israel, through the UN, and not the
flotilla organizers, that sought to ensure that the goods aboard the
flotillas were ultimately transferred to Gaza.
At the meeting of senior ministers called “the Seven” that was held before
the flotilla arrived on May 26, 2010 -- I presume you will read the protocol
of that meeting - I stressed the need to clarify Israel's policy in light of
the attempts to undermine the security blockade through the false claim of a
humanitarian crisis.
The discussion in “the Seven” was a continuation of a discussion held that
same morning by the same forum regarding our general policy towards the
Hamas regime in Gaza, during which I determined the need “to examine the
blockade policy and its security and diplomatic ramifications”.
In the discussion held by “the Seven”, I said that the principle that should
guide us is “the prevention of weapons smuggling." I also said that this
was the only explanation that will be understood by the international
community and that the right policy would be one in which Israel would
“screen and inspect" goods to prevent the entry of weapons into the Gaza
Strip.
After the flotilla, we continued this discussion and made the decision in
the Cabinet - the direction of which was already clear in the discussion of
“the Seven” - to complete the removal of the limitations on civilian goods
and leave the security blockade in force.
Obviously, the flotilla incident and the international discourse that
followed accelerated this decision. However, as you can see from the
discussions held by “the Seven”, the direction of the decision was already
clear beforehand.
Our policy, therefore, is intended to maintain the naval blockade which
supports the security blockade.
I would like to explain how dangerous an open sea lane to Gaza is for the
security of the State of Israel. On one ship, the Karin A, Iran tried to
send dozens of tons of weapons to Gaza. On another ship, the Francop, Iran
tried to send Hezbollah hundreds of tons of weapons, approximately
two-thirds of the total ammunition fired at Israel during the Second Lebanon
War.
Due to all these security considerations, my government continued to enforce
the naval blockade imposed by the previous government. We did so for the
flotilla in question, as well as with the two ships that followed – the
Irish ship and the Libyan ship.
Before this flotilla, the IDF prepared to enforce the blockade, as it had
during previous flotillas.
Given the number of ships, their size, the number of passengers on board and
their stated intentions, we saw the need to make a special diplomatic effort
to try and prevent the flotilla’s arrival to the shores of Gaza – or at the
very least to convince its organizers to dock at Ashdod or El-Arish and from
there to direct the goods through land crossings after the appropriate
security checks.
During the month of May, a continual diplomatic effort to this end was made
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs vis-a-vis many countries, including
countries whose citizens were onboard or whose harbors could be used by the
flotilla at any stage of its voyage – including Egypt, Greece, Cyprus,
Ireland, Britain, the United Nations, and above all with Turkey. The
Minister of Defense even participated in these efforts.
Given the importance I attributed to Turkey’s central role in this flotilla,
my office worked directly to assist in the diplomatic efforts vis-à-vis
Turkey.
Beginning on May 14, my office was in contact with the highest echelons of
the Turkish government. These contacts, and later on the contacts of our
Minister of Defense with the Turkish Foreign Minister whom he has known for
many years, were intended to prevent any conflict with the Marmara flotilla.
They continued up until the eve of the flotilla's arrival off the coast of
Gaza. I too personally appealed to a senior official in the Egyptian
government on May 27 so that he would intervene with the Turkish government.
However, as the date of the flotilla’s arrival neared, it became clear that
diplomatic efforts would not stop it.
In contrast, diplomatic efforts did assist in preventing violent
confrontations with the two ships that came after this flotilla – because
the Irish government and parties in Libya acted responsibly and helped
prevent a confrontation and also because the organizers of those flotillas
did not have any intention of confronting our forces – unlike the organizers
of the flotilla in question, or more precisely, unlike the IHH activists on
the flagship, the Mavi Marmara.
In fact, even in that flotilla, the passengers on the other five ships did
not want a violent confrontation, and therefore there was no such
confrontation. That was not the case on the Marmara.
Despite our ongoing diplomatic efforts, ultimately the Turkish government
did not prevent the Marmara’s attempt to break the naval blockade. All our
suggestions to re-route the ship’s cargo to undergo a security inspection in
Ashdod and then be transferred to Gaza through the land crossings were in
vain. We also did not hear a public message from the Turkish government to
cool the heated tempers of the activists onboard.
Apparently the Turkish government did not see that a possible incident
between Turkish activists and Israel was against their interests, and
certainly not something that justified exerting effective pressure of the
IHH activists.
I must point out that on the 17th of that month, the Turkish prime minister
met with Iranian president Ahmadinejad and with the Brazilian president to
make a joint statement regarding an Iranian nuclear that was opposed by the
United States and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council.
Turkey thereby strengthened its identification and cooperation with Iran
just days before the flotilla.
Regarding the IHH activists, not only did they not prevent a confrontation,
they announced their intention to seek one -- they announced that they
wanted to break the blockade and that “the Jews need to go back Auschwitz."
Given the lack of effective pressure by the Turkish government and the lack
of any desire on the part of the flotilla organizers to redirect their ships
to alternative ports, none of the diplomatic efforts were effective:
a.. We tried to prevent the launch of the flotilla at the diplomatic and
security levels. We did not succeed.
b.. We suggested transferring the goods through the Ashdod and El-Arish
ports. We did not succeed.
c.. We held continuous contacts vis-à-vis and with the most senior levels
of the Turkish government. We did not succeed.
During the closed forum, I will expand on my statement and explain why none
of our diplomatic efforts would have prevented the Marmara’s desire to try
to break the blockade.
When it became clear several days before the flotilla’s arrival that this
was the situation, I decided to convene “the Seven” in order to prepare for
the event in a coordinated manner in terms of the media, public relations
and diplomacy. Since this would be a media event surrounding a military
operation, in addition to the Ministers, I invited the Chief of General
Staff, representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and members of the
National Information Directorate to the discussion.
I asked to receive an update regarding recent diplomatic and communication
efforts, and to hear additional ideas as to how to minimize the public
relations and diplomatic costs of a confrontation that already seemed
inevitable.
At the end of the meeting, I authorized diplomatic and communication
assignments as I was about to leave for a very important meeting with the
President of the United States.
I asked that the confrontation be minimized as much as possible and “that a
supreme effort be made to avoid harming anyone”. I know that the Minister
of Defense and Chief of General Staff gave the same order.
I also authorized a number of actions in order to reduce the damage to
Israel's public diplomacy efforts.
I would like to call your attention to one of those directives: embedding
foreign reporters with IDF forces so that they could record and film the
unfolding events in order to prevent the dissemination of false reports.
I wanted to ensure that there would be complete coverage of what would
happen when our soldiers boarded the ships because I was afraid that, once
again, there would be an attempt to try to slander IDF soldiers as part of
the ongoing propaganda war against Israel.
Unfortunately, slandering the IDF and the State of Israel happens time after
time. It happened during “Operation Defensive Shield” when a mass slaughter
in Jenin was invented. It happened during the Second Lebanon War and during
“Operation Cast Lead”, when Israel was falsely accused of intentionally
harming civilians.
It started to happen on the morning of May 31. Preliminary reports of the
event published around the world claimed that our soldiers killed innocent
peace activists.
It was only when videos were distributed several hours later that this lie
began to be exposed. Imagine what would have happened if we did not have
these videos.
Once they were published, fair-minded and honest people around the world
began to understand that the Marmara was no love boat and that the IHH
activists were not exactly innocent peace activists.
It was only then that many people understood that our soldiers faced a very
real danger to their lives from brutal attacks with clubs, metal rods and
knives and - as you have no doubt learned - from live weapons. IDF soldiers
acted in self-defense. We made tremendous efforts to prevent injuries, but
the IDF soldiers have the right to defend themselves.
I have no doubt that once the Commission hall uncovers all the facts and the
whole truth comes to light, all the slanders related to the flotilla that
have been directed at Israel and the IDF will dissipate."
--------------------------------------------
IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il
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