Britannia Radio

Iran-North Korea Cooperation Deepens

Oct 18, 2010

By Robert Wall, David A. Fulghum London, Washington

Evidence continues to emerge that ballistic missile development ties between North ­Korea and Iran are active and producing improvements in the arsenals of both countries. While Iran has been the junior partner in the relationship in the past—acquiring No Dong and other missile technologies to build its own systems—a reverse flow of technical know-how is now underway. The first public appearance in North Korea of the BM25 Musudan, for instance, is a weapon that Israeli officials say has already been delivered to Iran. It is the first time the road-mobile, liquid-fueled intermediate-range ballistic ­missile has been shown beyond the North Korean military. The public unveiling took place on Oct. 10 during a parade attended by the country’s leader, Kim Jung Il, and leader-designate, Kim Jung Un. The BM25 is a derivative of the Russian-designed SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile, although it has been lengthened to add range. North Korea showed several of the missiles and wheeled launchers during the parade, although the operational status remains uncertain. The range is estimated at 3,000-4,000 km. (1,860-2,480 mi.), depending on warhead mass. The parade also showcased a No Dong ballistic missile with a tri-conic nose cone. That configuration is typically associated with Iran’s Shahab-3, causing analysts to say that technical information gleaned by Tehran in flight trials is being fed to Pyongyang. Such a move would suggest that Iran has made considerable progress in developing its indigenous missile-engineering ­expertise. The latest Iranian ballistic missile developments indicate the missiles “are much more sophisticated and reliable than the [early] Scud designs,” says Arieh Herzog, director of the Israel Missile Defense Organization. “The inertial navigation systems are better, and improved guidance in the final phase makes some of them accurate to within about 100 meters,” he says. A migration of the BM25 to Iran would have big security implications for Europe, since it would give Tehran the ability to strike targets in southern Europe. For Israel, the introduction of the BM25 would have relatively modest impact on its strategic calculation, since Iran already has the ability to strike Israeli cities with ballistic missiles, but it would allow Iran to disperse its launchers over a much larger area in the eastern part of the country. What’s more, Israeli planners are just as concerned about the rapid rise in ­lower-end rocket threats. The biggest worry stems from the fact that adversaries are being equipped with inexpensive but effective guidance systems that have tightened targeting errors to within 100-200 meters (330-655 ft.). That is high accuracy compared with Iraq’s rain of Scuds in 1991 that could predictably hit only large cities such as Tel Aviv or Riyadh. The Scuds created public fears and political pressure, but had virtually no effect on the military conflict. China has also participated in the exchange of missile technology. The Chinese Dong Feng DF‑11 missile was exported to Iran in 1995 and formed the basis of Iran’s Fateh (Conqueror) 110. The Fateh 110 was, in turn, exported to Syria, which used it as the basis for its M600 Zelzal missile. “While everybody is concerned about the Scuds, they are no more problematic than the M600 missiles,” says an Israeli military analyst.

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