Lessons on Egypt From Carter and the Shah
The fate of Iran after the U.S. abandoned its ally shows where events
this week could lead.
By Ronen Bergman
The Wall Street Journal
February 1, 2011
The White House's reaction to the rioting in Egypt is
shortsighted-and typical of what is wrong with the Obama
administration's Middle East policy. Only days ago, President Hosni
Mubarak was a longstanding and valued ally of the U.S. His regime was
the beneficiary of a $2 billion annual American aid package (the
second largest after Israel). And the White House and the State
Department tread carefully when broaching the issue of human rights
with Mr. Mubarak.
But after not even a week of protests, official U.S. statements
regarding Egypt have suddenly made human rights and democracy all the
rage. There's also been talk of terminating U.S. aid.
The U.S. has played this game with dictatorial regimes in the Middle
East for decades. The dilemma it faces is difficult, but it certainly
isn't new: Support a distasteful regime because it is a strategic
ally, or disavow the dictatorship because it betrays fundamental
American values like freedom and democracy.
The first option gives the U.S. immediate practical benefits, not the
least of which is increased regional stability. But there is a price
for this pact with the devil: The U.S. image is tarnished by
association, and the citizens who suffer under the dictator's yoke
are not likely to forget American support for the abuses.
With the second option, U.S. short-term interests will likely suffer
as other players rush in to fill the void. Image-wise, the U.S.
shines. And the hope is that in the long run, the country-and
others-will remember this principled stand and the U.S. will gain
some practical benefit from it.
The most difficult maneuver to execute is switching from one option
to the other midstream. In fact, the U.S. has never accomplished this
maneuver successfully in the Middle East, and all indications are
that it is unlikely to succeed now.
The most obvious example of this failure was President Jimmy Carter's
catastrophic mishandling of the events in Iran in 1978-79. The Shah
had flouted Iranians' basic freedoms for decades, yet this hadn't
prevented the U.S. from striking oil and arms deals with him.
On New Year's Eve 1977, President Carter called the Shah "an island
of stability" in the region. Yet as Iranians protested the Shah's
reign beginning in the fall of 1978, Mr. Carter began to insist on
democratic reform and human rights-to the exclusion of practically
everything else. To the extent that this criticism contributed to the
Shah's downfall, it was spectacularly counterproductive.
It certainly did not satisfy the masses of protestors-a hodgepodge of
left-wing and right-wing activists and religious extremists-who
continued to fill the streets. As they did, the high command of the
military (then 800,000 strong, the sixth-biggest in the world) waited
impatiently for a visit from Mr. Carter's emissary, the deputy
commander of American forces in Europe, Gen. Robert E. Huyser, who
came on Jan. 8, 1979. They wanted to know one thing: If they took
over, would the U.S. prevent a Russian invasion of Iran? That is all.
They could have handled everything else by themselves.
But the White House believed that a military intervention would be
the worst move possible. Huyser came to Tehran in order to relay the
message that President Carter had sent him to ensure a democratic
Iran.
When Huyser left Tehran, ties between the generals and Ayatollah
Khomeini, who had emerged as the leader of the opposition, had
strengthened. The army interpreted Huyser's message as a form of
abandonment. Gen. Abbas Gharabaghi, chief of staff of the army,
promised Khomeini, who returned from exile to cheering crowds on Feb.
1, that the army would not leave its bases. (Yesterday, the Egyptian
army promised it would not open fire on the protestors.)
On Jan. 16, the Shah, ailing and debilitated, decided that without
American backing he had best pack up and leave. He flew to Egypt with
his wife and a handful of aides. There he was welcomed as a head of
state by his friends, President Anwar Sadat and Vice President Hosni
Mubarak.
We are all familiar with what happened next. First, a bloody campaign
waged against all dissent against Iran's new clerical rulers. Then
the establishment of an Islamic regime in Tehran that has been no
friend to the U.S. For the past 30 years, Iran has attempted to
undermine the stability of the Middle East. It has been worse in
terms of human rights abuses than the regime it replaced, and it now
threatens the entire region with its nuclear program.
Also consider what happened in Gaza. In 2006, then-Secretary of State
Condoleezza Rice applied considerable pressure on the Israeli
government to permit the participation of Hamas in the elections of
the newly independent Gaza. This plan to create instant democracy was
based on a heavy dose of wishful thinking, including the unfounded
belief that Hamas would win only 30% of the vote and thus not pose a
real threat. In the end, Hamas won 70% of the vote and ultimately
gained total control of the Strip. Along the way, it killed many of
its Fatah opponents, ending any hope of true democracy there for
years to come.
Human rights and democracy are not causes that can be turned on and
off at will, like a tap of water. To suddenly demand respect for
human rights when the survival of the Egyptian regime is in the
balance-a scenario that could soon be repeated in Jordan and
elsewhere-is cheap, feel-good populism, and evidence of a
short-sighted approach that risks creating a long-term human rights
disaster zone.
Past experience suggests that if Mr. Mubarak's regime is toppled, not
only will American interests suffer, but the cause of freedom in
Egypt could be set back dramatically. And the U.S. will have
contributed to a Middle East that is less stable and more dangerous
than it is today.
Mr. Bergman is a senior military and intelligence analyst for Yedioth
Ahronoth, an Israeli daily. He is currently working on a book about
the Mossad and the art of assassination.
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