The Meir Amit
Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
June 23, 2011
The Upcoming Flotilla to the Gaza Strip Update (June 22, 2011)1
The organizers of Freedom Flotilla 2 face difficulties but are determined
to dispatch the flotilla, even with fewer ships than originally planned,
despite its lack of world legitimacy and in the face of political pressure
and technical difficulties
Latest Developments (as of June 22, 2011)
1. IHH head Bülent Yildirim recently announced that due to technical
difficulties, the Mavi Marmara would not sail with the other ships in the
upcoming flotilla. The participation of the Turkish cargo ship was also
canceled.
2. Yildirim denied that the difficulties were political. He said the Turkish
government had not asked IHH to cancel Turkish participation the flotilla
that that the reasons for the cancelation were purely technical. He added
that some of the Turkish participants would sail on other ships but that he
himself would not participate in the flotilla because of his strong
spiritual connections to the Mavi Marmara (Hürriyet, June 27, 2011).
However, it is not clear whether the more moderate participants will permit
operatives belonging to IHH and other radical Islamist organizations sail
with them.
3. The other organizations announced that they were planning to sail despite
the lack of IHH participation.
1) According to an announcement issued by the Free Gaza Movement (FGM), the
main umbrella network behind the flotilla, the Mavi Marmara's cancellation
meant that the flotilla was not Turkish-Islamic in nature, as Israel
claimed. Hundreds of participants, it said, and dozens of organizations from
all over the world would participate, far more than in the first flotilla,
even without the Turkish ship (FGM website, June 16, 2011).
2) Rami Abdo, a spokesman for the European Campaign to End the Siege on
Gaza (ECESG, one of the networks organizing the flotilla), said that a
meeting [held by the flotilla's steering committee] in Istanbul on June 20,
decided that the flotilla would set sail on June 25, as originally planned.
He said the organizers did not want to reveal the number of participants
until all administrative arrangements had been finalized (Radio Sawt
al-Quds, June 21, 2011). In addition, the organizers of the flotilla in
France said that a French ship (or two) would sail in the flotilla, contrary
to a previous announcement.
4. The flotilla organizers claim that 10 of the planned 15 ships have
already been acquired (Hürriyet, June 19; Agence France-Presse and The
Toronto Star, June 20, 2011). In reality, the number of ships now available
to the organizers may be smaller. According to the various announcements,
there will be 500 to 600 passengers and the flotilla will set sail from the
region of Greece on or around June 25-28. Some of the delegations (from the
United States and Canada, for instance) flew to the region to join the ships
anchored there (the Canadian delegation arrived in Greece on June 20). Some
of the delegations were supposed to receive training in "passive resistance"
tactics in view of possible scenarios for the flotilla.
The Significance of the Current Situation
5. The significance of the current developments is the following:
1) Apparently, the flotilla's organizers who do not belong to IHH are still
planning to go ahead, although on a smaller scale than previously planned,
with the participation of Western (American, Canadian, European and
Australian) anti-Israeli networks. It is not known whether IHH activists
will sail on the Western ships (which in our assessment are at full
capacity) as announced by Bülent Yildirim, or whether the entire
organization will not participate in the current flotilla. In any event,
even if IHH activists do sail, their presence will be small and symbolic, as
opposed to the central part they played in the previous flotilla.
2) Even if the flotilla does take place, there will be a significant
difference between its original plan and final format. Since the previous
flotilla, the organizers have been acting to dispatch an upgraded flotilla
of 15 vessels whose flagship would be the Mavi Marmara. Their objective was
to magnify the flotilla's propaganda effect and set a new high point in
their anti-Israeli campaign, while making it difficult for Israel to respond
to the challenge. In effect, there will be fewer ships than planned.
3) In addition, the flagship Mavi Marmara, which became a symbol and was
supposed to carry a significant number of participants, will not sail.
Moreover, during the political propaganda campaign which has been waged in
recent months, the organizers faced a number of setbacks which eroded the
legitimacy for flotilla as far as world opinion was concerned (reservations
were expressed openly by the Secretary-General of the UN, the United States,
the European Union and various Western countries). Thus the flotilla may set
sail with a certain diminished public standing, for the organizers, may be
seen as involving a certain risk, although the loss of prestige (and
possible also of money) in cancelling it would be greater (at least at this
point).
4) The announcement made by the IHH leader changed the flotilla's character.
It will no longer be dominated by Turkish Islamists, but rather led by
Western anti-Israeli networks which have been joined by social activists and
human rights activists who identify with the Palestinian cause (although
Arab-Muslim activists are also expected to participate, for example in the
British delegation). The aforementioned situation will mean the following:
A) Rather than IHH, two umbrella networks which participated with IHH in the
current (and previous) flotilla will now be prominent: the Free Gaza
Movement (FGM), anchored in America's radical left, affiliated with the US
Boat to Gaza, which plans to send 50 passengers on a ship called The
Audacity of Hope; and the European Campaign to End the Siege on Gaza
(ECESG), based in Britain and including Arab-Islamic activists, some of whom
are affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas. They may be joined by
a group of Arab extremists dominated by Jordanians (See below).
B) In our assessment, without Bülent Yildirim (assuming that he really will
not participate), leadership of the flotilla will pass to the senior leaders
of the FGM and ECESG. The FGM's three leading figures are Huwaida Arraf
(American with an Israeli Arab father and Palestinian mother), her husband
Adam Shapiro (American, Jewish) and Greta Berlin (supposed to sail on board
the American ship). The ECESG's leaders are Amin Abu Rashad (Holland),
Arafat Madi Mahmoud Shukri (Britain) and Rami Abdo (Britain). So far it is
unclear on which ships the flotilla leadership will sail (in the previous
flotilla command was located aboard the Mavi Marmara).
C) In our assessment the change in the flotilla's character will also change
the type of action the participants take. The extreme, organized violence
instigated by IHH will be exchanged for tactics of passive resistance, in
which Western activists are experienced, or by extreme violence instigated
by the Arab group, which is radical and potentially more dangerous than the
others. The presence of activists who participated in previous convoys and
flotillas and gained experience in anti-Israeli activities in the
Palestinian Authority-administered territories may inspire a physical
confrontation with IDF soldiers, even if in public the flotilla organizers
stress their commitment to nonviolence. Some of the participating
delegations (the Canadian delegation, for instance) received a short
training course (two days or so) in the tactics of passive resistance.2
D) Belonging to the Western networks are well-known public figures and
celebrities, many media personnel, Jews (especially in the American
delegation), politicians, human rights activists and social activists. Their
presence can be expected to be highlighted (as was done by the FGM) to
stress the flotilla's humanitarian character and to show that it is not
composed of Islamist extremists, as Israel claims. The objective is to make
points in the media campaign (which will also be waged during the flotilla)
and to make it difficult for Israel to halt the flotilla.
5) Recent developments brought into prominence IHH's dependence on the
Turkish government, in contrast to the independent decisions made by the
Western anti-Israeli networks: IHH has been forced to accommodate the
Turkish government's foreign policy considerations, and internal Turkish
affairs (the elections) forced the sailing date to be postponed to the end
of June. In the final analysis those considerations forced IHH to waive the
participation of the Mavi Marmara (and not, as claimed, "technical
difficulties," "the events in Syria," or the opening of the Rafah crossing,
which made the flotilla less significant). However, Western NGOs are less
dependent on governmental support and they still plan to dispatch the
flotilla, despite reservations held by the international community.
Nevertheless, Turkey apparently continues as an important focus for flotilla
organizing activities (the flotilla's steering committee met in Istanbul on
June 20, 2011).
6) The flotilla's objectives are geared toward political propaganda and not
humanitarian objectives. While the organizers openly state that their
objective is to lift the so-called "siege" of the Gaza Strip and bring
supplies to the Gazans, the humanitarian assistance on board the ships will
apparently be limited. For example, the American organizers have declared
that most of their cargo will consist of thousands of letters written by
Americans all over the country in support of and to identify with the
Gazans. The previous flotilla as well brought only a small cargo of
humanitarian assistance. It is another illustration of the fact that the
true objectives of the flotilla are political, merging with the objectives
of the campaign to delegitimize Israel: defamation of Israel in
international public opinion, isolating Israel, complicating Israel's
diplomatic relations with various countries and making it difficult for
Israel to wage its war on terrorism (without inspection of the cargos there
is nothing to prevent the ships from bringing weapons to the Gaza Strip). To
increase the flotilla's media impact the organizers will accompany it with
protests in various locations in Western countries,3 and perhaps even in the
Arab countries and the Palestinian Authority-administered territories.
7) There is an issue of Arab-Muslim participation, whose scope and nature
are currently unclear. Wael al-Saqa, chairman of the Jordan LifeLine
committee, recently said that negotiations for purchasing an Arab ship were
in their "final stages." It was also reported that a representative of the
committee went to Greece in the middle of June to conduct the purchase of a
ship (Watan News, June 15, 2011). [Note: On June 25 the Kuwaiti News Agency
reported that the Jordanian committee announced it had signed for the
purchase of a boat at the cost of €560,000, which would carry 70 Arab
passengers. According to the announcement, it is registered to a company
named Nur, which was set up by Arab investors for Arab participation in the
flotilla.] However, the cancellation of the Mavi Marmara's participation may
create difficulties for some of the Arab delegations which planned to sail
with it. So far apparently Arab-Muslim participation will be smaller in
comparison to the previous flotilla.
6. Apendices
1) Partial information about the ships expected to participate in the
flotilla
2) Partial information about the participants from Western Europe, Canada,
Australia and the United States.
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1 The full version appears in Hebrew on the ITIC website. The full English
version will appear shortly.
2 For further information about X, see the date ITIC bulletin, " The use of
nonviolent tactics is planned for the upcoming flotilla to the Gaza Strip.
In effect, it is liable to be translated into hard violence directed against
the IDF " at
3 The organizers of the American delegation have appealed to the American
public to hold protests, for example, in front of Israeli consulates and
American administration institutions, by appealing to the White House and
Congress, all to be accompanied by broad media activity.
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IMRA - Independent Media Review and Analysis
Website: www.imra.org.il
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