Thursday, 14 July 2011

Israel’s ruling elites have been afflicted by a mental disorder


prevalent in advanced democratic societies.


I call this disorder "Demophrenia."


Below is an abstract from my book Demophrenia:


Israel and the Malaise of Democracy.


CHAPTER 5


DEMOPHRENIA: SYMPTOMATOLOGY


by Prof. Paul Eidelberg

If in life we are surrounded by death,

so too in the health of our intellect, we are surrounded by madness.


—Ludwig Wittgenstein

Notebook on Culture and Value, 1944


Introduction


From its inception in 1948, the government of Israel, regardless of which party or coalition was at the helm, has been afflicted by "demophrenia." Demophrenia is a deeply rooted malady of national and even of world-historical significance. As indicated in the Prologue, demophrenia involves an antilogical and compulsive application of the democratic principles of freedom and equality to moral problems and ideological conflicts which are impervious to, and even exacerbated by, those principles. This disorder is most advanced in Israel, for its government is animated by a democratic mentality in conflict with Zionism, and ineffectual against the anti-democratic mentality of Israel's Arab inhabitants and neighbors.


To show that demophrenia is indeed a widespread but hitherto unrecognized mental disorder, I shall first review, by way of this Introduction, some of the literature on schizophrenia.


Schizophrenia is regarded as the core concept of modern psychiatry. Yet, after one hundred years of research, there is no commonly recognized causal explanation of this mental malady. In fact, the editor of a 1990 collection of essays written by clinical psychologists suggests that schizophrenia is not a meaningful scientific concept, that it does not refer to any empirically verifiable and naturally occurring entity, hence, that it should be abandoned.[1]


Various researchers distinguish between positive- and negative-symptom schizophrenia. The former includes hallucinations, delusions, and thought disorder; the latter includes autism, escapism, apathy, depersonalization, stereotypic behaviors, flattened emotional or affective reactions, impairment of volition, lack of self-esteem, paranoia, etc. Obviously these negative symptoms exist on a continuum with normal behavior. (I ignore the pathological antitheses of some of these symptoms.) Indeed, some psychologists contend that mental illnesses merely form the end-points of continuously variable behavior--a provocative position given the apparent discontinuity of function in auditory hallucinations and mutism (91, 161, 169). In any event, it should be borne in mind that schizophrenia is not necessarily a unitary or "all-encompassing illness which sets the patient apart from his fellow man" (61). A World Health Organization (WHO) study concludes that "schizophrenics, for all their vulnerabilities, are in the full sense responsive social beings like the rest of us" (63).


Still, those "vulnerabilities" can and do result in bizarre behavior. The renowned clinical psychologist Dr. David Shakow (seemingly) distinguishes four types of schizophrenic responses to diverse stimuli which, to my initial surprise, accurately describe the reactions of countless democrats to the characteristically bellicose behavior of Arab-Islamic leaders on the one hand, and to the occasionally pacific utterances of those leaders on the other:


(1) The central, directly meaningful stimulus is avoided, apparently because it is disturbing; instead the peripheral is endowed with meaning. (2) A casual attitude appears in which [only] part of the field is accepted as the stimulus. (3) The subject has a 'fixed' idea and resorts to it without regard for the [central and contradictory] stimulus. (4) The peripheral is ... selectively attended to, captures attention, and is adhered to.[2]


Moreover, to his false perception a schizophrenic's response may be appropriate or inappropriate to that perception. Alternatively, his perception may be veridical but his response will be inappropriate. The consequence, of course, is maladapted responses to reality.


The most pressing reality, at least to serious people in the West, is the stress and violence and disorder so evident in contemporary democratic society. Although WHO studies have shown that the prognosis of schizophrenia is worse in the urbanized and industrialized West than in the Third World (66), no systematic attempt has been made to determine whether the moral relativism and chaotic pluralism engendered by democracy contributes to schizophrenia. This lacuna may be attributed to the relativism that modulates the disciplines of psychology and psychiatry, as well as to the tendency of the medical profession to trace schizophrenia to biophysical causes (83, 93, 286).


The absence of research on the possible adverse effects of moral relativism on mental health is all the more curious when one considers that psychologists include "alienation," "anxiety," and "loss of identity" among the symptoms of schizophrenia. These symptoms are conspicuous in secular, egalitarian societies where moral relativism thrives. Surely a loss of belief in objective moral standards has emotional and behavioral consequences, some of which may be deleterious. Indeed, many psychotherapists maintain that "belief-modification" can mitigate various schizophrenic symptoms (244, 274). But if relativism or moral egalitarianism has adverse effects on the mental health of individuals, it may also impair, imperceptibly, the rationality of their government in matters of vital public concern.


A unique analysis of schizophrenia, with far-reaching significance for contemporary democracy, will be found in Ignacio Matte-Blanco's "Basic Logico-Mathematical Structures in Schizophrenia."[3] A profound student of Freud, Matte-Blanco takes his bearing (as does Shakow above) from the Freudian insight that the unconscious, as manifested in dreams, obliterates differences as if it were governed by an egalitarian logic which is anything but logical. Freud writes: "... the most insignificant points in common between two elements is enough to enable the dream-work to replace one by the other for any other purpose." Indeed, even "contraries are not kept apart but are treated as though they were identical, so that in the manifest dream [and according to Matte-Blanco, in the productions of more important psychical structures] any element may also stand for its contrary." Which means that "The governing laws of logic have no sway in the unconscious; it might be called the Kingdom of the Illogical."[4] Using Blanconian principles, I shall relate this "Kingdom of the Illogical" to the mentality and behavior of Israel's intellectual and political elites.


As indicated in the Prologue, Matte-Blanco (a practicing psychoanalyst) examines schizophrenic as well as normal mentality in logical, and not simply in dynamic, terms.


Ordinary thinking, it was said, deals with things (objects, persons, or concepts) which are in some way distinguishable from one another and with the relations existing between them. To be more precise, the mind recognizes, or makes propositions about, one thing, another thing, and their relation. The relation between things, using Matte-Blanco's terminology, can be either "symmetrical" or "asymmetrical." For example, in the proposition "A is different from B," the relation is symmetrical, whereas in the proposition "A is part of B," the relation is asymmetrical. Underlying such propositions are certain logical assumptions or principles, such as: (1) the principle of identity: A is identical to A; (2) the concept of two-valued or Aristotelian logic: either A or not A (either proposition A is true or not true); (3) the principle of formal contradiction: two contradictory assertions cannot be both true at the same time; (4) the principle of incompatibility: A cannot be different from and totally equal to B.[5] This said, let us examine Matte-Blanco's examples of symmetrical and asymmetrical relations:


If John is the brother of Peter, the converse is: Peter is the brother of John. The relation which exists between them is symmetrical, because the converse is identical with the direct relation. But if John is the father of Peter, the converse is: Peter is the son of John. In this case the relation and the converse are not identical. This type of relation which is always different from its converse is called asymmetrical" (213).


Now, according to Matte-Blanco, the "principle of symmetry" is not only a defining characteristic of the unconscious, but the unconscious treats asymmetrical relations as if they were symmetrical. This means that the unconscious uses a symmetrical logic that homogenizes the differences between things. Thus:


If John is the father of Peter, then Peter is the father of John. In Aristotelian logic this is absurd; in the logic of the unconscious it is normal ... [In other words], the principle of symmetry represents the most formidable departure from the logic upon which all the scientific and philosophical thinking of mankind has been based. We see it constantly in operation in schizophrenic and unconscious thinking (ibid.).


To appreciate the political significance of the principle of symmetry, we must first note that in classifying diverse things (objects, persons, or concepts), the logical mind selects some characteristic which they have in common without negating their differences. To illustrate: Jacob (a Jew) is a member of set or class of "Israelis," and so is Ahmed (a Muslim). This means that both satisfy some characteristic--say born in Israel--which defines or determines the class (which characteristic does not logically negate Jacob and Ahmed's religious or other differences.) But in view of Matte-Blanco's understanding of schizophrenia,


When the principle of symmetry is applied, all members of a set or class are treated as identical to one another and to the whole set or class, and are therefore interchangeable with respect to the propositional function [hereafter "characteristic"] which defines the class and also with respect to all the characteristics which differentiate them.


In Aristotelian logic each member of a class fully expresses the characteristic of the class, but it also expresses other characteristics as well, and it is in these other characteristics that the members of a class are different from one another. But if the principle of symmetry is applied this is no longer so (213-214).


For example--and here I shall only substitute my own individuals and classes for those used by Matte-Blanco: Jacob is a member of the class of "Israelis" and so is Ahmed; this means that both satisfy the attribute which defines the class. But Jacob may also be a member of a number of other classes, such as "Zionists," "secularists," "humanists," etc. Ahmed, on the other hand, is not an element of these classes to which Jacob belongs. The difference between them can be described precisely in terms of these characteristics which they do not have in common. If Ahmed were an element of all the classes to which Jacob belongs, then there would be no difference whatsoever between them. But ®PL59if the principle of symmetry is applied it is sufficient that both are elements of one class ("Israelis") to be identical. In scientific logic this is absurd (214).


It follows that when the principle of symmetry is applied to the members of the class of "Israelis," it negates Jacob and Ahmed's ideological differences, which differences may well involve diametrically opposed goals or loyalties. Clearly the principle of symmetry is a logical extension of the democratic principle of equality, one corollary of which is moral egalitarianism.


This may be illustrated by an example of "semantic subversion" (a theme to be discussed in Chapter 7). Thus, A, B, and C belong to a set of people which the democratic media designate as "activists." But whereas A and B advocate armed struggle, C advocates political struggle, to achieve their respective goals. Moreover, whereas A's goal is to establish an autocracy, B's and C's goal is to establish a democracy. When the principle of symmetry is applied, all members of the set of "activists" are treated as identical to one another and to the whole set, and are therefore interchangeable with respect to the characteristic which defines the set and also with respect to all the characteristics which differentiate them. Similarly, in the universe of discourse structured by moral egalitarianism, if A uses violence to destroy a democracy and B uses violence against A to preserve that democracy, both will be called "terrorists." We are now prepared to examine the relationship between the principle of symmetry and the negative symptoms of schizophrenia, in particular those involving the affective reactions.


When, as a consequence of the principle of symmetry, all members of a set or class are treated as identical to one another regardless of their ideological antagonisms, a leveling of affects occurs. For as Shakow also saw, there can be no distinctions between the affects if there are no perceived distinctions between stimuli. Matte-Blanco's analysis by means of the principle of symmetry is more revealing. To paraphrase:


The subtlety of responses to diverse stimuli presupposes the subtlety of differentiation. Confronted by an ensemble or set which contains everything, the individual's affective reactions or contacts should be diverse and contain contradictory affects. But under the influence of the principle of symmetry, instead of sharp contacts in small "zones" of affects, the contacts are of a "global" quality. Any sudden changes of affect can be understood as flashes of "asymmetrization" in the midst of a world immersed in "symmetrical unity" (219).


In such a world a patient may identify himself with any person, object, or concept (220). The loss of intellectual or moral discrimination may be accompanied by a loss of identity and self-esteem on the one hand, and by apathy and volitional impairment on the other:


[T]he principle of symmetry puts a total, absolute end to the possibility of logic-thinking in any 'zone' [or any political domain] of thinking-logic where it is applied. For this reason we may say that within its radius of action the principle of symmetry dissolves all logic: it is antilogical. It is obvious that it has no antilogical intentions, but only effects. We may more accurately say that the principle of symmetry is a logical way of describing an aspect of man which is completely alien to logic: an alogical component of man" (224).


For example, those afflicted by moral egalitarianism or democratic relativism tend to dissolve the ideological difference between A, who uses force as a means of destroying a democracy, and B, who uses force as a means of preserving a democracy. They focus on the means and disregard the ends.This mode of thinking conforms to what Harry Stack Sullivan termed "selective inattention." It exemplifies the symmetrical and therefore alogical mentality of schizophrenia. Here again the members of a set or class are treated as identical to one another and to the whole set or class, and are therefore interchangeable with respect to the characteristic which defines the class and also with respect to all the characteristics which differentiate them. This antilogical leveling of moral distinctions, so prominent in democracies, conforms to schizophrenia. Or as Dr. Blanco puts it:

If we study the essential structural aspects of schizophrenic manifestations and the characteristics of the unconscious processes we find that all of them constitute examples of different degrees of this process of unification and homogenization ... [Hence] there is not only in schizophrenia but in all normal human beings, an aspect which tends to treat reality as though it were homogeneous and indivisible. This contrasts with the thinking-logical aspect of man, which tends to distinguish things from one another" (224-225).


It follows from Dr. Blanco's ideas that schizophrenia is a misnomer, that the "classical term 'splitting' [of the personality] is hardly appropriate to what is observed in this respect," that it actually corresponds to an "invasion" or to an "increase of symmetrical relations" in areas of life where such symmetries do not exist or appear in a lesser degree. What happens in schizophrenia is not "splitting" but the exact opposite, "namely the formation of more inclusive classes or sets, to which the principle of symmetry is applied: as a result, everything becomes a transparent, unstructured, colossal unity" (223). Might not the term "demophrenia," in the horizontal or classless societies of the democratic world, be a more accurate designation for negative-symptom schizophrenia?


Like many schizophrenics, those afflicted by demophrenia are capable of dealing effectively with various areas of social reality. In other areas, however, they, too, to suffer from a lack of congruity between the three elements that form the personality: intellect, will, and the affective reactions. This classical understanding of schizophrenia, modified by the Blanconian principle of symmetry, may best be studied in the Jewish and democratic State of Israel, a state ensconced in a hostile Arab-Islamic sea. There demophrenics exhibit "selective inattention" to, as well as "symmetrization" of, contradictory aspects of cultural reality. While they ordinarily treat all the members of a set or population as identical to one another with respect to the general characteristic which defines the set or population, they typically ignore those characteristics which radically differentiate the members of that population. The result, as we shall presently see, is cognitive, volitional, and emotional impairment.


Although demophrenia encompasses these and other negative symptoms associated with schizophrenia, the malady is far more complex and difficult to recognize if only because it involves the dominant and democratic mentality of our age, one that has produced many blessings. Some evidence of demophrenia was presented in the previous chapters. The present chapter and the sequel will show, in a more vivid and systematic way, that demophrenia is very far advanced in the State of Israel.



[1] Richard B. Bentall (ed.), Reconstructing Schizophrenia (London: Routledge, 1990), pp. xiii, xv, 24, 284. (All further page references will appear in the text between parentheses.) See also D. G. Garan, Our Sciences Ruled by Human Prejudice (New York: Philosophical Library, 1987), pp. 119-122; Daniel R. Weinberger & Richard Jed Wyatt, "Structural Brain Abnormalities in Chronic Schizophrenia: Computed Tomography Findings," in Claude F. Baxter & Theodore Melnechuk (eds.), Perspectives in Schizophrenia Research (New York: Raven Press, 1980): "One of the oldest issues in schizophrenia research is whether the brains of schizophrenic patients are morphologically different from the brains of normal individuals. Despite 70 years of research, the question remains unresolved" (pp. 29-30); Joseph Zubin, "Chronic Schizophrenia from the Standpoint of Vulnerability," (ibid.):"Despite the notable advances made with each of these models [genetic, internal environment, neurophysiological, ecological, developmental, learning theory], we have not yet found any necessary or sufficient causes for schizophrenia" (277). Even of those psychiatrists who regard schizophrenia as a neurological disorder or brain deficit, few claim that its causes are known (24, 229).


[2] David Shakow, Adaptation in Schizophrenia: The Theory of Segmental Set (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1979), p. 67. Shakow cites Freud:"Protection against stimuli is an almost more important function of the living organism than reception of stimuli" (ibid., pp. 8-9).


[3] D. Kemali et al. (eds.), Schizophrenia Today (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1976), pp. 211-232. (All further page references will appear in the text between parentheses.) For a fuller analysis, see Ignacio Matte-Blanco, The Unconscious as Infinite Sets (London: Duckworth, 1975), ch. 2 et passim.


[4] Sigmund Freud, An Outline of Psycho-Analysis (London: Hogarth Press, 1963/1940), pp. 30-31, J. Strachey, trans.


[5]See Ignacio Matte-Blanco, Thinking, Feeling, and Being (London: Routledge, 1988), Introd. by Rayner & Tuckett, p. 7.