Turkey's recent international behavior is a clear indication that its
leadership, motivated by a neo-imperial syndrome, is leading the country's foreign policy into perilous waters.
The conflict over energy resources in the eastern Mediterranean only further exacerbates already strained Turkish-Israeli relations.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Strategic Realignment and Energy Security
in the Eastern Mediterranean
by Dr. Alexander Murinson
BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 159, January 9, 2012
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY:
Since the cooling of relations with Ankara in 2010,
Israel has sought alternative allies in the Mediterranean region, courting
Greece and Cyprus. An economic and security partnership between the three
non-Muslim countries in the eastern Mediterranean benefits all. The most
urgent strategic issue that unites them, however, is their need for energy
security. The recent discovery of substantial natural gas fields in the
Israeli and Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) challenge Turkey’s claim
as the central energy hub for Europe. Turkey is employing threatening
rhetoric as well as its navy to deter and harass Cypriot and Israeli
exploration efforts. Greece, Israel and Cyprus should increase their
strategic cooperation in order to contain such Turkish hostility.
Introduction
The eastern Mediterranean is becoming the focus of a growing geopolitical
tectonic shift. Today, Turkey, emboldened by the ouster of pro-Western
leaders in the region, such as Egyptian President Mubarak, envisions itself
as a revitalized master of the region once ruled by its Ottoman predecessors
prior to the dissolution of the Empire. This predominantly Sunni regional
bloc includes Egypt, Jordan and the Maghreb countries. As the fall of the
Alawite regime in Syria seems imminent, Syria and Lebanon are likely to join
the Turkey-inspired bloc.
Turkey’s ruling AKP party has reoriented its foreign policy, moving away
from Kemal Ataturk’s ideal and founding principle of Turkey as a part of
Western civilization. Instead, it is forging strategic ties with its Arab
neighbors and terrorist organizations like Hamas. The Mavi Marmara incident
in May 2010 served as a pretext for the official demotion in diplomatic
relations with Israel. Rather than being a cause for the dramatic breakdown
of the strategic understanding between the two regional powers, it was a
mere symptom of existing ill will.
This Turkish ambition is a logical extension of the “Strategic Depth”
doctrine promulgated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu who, since 2002,
has served as chief foreign policy advisor to AKP leader and current Prime
Minister Recep Tayiip Erdogan. In this vision, Turkey’s domination of the
Mediterranean waters, including its sea routes and marine resources, plays
an essential role.
Natural Gas: An Increasingly Critical Energy Source for Israel
Turkey’s enthusiastic flaunting of its Islamist credentials, especially in
the context of the Arab Spring, has precipitated a freezing of the strategic
partnership between Israel and Turkey. As a result, Israel has actively
sought out new allies in the neighborhood, courting Greece and Cyprus.
One of the critical issues in the emerging balance of power is the growing
importance of energy security in global affairs. Since the end of the Cold
War, Turkey has promoted itself as the indispensable energy hub for Europe
and Israel. A joint gas exploration between Israel and Cyprus has been met
by hostility from Erdogan's government. The natural gas fields are situated
in the Mediterranean Sea shelf of the Republic of Cyprus and their ownership
is strongly contested by Turkey.
For Israel, gas is increasingly becoming an important fuel source for
generating electricity. It currently relies on gas to meet around 36 percent
of its electricity needs (compared to zero reliance in 2004). Energy
forecasts evaluate that this could rise to around 70 percent by 2020, making
gas imports from Egypt an increasingly important source of energy for
Israeli firms and households. Egypt remains an important supplier of natural
gas to Israel, although there have been significant interruptions in supply
over the past six months. There are compelling reasons – economic and
energy-security related – for Egypt and Israel to continue their energy
trade. However, in the long-term, Israel must develop its domestic gas
sources and move away from this unreliable provider. The outcome will also
largely be influenced by the trajectory of the broader Israeli-Egyptian
relationship. It seems unlikely that Egyptian popular opposition to
exporting gas to Israel will wane, though a price hike could assuage some
critics.
Since 2008, Egypt has supplied Israel with gas through a 100-kilometer
undersea pipeline between El-Arish in the northern Sinai and a gas import
facility in Ashkelon on Israel’s Mediterranean coast. The pipeline is an
artery of the larger Arab Gas Pipeline (AGP), which pumps Egyptian gas to
Jordan, Syria and Lebanon. The pipeline has been blown up by militants in
Sinai five times over the past six months, sending energy prices in Israel
skyrocketing.
Prior to the pipeline explosions, Egyptian exports accounted for around 40
percent of Israel’s gas consumption. In 2010, Egypt’s Eastern Mediterranean
Gas Company (EMG) supplied Israel’s state-owned Israel Electric Corporation
with around 2.5 bcm (billion cubic meters). Israel’s domestic consumption
that year was around 5.2 bcm. The remainder of Israel’s gas comes from its
offshore Mari-B field, which is expected to be depleted by 2013.
In recent years, Israel and Cyprus have increasingly sought independent
sources of energy on their Mediterranean marine shelves. In December 2010,
the governments of Israel and Cyprus signed an agreement which delineated
the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) of both countries. The clarification of
the borderline is essential in protecting Israel's rights to oil and
underwater gas reservoirs. In the last three years, Israel has made
discoveries at the Tamar and Leviathan fields, which hold around 184 bcm and
453 bcm, respectively. After 2013, Israel will rely on production from these
recently discovered gas fields.
The American oil and gas company Noble Energy has been leading these
exploration and exploitation efforts in the Israeli and Cypriot EEZ since
2009. Shares in the US company are held by the Cyprus Energy Regulatory
Authority, Cyprus' national energy company, and by Israel's Delek Drilling
LP and Avner Oil Exploration LLP. The May 2011 Oil and Investor Journal
described the Leviathan gas field in the Israeli EEZ as the largest natural
gas find in the world over the last year. Noble Energy also discovered a gas
field called Bloc 12 near the Cyprus littoral that might produce as much as
280 bcm.
Challenges by Turkey and Lebanon to Israeli Gas Discoveries
In September 2011, Prime Minister Erdogan said that Turkey "will take
appropriate steps" and "prevent unilateral exploitation by Israel of natural
resources of the eastern Mediterranean.” In mid-September, Turkey sent three
naval ships to “protect” the Norwegian boat hired by the Turkish government
to conduct gas explorations in the territorial waters of the Republic of
Cyprus. Under Turkish pressure, the government in Nicosia agreed to share
the future gas resources with its northern neighbor. On November 23, Turkish
Energy Minister Taner Yildiz stated that Israeli and Cyprian gas and oil
explorations in the eastern Mediterranean were illegal and called into
question the agreed upon demarcation of the Exclusive Economic Zones between
Israel and Cyprus. He demanded that an agreement be signed among all
parties, including Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
(TRNC), and that the resources be shared equally.
Lebanon has also indicated its antagonism to the newly discovered natural
gas fields in the Israeli Exclusive Economic Zone. Beirut attempted to file
an appeal to the UN regarding the current demarcation of the maritime
boundaries between the two countries, which remain formally at war. The
Lebanese authorities claim that at least part of the gas reserves is located
in Lebanon’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The Israeli side believes otherwise.
According to an Israeli official statement, "…The border that Lebanon
presented to the UN was much farther south than the one proposed by Israel.
The proposed boundary is also contrary to the treaty which Lebanon concluded
with Cyprus in 2007."
On December 21, 2011, Turkish warships demonstratively shelled the strip of
water dividing the Israeli Leviathan and Cyprian Bloc 12 gas fields. Both of
these exploration fields contain large amounts of natural resources vitally
important to the energy security of these two small Mediterranean nations.
Cypriot and Israeli Responses
Turkey's recent hostile actions prompted a warning by Cypriot President
Demetris Christofias to desist from such behavior in the future and the
demand that Turkey discontinue the shelling by its warships. On December 23,
Christofias said: "If Turkey does not change its gunboat diplomacy and stop
playing the part of regional police officer, there will be consequences
which, for sure, will not be good – either for the whole region or the
Turkish people and first and foremost for Turkish Cypriots.”
Cypriot Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis, who visited Washington in
the third week of December, conveyed her concerns about the Turkish
provocations to US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton. Kozakou-Marcoullis
left feeling encouraged to continue with the gas drilling and to ignore
Turkish harassment.
In a speech at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars,
Kozakou-Marcoullis called Turkey "the neighborhood bully," adding that a
Turkey "whose foreign minister once promoted a policy of 'zero problems'
with its neighbors is now pursuing a policy of 'only problems.'" She added,
"The tensions with Israel were just the beginning of a concerted effort by
Ankara to delegitimize others in order to legitimize its actions."
In response to the Turkish naval demonstrations near the Israeli gas
installations, Uzi Landau, Israel's Minister of Energy, stated that Israel
"will continue to construct its gas platforms and will defend them." More
importantly, Israeli authorities declared that for the safeguarding of its
drilling platforms, they will use unmanned marine vehicles, equipped with
night vision devices, radars and multiple launch rocket systems.
According to some Israeli military sources, the cancellation on December 22
of the $90 million sale to the Turkish Air Force of Elbit's hi-tech
surveillance system was timed to send a signal to Turkey to desist from its
campaign of harassment in and around Israel's gas fields.
Conclusion
Turkey's recent international behavior is a clear indication that its
leadership, motivated by a neo-imperial syndrome, is leading the country's
foreign policy into perilous waters. The conflict over energy resources in
the eastern Mediterranean only further exacerbates already strained
Turkish-Israeli relations.
In view of increasing global competition for energy resources, Israel should
accelerate the development of new gas fields in its Exclusive Economic Zone.
As Israel plans to export its gas to Europe and, as has been recently
disclosed, to its new strategic partner, India, Israel must demonstrate the
legitimacy and security of its gas and marine installations. Therefore,
Israel should pursue a diplomatic campaign to maintain its hold on its EEZ
on par with other countries. Moreover, Israel should increase its naval
presence in its EEZ in order to protect its access to its resources.
Finally, Israel should enhance its cooperation with friendly countries in
the eastern Mediterranean, such as Greece and Cyprus, in order to maintain
energy security and construct pipelines for energy exports to Europe.
Alexander Murinson, an independent researcher who holds a PhD from the
School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London. He is the
author of Turkey's Entente with Israel and Azerbaijan: State Identity and
Security in the Middle East and Caucasus.
BESA Perspectives is published through the generosity of the Greg
Rosshandler Family
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