Eurocrash: what next for the UK?
Sunday 10 June 2012
Understandably, we are also seeing calls for an in/out EU referendum strengthening, and as our earlier piece suggested, we may see the Tories plant a referendum on their own agenda. There is some talk of an announcement at the party political conference in the autumn.
At the moment, though, the only thing on offer, and that from the preposterous Osborne, is the promise that the "referendum lock" will be triggered if a future treaty transfers "areas of power". But since any new treaty should apply only to the eurozone – and the "colleagues" intend to make it so – this alone will not break out the ballot boxes.
However, such is the pressure for a referendum that the Tories might feel impelled to do something more, especially if it is considered that a forthcoming "second class" status is a turning point.
The most likely response to this is a referendum to secure a mandate to negotiate a new "relationship", which could be more promising than even the Tories believe. Outside the framework of an IGC, the only way a single member state can insist on such a negotiation is if it first notifies its withdrawal from the EU, invoking Article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty.
This Article states that it is up to the member state to notify the European Council of its intention to leave, and the Union is then required to negotiate and conclude an agreement with that state. It is also required to set out "the arrangements for its withdrawal, taking account of the framework for its future relationship with the Union".
If continuing membership of the Single Market remains an article of faith, Britain could then negotiate to remain in the EEA (of which we are already part by virtue of our EU membership). This would keep the "four freedoms" and the Single Market intact, but ditch any other provisions.
Although this is less than full withdrawal, the differences would be marginal. As long as we are signatories to UNECE, the OIE, Codex Alimentarius, and a host of other trans-national organisations – not least the Bank for International Settlements, with its Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel) – then we are bound by a myriad of provisions that would otherwise come within the purview of the EEA.
The crucial thing here, is that, withdrawal from one particularly restrictive and intrusive regional body does not mean departure from the international community. We could even belong to such organisations as the European Space Agency and Eurocontrol without having to be a member of the EU. Things like defence co-operation can still be managed via Nato.
However, what could turn out to be a bigger problem for a departing UK in negotiating its "future relationship with the Union" is the difficulty in knowing with whom, or what, it is negotiating – and getting the other members to focus.
We will know better at the end of June but, as it stands, the "colleagues" are intent on a "two-speed" Europe. The likelihood is, therefore, that we would be negotiating with an EU comprised potentially of two very different halves, the inner and outer circles.
Nor indeed could we predict the membership of these "circles". The idea that the inner circle would comprise seventeen members cannot be taken for granted. We may expect Greece to leave. Others may follow. On the other hand, others (Latvia, for instance) may join.
There is also another tenable scenario – the failure of any new treaty which aims for the fiscal and final political union of eurozone states. It is all very well Cameron expressing his approval of the idea (and even his encouragement), but the peoples of the states concerned have yet to be consulted.
Without doubt, some of these would have to be consulted formally by way of referendums – specifically Holland, France and Ireland. Germany has to confront the need for changes to the Basic Law, requiring a two-thirds majority in parliament and the probability of a challenge in the constitutional courts.
Given the extraordinary degree of integration involved, two possible scenarios could arise. Firstly, the treaty could be rejected out of hand, at any stage of the process from negotiation to final ratification. Almost as disruptive, the process could become so prolonged – in the manner of the constitutional treaty – as to become meaningless.
Then, in and amongst all this is the idea that the "colleagues" should then devote their undivided attention to resolving the British problem to the satisfaction of the British government. Is this likely to happen?
Standing back from that question, it is not unreasonable to expect the "colleagues" to be a tad preoccupied. They could not stop us making an application to withdraw, but there is nothing to say that they have to race to completion. Article 50 makes provision to extend the two-year period allocated for negotiations.
A British government, and especially a Tory government trying to convince a cynical electorate that it is acting in good faith, could find this something of a nightmare. With the best will in the world, it will be difficult to speed matters up, and there will be plenty of pressure for it to stay its hand until the eurozone situation has clarified.
In short, the government is confronted with the very thing no government ever likes – uncertainty. And, while the idea of a referendum might look extremely attractive, for the moment we might have to wait our turn before the "colleagues" can attend to our exit plan.
COMMENT THREAD
Richard North 10/06/2012
The march of the well-paid zombies Monday 11 June 2012  Showing quite how different we are, the French today have their newspapers crammed with election results, describing a major event for them which has barely registered in the British papers. This rather reinforces the fact that we work to different political cycles and tempos, making a nonsense of the "European ideal" of a single polity. Something which would resonate with British readers, though, is an article in le Monde which complains about their parliament (pictured), calling it "an assembly of moonlighters". The thrust of the piece is that eighty percent of French MPs have a "dual mandate", holding not only their seats in parliament, but also local office, a process known as "cumulation". Unlike in most European countries, a member has the right to run a city, their equivalent of a county council or a regional council. After the devolution of public administration launched in the early 1980s by Mitterrand, local level is where seventy percent of public investment is realised, giving the local authorities real power. This contrasts with the national parliament where, through a combination of EU law and a powerful executive, individual MPs have very little real power or influence. For an ambitious MP, therefore, local politics is the place to be, the place where they can make a difference and where they get the chance to be noticed and develop their careers. The dual roles are also extremely lucrative and MPs also see them as an insurance against uncertainty. While there are differences in the UK, I would suggest we are seeing something of a similar mechanism over here. As with France, MPs who are blocked from meaningful activity in the Commons find other (albeit different) outlets for their energies. Unlike France, where there is no opportunity to indulge in local politics, they either immerse themselves in party politics or self-enrichment schemes (or both) or devote themselves to advancement within the executive. While there may be those differences, however, I recognise from personal observation the penalty these people have to pay to deal for their lifestyle. An academic report speaks of "exhausting" and "relentless" ongoing activity, a lifestyle of great intensity, and a perpetual race against the clock. "Cumulants" are described as forever being "head down". It is a life in excess, with records, meeting, worries, queries, letters, meals, and juggling investments. They are as a result likely to express in the interviews a sense of "asphyxia" or "loss of meaning". Many cite the inability to think, or take a step back. The biggest casualty, though, is parliament. MPs without second jobs are significantly more active in parliament. And it is in committee meetings, public hearings on projects or legislative proposals and monitoring tasks that build, step by step, the legislative function. The only activities that do not suffer are written questions to ministers and attendance at the weekly televised question time (also on Wednesday). Most badly affected are activities to which MPs' constituencies are not very sensitive. For the UK, one might say that the lessons are obvious – that MPs should not have two (or more) jobs. And over here, the biggest alternative employer is the executive, which thus robs parliament of its best and brightest, turning them into zombies as they struggle to meet the demands of the dual mandate. If we must have elected representatives, and they take our money, then we deserve more than well-paid zombies who struggle to think or take a step back. COMMENT THREAD Richard North 11/06/2012 |
Hands up! This is a rescue! Monday 11 June 2012  Such a victory should free him from having to rely on hard leftists hostile to European integration, and enable him to meet Merkel more than half-way. In the manner of European politicians, we can expect him now to ignore his election promises and get down to the business of handing more powers to "Europe". Meanwhile, Reuters is also reporting that the Spanish rescue plan may afford only a short-lived relief for the euro. Not least of the problems is a £82.5 billion refinancing requirement by the end of the year, with a further $15.7 billion maturing in the regions. Add to this the continuing problem of capital flight, which seems to be one the major problems of the stricken eurozone economies, and we have Jose Carlos Diez, chief economist at Intermoney in Madrid, saying on Spanish television, "We're very close to junk bonds and we'll end up in the junk". If that isn't bad enough, europhile Wolfgang Münchau in the Financial Times is declaring that, if the "colleagues" fudge the march to the banking union and then a wider fiscal and political union, he too "would conclude that it is time to prepare for the end of the eurozone". Bizarrely, he states that "such a process would probably take several months, and may not be ready until December", thereby offering a timescale which is so wildly optimistic that there cannot be even the remotest chance of it being achieved. If Münchau is thus relying on political union being "ready" by December, then he will be disappointed, and we had better prepare for the end of the eurozone. The Spanish protestor, incidentally, is holding up a sign saying: "Hands up! This is a rescue!" In truth, it isn't even that – just a short delay in the inevitable. COMMENT THREAD Richard North 11/06/2012 |
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