A Sequence of Failures
Why is the MoD seeking measures to protect the Egyptian border only now? Why is Israel procuring Chinese gunpowder while IMI's ammunition factory is dried up? Who will be responsible for Israeli children not having CBRN kits? And why is the latest round of combat with Hamas expected to end soon?
Amir Rapaport 22/6/2012
http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=1417
Why must we wait for blood to spill in order to see budgets freed for
measures that were clearly needed in advance? The reason is that state
clerks and monetary persons rule leaders that have become terrified of
investigating committees.
The criminal neglect of the firefighter layout, revealed this week in its
full ingloriousness with the State Comptroller's report, is just one example
of how the country is being managed like a poorly budgeted grocery store
rather than a high-tech company with vision. Either way, eventually, the
issue of the fence along the Egypt-Israel border will be worthy of its own
report.
This week, a terror attack took place along the Egypt-Israel border at a
construction site of the fence. Years before this attack, following Israel’s
departure from Gaza in 2005, it was decided that an advanced fence was
needed. At the time, the IDF knew that the evacuation of the Philadelphia
route would allow terrorists from the Gaza Strip to cross into Egypt and
infiltrate Israel through its 240 km of fenceless border. Despite this
assessment and several terror attacks between 2006-2010, work along the
border only began after a lengthy delay, and was only accelerated after
Egypt’s grip over Sinai deteriorated and illegal migrants began stream
through.
It was only at a very late stage that the Israeli government funded the
“hourglass” project to construct a “dumb” fence along parts of the border.
Last year, it was decided that the partial fence would be reinforced with
regional measures such as radars, cameras, and other sensors in areas deemed
likely to be breached. Was this enough? As it turns out, it wasn’t.
Only in the past few days has the Ministry of Defense begun to examine the
possibility of installing electrical measures to turn the fences into
“smart” ones. Unfortunately, due to a lack of infrastructure, the
installation of the measures at this late stage will cost much more money
than had they been installed at the start of construction.
Southern Terror Attack
The IDF is still not entirely sure who was behind the border attack near
Kadesh Barnea. However, claims made by the Arab media that the attack was
caused by terrorists associated with Global Jihad are not unreasonable.
It is impossible not to view the terror attack and the volley of rockets
towards the western Negev against the background of the large election drama
unfolding in Egypt. The elections, which have yet to be decided, are almost
as important to Israel as they are to Egypt. If the Muslim Brotherhood is
declared the winner, the peace agreement between Israel and Egypt could
suffer a de facto clinical death.
What is interesting is that this terror attack resulted in a round of combat
between Israel and Hamas, to which both sides were dragged into with a clear
lack of desire. On one hand, this is the first time that Hamas was involved
in fire towards Israel in many months. In the previous rounds, the
Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Palestinian Resistance Committees were the
ones that launched the Grad rockets. On the other hand, the organization has
been cautious: it did not launch rockets into the heart of Israel's southern
cities, but instead settled for harassing fire towards the outskirts of the
various towns. While this does not mean that this combat round can’t evolve
into genuine combat in the coming days, it's likely that the fire will die
out, since it’s not in the interests of either party.
The Mask Failure
It's pretty clear that in the future, investigatory committees will deal
with the failure surrounding CBRN protection masks – an ordeal that has
already been going on for several years and is still not resolved despite
old warnings.
In short, Israel ceased the funding of the protective kit refreshment
project in the middle of the last decade, as it required an investment of
more than 100 million NIS annually to preserve the functionality of the kits
for the entire populace. When the distribution of the kits was renewed two
years ago, no funds were allocated to close the gap that accumulated over
the years. Since then, the project has suffered from poor budgeting. The
result is that today, there are functional CBRN kits for only 60% of the
population, and the situation is especially bad with the CBRN kits for
children; warehouses and homes have proper CBRN kits for less than half of
the children in Israel.
How does this settle with the scenario recently brought up in various forums
by IDF officials and Israel's Minister of Strategic Affairs, Moshe Ya’alon,
which say Hezbollah will get chemical weapons from Assad’s crumbling regime
in Syria and threaten Israel? It doesn't. However, if citizens storm the
refreshment stations in the event of war, and there are insufficient kits
for everyone, or worse – if people are unprotected against a chemical
attack – answers will be demanded by an investigatory committee, or at the
very least, by Israel’s State Comptroller.
The Ammunition Failure
Speaking of failures, in the past few years Israel decided to procure
gunpowder from China in an attempt to save a few tens of millions of NIS.
This resulted in the downturn of Israel Military Industries' (IMI) heavy
ammunition factory, which is already finding it difficult to end the month
and pay its employees from the Ministry of Defense fund. The decision to
procure cheap explosives is understandable on the face of it, but what is
not clear is why it is being done with continual cuts. It is especially
curious given that their factory is determined as “strategic,” and the
Ministry of Defense wants to keep it afloat in case it must produce
ammunition in an emergency.
There is no reasonable answer to the question of why gunpowder is being
procured in China while the MoD continues to pay IMI salaries.
Shortening Service
Lastly, the shortening of military service for men in homefront positions,
which a public committee is about to recommend, is another result that was
known of in advance, but could have been reached a long time ago. It’s no
secret that the IDF supports a plan to shorten service for men by four
months and provide salaries during the final four months of service to
combat soldiers that continue serving for three years. The very same
recommendation was already published by IsraelDefense about three months
ago, and was based on plans that the IDF was preparing for in advance.
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