FCO 30 1048
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| Folio No | Reference | Date |
| 101 | AE (71) 7th Meeting | 17.06.71 |
Mr SinclairThe Legal Advisers have helped me in redrafting the opening passage of that draft and IThe above listed Cabinet document(s), which was/were enclosed on this file,
has/have been removed and destroyed.
For complete series of Cabinet documents see CAB (CABINET OFFICE) CLASSES
Signed Margaret Shatwell Dated 21.12.00
TMr Logan
FACTSHEET ON SOVEREIGNTY
1) You will wish to show Mr Royle Mr Rippon's minute below.
2) Meanwhile I submit a draft let ter from you to the Lord President's Private Secretary. I hope I have not gone too far in voicing our continued worries about question and Answer No 16. EID feel it would be better to leave this out.
W.J.Adams
European Communities Information Unit 1st July 1971
Copy to:
Mr Pakenham
Mr Statham
Mr Watts (Legal Advisers)
LETTER
PLP Davies Esq
Office of the Lord President Mr Logan
I enclose a draft on Sovereignty for inclusion in the Factsheet series "Britain and Europe". It has been cleared with the Minister and with the Law Officers. You will recall that we are committed to a Factsheet on Sovereignty.
We are rather worried about the impact on Parliamentary opinion of Question and Answer No 16. There is no way so far as we can see of softening the wording. The fact of the primacy of community legislation cannot be disguised. But I feel that there is a case for omitting it altogether.
If the Lord President agrees with this view, we shall however have to go back to the Law Officers. The Legal Advisers consider that this is a central question and that MP's would be bound to ask why we had dodged this matter.
As usual, time is very short. The absolute deadline for getting a text to the COI is not later than Monday, 5th July, if we are to achieve our publication target of Thursday/Friday, 15/16th July. The proposal is to issue this Factsheet in a join edition with the new Factsheet on the Free Movement of Labour which, as you know, the Department of Employment want us to publish urgently.
SOVEREIGNTY
Sovereignty is a complicated subject which can be debated at length. Such a debate would be out of place in this Factsheet. It is thought to be more helpful for the Factsheet to single out some of the practical questions which arise in this context and to answer them as simply as possible.
1) Would the position of the Monarchy be affected? Joining the Common Market would not affect the position of the Monarch. Three of the existing members of the European Communities are Monarchies, and two of the other applicant States are also Monarchies.
2) Would the constitutional position of the Crown Parliament be affected by entry into the European Communities?
Entry into the European Communities would not in itself have any effect upon the constitutional position of the Crown in Parliament.
3) By entering the European Communities would the United Kingdom cease to be regarded as a sovereign independent State in International Law?
No. There has been no question of the present members of the European Communities ceasing to be regarded as sovereign independent States because of their membership of the European Communities and they continue, for example, to participte in international organisations such as the United Nations whose membership is open to sovereign States.
4) Would our international influence be affected?
Yes, it would strengthened.
Inside the Community, the United Kingdom would have influence both on its own account and on its ability to sway decisions of the EEC which, in certain fields, e.g. trade, is developing the influence of a super-power. Outside the Community, the United Kingdom would have no influence in determing the Community's policy and would therefore be less important in the eyes of the third countries more concerned about the large impact of the EEC on their interests.
5) Would the United Kingdom retain its freedom of action in matters of foreign affairs and defence?
The United Kingdom would, by entering into the European Communities, be undertaking certain international obligations in the fields covered by the European Treaties. These obligations would, like obligations in other treaties which are biding upon the United Kingdom, affect the United Kingdom's freedom of action in the fields covered by the treaties. The treaties establishing the European Communities are, however, limited to certain economic and commercial affairs and closely related matters: these do not include defence.
6) Would the United Kingdom's existing treaties with other countries be affected?
There are some existing treaties in economic and commercial matters the continuation of which would be inconsistent with obligations under the European Treaties. The United Kingdom would need to, and intends to, secure, with the agreement of the other parties concerned, the termination of these agreements so far as they conflict with the obligations under the European Treaties (and, where appropriate, intends to negotiate new agreements in their place). Article 234 of the Treaty of Rome takes account of this situation.
7) Would the United Kingdom remain free to enter into future treaty commitments with other countries?
As with any international treaty, the United Kingdom would not in future enter into treaty commitments which were contrary to obligations contained in the Community Treaties to which the United Kingdom would be bound. These treaties, however, only impose obligations within their limited fields, and outside those fields the United Kingdom's freedom to conclude treaties with other States would not be affected by membership of the European Communities.
8) Are the Treaties establishing the European Communities intended to last forever?
The Treaties establishing the EEC and Euratom are concluded for an unlimited period. The Treaty establishing the ECSC is concluded for fifty years.
9) Is it possible to withdraw from the Treaties establishing the European Communities?
These treaties contain no provision expressly permitting or prohibiting withdrawal. Nor do some other important treaties to which the United Kingdom is a party e.g. the United Nations Charter. The Community system rests on the original consent, and ultimately on the continuing consent, of Member States and hence of national Parliaments.
10) Would the procedures of Parliament be affected by membership of the European Communities?
Nothing in the Treaties establishing the European Communities requires member States to change the procedures of their legislative bodies.
11) Would Ministers continue to be responsible to Parliament?
Yes. Parliament would continue to exercise control over the actions of ministers; and moreover Ministers would be answerable to Parliament for the paret they and their officials play in the formulation of Community policy.
12) Would Parliament's freedom to legislate how it chooses be affected?
In legislating, Parliament would need to take account of the obligations assumed by the United Kingdom under the Treaties. Parliament would have to refrain (as it does in connection with other treaties) from enacting legislation contrary to those obligations.
13) Would legislative acts made by the European Communities in Brussels have effect as law in this country?
Yes, Certain provisions of Community Law, primarily regulations made by the Council and the Commission, apply directly as law in each member State; but by far the greater part of our domestic law would be unaffected.
14) What control would Parliament have over the preparation and making of Regulations and other Community instruments, such as Directives and Decisions?
Where instruments are made by the Council of Ministers, the United Kingdom will be represented by a Minister of the Crown who will be responsible to Parliament for his actions. Members of the United Kingdom Parliament will of course be represented in the European Parliament which is required to be consulted before Community Regulations and Directives involving new policies are adopted.
15) When a Regulation has been made, would Parliament be able to reject its application to the United Kingdom?
This would not be consistent with the treaty obligations which the United Kingdom would have assumed.
16) If a Regulation made by a Community organ conflicts with a statute enacted by Parliament, would the Regulation or the statute prevail.
Parliament would have to be willing to give effect, or enable effect to be given, to the Regulation so that it prevailed over the statute: but see the answer to the next question.
17) To what extent would the law which at present applies to the United Kingdom be affected by membership of the European Communites?
By far the greater part of our domestic law would be unaffected. The European Treaties are concerned with economic, commercial and closely related matters.
18) Would the common law still apply?
Yes.
19) Would the procedures of our courts be affected by entry into the European Communities?
Our courts would in certain cases need to refer matters to the European Court of Justice for rulings on points of Community Law. But otherwise the workings of our courts would be unaffected.
20) Would there be British representatives in the various institutions of the Communities?
Yes. A British Minister would be on the Council of Ministers. There would be British Parliamentarians sitting in the European Parliament. There would be a British Judge on the European Court, and British officials on the staff of the Commission, on much the same basis as in other international organisations.
21) Would decisions be taken in the Communities which run counter to our national interests?
All major decisions are taken by the Council of Ministers, on which we should be represented. Although the European Treaties provide for majority voting on most matters, the member States recognise that it is not in practice possible to force another member State to act contrary to its vital national interests. As the Prime Minister said in the House of Commons after his meeting with President Pomidou..."The maintenance and strengthening of the fabric of co-operation in the Community requires that decisions should in practice be taken by unanimous agreement when vital national interests of any one or more members are at stake."
CONFIDENTIAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNTIES
1) I submit a Planning Paper on a question of entry into the European Communities and its effect on British Sovereignty.
2) The paper, which has a full covering summary, analyses the problem from a political standpoint and ventures some recommendations. In order to tackle it properly, however, it was necessary first to examine the formal and legal aspects of the subject, again from a political viewpoint. In undertaking this, our Legal Advisers have taken full account of the views of the Law Officers and believe it to be in accord with them; but the Paper is a Foreign and Commonwealth Office paper and has not been cleared outside the Office.
3) I also submit a draft paper on the same subject drawn from the Planning Paper but in briefer form; you may consider that this should be circulated to members of the DOP for information and as background to their wider consideration of European issues. Attached to the draft is an Annex setting out the areas in which HMG's freedom will and will not be significantly restrained.
4) I hope that the draft for the DOP, together with the main Planning Paper, meets the requirement for advice on Sovereignty which both the Secretary of State And you yourself expressed during May
Dennis Greenhill
21 June 1971
c.c. Ssir V Evans, Mr Bottomley, Sir T Brimelow, Sir C.O'Neill
CONFIDENTIAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
1) The object of the paper is to examine the implications for British Sovereignty of entry into the European Communities, to clarify the meaning of the term and to suggest a number of conclusions.
2) Historically, sovereignty was originally invoked to describe the powers of the ruler within his State. External sovereignty, on the other hand, has been primarily a negative matter of denying the existence of any external sovereign authority, with consequent emphasis on equality and independence. Neither aspect of sovereignty should be confused with the realities of power (paragraphs 2-4)
3) The internal and external aspects of sovereignty can still be distinguished in the contemporary political system. Sovereignty in external relations still includes formal equality between states (e.g. voting in the UN General Assembly) and the absence of any formally superior source of authority external to the state. But all states are under some degree of external constraint and most have deliberately limited their freedom of action in pursuit of national interests, for example by military alliances. The limitations are reinforced by the increasing inter-dependence (especially economic) of modern states. Externally, therefore, sovereignty is a technical concept.
The range of subjects which may be affected by Community law is set out in an Annex (paragraph 12)
7) Political and public anxiety expressed over possible "loss of sovereignty" may in fact reflect wider concerns including fears of loss of national identity, fears of change, dislike of remote and bureaucratic government (especially by foreigners) and instinctive attachment to the independent exercise, as in the past, of national powers. Reference to "loss of sovereignty" have elicited strong response because of these quite different concerns (paragraphs 13-16)
8) It will be in British interests after entry that the Community should develop toward an effectively harmonised economic fiscal and monetary system together with a fairly closely coordinated foreign and defence policy. This would mean in the very long term major changes in the way in which British national relations with the rest of the world are managed and important implications for external sovereignty. It could only take place if there were a strengthening of the institutions of the Community with consequential weakening of national institutions, including Parliament. But the "last resort" Political power of Parliament to assert national interest and renounce the Treaty is unlikely to be eroded in this century (paragraph 17-22).
9) To meet the public anxieties as concern for "loss of sovereignty" it aill be important
(i) Before entry to deal squarely with the problems of British power and influence by presenting the choice between the affect of entry and non-entry in a rapidly changing world; after entry to ensure that unpopular measures or unfavourable economic developments are not attributed to the remote and unmanageable workings of the Community;
(ii) to strengthen local and regional democratic processes and help develop effective Community regional economic and social policies;
(iii) to ensure that the British Parliament plays an effective part through its own processes and that British Parliamentarians acquire a position of influence in the European Parliament;
(iv) to ensure effective consultations between British representatives and negotiators on Community affairs and the British Parliament. A Select Committee on Community Affairs might be considered;
(v) to stress the gains through Community membership in real international influence and to contrast this with the highly formal and technical nature of the "sovereignty" will be eroded (paragraphs 23-24).
10) These conclusions are highly political but entry into the Community will blue the distinction between domestic political and foreign affairs. British officals, like those of other member states, will necessarily play a more political role over wider areas of public business. The task will be to adapt democratic institutions both in the UK and in Brussels to meet and reduce the real and substantial public anxieties over national identity and alienation from government, fear of change and loss of control over their fate which ar arouses by talk of "loss of sovereignty" Paragraphs 25-26).
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
1) The object of this paper is to examine the implications of entry into the European Communities for British Sovereignty. The subject is one which arouses widespread if somewhat vague public concern and which could become the central politcal issue in the national debate on entry to the Community. The paper does not seek to provide a comprehensive philosophical analysis of sovereignty but sets out to clarify the various ways in which the term is commonly used in present circumstances; to identify the relevant changes which will be involved in joining the European Communities; and to suggest a number of conclusions and implications for policy.
I. THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
(a) Historical Background
2. Historically the concept of sovereignty has been of major importance to both political scientists and jurists. The growth of its use was closely associated with the development of the system of national states in Western Europe: there was no mediaeval equivalent and the wider claims of the Holy Roman Empire and the temporal power of the Pope cannot really be considered in terms of national sovereignty or nation states. Sovereignty was initially invoked to describe the powers of the ruler within his State. When dealing with other States the ruler asserted his (internally) sovereign status, an attribute which, given the identification between the ruler and his State, attached also to his State. Since the other States similarly had sovereign rulers, and regarded themselves equally as sovereign States, the relationship between such sovereign States had to be formally one of equality and independence. On the international plane the sovereignty of the "sovereign" State is not a true international sovereignty, but a transposed internal concept of sovereignty - a description of a legal status possessed in some other (ie the internal) legal order.
3) Consequently, from the outset the antithesis between the connotation of "sovereignty" in its internal and external aspects has been evident. Internal sovereignty has been primarily a matter of positive possession of ultimate power in a hierarchically-structured internal legal framework, so that interest has lain in identifying the location of that power within the State; but external sovereignty has been primarily a negative matter of denying the existence of any external sovereign authority, with consequent emphasis on equality and independence as the legal framework for international relations. In the particular instance of the United Kingdom, the State, externally, is legally equal to and independent of all other "sovereign" states; the international personality is that of the United Kingdom as a State, represented internationally by the Crown as Head of State (a situation accurately reflected in our internal constitutional law by the Crown's prerogative in matters of foreign affairs). Internally the sovereign power in the State (at least in matters of legislation) is usually considered to be located in the Queen in Parliament.
4) The technical legal aspects of sovereignty, both internal and external (particularly the latter), must not be confused with the realities of power. Ultimately it is the latter which count. There may be a tendency that, in proportion as the facts about the realities of power are unpalatble, so emphasis on and interest in the comforting and reassuring legal aspects of sovereignty increases.
(b) Contemporary Aspects of Sovereignty
5) In the contemporary political system we can distinguish the internal and external aspects of sovereignty.
External Sovereignty
6) Sovereignty in external relations still includes formal equality of status with other states. A striking expression is in voting arrangements in the UN General Assembly, where, for example, Mauritius has the same vote as the US (but the realities of power are reflected by the veto in the Security Council, and by systems of weighted voting in many organisations, not least the European Communities). It involves also the absence of any formally superior source of authority external to the State. It does not mean equal power or influence, or freedom of action in the international scene, or even within the state itself, though these ideas naturally spring to mind in the context of sovereignty. To take an extreme example, while the Central American republics are sovereign states recognised as such by other states, in practice they are limited by their relations with the US Government, and perhaps more critically with private US interest, both in their freedom of international action andin their ability to regulate affairs within their own boundaries. All states are under some degree of external constraint and most have deliberately limited their freedom of action in pursuit of national interests, for example by military alliances, entry into international organisations or even by the conclusion of routine treaties. These limitations are re-inforced by the increasing interdependence of modern states and the development of economic and other links which cut across national boundaries. It is therefore generally recognised that sovereign states can lose some degree of independence of action in external relations without forfeiting their international legal status. But it is always a question of degree in each particular case whether the restraints are so extensive as to be incompatible with continued existence as an equal and independent member of the international community, with the capacity to conduct its own international relations.
7) The effect of the above is that, externally, sovereignty is a technical concept with in many ways only limited bearing on the questions of power and influence that form the normal preoccupation of foreign policy. As a result, much of the debate on entry into the Communities in terms of the power and influence we should gain or lose thereby and on the corresponding effect of non-entry, while a crucial debate in terms of policitcal decisions and British interests, is strictly not a debate on the legal issues of external sovereignty. It is, however, a debate which arises naturally from that issue and which is tied up with ideas of sovereignty in the public mind (see paragraph 15(iv) below).
Internal Sovereignty
8) Internally within the United Kingdom, the notion of sovereignty is bound up with the doctrine of Parliamentary Sovereignty, which in turnis the outcome of the battle between Crown and Parliament as to which should wield supreme power in the land. the formal compromise has been to accept that supreme power to legislate should rest with the Queen in Parliament. For present day practical and political purposes in the UK, the Parliamentary sovereignty may be taken to involve the exlusive power to make supreme law. This power has three essential features:
(a) a statute which has been duly enacted by Parliament and received Royal assent cannot be declared invalid by the courts on any grounds, for example that its provisions are contrary to constitutional law or to common law or to international law;
(b) Parliament may enact any law it wishes; consequently no Parliament is bound by the acts of its predecessors, and any prior statute may be amended or repealed by a later statute;
(c) there is no legislative power in the land save by the authority of Parliament.
9) To the layman those features mean that the Queen in Parlaiment has sovereign law-making power in the territory, unchallenged by any rival national or international source of authority and that its freedom to enact legislation is in law untrammelled by acts of its predecessors or otherwise. The purity of this doctrine is not absolute, particulary as regards the second feature mentioned. For example, Parliament has for all practical purposes limited the jurisdiction of its successors in a geographical sense, by granting independence to colonial and other territories. It is unthinkable that Parliament would attempt to repeal an independece act so as forcibly to regain legislative power over the territory in question. But there has been no comparable (and irrovocable) transfer of authority within the UK itself purporting to bind successor Parliaments; and although Parliament has occasionally enacted legislation which in terms purports to regulate the freedom of action of future Parliaments, in strictly legal terms such legislation does not prevent future Parliaments from legislating to the contrary.
II THE EEC AND BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY
10. If we have correctly identified the two major aspects of sovereignty then we are now in a position to consider how they will be affected by British accession to the Community. The first stage is to consider the Community as it will be upon enlargement putting on one side the prospective implications of any future development or "deepening" of the Community
External Sovereignty
11. Membership of the Communities will involve us in extensive limitations upon our freedom of action. In many respects these are essentially the result of a contractual arrangement, not dissimilar in kind from other international contractual arrangements which we have e.g. in the GATT: these constitute restraints upon the exercise of sovereign powers as a result of an act entered into by virtue of our sovereign status, and they do not amount to a restriction of that status. But it is not correct to regard the European Community Treaties as involving solely matters of a legal significance equivalent to that of other existing treaties. For example, in matters within the Community field (see Annex) we shall be accepting an external legislature which regards itself as having direct powers of legislating with effect within the United Kingdom, even in derogation of United Kingdom statutes, and as having in certain fields exclusive legislative competence, so that our own legislature has none; in matters in which the Community has already adopted a common policy, we shall be accepting that the Commission will jointly represent the Member States, who to that extent will have their individual international negotiating powers limited; and we shall in various fields be accepting a wide degree of coordination of our policy with that of the rest of the Community. All of this we shall be accepting "for an unlimited period", with no provision for withdrawl. But at the same time France or Italy for example as members of the Communties, have not come to be regarded internationally as less than sovereign states. This is particularly so since, despite the appearance of permanence of membership it is commonly recognised that the member states do still have the ultimate politcal option of renouncing membership and that the Community cannot at this stage impose its will against the firm opposition of a major member. In other words in practice, and in the final analysis it remains to date a cooperative venture of independent equal sovereign units and not some supernational and overriding authority. Membership would mean an increasing range of subjects on which Britain's policy was concerted with the remainder of the Community and also that in negotiations with the rest of the wordl on matters forming the subjec of common Community policies, there would be join representation by the Commission. The Community being exclusive in character and membership also means in practice giving up some of our important links with the remainder of the world (Commonwealth Preference for example). But overall it is clear that membership of the Community in its present form would involve only limited dimunition of external sovereignty in practice. If it is right to say that the question of the retention of the international status of a sovereign State is a matter of assessing in each case the degree to which a State's external independence, equality and capacity to condut its own international relations are restricted, we could nevertheless fairly conclude that although the implictions for our freedom of independent action are considerable, no substantial impairment of our international status would follow immediately upon our membership of the European Communities.The loss of external sovereignty will however increase as the Community develops, according to the intention of the preamble to the Treaty of Rome "to establish the foundations of an even closer union among the European peoples". We deal with the implications for sovereignty of such dynamic development below in paragraphs 17 to 22.
Internal Sovereignty
12. The implications of membership for Parliamentary sovereignty and for the legal system which is closely related to it, are more immediate.
(i) By accepting the Community Treaties we shall have to admit the whole range of subsidiary law which has been made by the Communities. Not only this but we shall be making provision in advance for the unquestioned direct application (i.e. without any further participation by Parliament) of Community laws not yet made (even though Ministers would have a part, through membership of the council, in the making of some of these laws). Community law operates only in the fields covered by the Treaties, viz. customs duties; agriculture;free movement of labour; services and capital transport; monopolies and restrictive practices; state aid for industry; and the regulation of the coal and steel and nuclear energy industries. Outside this considerable range there would remain unchanged by far the greater part of our domestic law (see Annex).
(ii) Community law is required to take precedence over domestic law: i.e. if a Community law conflicts with a statute, it is the statute which has to give way. This is something now implied in other commitments which we have entered into in the past. Previous treaties have imposed on us obligations which have required us to legislate in order the fulfil the international obligations set out in the treaty, but any discrepancy between our legislation and the treaty obligations has been solely a question of a possible breach of those international obligations: the conflicting statute has still undoubtedly been the law to be applied in this country. But the cmmunities system requires that such Community Law as applies directly as law in this country should by virtue of its own legal force as law in this country prevail over conflicting national legislation. The Law Officers have, however, concluded that while the European Community will uphold the supremacy of Community Law in its application within the United Kingdom, our Courts, if faced with a statute intended by Parliament to override Community Law, are most unlikely in the immediately foreseeable future to be restrained from giving effect to the statutue.
(iii) The power of the European court to consider the extent to which a UK statutue is compatible with Community Law will indirectly involve an innovation for us, as the European Court's decisions will be binding on our courts which might then have to rule on the validity or applicability of the United Kingdom statute.
(iv) The Law Officers have emphasised that in accepting Community Law in this country we shall need to make it effective as part of a new and separate legal order, distinct from but co-existing side by side with, the law of the United Kingdom. They have referred to the basic European Communities Treaty provisions as amounting "in effect to a new body of "Federal" statute law".
III POLITICAL REALITY AND POPULAR CONCERN.
13. The account given sets out the technical case.
In lay terms we may say that if Britain joined the Community there would be many implications for both external and internal (particularly parliamentary) sovereignty. some of these would be wholly novel, and the general effect particularly in the longer term would be of more pervasive and wide- ranging change than with any earlier commitments. Largely this is because the Community treaties when drawn up were seen as arrangements not merely for collaboration but for positive integration of large parts of the economic and social life of the Member States. As a result the conventional theoretical line dividing internal from external affairs has become blurred, a process which as we have seen is already advancing with the development of transnational economic activity.
14. But public and political concern over "loss of sovereignty" cannot be allayed simply by setting out these technical considerations. In the public debate advocates of entry deny that sovereignty will be lost or transferred and argue that account should be take "of the effective ability of Britain's national institutions to protect and advance the interests, domestic and external, of the British people". They imply that sovereignty as defined above should be disregarded - considering it to have been eroded past usefulness by GATT, NATO etc and the powerlessness of the medium sized state acting alone. Although this approach rides roughshod over "sovereignty" in its technical sense, it has the merit that in addressing the political rather than the legal reality it comes nearer to the sources of active public concern.
15 These public concerns clearly include:
(i) National Identity
We are all deeply conscious through tradition, upbringing and education of the distinctive fact of being British. given our island position and long territorial and national integrity, the traditional relative freedom from comprehensive foreign, especially European, alliances and entanglements, this national consciousness may well be stronger than that of most nations. when "sovereignty" is called into questions in the deabte about entry to the Community, people may feel that it is this "Britishness" that is at stake. Hence Mr Rippon's pointed question "are the French any the less French for their membership?" There is another, less attractive, aspect of this national pride. This is the large measure of dislike and mistrust of foreigners that persists in Britain. Nancy Mitford's Uncle Matthew was not alone in considering that: "Abroad is hell and foreigners are fiends".
(ii) Change
However it is presented, entry to the Community will mean major change. It is natural and inevitable that this should be disliked and resisted by many. Even though the "loss of sovereignty" may be limited to fairly precise areas of Government and Parliamentary powers and be without significance for the lives of most of the country, still the phrase conjures up a spectre of major and uncontrollable change and of adjustments that will have to be made which are deeply distrubing. "Loss of Sovereignty" may be a euphanism for fear of change and of the unknown.
(iii) Remoteness of the Bureaucracy
It is generally acknowledged that in modern industrialised society the impersonal and remote workings of the Government bureaucracy are a source of major anxiety and mistrust. the operations of democracy seem decreasingly fitted to control the all-embracing regulatory activies of the Civil Service. In entry to the Community we may seem to be opting for a system in which bureaucracy will be more remote (as well as largely foreign) and will operate in ways many of which are already determined and which are deeply strangeto us. This bureaucracyis by common consent more powerful compared with the democratic systems of the Community than is ideal. Yet the way to remedy this balance without reducing the Community to a mere standing association for negotiation between national Ministers is by strengthening the Community's democratic processes which in turn means more change more "loss of sovereignty"
(iv) National Power
As explained in paragraph 6 above, questions of power and influence have a close popular connection with ideas of sovereignty. The British have long been accustomed to the belief that we play a mjor part in ordering the affairs of the world and that in ordering our own affairs, we are beholden to none. Much of this is mere illusion. As a middle power we can proceed only by treaty, alliance and compromise. so we are dependent on others both for the effective defence of the United Kingdom and also for the commercial and international financial conditions which govern our own economy. But this fact though intellectually conceded, is not widely or deeply understood; instinctive attitudes derive from a period of greater British power. Joining the Community does strike at these attitudes: It is a further large step away from what is thought to be unfettered national freedome and a public acknowledgement of our redued national power; moreover, joining the community institutionalises in a single, permanent coalition the necessary process of accomodation and alliance over large areas of policy, domestic as well as external. Even though these areas may be less immediately relevant to survival than defence, as covered by NATO, the form of the Community structure and the intentions explicit in the preamable to the Treaty of Rome emphasise the merging of national interests.
16) We do not suggest that these issues of public concern have any necessary connection with the technical meaning of sovereignty, but the debate hitherto has been conducted on two levels. On the one level there have been legal arguments defining the implications for external and Parliamentary Sovereignty of accession, implictions which are important but have been found politically acceptable. On the other level we believe that argument about the loss of sovereignty couched in more general terms has elicited a strong response because of the anxieties about national identity, power and change outlined above.
IV THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMUNITY
17. The account presented of the implications for sovereignty of membership has up to this point delat with the Community as a static institution. Its effective role now centres upon, though it is not limited to, the Common Agricultural Policy and the Common Commercial Policy based on but now going beyond the Common External Tariff. The Council of Ministers continues to be dominated by trade-offs between national interests and the principle of majority voting has been side-tracked. The European Parliament exercises little control over the processes of the Community while the Commision through committed to the "deepening" of the Community is hamstrung by the difficult of reaching agreement on major policy in the Council of Ministers.
18. That the Community within its present limitations should present little challenge to national sovereignty is perhaps inevitable; but it will be in the British interest after accession to encourage the development of the Community toward an effectively harmonised economic, fiscal and monetary system and a fairly closely coordinated and consistent foreign and defence policy. This sort of grouping would bring major politico/economic advantages but would take many years to develop and win political acceptance. If it came to do so then essential aspects of sovereignty both internal and external would indeed increasingly be transferred to the Community itself.
19. If such a development took place, then over a wide range of subjects (trade, aid monetary affairs and most technological questions) Community policies toward the outside world would be common or closely harmonised. Although diplomatic representation would remain country by country its national role would be much diminished since the instructions to representatives would have been coordinated among member states. By the end of the century with effective defence and political harmonisation the erosion of the international role of the member states could be almost complete. This is a far distant prospect but as members of the Community our major interests may lie in its progressive development since it is only when the Western Europe of which we shall be a part can realise its full potential as a political as well as economic unit that we shall derive full benefits from membership.
20. Such positive development of the functions of the Community could probably only take place with concomitant development of the institutions of the Community. It is hard to envisage the necessary decisions being taken under the present organisation of the Community.; more effective decision-making at Community level would either require majority voting on an increasing range of issues in the Council or stronger pressures to reach quick decisions by consensus. In either case the role of the commission would become more important as the Community became responsible for the regulation of wider areas of the internal affairs of the member states and this would in turn increase the need the strengthen the democratic institutions of the Community, including perhaps a directly elected Parliament. In that event the development of a prestigious and effective directly elected Community Parliament would clearly mean the consequential weakening of the British Parliament as well as the erosion of "Parliamentary Sovereignty".
21. The process outlined is an exceedingly long-term one, and depends upon the continuing progressive development of the Community. For a very long time - almost certainly until the end of the century - the major member states would retain the practical "last resort" political possibility of secession (albeit in probable breach of international obligations and with increasingly damaging economic consequences for the defector). So long as the member state's participation is subject to national scrutiny and can in practice be withdrawn, it may be said that the nation's status as an equal and independent state in the international community will be unaffected. Parliament's power will likewise survive; if Britain can in practice renounce the Treat when the Community laws which are applied autotmatically within the member states are seen to depend upon the continuing (and pre-eminent) aquiescence of Parliament which may in the last resort be withdrawn.
22. Even with the most dramatic development of the community the major member states can hardly lose the "last resort" ability to withdraw in much less than three decades. the Community's development could produce before then a period in which the political practicability of withdrawl was doubtful. If the point should ever be reached at which inability to renounce the Treaty (and with it the degeneration of the national institutions which could opt for such a policy) was clear, then sovereignty, external, parliamentary and practical would indeed be diminished.
V CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS.
23. We have examined the two main aspects of sovereignty external and parliamentary sovereignty will be limited, while in the case of parliamentary sovereignty it will be real and novel but not likely to damage British interests. There are in addition major aspects of public concern which are evoked by reference to sovereignty though that is not what they are about - national identity, opposition to change, mistrust of bureaucracy and a belief that Britain standing alone should control its destiny. these may be at the source of much anxiety about and instinctive opposition to British entry. Finally we have argued that in the longest term the progressive development of the Community could indeed mean the weakening of the member states' independence of action and in the last resort of their national institutions and their sovereignty.
24. If it is accepted, there are a number of implications to be drawn from this analysis:-
i. although public concern is not over technical soveriengty itself but over more generally national traditions, it is real and important and can be evoked by reference to sovereignty. Before entry it is important to deal squarely with the anxieties about British power and influence (masquerading under the term sovereignty) by presenting the choice between the effect of entry and on Britain's power and influence in a rapidly changing world. After entry there would be a major responsibility on HMG and on all political parties not to exacerbate public concern by attributing unpopular measures or unfavourable economic development to the remote and unmanageable workings of the Community. This counsel of perfection may be the more difficult to achieve because these same unpopular measures may sometimes be made more acceptable if they are put in a Community context, and this technique may offer a way to avoid the more sterile forms of inter-governmental bargaining. But the difference between on the one hand explaining policy in terms of general and Community-wide interest and, on the other, blaming membership for national problems is real and important.
ii. The transer of major executive responsibilities to the bureaucratic Commission in Brussels will exacerbate a popular feeling of alienation from government. To counter this feeling strengthened local and regional democratic processes within the member states and effective Community regional economic and social policies will be essential.
iii. Parliamentary sovereignty will be affected as we have seen. But the need for Parliament to play an increasing (if perhaps more specialised) role may develop. Firstly, although a European Parliament might in the longest term become an effective, directly elected democratic check upon the bureaucracy, this will not be for a long time, and certainly not in the decade to come. In the interval, to minimise the loss of democratic control it will be important that the British Parliamentarians should play an effective role both through the British membership in the European Parliament and through the processes of the British Parliament itself. Few if any of the Parliaments of the Six make the most of their role in either respect. It would be clearly in the interest of the UK that British parlaimentarians should acquire a position of influence in the European Parliament against the day when it assumes effective powers.
iv. The process of consultation between the Commission, Government experts and the European Parliament is complex. The issues dealt with are neither "foreign affairs" nor wholly domestic to the member states. The form of the consultations is sich that they can hardly be watched over by the House of Commons as a whole - despite the flexibility of Question Time. The result in the present member states is that Community affairs are largely the prerogative of the executive to be endorsed after the event by the elected representative body as though in foreign affairs. To meet this new problem the creation of a Select Committee on Community affairs or some quite new Parliamentary device might be considered.
v. It will be recognised that the more the Community is considered, developed as an effective wide-ranging and democratically controlled organisation, the more Parliamentary sovereignty will be eroded and the less important external state sovereignty will become. The ability and the ultimate politcal right in the last resort to withdraw will remain for a very considerable time, though it may come to have mainly theoretical significance. In that last resort the ultimate sovereignty of the State will surely remain unchallenged for this century at least. Meanwhile, it will continue to be important to stress the potential gains in real international influence (albeit indirect) through participation in the Community's policies and to contrast this with the highly formal and technical nature of the "sovereignty" that will be eroded.
25. The conclusions and implcations we have drawn are highly politcal and may be judged beyond the competence of the FCO to advise. Nevertheless the impact of entry upon sovereignty is closely related to the blurring of distinctions between domestic political and foreign affairs, to the relatively greater political responsbility of the bureaucracy of the Community and the lack of effective democratic control.
26. To play an effective part in the Community British members of the Commission and their staffs and British officials as negotiators will necessarily assume more political roles than is traditional in the UK. The Community, if we are to benefit to the full, will develop widers powers and co-ordinate and manage policy over wider areas of public business. To control and supervise this process it will be necessary to strengthen the democratic organisation of the Community with consequent decline of the primacy and prestige of the national Parliaments. The task will not be to arrest this process, since to do so would be to put considerations of formal sovereignty before effective influence and power, but to adapt institutions and policies both in the UK and in Brussels to meet and reduce the real and substantial public anxieties over national identity and alienation from government, fear of change and loss of control over their fate which are aroused by talk of "loss of sovereignty"
ANNEX
AREAS OF POLICY IN WHICH PARLIAMENTARY FREEDOM TO LEGISLATE WILL BE AFFECTED BY ENTRY INTO THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.
1. In general it should be noted that there are very few if any areas in which Parliament will be wholly free from restraint. It should also be noted that the boundaries which distinguish these areas are changing all the time, as Community policies develop.
2. Much depends upon the way in which the Community has taken action in any particular area. In the case of action by way of Regulation there is, once the Regulation has been made, no room for Parliamentary action (other than, possibly, to supplement the Regulation or mere debate). Generally speaking Parliament must take the Regulation as it stands, and while with Regulations made by the Council, a United Kingdom Minister (who is subject of course to Parliamentary pressure) will take part in the proceedings leading up to adoption of this Regulation, this is not the case with Regulations made by the Commission. Regulations made by the Commission are however essentially of an implementing rather than policy-making nature. Community action by way of a Directive leaves Parliament freedom of choice as to means but no freedom as to the result to be achieved. Recommendation leaves Parliament free to decide not only on the means, but also upon whether to comply with the Recommendation at all.
3. Given these major qualifications the lists below, which are by no means exhaustive, identify the areas of legislative action which will be principally affected and those which will not.
AREAS IN WHICH PARLIAMENT'S FREEDOM OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION WILL BE SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRAINED.
Customs duties and all other matters incidental to the formation of a customs union;
Agriculture;
Free movement of labour, services and capital;
Transport;
Monopolies and restrictive practices;
State aid for Industry;
Coal and Steel;
Nuclear energy industry;
Company Law;
Insurance Law;
Fisheries;
Value added tax;
Social security for migrant workers;
AREAS IN WHICH PARLIAMENT'S FREEDOM OF LEGISLATIVE ACTION WILL NOT BE SIGNIFICANTLY RESTRAINED.
The general principles of criminal law;
The general principles of the law of the contract;
The general principles of the law of civil wrongs (tort);
Land Law;
Relations of landlord and tenant;
Housing and town and country planning law;
Matrimonial and family law;
The law of inheritance;
Nationality Law;
Trusts;
Social services (other than for migrant workers);
Education;
Health;
Local government;
Rates of Direct Taxation;
FURTHER IMPORTANT AREAS IN WHICH MEMBERSHIP OF THE COMMUNITY MIGHT AFFECT HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT FREEDOM OF ACTION.
In addition to the areas listed above, there are a number of important areas in which membership of the Community would impose obligations vis-a-vis the Commission of other member States. These obligations which will restrain our freedom of action in areas hitherto within the discretion of the Executive may be divided into two classes:
a) present obligations to consult; b) future obligations to consult, or to coordinate policies.
2. Present obligations to consult include:
i) Economic Policy : Articles 103-9 of the Treaty of Rom anjoin a wide measure of consultation and coordination on policy on current trends on balance of payment problems.
On exchange rates each Member State is required under the Treaty "to treat its policy .... as a matter of common interest". In practice the main common interest has been the need to allow the CAP to work smoothly; but this has not prevented member states changing parity sometimes with, sometimes without, consultation.
On balance of payments difficulties member states are allowed (under the Treaty) to pursue policies necessary to preserve or restore equilibrium, preferably with consultation beforehand. The Commisssion is empowered to investigate and to make recommendations but national freedom is not significantly restrained at this stage.
ii) Foreign Policy the Davignon report (1970) provided for six-monthly meetings of Foreign Ministers and quarterly meetings of Political Directors to coordinate foreign policies and Governments should consult on all important questions. Two such meets of Foreign Ministers have so far occurred. But no effective restraint exists upon national responsibility for foreign policy as such, and the obligations go no further than those we already have under WEU.
3. Future obligations, where we as members would of course have a full and equal voice in the creation of the detailed policy, include
(a) Economic and Monetary Union
The Council of Ministers adopted a programme of action on 9 February 1971 aimed at establishing economic and monetary union of the Six (and by implication of an enlarged Community of Ten) in ten years. Only the first stage is agreed: Central Banks are to coordinate their monetary policies; the Commission and member governments are to consult three times a year with a view to coordinating their economic policies and are to produce a joint annual report on short term economic policy; arrangements were to be instituted for a first step in narrowing the margins of fluctuation of members' currencies against each other. These measures are to remain in force for five years and then lapse if agreement has not then been reached on the second stage, which ought to begin on 1 January 1974. Althought the arrangements for narrowing the exchange margins have been posponed by the May currency crisis and the German Government's decision to float the D-mark, it is likely that on entry the UK will have to adhere to the agreement summarised above, assuming that current difficulties in implementing these agreements have been overcome by the time we join. We shall of course take part as full members in the discussions which must precede any move to the second stage.
(b) General provisions for harmonisation of legal practices
There are two relevant general provisions. Article 100 of the Rome Treaty, on the Approximation of Laws, and Article 220 on the negotitation of mutually beneficial agreements which could in theory both lead to encroachment in the future on areas where our freedom to decide on policy is not now significantly restrained. A large number of miscellanesou regulations of little political significance have already been made under Article 100.They are designed to facilitate intra-Community trade by the establishment of uniform standards and practices. After entry we shuold of course have a full say in the scope and application of future work in this field.
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY
1. Strictly interpreted, the term "sovereignty" has two principal applications. It originally described the powers of the ruler within his State. In the United Kingdom this internal sovereignty is bound up with the doctrine of Parliament's sovereign law-making power therein, unchallenged by any rival national or international source of authority and free to enact legislation, untrammelled in law by acts of its predecessors or otherwise. The term "sovereignty" on the international plane derives from this original, internal use. In dealing with other States each ruler asserted his own (internally) sovereign status and recognised the equality and independence of other sovereigns. (see Annex A).
2. In this strict sense joining the Community would have immediate implictions for internal sovereignty because:-
a. Community Laws, existing and future, will apply directly in this country as, in effect, a new body of "Federal" statute law;
b. Community law will take precedence over domestic law;
c. the European Court's decisions will be of United Kingdom statutues.
The range of subjects which may be affected is set out in Annex B.
3. At this stage in the Community's development, entry would, however, mean no substantial impairment of our international sovereign status, despite extensive limitations on our national freedom of action. If in the future, the Community were to develop on a broad political front and its institutions matched this development, then national sovereignty would progressively diminish; but member states would nevertheless retain for as long as can be foreseen both the power to prevent decisions against their vital national interest and the ultimate practical ability to renounce the Treaty.
POLITICAL REALITY AND PUBLIC CONCERN.
Public and political concern over "sovereignty" in this context goes wider than these technical matters, and the effects of membership will be more pervasive than with earlier commitments. The prospect of major commitments in the Community arouses keen concern which is often expressed as fear about sovereignty but may rather concern:-
a. National identity
People fear that to become more European we must be less British; a certain mis-trust of foreigners is persistent in Britain.
b. Change
Membership will mean major changes; talk of "loss of sovereignty" reflects fear that this will be uncontrollableand irrevocable.
c. Bureaucracy
Even in Britain, bureaucracy can seem remote. The Community democratic processes are inadequate and the Community bureaucracy will be largely foreign. Our own Parliament will find it more difficult to supervise important decision-making in Brussels and even in London.
d. National Power
The British people believe they order their own affairs; but their instincts derive from the past power rather than present realities. Membership involves the permanent merging of important national interests. HMG will find their freedom of action in many fields restricted by Community decisions.
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY
5. a. British Parliamentarians should be encouraged and assisted to play the most effective possible role in the European Parliament;
b. Ways should be found to adapt the processes of the British Parliament so as to minimize public feelings of remoteness and alienation from the decision-making in Brussels. To meet these new problems a Select Committee on Community Affairs, or perhaps other new machinery might be considered;
c. Special attention should be given to strengthening local and regional democratic processes.
6. More generally, apprehensions will arise from the reduction of British power and influence, real or imagined. Even those who concede intellectually that as a middle ranking power we must proceed by treaty, alliance and compromise, may not accept the implications of this fact emotionally or instinctively . Joining the Community will deeply affront many people. Before and after entry, we must therefore ensure that unpopular measures or unfavourable economic developments are not wrongly attributed to the unmanageable workings of the Community. We must also demonstrate the increase in our real international influence through our share in the formulation and execution of Community policies, contrasting this increase in influence with the highly formal nature of the "sovereignty" that will be eroded.
Mr Daunt (Received in registry no 37 - 5 July 1971
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNTIES
At the Planning Committee meeting on 8 June, it was agreed that the Planning Paper on Sovereignty should be prepared as quickly as possible for submission to FCO Ministers and the PUS asked that a shorter paper, suitable for DOP or Cabinet consideration, should be prepared for submission at the same time.
2. I now submit:
Flag A (i) an amended version of the Planning Paper. The principal changes are in
- the bowdlerising of reference to the development of supra-national tendencies;
- the addition of further section to the annex covering exchange rates and other subjects on which there will be some obligations.
- a qualifying phrase in paragraph 25 (iv) reflecting doubts in sir C O'Neill's mind over the appropriateness of a Select Committee and
- a number of relatively minor changes to the legal arguments which are now in conformity with the views of the Law Officers;
(ii) a draft based on the Planning Paper but cast in a form suitable for DOP (it is within the 700 word limit). the detail has been relegated to the Annexes, which contain (Annex A) a fuller discussion of the legal issues and (Annex B) an analysis of the areas in which our freedom of legislative or executive action will or will not be restrained;
(iii) a draft covering submission from the PUS to Mr Rippon and the Secretary of State.
3. The draft DOP paper at (ii) above has been cleared with the Legal Advisers and EID, and has been drafted to conform with the views of the Law Officers. We have also had the benefit of the Flag C helpful and penetrating draft put to the PUS by Mr Bottomley on 16 June, on which we have leaned heavily. Thus, our draft makes the points in the last sentence of Mr Bottomley's paragraph 3 and in his paragraph 4; and incorporates virtually verbatim his paragraph 5 and 6. The only essential differences are that:
(a) we have retained for DOP the important legal distinction between internal and external sovereignty (which is fundamental to the Planning Paper);
(b) in dealing with the issue raised by Lord Denning to which Mr Bottomley very properly draws attention (i.e. whether or not Parliament can lawfully go back on the Treaty of Rome once HMG has signed it), we have retained the approach adopted in the Planning Paper. We agree with Mr Bottomley that "it is not possible to state with any certainty what effect our "joining the European Communities would come to have on the sovereignty of Parliament". Much will depend on future developments both in Parliament and in the EEC. But what we do say represents the views of our legal advisers, who consider it to conform with those of the Law Officers.
4. The PUS should see these drafts before the weekend. I am, therefore, submitting them direct to you, with a copy to Mr Bottomley as regards paragraph 3 above. If Mr Bottomley sees grave objection to our draft DOP paper, I recommend that the Planning Paper shuld, nevertheless, go forward to Ministers forthwith, leaving the DOP approach to be finalised on the PUS's return from Mosow towards the end of this month.
17 June 1971. L. Fielding
Copied to: Mr Logan Planning Staff
sir V. Evans
Mr Bottomley
sir T Brimslow
Sir C O'Neill.
Sir C O'Neill
Received in Registry No 37 - 5 Jul 1971-
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES
Under my minute of 9 June, i circulated a cockshy draft of a short paper on this subject, resulting from the Planning Committee discussion on 8 June.
2. The Legal Advisers have helped me in redrafting the opening passage of that draft, and I now circulate a revised version of the whole.
3. Since I redrafted to meet the Legal Advisers' points, I have seen an opinion bearing on this subject from the Law Officers. Their view on the ultimate sovereignty of Parliament, and the impossibility of any one Parliament binding its successors, is much closer to my original version than to the revised version which our own Legal Advisers have agreed to. In particular, the Law Officers ignore the Denning point quoted in my new paragraph 1. The Legal Advisors stick to their guns, nonetheless, and I do not feel that I have any option but to follow them. But it certainly does substantially increase the objections to circulating any paper at all - only fools rush in where angels fear to tread - or at least where archangels differ on correct route through the minefield.
J.R.A.Bottomley
16 June 1971
Copy to Sir V Evans
Sir C O'Neill
Sir T Brimelow
Mr L Fielding.
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES.
It is not possible to state with any certainty what effect our joining the European Communities would come to have on the sovereignty of Parliament. The question was mentioned in a judgement of the Court of Appeal on 10 May. 1971, but the court deliberately refused to answer it. Lord Denning, presiding said inter alia
"If HM Ministers sign this treaty and Parliament enacts enacts provisions to implement it, I do not envisage that Parliament would afterwards go back on it and try to withdraw from it. But, if Parliament should do so, then I say we will consider that event when it happens. We will then say whether Parliament can lawfully do it or not."
2. So long as Parliament continued to exist in its present shape, it would no doubt be possible in the last resort for legislation to be passed and enforced to separate the United Kingdom from the Communities. But this is not a speculation we can indulge in or encourage.
3. the situation is also uncertain over external aspects of sovereignty. But it seem fair to conclude that, although the implications for our freedom of independent action would be considerable, no substantial impairment of our international status would follow immediately upon membership, and that membership of the Community as it at present exists could involve only limited diminution of external sovereignty in practice. Fuller account of these issues are at Annex A.
4. What is clear is that, regardless of the fundamental but uncertain problems touched on above, the "sovereignty" issue comprehends a number of real problems on which there is public uneasiness. These problems will need to be delat with and to be explained to Parliament and the public, both before we join and continuously thereafter. The most important of them are:
(i) Parliament will have to allow some its legislative functions to be carried out by organs of the Communities (see Annex B) - some of whose legislation will take precedence over Parliamentary legislation;
(ii) the Executive will find its freedom of action in many fields restricted by Community decisions (see Annex C): and
(iii) Parliament will have increased difficulty in carrying out its traditional function of supervising the activities of the Executive ("grievances before supply") in fields in which the primary decisions will be taken in Brussels rather than in London.
5. Among the ways in which these problems could be dealt with are the following:
(a) British Parliamentarians should be encouraged and assisted to play the most effective possible role in the European Parliament;
(b) Ways should be found to adapt the processes of the British Parliament so as to minimize feelings of remoteness and alienation of the decision-makers in Brussels. The creation of a Select Committee on Community Affairs might be considered;
(c) Special attention should be also given to the strenthening of local and regional democratic processes.
6. More generally the fear of "loss of sovereignty" reflects apprehensions arising from the reduction of British power and influence. For many people in this country - even among those who concede intellectually that the days of splendid isollation are long past and that we are nowadays a power of the middle rank and can proceed only by treaty, alliance and compromise - it is not easy to accept the implications of this fact emotionally or instinctively. Joining the Community will affront the deep feelings of many people in this country. It will therefore be important - after as well as before joinig - to demonstrate the increase in our real international influence through our sharing in the formulation and execution of the Community's policies.
Parliamentary Under-Secretary. Rec'd 5 July 1971 Lingholm
Keswick
Cumberland
30th June 1971.
The Marquess of Lothian
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London SW1
Dear Lothian
Many thanks for your letter of 21st June in regard to the Treaty of Rome and discussing the question as to whether itn particular countries could or could not opt out if they so wished.
Whilst your answer is certainly most helpful, it does not really go quite as far as I would have hoped. However, I will use it as best I can in the context of the fear of irrevocability which I mentioned in my original letter. Thank you for your trouble.
yours sincerely
Received 5 July 1971
From: Geoffrey Johnson Smith MP
Dear Sir
I should be most grateful if your Department would kindly comment on paragraph three of the enclosed letter.
I have been getting quite a lot of questions on this point from the better educated constituents. I have done some research and have, I think, quite a good answer. I think the time has come for me to seek the authoritative views from your Department, whose legal division must have given some considerable thought to this problem.
Anthony Royle Esq MP
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street S.W.1
Nowplace
Framfield
Nr Uckfield, Sussex
28th June 1971
Geoffrey Johnson Smith Esq MP
House of Commons
London S.W.1
Dear Geoffrey
I am sure that you will be beginning to realise that individuals everywhere are starting to take action to ensure that we will not be led like lemmings into the Common Market.
I doubt that you made many statements, if any, that I could agree with at your talk in Framfield. You achieved your biggest cheer when you said something to the effect that 'it was necessary to get people together'. You hugged the air in front of you, but please when you say that again at other meetings, just remind the audience that you are going to force them to 'get together'. We have had happy voluntary relationships with Australia, New Zealand and many other countries, a relationship which is forced cannot possibly by harmonised.
You further answered another question to the effect that nothing in the Treaty of Rome gave anyone any power to be executive, judge and jury in their own case. You said you would 'run a mile'. I am not going to ask you to run a mile, but the nine Commissioners do have powers to make their own regulations and orders. They have the power to investigate company's books without a search warrant in any country. They have the power to convict. This conviction has to be passed on to the national court which has to obey it. There is no appeal. If the fine is excessive or cannot be paid, then the court will have to proceed to the next stage which must be gaol. I really believe you cannot possibly know what the Treaty of Rome is about.
I think it fair to ask you to refute my statement with the necessary quotation or to apologise and admit that you were wrong in the Framfield hall.
I do not think you can possibly realise the monstrosity that the agricultural and fishery legislation inside the EEC is producing. The cost has risen in four years from £250,000.00 to £1,500,000,000. For what purpose is this money to be paid and who is to gain? Food prices are to rise and there is this enormous tax.
It is easy to see the hideous dangers and vast cost of joining the EEC. Can you give me one certain advantage.
I am more and more certain that the Conservative Party if it heads for the Common Market, is going to destroy itself and it will also compound the economic difficulties in which we already wallow because the Party simply will not do that which is necessary both to stop inflation, to increase employment and put the country on a sound economic footing. I think you will become more and more aware that the British people do not intend to be led over the cliff like lemmings. For the umpteenth time in history a relativing few people are confusing and betraying a very great number. I am sure it will never happen. You are using devious means to give away the sovereignty of Parliament in perpetuity. This is quite different to making a treaty which can be cancelled by a subsequent Parliament. From your talk in Framfield and communications with Geoffrey Rippon and other members of your Government, I am satisfied that the real dangers in the situation are not understood.
Yours sincerely
Antony Fisher.
Foreign & Commonwealth Office
Downing Street, London S.W. 1
Telephone 01-930 3440 23 June 1971
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster.
Dear Robert
Albert Costain has passed on to me your letter of 10 June, with an enquiry from a constituent about the legal position if we join the European Community.
In general Community Law, whether embodied in instruments having direct internal effect or in instruments which require implementing legislation to be passed by the Member States, is applied through the municipal courts of Member States.
However, sometimes Community institutions and in particular the Commission, are given some powers to decide whether there has been an infringement of Community law and, in accordance with a quasi-judicial procedure, to impose penalties for the infringement. An example is in the field of restrictive practices, where Regulation 17 gives the Commission such powers. Where the Council or the Commission has the power to take such decisions, Article 173 of the Treaty of Rome provides a safeguard by allowing the decision to be challenged before the European Court of Justice.
yours
Geoffrey Rippon
To: Robert S. Redmond, Esq TD, MP
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1
21 June 1971
From the Parliamentary Under-Secretary
Thank you for your letter of 6 June about the question of sovereignty and the EEC.
I should first of all like to point out that membership of the European Communities would not affect the vast majority of the Government's powers to run this country. However, no country these days can really decide all its affairs by itself. Britain's actions in both the political and the commercial sphere are already greatly circumscribed by a nexus of international agreements such as the GATT and the UN. I firmly believe that our membership of the Community institutions, particularly the Council of Ministers will be of great benefit to this country when it comes to making agreements with countries outside Europe. The Community has already show that it can defend its members' interests far more effectively than they could individually.
The Community is, of course, committed to examining means of progress towards economic and monetary union, as a logical development from the present stage of economic and commercial integration. This policy is still, however, in its infancy and progress will be necessarily slow. Britain would be a member of the Community before any decisive steps towards economic and monetary union were taken, and would certainly ensure that no action detrimental to her national interest was taken.
J. Derrick, Esq
Little Orchard
Sudbrook Lane
Petersham
Richmond,
Surrey.
I have noted your request for tickets and I shall do my best to obtain one for you, although I should warn you that they will be in very short supply
Anthony Royle
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London S.W.1
From the Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State 21 June 1971.
E.I.D.
Thank you for your letter of 8 June about the irrevocability of the Treaty of Rome.
The Treaty of Rome is not, of course, unique in that it does not have a time limit or contain a denunciation clause. The United Nations Carter, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement of 1957 (to name only a few international agreements to which Britain is a party) could also be termed "irrevocable" if this were the criterion. There are no constitutional obstacles in the way of Parliament's approving Treaties of unlimited duration if it so wishes.
the important point to make here, as I am sure you will realise, is that the Community operates on the basis of concensus, and that the obvious course of action to take in the event of problems would be to get together with our partners and to attempt to solve them within the framework of the Community. A Treaty only remains effective so long as the political and economic need for it is there; if internal problems and disagreements in the Community grew too strongly to be resolved by discussion, and its internal differences became irreconciable, then it would fall apart of its own accord. But I believe that the advantages of continuing membership will grow as integration within the Community proceeds. In fact, the course the Community has taken so far demonstrates this. The Community has been an outstanding economic success. It has had the collective strength to overcome all manner of obstacles to its development. There is no significant regional or political group in the Community which wants withdrawal or dissolution - let alone any member state.
The Viscount Rochdale O.B.E, T.D, D.L
House of Lords,
S.W..1.
There were plenty of people in the Six who expressed the doubts and fears you now hear from anti-Marketeers in this country, before the Treaties were signed. These voices have long since fallen silent. The member states have lost none of their separate national identities; collectively they have gained, not lost, in influence.
It is difficult to find a succinct formula of words to cover this question, but I hope what I have written above will help.
(LOTHIAN)
Mr Statham
1. I submit a draft note of guidance on the ESBC entry fee for Mr Rippon's use in answering questions in Parliament.
I.T.Steven
European Integration Department
18 June 1971
EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY ENTRY FEE.
THE REASON FOR AN ENTRY FEE.
Our contribution, in 3 instalments, of an "entry fee" of 57 m.u.a (£24 million) to the ECSC has been accepted because this sum represents our participation in the accumulated funds to which we shall have access immediately upon entry and from which HMG, local authorities, the coal and steel industries and other industries related thereto will derive considerable benefits. The funds have been built up from levies imposed on the coal and steel undertakings of the existing member states since the ECSC was set up in 1952.
THE BASIS UPON WHICH THE ENTRY FEE WAS CALCULATED
It is a principle of the ECSC that, unlike the funds of other Communities, levies will be imposed directly on the output of the coal and steel industries of the member states. The calculation of an entry fee was based on the last available valuation of the funds, at the end of 1969, audited in 1970. The proportion was taken as the amount of the levy, based on coal and steel output which the UK would have paid had we been members during 1969 compared with the levy paid by the Community in that year. This proportion amount to 37%
NEGOTIATION ON THE BASIS OF CALCULATION
Accumulated ECSC funds at the end of 1969 stood at 220 million and the sum which would have been payable, if book values had been strictly calculated, would have been 81.4 m.u.a (£33.9 million) The reduction to the present agreed figure was made after the Community had accepted that some parts of the accumulated reserves e.g. those consisting of loans for workers' housing, made at very low interest rate, could be written down in value. By this device the book value of the accumulated funds was reduced from 220 to 155 m.u.a with the consequential reduction in the amount of our entry fee from 81.4 m.u.a. to 57 m.u.a.
AN ALTERNATIVE BASIS FOR CALCULATION
Agreement by the Community on the basic calculation itself represented a considerable concession, since some of the Governments of the member states had argued that our participation in the accumulated funds should have been equivalent to the sum when we would have contributed to these funds had we been members of the ECSC since inception. Such a basis of calculation would have made us liable for a sum in excess of 100 m.u.a.
Mr Morland
Mr Logan
I submit for Mr Royle's signature a draft reply to a letter from on of his constituents, Mr J. Derrick.
G.E.Clark
European Integration Department
17 June 1971.
Mr Morland
Mr Godden
Mr Goodenough
I submit for Lord Lothian's signature a draft reply to a letter from Lord Rochdale about the irrevocability of the Treaty of Rome.
G.E.Clark
European Integration Department
17 June 1971
Mr Morland
Mr Pakenahm
I submit for Mr Rippon's signature a draft reply to a letter which Mr Costain has received from Mr R.S.Redmond MP.
the legal advisers agree.
G.E.Clark
European Integration Department
15 June 1971
Little Orchard
Rec'd and ack 10/6 Sudbrook Lane
I.R Department Petersham
for draft reply please Richmond
From Mr Royle
6th June 1971
Dear Mr Royle
Thank you very much for your letter explaining how you feel about British entry into Europe. Although I fully agree with what you said, I am sorry you did not raise the matter of sovereignty, since I wrote my letter to you last April, I have become increasingly worried about the loss of sovereignty which could result from the EEC's long term economic plans, such as monetary union. I would feel much happier about entry if the Government were to give an assurance that Britain veto any such plans if, and when we join. However I fully apreciate the potential economic advantages of entry on suitable terms.
However, the real urpose of this letter is to ask you whether you could get me Strangers Gallery tickets for Commons debates on entry after the Government has published the White Paper on the terms of entry. It saves spending all the time queueing! If you can get me tickets (or a ticket if you can only get me a ticket for one debate) I would prefer them to be for debates after July 9th. Incidentally, I should like to register my disapproval of any plans to have a Commons vote on entry before the Summer recess.
Yours sincerely
John Derrick.
Anthony Royle MP
House of Commons
London SW1
Perhaps you could say that Mr Royle has noted his request for tickets and that he will do his best to obtain one for him but they will be in very short supply.
I have taken a copy of his letter and will do what is necessary.
Anne
Mr Sinclair (legal Advisers K 166)
Mr Steven (European Integration Department E 204a)
1. Please see the attached letter from Mr de Winton about the procedures adopted by the Commission in imposing penalties. Before we can answer the various points put to us I think we shall have to do a bit of writing around.
2. On the first point, about the presumption of innocence, it is not true that all members of the Community have subscribed to Article 6 (2) of the European Convention on Human Rights: france is not a party to that cConvention. For convenience, Article 6 (2) reads: "everyone charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until proved guilty by law".
3. I think that it would be a perfectly fair assumption to make in public, that the five who are parties to the Convention do in fact have laws which are in accordance with this provision. The Solicitor General, however, obviously would like to have this confirmed by quotations from authoritative works on the criminal procedures in some of the countries concerned. I think that there is no real alternative to asking the Embassies in the Six to provide appropriate quotations from authoritative works in their countries. I think this is particularly required in the case of France, given that France is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights.
4. The other main question is whether there is any prior impartial hearing before the Commission imposes fines or penalties, it is cleared from Article 19 that before taking the decision to impose a fine or penalty under Article 15 and 16 there must be an opportunity given to the "accused" to express their views. Article 1 of Regulation 99 refers to this process as a "hearing". Article 7 of Regulation 99 obliges the Commission on to provide an opportunity for written arguments to be developed orally. Article 9 of Regulation 99 provides that the hearings shall be conducted by persons appointed by the Commission.
5. I think from this procedure it can be safely said that there is a prior hearing before the Commission decides to impose a fine. What I am less certain about is the extent to which it can be said that the hearing is "impartial". Simply as a matter of form, and irrespective of the possible impartiality of the procedure adopted in practice, it may be said that a hearing before a person who is appointed by the "proseceuting" authority can scarcely be thoroughly impartial. Whether that formal point is a good one or not, clearly a great deal depends on exactly how these appointees operate, and what kind of persons the Commission appoint for this purpose. I think we have no alternative but to ask Brussels about this. I notice that in paragraph 31 of the 1967 White Paper we did not actually say that the hearings were impartial, but merely reference to "quasi-judicial procedure". There is perhaps further criticism to be directed at the procedure provided by Article 9 of Regulation 99, and this is the provision in paragraph 3 that hearings shall not be public. Quite apart from any general principles which might be thought to apply, it is worth drawing attention in this context to Article 6 (1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, which provides that "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law" It may be enought that the ultimate determination of a person's rights or liability to a penalty under Regulation 17 can be determined by the European Court. Nevertheless, I think that Article 6 (1) could be used damagingly.
6. Article 17 of Regulation 17 confers upon the European Court full jurisdiction within the meaning of Article 172 of the EEC Treaty when adjudicating on appeals brought against decision by which the Commission has fixed a fine or a penalty. Mr de Winton asks whether this has an bering on the procedure of the Commission, particularly the impartiality of the hearing. I am sure that the existence of Article 172 does have a bearing on the procedure of the Commission, in that the knowledge that there can be an appeal to the European Court is bound to make the Commission very chary of doing anything improper. I would doubt, however, whether this would enable somebody to question the impartiality of the hearing by the person appointed by the Commission solely on the grounds that, being appointed by the Commission, he could not be impartial. But I should have thought it very likely that, if, on some other grounds, it could be shown that the hearings were conducted impartially, this could be sufficient to enable the European Court to cancel or reduce the fine or penalty imposed. In this connection, it is worth noting that the European Court, in the Koster, Berodtand Companycase (Affairs 25/70, judgement delivered in December 1970) decided that respect for the general principles of law is assured by the European Court.
7. Much the same can, I think, be said about the effects of Article 173 of the EEC Treaty, although in this case the European Court has power to declare the decision of the Commission imposing a fine or peanlty to be invalid.
8. Apart from Regulation 17, I think that other provisions providing for a person upon whom the Commission proposes to impose a penalty must have a prior hearing are probably only to be found in other particular Regulations. I am not aware of any general provisions to this effect. Other particular Regulations in this context are Regulation No 11 of the EEC Council, Articles 17 and 18 of which provide for the Commission to impose a penalty, and Article 25 of which provides for some kind of prior hearing. In this case it is specifically provided that the person to hear the explanations of the "accused" is to be an official of the Commission. Article 25 also provides for Article 172 of the EEC Treaty to apply. Another particular Regulation is EEC Council Regulation No 1017/68. Article 23 provides for the imposition of penalties, Article 26 provides for some kind of prior hearing, and Article 24 provides for the role of the European Court under Article 172.
9. I do not know how far it is possible to generalise (and again, perhaps we should ask Brussels) but I suspect that virtually every Regulation which allows of decisions to be taken imposing fines or penalties by the Commission also provides for a prior hearing (which may be written, or written and oral) and also for a reference to the European Court under Article 172. The real difficulty in being re-assuring about the point put to the Solicitor General is on the question of impartiality of this prior hearing. So far as this impartiality might be called in question, the fact that the European Court is available by way of appeal is a good safeguard.
A.D.Watts
Legal Advisers
W 44/4
01-405 7641 ext 20 Law Officers' Department
The Legal Secretary Royal Courts of Justice
Law Officers' Department London W.C.2
Royal Courts of Justice
London W.C.2 24 June 1971
Dear Arthur
The Solicitor-General has had in mind to take up the two brief points made in the attached note and spell out an answer to them in one of his forthcoming speeches, assuming that they can be refuted. The question of the procedure for imposing penalties may well have been fully studied during recent years, but we do not have any detailed official paper about it here. We would therefore be grateful for any advice the Foreign and Commonwealth Office can give us about the answers which the Solicitor-General might make in his speech.
The first point to be dealt with is that Continental systems of jurisprudence require an accused to prove his innocence. Since all Members of the Community have subscribed to the convention for the protetion of fundamental rights and freedoms, which provides in Article 6 (2) for a presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, it must be assumed that their laws fully reflect this position. It would, however, be helpful if this could be confirmed by quotations from authoritative works on the criminal procedures in some of the countries concerned.
The second point is that EEC regulations, such as regulation 17, authorise the Commission to impose penalties "without any prior impartial hearing" So far as regulation 17 itself is concerned the position seems to be fairly clear. Article 19 of regulation 37 requires the Commission to give undertakings or associations an opportunity to express their views on the acts or omissions of which they are accused before taking a decision to impose a penalty. Regulation 99 spells out the procedure for this; under which the Commission is required to specify the grounds of complaint, and enterprises or associations can submit written pleadings and also are entitled to an oral hearing by a person appointed by the Commission.
There are a number of questions on which we need clarification as follows:
(a) Are the persons appointed to conduct the hearing "impartial"
(b) Do the doctrines of "full jurisdiction as to the merits" within the meaning of Article 172 of the Treaty, or the grounds of jurisdiction of the court mentioned in Article 173 of the Treaty, have any bearing on the procedure of the Commission, in particular the impartiality of the hearing?
(c) Leaving aside regulation 17 (and also Article 36 of the ECSC Treaty) are there any provisions, of general or particular application, guaranteeing the person upon whom the Commission proposes to impose a penalty a prior hearing? Para.31 of the 1967 White Paper leaves the impression that a quasi judicial procedure would always be observed.
A.D.Watts Esq
Legal Advisers,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Downing Street
London S.W.1.
3 August 1971
Reference 104
Mr I.T.Steven
Presumption of Innocence
I have looked through the Constitutions of the six Member States of the European Communities. Though five of them contain some guarantees of a fair trial (for Belgium, see Articles 7 and 8; for FRG, Article 103; for Italy, articles 24 and 25; for Luxembourg, Articles 12 and 14; and for Netherlands, Articles 170 and 175). the Italian Constitution alone expressly refers to the question of innocence and guilt. "The person accused is not considered guilty",it says in the second paragraph of Article 27, "until final sentence has been passed upon him".
This does not prevent, however, the presumption of innocence from being a basic tenet in criminal proceedings in the other Member States of the Six. The principle in dubio pro reo prevails in all of them (for the FRG, see K. Neumann in the F.O. Manual of German Law, Vol II, p149, HMSO 1952). This is why five of the six could adhere, as far as its Article 6(2) is concerned to the European Convention of Human Rights. And so could certainly France.
While this is the case, there is an important difference in the way in which the presumption is applied in criminal proceedings in the six Member States on the one hand, and in the UK on the other. In the UK the general presumption that a person is innocent until the contrary is proved, and that the more serious the crime, the more clearly it must be proved (see Halsbury's. Simonds ed., Vol.10, p.457) leads to an allocation of the burden of proof at the trial.
In the six Member States, on the other hand, the presumption has not the same function. Thus in the FRG, it is the duty of the Court to do everything necessary to ascertain the truth. This, in a sense, "does away" with the whole problem of buden of proof. Yet the presumption of innocence applies to the weighing of the evidence (cf K.Neumann, ibidem; J.E.S Fawcett, the Application of the European Convention on Human Rights, O.U.P 1969, p161). The same applies in France and Belgium and presumably in Luxembourg and the Netherlands.
Unfortunately, F.O. Law Library does not contain, nor was its very resourceful librarian able toproduce, the Codes of Criminal Procedure of the Six or text books on the subject. So I am not in a position to quote Chapter and Verse for the foregoing. But I am pretty certain that my recollection is correct. Moreover, a few years agao, I read an article by, I believe, Professor C. Hamson on the French law on the subject. His conclusion was that taking the pre-trial and trail as a whole the position in France was very much the same as over here. (I cannot locate the article now and there is no reply from Hamson's home in Cambridge.)
I would not generalise this conclusion. My own impression is that, while the presumption of innocence applies in the six Member States, their rules on the admissibility of evidence differ from those in this country where the rules are highly technical and, on the whole, limitative. This is one of the reasons for the general impression that the rule of law is more pronounced in this country than "on the Continent". The other reasons concern the pre-trial stage.
Alexander Elkin
KCS EID 347A
Ext.502
263 Written answers 12th June 1971
to amend the opertion of the Maintenance Orders (Facilities Enforcement Act 1920, so as to include affiliation orders and to extend it to include foreign and Commonwealth countries, and if he will make a statement.
Mr Carlisle: Legislation for this purpose is being prepared and will be introduced when parliamentary time permits.
Downing Street Demonstration
(Police)
Mr Dempsoy asked the Secretary of State for the Home Department how many police officers and of what ranks on duty and standing by; and how many police vans were engaged in controlling the Clydeside workers, ministers of the religion and Scottish Members of Parliament during the recent demonstration at No 10 Downing Street; and what was the total cost involved of those police services.
Mr Sharples : Ninety four police officers were on duty on 16th June in connection with the visit of the shipbuilding workers in London.
Their ranks were 1 commander, 2 chief superintendants, 4 inspectors, 9 sergeants, 76 constables, one coach, five personnel carriers and one car were used.
There were no additional costs to police funds.
WEST MIDLANDS.
Q6. Mr Carter asked the Prime Minister if he will now make an early official visit to the West Midlands.
The Prime Minister: As I indicated in the reply I gave last Tuesday to a supplementary question from my hon Friend the Member for Brierley Hills (Mr Montgomery ), I shall be visiting the West Midlands on 30th September and 1st October - (Vol 819 c 227-229)
FIRST LORD OF THE TREASURY
Q7. Mr Douglas asked the Prime Minister if he will introduce legislation to abolish the office of First Lord of the Treasury.
The Prime Minister: No
EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
Q8. Mr Biggs-Davison asked the Prime Minister what requests he has received from the Prime Ministers of Canada and Australia in view of the difficulty of directly associating those Commonwealth realms with the European Economic Community to include in Her Majesty's Government's negotiations in Brussels provision for assured outlets for Australian and Canadian exports to the United Kingdom and the Community.
The Prime Minister: There is continuing close consultation with the Governments of Canada and Australia about the future of their trade with the United Kingdom as a member of an enlarged Community. In the negotiations on transitional arrangements, agreement has been reached on a number of products important in these countries.
Q9. Mr Bruce-Gardyne asked the Prime Minister whether he will co-ordinate a programme of public speeches by Ministers to ensure that the electorate is properly informed concerning the advantages which would result from the enlargement of the European Community.
The Prime Minster: My righ hon. Friends, and I will continue to provide this information both through public speeches and by other means.
Q16. Mr Biggs-Davison asked the Prime Minister what amendments of, or derogations from, the Treaty of Rome he discussed with President Pompidou in order that essential sovereignty may be maintained if the United Kingdom enters the European Economic Community.
The Prime Minister: As I told the House on 24th May, President Pompidou and I agreed that decisions in the Community should in practice be taken by unanimous agreement when vital nationalinterests of any one or more Members are at state - (Vol. 818. c 31-35)
HOMELESS PERSONS.
Q10. Miss Lester asked the Prime Minister if he is satisfied with the co-ordination between the Home Office, the
Date 22 June
COL 264
VOL 819
ADVICE FOR THE PRIME MINSTER
NOT YET APPROVED
SUBMITTED TO: Mr Rippon and Mr Royle
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION The draft reply should
reach the Parliamentary Office through
for Oral Answer on Tuesday 22nd June your Under-Secretary by
*U. Mr John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell): To ask the Prime Minister, what amendments of, or derogations from, the Treaty of Rome he discussed with President Pompidou in order that essential sovereignty may be maintained if the United Kingdom enters the European Economic Community.
A.R.V.
Tuesday 22nd June 1971
Q. Mr John Biggs-Davison
(To be answered by the Prime Minister)
As I told the House on 24th May, President Pompidou and I agreed that decision in the Community should in practice be taken by unanimous agreement when vital national interests of any one or more Members is at stake.
Vol; 818
NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES
DISCUSSION OF AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY OF ROME WITH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU
1. President Pomidou and I did not discuss amendments to the Treaty of ome, but agreed on the continuation in an enlarged Community of the agreement between European Economic members in 1966 (known as the Luxembourg Agreement) under which Community decisions must in practice be reached by unanimous agreement on issues where the vital interest of one or more Member State is at stake.
2. My right honourable Friend, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs answered yesterday a question about this from my honourable friend the Member for Esher.
SOVEREIGNTY
3. The voting practices of the Community, as they have evolved, adequately protect the interests of Member States. As a member of our enlarged Community we would have appropriate voting rights in its institutions and similar rights for expressing our view.
GENERAL QUESTIONS ABOUT THE TALKS WITH PRESIDENT POMIDOU
4. The purpose of these talks was to establish a broad identity of view on European questions. I would refer honourable Members to my statement on the 24th May.
5. SECRET AGREEMENT IN PRIME MINISTER'S TALKS WITH PRESIDENT POMPIDOU
I gave the House an absolute assurance about this on the 10th June.
FRENCH LANGUAGE
6. The languages of all Member States are official languages of the Community. There is no question of any Member attempting to impose one language on its partners. But it is natural that with the prospect of enlargement of the Community existing members wish to be assured that there will be no overturning of day to day practices.
7. The Community has put to us a possible approach to resolving this question on the basis of certain principles. Briefly, the concept is that our contributions should be governed by the Community's decision on the providing of ressources propres from the outset of our membership, but that during the transitional period the contribution should be governed by a key and that the amount of our national liability which we should actually be called upon to pay would be abated over the transitional period by annually diminishing percentages.
EFFECT OF EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY ENTRY ON FOOD PRICES
8. The effect of entry on food prices tends to be exaggerated. The previous Government in the White Paper of February 1970 forecast an increase in the Food Index of 18 to 26 per cent over the transitional period. This would be 5 to 4 per cent, annually, or less than 1 per cent on the cost of living, of which food accounts for about one quarter. The increases might in fact be somewhat less because the gap between United Kingdom and European Economic Community prices has been narrowing. My right honourable Friend the Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food will shortly be giving the House revised figures for the increase in the cost of food on entry and I am confident that they will show a maredly better picture than that presented in the February White Paper.
FOOD PRICES IN THE COMMUNITY
9. It should not be thought that food prices in all countries in the Community are uniform. Many factors, such as patterns of consumption and seasonal factors make for variations. Price levels for some kinds of fresh fruit and vegetables are lower in many countries of the Community. If we join, there is no reason to suppose that our prices would rise to the highest levels in the Community. On some products, for example milk, poultry,fish tea, coffee, cooking oils and fats, price rises would be very small indeed.
STERLING
I would refer honourable Members to my Statement on the 10th June.
MONETARY UNION AND "ALIGNMENT" OF STERLING
11. Progress towards monetary union may be difficult and there may be setbacks, but I am confident that there will be developments in this direction. It would therefore be appropriate and right to have discussion on the question of progressive "aligment" of policies after we become members of the Community.
QUESTIONS ABOUT MEETING OF DEPUTIES ON THE 16TH OF JUNE AND MINISTERIAL NEGOTIATING MEETINGS ON THE 21ST - 22ND JUNE
12. My right honourable and learned Friend the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster will be covering these in a statement after the current meeting.
REFERENDUM
13. I have always made it plain that it is Parliament's responsibility to decide this issue as it is to decide other issues in international relations.
BACKGROUND NOTE
DISCUSSIONS WITH PRESIDENT POMIDOU ON AMENDMENTS TO OR DEROGATIONS FROM THE TREATY OF ROME TO MAINTAIN SOVEREIGNTY.
The question relates to the Prime Minister's agreement with President Pomidou on the maintenance of the Luxembourg Agreement, whcih was referred to in the Prime Minister's statement on the 24th of May. The Luxembourg Agreement modifies the voting procedures in the Council of Ministers of the Community (laid down in Art 148 of the Treaty of Rome) in cases where vital interests of members are at issue. This modification of voting practices was arrived at, after the French withdrawal for six months from the Council of Ministers, in 1966. It enables member governments to maintain essentail sovereignty by requiring unanimity on key decisions.
ADVICE
FOR THE PRIME MINSTER
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION.
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION
for oral answer on Tuesday 22nd June.
*U. Mr John Biggs-Davison (Chigwell): To ask the Prime Minister what amendments of, or derogations from, the Treaty of Rome he discussed with President Popidou in order that essential sovereignty may be maintained if the United Kingdom enters the European Economic Community.
As I told the House on the 24th May; President Pompidou and I agreed that decisions in the Community should in practice be taken by unanimous agreement when vital national interests of any one or more Members are at stake.
Col 31-35
969 Oral Answers 21st June 1971.
The transistional period of for perpetuity, because this matter is of great importance to the inshore fishing community. To rever to the question under discussion -
(Hon. Members: "Too Long ) - it has been said that if they enter the EEC, the Norwegians are prepared to surrender those eights they are now demanding for themselves on maintaining the 12-mile limited and that they will go back upon the pledge they have already made that they will ban trawling within that 12-mile limit. If that is so, is not the offer being made to the British deep fishing fleet: -
Hon. Members: Too long!
Mr Deputy Speaker: Order. The hon Gentleman should be as short as possible.
Mr McNamara: With the greatest respect, Mr Deputy Speaker, I am trying to be, but I am being interrupted by hon Members opposite. These points are of interest to those of us who represent fishing constituencies and they need further enlargement than we have had from the Government. The point I was trying to make was this -------
Hon Members: Too long!
Mr Deputy Speaker: Order. I must ask the hon Gentleman to conclude his question in one sentence quickly.
Mr McNamara:
Does it not mean that the benefits offered to the deep-sea fleet of being able to fish within the 12-mile Norwegian limit will not exist?
Sir G. Nabarro: Garrulous old wind-bag.
Mr Royle: The six-mile proposal on the table for the discussions in Luxembourg this week. We are, of course, aware of the Norwegian proposals and have been studying them closely. The problems faced by the two countries are by no means identical but we shall continue to onsult the Norwegian Government closely, particularly on matters of common interest.
15. Mr Mather asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to what extent amendment to the Treaty of Rome is now considered necessary by Her Majesty's Government.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Her Majesty's Government accept the Treaty of Rom and the decisions flowing from it subject to the agreements reached and to be reached in the negotiations. On enlargement of the Community, the Trety of Rome needs certain technical amendments necessary to provide for the additional membership.
Mr Mather: I thank you my right hon-friend for that reply. As the full implications if Britain is to join cannot be clearly foreseen, will he press for an amendment of Article 240 of the Treaty of Rome to limit the binding effects which may arise for us as a result of the passage of time and to protect our over-riding national interest?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Where matters of over-riding national interest are concerned, we have made it plain - as my right hon Friend. the Prime Minister did i his talks with President Pompidou - that decisions should be reached by unanimity. This, I think, is the big protection against an vital interest of a member country being overridden.
Mr Heffer: It is not clear that the harmonisition programme, particularly in relation to taxation, means that this country will have to accept the value added tax and that even if we dislike that tax and we have a Labour Government, we cannot, if we are in the Common Market, get rid of it because of the harmonisition programme?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: That would be for the Labour Government to decide. If there ever is a Labour Government again.
17. Mr Trew asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will ensure that the White Paper on the terms for entry into the European Economic Community refers specifically to the degree of Great Britain's commitment to initatives that go beyond the scope of the Treaty of Rome.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I would ask my right hon.Friend to await the White Paper that we are about to issue.
Mr Trew: Does my right hon Friend agree that there are initiatives under way in Europe in respect of economic, monetary and political union which could have no less profound an effect on the future of this country than the Treaty of Rome itself? Will he ensure that these matters, particularly the questions of our commitments to them, are dealt with as clearly and as specifically as possible in the White Paper?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Yes, Sir. It is intended that the White Paper should be as comprehensive as possible so as to give the House and the country all the information we have.
Mr Molloy: Reference has been made to the West German growth rate. Will the White Paper say whether the effects on the British economy of joining the EEC would be as dynamic as the effects of membership on the Italian economy?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: The hon. Gentleman will be able to make all the necessary comparisons, including the one he has mentioned.
Mr Scott-Hopkins: does not my right hon Friend agree that any further initiative in the political, monetary or defence sectors would be the subject of separate negotiations after our entry into the Community?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Questions relating to sterling are to be taken outside the context of the present negotiations. The only commitment which the EEC has undertaken in regard to financial matters is that there will be discussion to see how far economic and financial co-operation can be taken. So these will be outside the negotiations.
Mr Shore: I do not think the right hon Gentleman has quite got the point. There really is rather more agreement amongst the Six than just a kind of loose decision to make progress with economic and monetary union. Is he not aware that there is a substantial body of Community policy in the form of regulations and other directives which need to be published and made available to the House not later than the time that he introduces his proposed White Paper?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: Yes, sir: but that was not the question I was asked. I was asked about economic discussions which go beyond the scope of the present negotiations.
18. Mr Lane asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he now expects to be able to publish a White Paper on the Common Market negotiations before mid-July.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I would refer my right hon Friend to the statement by my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister on 17th June:- (Vol 819 c 643-5).
Mr Lane: If things go well in Luxembourg this week, as may of us hope, and if the Giovernment then decide to recommend British entry, will my right hon Friend ensure that the White Paper devotes plenty of spece to the alternatives and makes clear that no practical alternative will offer such good prospects, both economic and political, as membership of an enlarged Community?
Sir Alec Douglas-Home: I have never made it a secret than I cannot see an alternative which would offer as good a prospect for this country as joining the EEC.
21. Miss Lestor asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what progress has been made in discussions involving the acceptability of overseas workers in this country as Community workers with the European Economic Community in the event of Great Britain joining.
Mr Antony Royle: We are clarifying in discussion with the Community the definition of British national for the purposes of the provisions of the European Economic Community on freedom of movement of labour. Its reactions to our proposals are awaited.
Miss Lester: Bearing in mind that the answer is similar to the answer that we have been receiving during the last year from the Prime Minister and the Home Secretary during the passage of the Commonwelath Immigration Bill, may I ask the right hon Gentleman to confirm one thing: Namely, that Commonwealth and other workers from overseas in this country who are citizens of this country will be acceptable as Community workers, and that those who are eligible to take up citizenship if they wish to be accepted as Community workers would be well advised to do so?
Mr Royle: I never like to disappoint the right hon Lady and I am sorry that I should have disappointed her this afternoon. The facts are that we are waiting the details of our proposals to be agreed with the Community and until these are.
21st June 1971
*U Mr Peter Trew (Dartford): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will ensure that the White Paper on the terms for entry into the European Economic Community refers specifically to the degree of Great Britain's commitment to initiatives for closer co-operation which go beyond the scope of the Treaty of Rome.
No 17
SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME
I would ask my honourable Friend to await the White Paper that we are about to issue.
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION The draft reply should reach the
for ORAL answer on 21st June 1971 Parliamentary Office through your
Under-Secretary by Noon Monday
*U Mr Peter Trew (Dartford): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will ensure that the White Paper on the terms for entry into the European Economic Community refers specifically to the degree of Great Britain's commitment to initiatives for closer co-operation which go beyond the scope of the Treaty of Rome.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home (his signature)
I would ask my hon Friend to await the White Paper that we are about to issue.
REFERENCE
Flag A 17 June Vol 819 Cols. 643-645
NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES
INITIATIVES FOR CLOSER COOPERATION WHICH GO BEYOND THE TREATY OF ROME
These are, principally, our participation in moves by the Community towards economic and monetary cooperation and our participation in political consultations resulting from the Davignon Report.
ECONOMIC AND MONETARY COOPERATION
A decision of the Council of Ministers of the EEC of 9th February 1971 laid down the steps to be taken in the first of three stages towards eventual economic and monetary cooperation. These include technical measures to reduce margins of fluctuation between currencies, consultations on economic policies and coordination of central bank monetary policies.
THE EFFECT OF THE DOLLAR/DEUTSCHMARK CRISIS
Owing to the Dollar/Deutschmark crisis at the beginning of May the implementation of measures to reduce margins of fluctuation between currencies has been postponed.
IMPLEMNTATION OF SECOND AND THIRD STAGE
No specific timetable has been agreed for the second and third stages. As a Member of the enlarged Community, we will be able to take a full and equal part in the discussions which must precede the introduction of these stages.
MONETARY UNION AND "ALIGNMENT"
Progress towards closer monetary cooperation may be difficult, and there may be setbacks, but I am confident there will be developments in this direction. It would therefore be appropriate and right to have discussion on the question of progressive "alignment" of policies after we become members of the Community.
ARTICLE 108 OF THE TREATY
If any member country of the enlarged Community (including the United Kingdom) were to require financial assistance under Article 108 for whatever cause, the case would in the first instance be examined by the Community institutions concerned. Assistance might then be furnished either through the facilities of the Community itself or internationally. There is no difference outstanding between us and the Community on this matter.
POLITAL CONSULTATION
As a result of the Davignon Report, Foreign Ministers of the Six meet at 6-monthly intervals with a view to discussing and coordinating their foreign policies. The applicant countries have been associated with this development in a parallel series of meetings of the Ten Foreign Ministers. As hon Members will know, I have taken part in 2 very successful meetings in the latter series. After enlargement we expect the 2 series of meetings to be merged.
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTIONS The draft reply should reach the Parliamentary
Office through your Under-Secretary by
Noon Monday 14/6
For Oral answer on 21st June 1971
*U Mr Peter Trew (Dartford): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he will ensure that the White Paper on the terms for entry into the European Economic Community refers specifically to the degree of Great Britain's commitment to initatives for closer co-operation which go beyond the scope of the Treaty of Rome.
Sir Alec Douglas-Home (his signature)
I would ask my hon. friend to await the White Paper that we are about to issue.
REFERENCE
Flag A 17 June Vol 819 Cols 643-645
What is the significance of 108?
Under this article if any member state is in balance of payments difficulties the Community will decide how to help. There was some question at one time of our agreeing to forego this July.
21st June 1971
*U Mr Carol Mather (Esher): to ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to what extent amendment to the Treaty of Rome is now considered necessary by Her Majesty's Government.
NO 15
SIR ALEC DOUGLAS-HOME
Her Majesty's Government acepts the Treaty of Rome and the decisions flowing from it, subject to the agreements reached and to be reached in the negotiations. On enlargement of the Community the Treaty of Rome needs certain technical amendments necessary to provide for the additional membership.
REFERENCES
Flag A Cmnd 4401
NOTES FOR SUPPLEMENTARIES
ACCEPTANCE OF THE TREATY OF ROME
In our opening statement to the Communities in June last year we made it clear that we accept the Treaties of the Communities and the decisions flowing from them subject to matters to be covered in the negotiations.
WHAT AMENDMENTS TO THE TREATY ARE ENVISAGED?
It would, for example, be necessary to amend the Articles of the Treaty of Rome relating to the institutions of the Community to accomodate representation from new members.
PRESENTING THE RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS TO PARLIAMENT
I would refer hon Members to the statement last Thursday by my rt hon Friend the Prime Minister.
REFERENDUM
We have always made it plain that it is Parliament's responsibility to decide this issue as it is to deide other issues in international relations.
69 Written Answers 15 June
FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS
European Economic Community
Mr Marten asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether, in view of the negotiations over the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement and Great Britain's entry into the European Economic Community, he will state what quantity of sugar was imported into Holland from the Dutch dependency of Surinam in 1968, and what is the quantity for 1971: and if he will make a statement giving the reasons for the reduction.
Mr Rippon: Figures from international sources show that the Netherlands imported 7,182 metric tons of raw sugar from Surinam in 1968. No figure can yet be quoted for 1971. Under arrangements agreed with the European Economic Community, it is understood that the Netherlands have the right to import, free of levy, 4,000 tons of raw sugar per year until 1974 from Surinam but reports indicate Surinam's exports of sugar may be seriously reduced in 1971 due to damage to cane by pests.
Mr Chichester-Clark asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (1) whether he is satisfied by the Commission and the Six Member Countries of the European Economic Community are aware of the special problems which would arise in relation to Northern Ireland if the United Kingdom were to enter the European Economic Community: and if he will make a statement.
(2) what part of the special economic problems of Northern Ireland will play in the decision of Her Majesty's Government to accept or reject terms of entry to the European Economic Community.
Mr Rippon: The decision whether to enter the Community will be taken in the light of the advantages secured for the United Kingdom as a whole, having regard to the interests of all areas, inclduing Northern Ireland. In our negotiations with the Community, we are taking full account of those interests.
Mr Moate asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what consultations have taken place on the constitutional and financial position of the Isle of Man if Great Britain should join the European Economic Community: and if he will make a statement.
Mr Rippon: There has been full consultation with representatives of the Isle of Man Government covering all the implications for the Island of United Kingdom entry into the European Economic Community. We expect to have discussions with the Six very shortly on arrangements which will best meet the wishes and needs of the Isle of Man.
Mr Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs why, in the event of Parliament approving the instruments of accession to the Treaties of the Communities, he will not propose in the accompanying legislation that the House of Commons should be able to renounce membership on behalf of the United Kingdom at any future date.
Mr Rippon: In legislation to give effect to a treaty in this country, it is neither usual or appropriate to provide for the termination of our international obligations under the treaty.
Mr Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether the present practice of proposals being made by the Commission and Ministers to the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community being confidential and unquestionable by the House of Commons or its Members will continue on present known terms if Great Britain enters the Common Market.
Mr Rippon: Hon Members will continue to be free to question Ministers about proprosals in the European Economic community as they affect the United Kingdom.
Mr Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs whether he will make a statement on the recent official visit to Great Britain of Mr Don Dunstan, the Prime Minister of South Australia: what discussion he had with him concerning Great Britain's entry into the European Economic Community; and what was
Date 15 June
Col 70
Vol 819
14th June 1971
1a. Mr Arthur Lewis (West Ham, North): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, why, in the event of accession to the Treaties of the Communities, he will not propose in the accompanying legislation that the House of Commons should be able to renounce membership on behalf of the United Kingdom at any future date.
NO 38W
MR GEOFFREY RIPPON
In legislation to give effect to a treaty in this country, it is neither usual nor appropriate to provide for the termination of our international obligations under the treaty.
14th June 1971
La. Mr Arthur Lewis (West Ham, North) : To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, why in the event of Parliament approving the instruments of accession to the Treaties of the Communities, he will not propose in the accompanying legislation, that the House of Commons should be able to renounce membership on behalf of the United Kingdom at any future date.
NO 32W
MR GEOFFREY RIPPON
In legislation to give effect to a treaty in this country, it is neither usual nor appropriate to provide for the termination of our international obligations under the treaty.
Reference
Flag A Article 240 of the Treaty of Rome
Mr Ford
Parliamentary Unit
I Submit a draft reply for the Chancellor of the Cuchy of Lancaster to use in answering a question from Mr Arthur Lewis which asks why, in the event of Parliament approving the instruments of accession to the Treaties of the Communities, he will not propose in the accompanying legislation that the House of Commons should be able to renounce membership on behalf of the United Kingdom at a future date.
The question is for oral answer on 14 June, but will not be taken orally.
The draft answer has been cleared with the Legal Advisers.
A.H.Brind
11 June 1971
71 Written Answers 15 June 1971
the attitude and view of the South Australian Prime Minister as expressed to him on this subject.
Mr Rippon: My right hon. Friend received Mr Dunstan on 25th May. In the part of their discussion which related to the European Economic Community, Mr Dunstan expressed fears for South Australia's export trade with the United Kingdom in certain goods and commodities. My right hon. Friend cited the overall buoyancy of the australian economy and explained that the effects of European Economic community entry (which could affect only a small proportion of Australia's export earnings) would be spread over five to eight years.
Mr Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to what extent, if Great Britain joins the European Economic Community, the implementation of Article 189 of the Treat of Rome will enable the British House of Commons to pray for the annulment of orders made by the Council of Ministers.
Mr Rippon: Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome defines the effect of regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions of the Council of Ministers and the Commission of the European Economic Community in Member States. If Parliament approves an Instrument of Acession to the European Communities, its powers in relation to acts of the Council and Commission will be exercised in the light of this article.
Mr Arthur Lewis asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs why he has agreed in principle to the European Economic community countries having the same freedom of capital movements as applied to the countries of the sterling area on Great Britain's entry into the Community: and whether he will make a statement.
Mr Rippon: We have proposed that we should comply by the end of the transitional period, with the obligations of the Community concerning movements of capital within an enlarged Community. I will report to the House on the outcome of the negotiations with the Community on this matter as soon as they are concluded.
India and Pakistan.
Mr Carter-Jones asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how much financial help has now been given by her Majesty's Government towards supporting India with the cost of maintaining refugees from East Pakistan now in India: what additional help he proposes to give in the next six months: and if he will make a statement.
Mr Anthony Royle: I would refer the hon Member to my right hon. Friend's statements to the House on 8th and 9th of June. Her Majesty's Government made an immediate contribution of £1 million to the United Nation's Secretary-General's Appeal Fund for the Refugees. We are also contributing £750,000 in the form of food aid through the World Food Programme. We are making available a total of £250,000 to meet the cost of Royal Air Force and charter flights and the cost of saline solution, syringes and vaccines, which have enabled the British charities to give immediate help to the Indian authorities. Of this amount £177,000 has already been committed. supplementary provision for £250,000 will be sought in due course and, if necessary, an advance will be made in the meantime from the Contingencies Fund. This sum includes the amount of £18,000 which I notified to the House on 11th May.
We are ready to consider further contributions to the relief effort, but it is not possible yet to forecast what may be needed over the next six months. (Vol 818 c 862-4 1066-70; Vol 817 c 206-7.)
Mr Carter-Jones asked the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs how much financial help has been given by the United Nations in assisting India with the cost of maintaining refugees from East Pakistan now in India: what additional help he expects to be given by the United Nations in the next six months: and if he will make a statement.
Mr Anthony Royle: Our latest information is that about $30 million has been contributed by Governments to U Thant's appeal for the refugees. $500,000 has been made available by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees. £400,000 in kind by U.N.I.C.E.F and
*La. Mr Arthur Lewis (West Ham, North): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to what extent, if Great Britain joins the European Economic Community, the implementation of Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome will enable the British House of Commons to pray for the anulment of orders made by the Council of Ministers.
Mr Geoffrey Rippon
Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome defines the effect of regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions of the Council of Ministers and the Commission of the EEC in Member states. If Parliament approves an Instrument of Accession to the European communties, its powers in rleation to acts of the Council and Commission will be exercised in the light of this article.
(Reference
Flag A27 May Vol 818 Col 220W)
Mr Ford
Parliamentary Unit
1. I submit a draft reply for the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster to use in answering a Question from Mr Arthur Lewis which asked to what extent, if Great Britain joins the European Economic Community, the implementation of Article 189 of the Treaty of Rome will enable the British House of Commons to pray for the annulment of orders made by the Council of Ministers.
2. The Question is for oral answer on 14 June, but will not be taken orally.
3. The Question arises out of an answer given to Mr Lewis on 27 May.
4. The draft answer has been cleared with the Legal Advisers.
A.H.BRIND
11 June 1971
PARLIAMENTARY QUESTION The draft reply should the Parliamentary
for Oral answer on 17 June 1971 Office through your Under-Secretary by
Noon Monday 14/6
*II Mr Roger Moate (Faversham): To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, whether he is satisfied with the co-ordination between Government departments in making the appropriate studies of those of the approximately 3,000 regulations issued by the Commissioner of the European Economic community that would need to become law in this country if Great Britain were to join the Community.
(Hand written comment)
This question has now been withdraw. We do not know why - possibly because Mr Moate realises that now it has been transferred from the PM's list to EEC, he stands no chance of getting an oral answer. It may therefore reappear at a later date.
From Robert S Redmond T.D., M.P.
House of Commons
London SW
10th June 1971
Dear Albert
I have had a query submitted to me from my constituency about the Common Market and the position of the law if we join.
This constituent asks that if he offended against Common Market law in connection with his business activites, would be be prosecuted under Common Market Law or under our own law. I do not know whether this point has been worked out but I should be grateful for your comments.
Yours sincerely
Bob
A.P.Costain Esq. M.P.
The duchy of Lancaster
Lancaster Place. Strand. W.C.2
Legal Advisors
M. de Winton Esq
Law Officers Department
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand WC2 8 June 1971
I am enclosing a fair draft of the Factsheet on Sovereignty, as it resulted from our meeting yesterday afternoon. We are submitting this draft to Ministers within the Foreign Office, and I should be grateful if you could at the same time seek the views of the Law Officers on it. As you will know from what was said at yesterday's meeting, the drafts must be finally cleared by the evening of 9 June, and I very much hope that it will be possible for this timetable, which is dictated by Ministerial requirements, to be kept.
A.D.Watts
Encl.
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