Friday, 21 September 2012


Missiles Will Fall on Tel Aviv”

Things that may or may not happen in the coming year: A US attack in Iran,the abduction of an IDF soldier, Assad will leave the stage, and IMI will finally be privatized. An annual defense forecast.
Amir Rapaport 21/9/2012


http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=483&ArticleID=1653


With the start of the new Jewish year, here is an up-to-date defense 
forecast concerning some of the important developments that will be relevant 
in the coming year, which is being called by the IDF Chief of Staff as “a 
decisive year.”

“Israel will attack Iran”: low likelihood. A barking dog doesn’t bite, and 
in previous times when Israel attacked the nuclear reactors of hostile 
countries, in Iraq and (according to foreign publications) in Syria, it did 
not threaten, but simply carried them out. This is not the case when it 
comes to Iran. When Meir Dagan, former head of Mossad, finds it appropriate 
to warn against the potential effectiveness of an independent Israeli strike 
and its consequences, it probably isn't without reason, even if long after 
having concluded his service.

“The US will attack Iran”: medium to high likelihood. However, when 
examining the list of possibilities, this is the most likely option. The US 
has interests of its own in preventing Iran from reaching nuclear weapons 
(more than a commitment to Israel). However, on the other hand, assuming 
that US President Obama, a recipient of the Nobel award for peace, is 
reelected, there is also a possibility that Iran will not be attacked at 
all. Another possible scenario: in March, after the Iranians enrich 250 
kilograms of uranium to a level of 20%, they will announce the halting of 
the nuclear program, thus removing the core component behind an attack 
against them, and even from the continuation of the sanctions. The rest of 
the route towards a bomb (which would be short) will be carried out 
covertly, far from the prying eyes of the IAEA.

“War will erupt with Hezbollah”: medium likelihood. Both Israel and 
Hezbollah have no interest in going for another round of combat in the 
coming year. However, a war could erupt due to the developments in Syria or 
in Iran, or due to an Israeli decision to prevent the transfer of strategic 
weapons from the crumbling Syria to Nasrallah in Lebanon at any cost.

“There will be another round of combat with the organizations in Gaza, and 
rockets will be launched towards southern towns”: high likelihood. The 
question is only with regards to the scope of the combat.

“An IDF soldier will be abducted”: medium likelihood. Every Palestinian 
organization understood from the Gilad Shalit affair that in the bottom 
line, abductions are worthwhile. The IDF launched a campaign warning the 
soldiers against the next abduction attempts, but it is doubtful if that 
will help prevent the next abduction.

“Bashar Assad will fall”: high likelihood. It is truly difficult to see how 
the Syrian president can survive the next year in power. It is a reasonable 
possibility that he will seek shelter in Russia. The bigger question is who 
will rule Syria after his departure. It seems that it will not be the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Syria is a much more secular country than Egypt), but Al-Qaeda 
and Iran are already preparing on their part in order to sort the matter, in 
their way.

“The peace agreement with Egypt will be cancelled”: low likelihood. At this 
stage, the Muslim Brotherhood has no interest in announcing the cancellation 
of the agreement and entering a direct confrontation with the US, though it 
will continue targeting its clauses. However, the IDF must already treat the 
agreement as though it does not exist with regards to the force build-up for 
the range of the next five years.

“The IDF will hit the road with the new ‘Oz’ perennial plan”: low 
likelihood. A plan named Oz has indeed been approved by the General Staff 
for the years 2013-2017 (its main elements were revealed in previous weeks 
in this column). However, it is doubtful if the plan will be budgeted, as 
the Israeli budget for 2013 will not be approved and the Knesset will 
apparently disperse towards elections in the first half of the year. In any 
case, the Oz plan is not revolutionary, but more or less represents a 
continuation of the existing situation.

“Relations with Turkey will be restored”: low likelihood. This represents a 
genuine interest for both parties, but the blood that has been spilled 
(literally), and the ideological gaps will prevent the restoration of the 
alliance between the countries, even if the flames lower somewhat. Besides, 
Ankara knows in any case that the road to Washington, in the Obama era, does 
not pass through Jerusalem as was once the case.

"Many Haredim will be recruited to the IDF": low likelihood. Despite the 
cancellation of the Tal Law, the IDF cannot forcefully recruit tens of 
thousands of Yeshiva men (nor does it want to do so). What then? The Haredi 
service courses and the Haredi Nachal will increase here and there, nothing 
more.

"Senior Israeli officials will be assassinated or terror attacks against 
Israeli targets overseas will take place": high likelihood. So long as 
mysterious explosions take place on Iranian soil, Iran and its allies will 
continue to seek revenge, like in the Burgas terror attack.

"A tender will be published for IMI’s privatization": medium likelihood. On 
one hand, the current intent to publish a tender for privatizing IMI by 
January 2013 seems serious, and there is a principle understanding between 
the Ministry of Treasury, the Ministry of Defense, the management and the 
employees. However, we've been in this situation so many times in the past, 
where it seemed as if a tender was imminent, so the current opportunity for 
privatizing IMI may dissipate.


“Missiles will fall on Tel Aviv”: medium likelihood. Whether if because of a 
front in Iran, or against Syria, Hezbollah or the Gaza organizations – 
missiles could definitely fall on Tel Aviv in the coming year, for the first 
time since the First Gulf War in 1991.

“Gadi Aizenkot will be appointed Deputy IDF Chief of Staff”: Medium 
likelihood. This is an appointment that seems the most natural, and has been 
delayed for several months, but it is doubtful that the minister of defense 
will approve it in light of involvement attributed to Aizenkot with regards 
to the Harpaz affair. If it isn't Aizenkot, then the next candidate with the 
best chances for being appointed to the position is Maj. Gen. Avi Mizrahi. 
If he is not chosen, Mizrahi may find himself as the head of the Land 
Division at Elbit Systems, instead of Bezalel Machlis, who will be appointed 
as CEO in March.

Lastly, who will be the next Chief of Staff after Gantz? The next deputy 
chief of staff, whoever it might be, will have considerable chances. 
However, the chances of the current deputy, Maj. Gen. Yair Naveh, should not 
be ruled out, nor the chances of the current Head of the Northern Command, 
Yair Golan. Another possibility: Maj. Gen. (Res.) Yoav Galant. Don't be 
surprised if he comes back to the IDF (if Ehud Barak remains the Minister of 
Defense after the next elections).
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