SECURITY NEWS -OCTOBER 7-8
Our military is a reservist-based organization and a substantial percentage
of the personnel expected to man C3 systems will be reservists. The notion that they will be able to ‘command’ any C3 system very easily, as they belong to a different generation that adapts to changes – the information generation – is wrong. I intend to freeze the configuration, as I feel that we are chasing the tail of application refinements.The Objective in Real TimeMaj. Gen. Uzi Moscovitch, the Head of the IDF’s C4I Branch, outlines the main challenges his division faces and the IDF’s primary plans for communications and computersIsraelDefense 8/10/2012
At the 2012 Fire Conference on Air and Land Jointness in a Complex
Environment, Maj. Gen. Uzi Moscovitch, head of the IDF’s C4I Branch, went
into great detail concerning the future challenges his division faces, along
with future plans and his visions for improving the directorate.
Appointed head of the IDF’s C4I Branch about six months ago, Moscovitch
first served in a number of positions in the Armored Corps, ranging from
ground trooper to division commander. Most recently, Moscovitch headed a
strategic workshop at C4I that shaped the branch's objectives for the coming
years.
Moscovitch began by explaining that the most significant challenge of today
is “acquiring technologies that would enable us to convey a precise map
reference from the weapon sight and superimpose it accurately on a tactical
aid or on a mapping layer, so that it may be addressed as a target.”
“Numerous complexities are involved here – flat, curved, and different
viewing angles. We have projects and start-ups, and this field is possibly
the most significant challenge for us. What we need is a precise and
standardized map reference – a 10-digit resolution as a minimum reference
and a 12-digit resolution as a desirable objective. In an era of urban
warfare, if you do not operate in a world of precise map references, there
will be operational implications.”
According to Moscovitch, the operational challenge in the field of command,
control, and communication systems (C3) is that “every operational C3 system
should support each one of the five primary efforts. These five efforts
include intelligence, logistics, command and domination, situational
awareness and command, and maneuvering and employment of firepower.
Everything associated with the employment of firepower and the ability to
process, fuse, and filter intelligence data is important, and more should be
invested in it than in the logistics element. I do not take logistics
lightly, it is important that we know what our inventory levels are and what
our status is now and in the future. Still, the main idea is that the C3
systems should support all of the elements I pointed out.
“As far as the issue of situational awareness and command is concerned,
there are essential prerequisites for operational C3 systems that constitute
the base layer of any system. In a world where everyone uses a smartphone,
knowing the situational picture of our own forces first may sound trivial,
but in the tactical medium and in an urban area, it is by no means a simple
task. In addition, we have yet to mention enemy forces, which do not give
away their positions voluntarily. While it may sound rudimentary, in
operations such as Cast Lead, the demand is for a detailed status picture of
our own forces. This has implications on the aspect of communication
networks and end units.
“In the field of firepower employment, the world is replete with mapping
technologies as well as standards. The world is evolving, as there are
substantial civilian incentives pushing the field forward. As far as our C3
systems are concerned, at the right time, a decision should be made
regarding the technology and standards that need to be adopted for the next
three to four years. This involves a major risk, and therefore, the
estimated assimilation time needs to be determined – in addition as to
whether it is a good time. This decision incorporates a sort of built-in
frustration: as you make your decision and set your goals for a specific
period, you know that the world will continue to move forward, and that in a
few years, you will be lagging behind.
“The essential prerequisites for operational C3 systems are identification
and recognition capabilities for blue and red – friend or foe – on the same
system. Once again, it may sound simple and trivial, but it is part of the
basics.
“Additionally, we need the ability of conference-type communication at the
communication and application level between the various service branches
within a given arm. Within every arm, each arm-specific system was developed
at a different time using different technologies and different interfaces.
One of the most significant challenges involves the ability to connect and
interface those systems. The systems should address the six primary efforts
previously outlined.
“The communication medium should be both reliable and adequate. The mobile
abilities will never match the standard of the stationary abilities. Anyone
carrying a smartphone in their pocket does not carry a telephone, but
instead, a transceiver. When radio systems are the issue, the conflict for
the planner is between bandwidth and power. For a military radio system, you
must add encoding and immunity. This leads to a complex scientific
undertaking. It is tempting to think that by tomorrow morning, everyone can
have iPad-like sets at the individual troop level. Though it appears to be
simple, in reality, it is very complex.
“Another prerequisite is operating simplicity. Here, there is a chance for
an immediate clash with commercial interests. We have a tendency to
constantly refine our applications. The manufacturing firms want to do it
and so do we, but in our operational C3 systems, we have reached a situation
in which I will do whatever I can to freeze the configuration to the maximum
extent possible. Our military is a reservist-based organization and a
substantial percentage of the personnel expected to man C3 systems will be
reservists. The notion that they will be able to ‘command’ any C3 system
very easily, as they belong to a different generation that adapts to
changes – the information generation – is wrong. I intend to freeze the
configuration, as I feel that we are chasing the tail of application
refinements. As far as the cost-to-benefit ratio between refinement and
assimilation is concerned, I believe that we are at an imbalanced point.
“Generally, the first level of C3 systems is for the stationary command
posts: we have been there in reasonable form for a period of almost 20
years. A vital trail accompanied developments in the field of accurate fire
and intelligence. We have experienced some assimilation difficulties, but
the items that we have outnumber the items we don’t have.
“In principle, the three primary arms (land, air, and intelligence) have C3
systems that were developed at different times using different technologies.
We link these systems to fulfill the prerequisites that are essential for an
operational C3 system.
“In this layer of C3 systems, communication is not a problem. The
operational process works by identifying and defining the enemy, or spotting
a potential target, which is defined by a land C3 system. This goes to a hub
located somewhere in the rear, within our stationary hub. From there, it
goes to a place located further back, and finally it reaches the GHQ-level
system, out of which it may be disseminated to other systems.
“We have a few doubts regarding our development trends for the next 4-5
years. Our primary mission will be to verify how we can accept the changes –
the highly significant developments expected from these manufacturers.
"The second level is tactical connectivity. We are already in an era where
there are many sensors and a lot of information and intelligence on the
ground. We want to reach a state where we would be able to convey data
records between combat platforms, particularly between land and air. I am
not referring to a direct voice link. The question here is how to transmit
the data records produced from the air to the ground or vice versa. Within
all of this, we should connect whatever we are capable of producing in the
rear to our stationary echelon.
"The process is very similar to what I presented before, with one
significant difference: here there are no hubs – the land element does not
transmit to some land hub located in a rear-area command post or GHQ – it
all takes place between one platform and another. We expect to have a
tactical, mobile, ad-hoc internet network. Each of these characteristics has
its own complexity and linking all three together is highly complex. This is
one of the three significant things we intend to do in the coming years.
“Two operational developments are under way, and both are intertwined. We
need to take an irregular enemy entity and peel off its layers. The process
that should take place is a spectral peeling of the enemy. Some of these
capabilities are futuristic while others already exist. This will lead to
flooding information systems with data, and that phenomenon will only
intensify. A need arises for the assistance of operational expert systems.
Around the world, such systems are addressed mainly by marketing elements.
The military world does not have a commercial incentive. The potential
clients are the few modern militaries that possess the appropriate systems
and the appropriate precision weaponry. At C4I, together with the IDF’s
ground forces, we have major software houses. I hereby call on anyone who
may benefit from it. This is the direction we intend to take."
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Tuesday, 9 October 2012
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